Technology, Trust, and Religion by Drees, Willem
A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C 
G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G 
A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A 
C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C 
T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A 
G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A 
C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T 
T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G 
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C 
G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G 
C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G 
C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T 
A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A 
T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G 
T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A 
C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C 
C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T 
G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G 
A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C 
C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T 
A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G 
A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G 
T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C 
G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C 
C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A 
G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T 
G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T 
T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C 
A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C 
G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G 
A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A 
C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C 
T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A 
G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A 
C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T 
T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G 
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C 
G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G 
C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G 
C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T 
A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A 
T  G  C  C  G  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C 
C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A 
G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T 
G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T 
T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  T  T 
A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  
G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  
A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  
C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  
T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  T  A  
G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  G  A  
C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  G  T  
T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  C  G  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C  G  T  T  A  G  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  A  C A  T  G  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  C  C  G  T  T  
A  A  C  C  T  G  A   C  T  G  A  C A  
T  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  G  A  C  C  G  
T  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  C  C  T  G  A  
C A  C  C  T  G  A  T  T  A  G  A  C  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  G  A  C  C  T  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C  G  T  T  A  G  
A  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  C  G  G  A  C  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  C  C  G  T  T  
A  A  C  C  T  G  A   T  A  G  C  G  G  
A  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  T  G  C  C  G  
T  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  T  T  A  G  C  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  C A  T  G  C  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  T  G  A  C A  T  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  
T  A  C  C  T  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C 
A  A  C  C  T  G  A  T  A  G  A  C  C  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  A  C  C  T  G  
A  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  T  T  A  G  A  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A   C  G  G  A  C  C  
T  A  C  C  T  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  G  C  G  G  A  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  T  G  C  C  G  T  
T  A  C  C  T  G  A  T  T  A  G  C  G  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  C  
G  A  C  C  T  G  A   C  G  T  T  A  G  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  G  A  C A  T  G  
C  A  C  C  T  G  A  A  C  C  G  T  T  
A  G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  
T  G  C  C  G  T  G  A  C A  T  G  C  
C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  T  A  
G  C  G  G  A  C  C  T  G  A  C A  T  
G  C  C  G  T  T  A  G  A  C  C  G  T  





   Religions in Controversies  
on Ecology and the Modification  
  of Life   Edited by
   Willem B. Drees
l e i d e n  u n i v e r s i t y  p r e s s
W
hat does it mean to be human in a world of technology? 
What could be the role of religion in responding to the 
ecological crisis? Should we be concerned about the ge-
netic modification of food, and even of ourselves? Who 
do we trust to make decisions regarding our common future? What do 
we use our technology for? These are not questions for experts only. 
How can the wider public be involved? Do experts and the general public 
trust each other sufficiently? Or is the public ignorant, in the eyes of 
the scientists? And are too many engineers narrow minded, according 
to the general public? The contributors to this timely and necessary 
volume address expertise, trust, and engagement, as we consider our 
technological condition, religious resources for the ecological crisis, 
biotechnology, and matters of trust between scientists and the general 
public. With contributions from leading scholars in the field, includ-
ing Bronislaw Szerszynski from Lancaster (UK) and James Miller from 
Queen’s University, Canada, and younger scholars from the Nether-
lands, Belgium, the UK, Canada and the USA, this book will captivate a 
range of readers interested in cultural, social, and spiritual aspects of 
our technological age.
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 Preface and Acknowledgements
Technology is a major dimension of human existence, and a major force for 
change, for better or for worse. Ecological concerns have become promi-
nent in the last decades. They thus become issues of human concern and 
of human values – issues that merit religious reflection, and thus also 
trigger reflections on the role of religions in modern, secular and pluralist 
societies, where the appeal to traditions has been challenged.
 In the context of the programme The Future of the Religious Past by 
NWO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, a project 
was funded on religion, ecology and technology. The project is titled Mis-
placed Vocabularies: Scientific and Religious Notions in Public Discourses 
on Ecology and Genetics. The principal researcher of the project is Willem 
B. Drees, professor of philosophy of religion and ethics at Leiden Univer-
sity. As a postdoctoral fellow in this project, Tony Watling surveyed the 
multireligious literature on ecology. The project also encompasses a PhD 
project by Olga Crapels on religion in public discourses on genetics.
 Drees, Watling, Crapels, and Taede Smedes, another postdoctoral fel-
low working on religion and science, formerly at Leiden University, or-
ganized a conference on religion, technology and public concern, which 
was held at Leiden University, the Netherlands, in October 2006. Several 
essays from this symposium were selected for this volume. In the edito-
rial process, Drees received extensive assistance from Renée Reitsma, a 
masters student in the philosophy of religion, and John Flanagan, a Ph. D. 
candidate in Old Testament Studies, both at the Faculty of Religious Stud-
ies of Leiden University, now the Leiden Institute for Religious Studies. 
The conference, their careful editorial help, and the publication of this 
volume has been made possible by the grant from NWO, the Netherlands 
 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Organization for Scientific Research. Drees is also grateful to the Cen-
ter of Theological Inquiry, Princeton, USA, where he was the J. Houston 
Witherspoon Fellow for Theology and the Natural Sciences in 2008-2009, 
while completing the editorial work on this book.
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 Technology, Trust, and Religion
Willem B. Drees
We live in a technological culture. Our identities and our responsibili-
ties, our hopes, dreams, and nightmares are all shaped by rapidly evolving 
technology and its impact on our environment. What is it to be human if 
we are dependent upon technological artifacts and systems? What con-
cepts of ‘the natural’ and ‘the sacred’ are invoked by the accusation of 
‘playing God’? Will technology transform our religious and humanistic 
traditions? And will our traditions shape our technological culture? What 
is the role of religion in relation to public concerns about technology? 
Is religion a brake upon technological possibilities, a valuable guide that 
might helps us in the choices we face, or, is religion itself in flux, slowly 
adapting to new powers?
 Are we destroying our natural habitat with biotechnology, or with civil 
engineering and human greed? Does the ecological crisis call for more re-
fined technology, or should we change our behaviour and values instead? 
What role might there be for religious traditions in responding to the eco-
logical crisis? And should we be concerned about our abilities to modify 
living beings: crops, animals, and even ourselves? How might we reflect 
upon the challenges that have arisen?
 Last but not least, how should we make decisions about our common 
future, in light of ecological challenges and new technologies? And who 
should make these decisions: scientists and engineers, since they possess 
expert knowledge? Or are they too narrow minded, concentrating on their 
inventions as if they were children playing with new toys? What do we 
use our technology for? This does not seem to be a question reserved for 
experts only. How can the general public be involved? Can it work with 
the experts? Do these two groups trust each other? Is the public ignorant, 
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in the perspective of the scientists? Or are the engineers too narrowly 
focused, in the eyes of the general public? Matters of trust, expertise and 
involvement need to be addressed again and again.
 These are the issues we will address in this volume: our technologi-
cal condition (part one), religious resources for the ecological crisis (part 
two), biotechnology (part three) and matters of trust between scientists 
and the general public (part four). In this introductory chapter I’ll offer 
some preliminary reflections on these issues, especially on our techno-
logical condition, while arguing for a positive appreciation of our techno-
logical abilities ‘to play God’.
 Religion in an Age of Technology
Th e standard view of technology’s place in relation to ‘religion and science’ 
can be illustrated well with the titles of two books by Ian Barbour: Religion 
in an Age of Science and Ethics in an Age of Technology. Th is may seem an 
obvious pair of titles, but it is nonetheless a particular and consequential 
way of dividing the fi eld; I owe this observation to Ron Cole-Tuner in a pri-
vate conversation when these books had just appeared. Why not Religion 
in an Age of Technology? And does the absence of Ethics in an Age of Sci-
ence, to take the fourth combination of the pairs {science, technology} and 
{religion, ethics}, imply that there is no moral issue in relation to scientifi c 
knowledge, but that one exists in relation to technological applications?
 The underlying issue is in part the understanding of ‘science’. There is 
substantial interest in the religious implications of cosmology and fun-
damental physics – our attempts to understand the nature and origins 
of physical reality. Furthermore, there are many books on religion and 
evolutionary biology, on our understanding of the natural history of our 
world. In focusing on cosmology and natural history, we deal with as-
pects of reality that we may seek to understand but (being history) cannot 
change. But science is not only about understanding reality. Science is 
also about transforming reality. That may not be obvious when cosmology 
is our prime example, but it is clear when one thinks of chemistry – with 
its roots in alchemistic practices, seeking to purify reality by transforming 
elements. Disciplines such as the material sciences are clear examples of 
this active, reality-transforming side of science, rather than of science as 
the quest to understand reality.
 The case for including engineering among the sciences has become 
far more serious over time, with a fundamental transition somewhere in 
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the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries during the rise of chemistry and 
the control of electromagnetism. Modern technology is interwoven with 
science; the computer would not be possible without the understanding 
provided by quantum physics, and genetic engineering depends on un-
derstanding the double helix of DNA – and vice versa: progress in under-
standing depends upon progress in construction.
 The underlying issue is in part also the understanding of ‘religion’. If 
the interest in religion, in the context of ‘religion and science’, is defined 
by an apologetic interest in arguing for the plausibility of the existence 
of God as ‘the best explanation’ of reality and its order, then the prime 
interest in science for the understanding of reality it aspires to offer. 
But religious traditions not only fulfil such an ‘explanatory’ function, 
they also often have an evocative function and a transformative interest 
– they call people to work for a better world or to work for this world 
in a better way, by seeking to liberate beings from bondage. Such libera-
tionist theologies certainly should have an interest in the way we hu-
mans transform reality, for better or for worse. Cosmologically oriented 
theologies and worldviews also need to accommodate the fact that our 
world turns out to be as flexible and as malleable as technology reveals 
it to be.
 Dimensions of Technology
When speaking about technology, most people at first refer to devices 
such as the telephone, the car, and the refrigerator. We live in the midst of 
such technological artifacts, machines, as materially present entities. But 
technology is more. These devices cannot function without infrastruc-
ture. Think of telephone lines, electricity, and gas stations, and behind 
those, more infrastructure: refineries, ships and pipelines, oil wells – and 
there the sequence ends, as the oil deep down in the ground is not itself 
a product of human technological activity. That is where we touch upon 
natural resources, at the beginning of the line. And in using oil as fuel we 
also have to get rid of excess heat and waste products, and thus need not 
only a well but also sinks to get rid of what we do not use, which generates 
ecological problems for the atmosphere and the soil.
 Technology is also a social system, for the kind of actions it requires and 
for the services it provides. And technology depends on skills (and thus on 
educational systems) as much as on hardware. Highly technical medical 
disciplines such as surgery are certainly also about technical skills of the 
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humans involved. And skills are also involved for ordinary people; driving 
a car is a technical skill.
 So far, I have referred to two ‘layers’ of technology: the material mani-
festations of technology in devices and infrastructure, and the social, hu-
man dimension of organization and skills. There is a third layer when 
we consider the psychological level. We can also consider particular at-
titudes to be ‘technological’. It refers to a way of life in which a problem 
– whether it’s a leaking roof, an illness, or a miscommunication – is not 
the end of a story, to be accepted as a fact of life, but rather perceived as 
a problem to be addressed. An active attitude, sitting down to analyse a 
problem in order to solve it by practical means, is part of our lives. To us 
this is such a self-evident part of our lives that we may find it hard to un-
derstand cultures in which a tragic or fatalistic attitude is more common. 
The ‘technological attitude’ brings us to a major aspect of some of the 
contributions in this volume: do we wait for God to rescue us, or should 
we do it ourselves? How do we see human action in relation to the wider 
understanding of reality?
 Last but not least, technology is more than devices and infrastruc-
ture, organization, skills, and attitudes. We live in a technological 
culture. Technology pervades and shapes our lives. Antibiotics, sew-
age systems, anti-conception pills, refrigerators, and central heating 
systems are more than new means. Antibiotics and sewage systems 
changed our sense of vulnerability (limiting enormously the number 
of parents who had to bury their own infants). The pill changed rela-
tions between men and women and between parents and their children. 
Thanks to the refrigerator and the microwave we can eat whenever it 
suits us, individually, and each according to his or her taste, and thus 
the common meal as a major characteristic of the day has lost signifi-
cance. Central heating has made the common room with the fireplace 
less important; we can each spend our time in our own rooms in the 
way we like. Technology makes life easier and more attractive; with ste-
reos and iPods, music is available without effort. Such developments 
were considered by the philosopher Albert Borgmann in his Technol-
ogy and the Character of Contemporary Life (1984). His concern is 
that while consumption has become easier, some more demanding but 
meaningful and rich experiences are lost.
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 History of Technology as Cultural History
That technology and culture are intertwined can be made clear by consid-
ering the history of technology as cultural history, and not just as a history 
of inventions (e.g. Diamond 1998; McNeil 1990). In a sense, technology 
has made us human, just as tool making and the ability to make, maintain, 
and use fire are tied up with the emergence of our own species, including 
its social structures. In a more recent past, the transition from copper to 
iron some 1500 years bce changed social structures. Copper was relatively 
rare and thereby created an elite, whereas iron was more widely available 
and thus more democratic; iron, however, required a more demanding 
manufacturing process, which strengthened the emerging division of la-
bor. Interaction between cultures revolved around trade, and thus with 
technologies of transport, production, and use. Agricultural technol ogies 
such as the domestication of animals, the improvement of wheat and oth-
er crops, and much later of farming tools such as the plow increasingly 
allowed for greater production with fewer workers, thus creating the op-
portunity for the emergence of cities.
 In more recent European history, accurate timekeeping and the inven-
tion of the printing press may have been major factors in the transition 
from the medieval to the modern period. The Protestant Reformation 
made good use of the printing press, and in subsequent centuries, new 
labor relations arose due to the introduction of machines. Working with 
machinery owned by the master, installed at premises belonging to the 
master, was the beginning of the factory system. A good example can be 
seen in the shift in location of the production of textiles from the home 
to factories. When textile producers shifted from using water power, with 
locations spread out along the river, to coal, factories were concentrated 
close to the coalfields. In the absence of affordable passenger transport, 
workers had to live nearby, in houses they had to rent from their masters. 
Thus, we see the rise of the major industrial cities, with social arrange-
ments such as regular working hours and standardization.
 The steam machine and the ‘railway mania’ were followed by the free-
dom of internal combustion. What the car has done to social relations is 
enormous: for all commuters, the spheres of home and work were sepa-
rated, and at the same time, the possibility for children to play safely out-
side was diminished. Controlling electrons in the late nineteenth century 
(telephone and electrical light) with subsequent developments in the 
twentieth century (radio and TV, computers and the Internet) added to 
the enormous cultural transformations of our time. As just one indication 
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of how quickly the developments are going: the very first ‘www’-type of 
communication took place between two computers at CERN in Geneva 
on Christmas Day of 1990 (Berners-Lee 2000, 30).
 The way we speak about technological possibilities influences our 
perception of what is happening. Talking about the Internet as creating 
‘cyberspace’ suggests a new domain, floating free and remote from tradi-
tional human activities, as if we are starting all over with a new reality (see 
also the contribution by Karen Pärna, this volume). This language was 
severely criticized by Michael Dertouzos in an essay in 1981 (incorporated 
in Dertouzos 1997,11):
Th e press and most soothsayers tell us we must prepare ourselves to 
enter Cyberspace – a gleaming otherworld with new rules and majestic 
gadgets, full of virtual reality, intelligent agents, multimedia, and much 
more. Baloney! Th e Industrial Revolution didn’t take us into ‘Motorspace’. 
It brought motors into our lives as refrigerators that preserved our food 
and cars that transported us – creations that served human needs. Yes, 
there will be new gadgets, which will be fun to use. But the point is that 
the Information Marketplace will bring useful information technologies 
into our lives, not propel us into some science fi ction universe.
Technology also influences our self-understanding: who has never felt a 
‘huge pressure’? Do you occasionally need ‘to let off steam’? These are 
images from the steam age. We may consider ourselves as made in God’s 
image, but we speak of ourselves as if we were made in the image of ma-
chines. This is not exclusive to the steam age. The early radio receivers 
also left their traces in our language – we need to ‘tune in’ – and comput-
ers and the Internet are modifying our vocabulary and self-understand-
ings right now. How do we appreciate new technologies: as opportunities, 
or as problems?
 Technology: Liberator or Threat?
When technology is seen as a liberator, we may speak of technological 
optimism. We expect positive contributions to human lives from technol-
ogy, contributions that will liberate us from various burdens and increase 
standards of living around the world. We expect a longer and healthier 
life, with more choices for the individual and more spare time as ma-
chines take over various tedious tasks, with better communication (e.g. 
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telephone and Internet) and more direct forms of democracy. There may 
be problems, for instance with the environment, but these problems can 
be resolved by technology. One should not idealize the past; we may want 
to camp outdoors occasionally, but we would not like to be cut off from 
modern medicine when needed.
 Technology may also be seen as a threat to authentic human lives. Tech-
nology promotes uniformity and efficiency, undermines social networks, 
and increases the possibilities for tracing and manipulating individual be-
haviour. Earlier philosophies of technology, for example those of Lewis 
Mumford and Jacques Ellul, tended to be of such a more pessimistic kind. 
More recently, the Unabomber (Chase 2000) and Bill Joy from Sun Micro-
systems can be mentioned as adherents of such a view. The structure of 
their messages is often double, just as with messages on predestination or 
genetic determinism: we are unable to resist, but still we ought to resist. 
Technology is perceived as a force in its own right, with human behav-
iour, individually and collectively, following in its trail. This pessimism 
concerns not only what technological devices may do, but also how they 
make us look at problems, at fellow humans and at our selves. Technology 
has overtaken the way we think about ends and values.
 Whereas optimism may be aligned with the tradition of utopian thought, 
we also have a dystopian tradition; there is, alongside the social utopia of 
Th omas More’s Utopia (1516), the social dystopia of George Orwell’s Ani-
mal Farm (1948) and, alongside the technological utopia of Francis Bacon’s 
Nova Atlantis (1627), the technological dystopia of Aldous Huxley’s Brave 
New World (1932). It has been argued, in my opinion convincingly, that 
the technological utopian dream has been far less disastrous in its conse-
quences than the social utopian one (Achterhuis 1998); technology always 
has unexpected consequences, it may be used for other purposes, and it 
leaves one free to think and explore, unlike the desire to improve behav-
iour and attitudes, which deteriorates into one-sided control of humans.
 A third view of technology, discussed with the other two (in Barbour 
1993, chapter one), is more modest and less loaded with a positive or nega-
tive valuation. Technology may be seen instrumentally or contextually, 
emphasizing the human responsibility for design, deployment, and con-
sequences. This view may be held naively or it may be more reflective, 
for example when design and use are subject of public discourse. Each 
context may have many dimensions, including incentives and inhibitions, 
desires, biases, and prejudices. In this volume we are not presenting tech-
nology as a liberator in itself, nor as a threat that happens to humans, but 
as a social domain where humans need to take responsibility.
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 Technological and Human Competences and the God-of-the-Gaps
A surgeon stands by my bed. She explains what they intend to do tomor-
row. When she has left for the next room, the man in the bed beside me 
begins to talk. ‘You know, my son was in medical school with her. When 
she had to do her exams, the professor said that she should have failed, but 
that he would let her pass just to be rid of her.’ I am down.
 A pastor stands besides my bed. She reads Psalm 139, words of trust and 
consolation. ‘If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost 
parts of the sea, even there thy hand shall lead me, and thy right hand 
shall hold me.’ I see my life in the light of eternity. My mood goes up again. 
When she has left for the next room, my neighbor begins again. ‘You know, 
my daughter was in seminary with her. When this chaplain had to do her 
exams, the professor said that she should have failed, but that he would let 
her pass just to be rid of her.’ Th is does not bother me at all.
We demand professional competence from a surgeon, a pilot, and an en-
gineer who designs a bridge, and rightly so. (Th e example of the surgeon 
was made up; it does not do justice to the professional responsibility of 
those who train doctors.) With the pastor, and in everyday human con-
tact, the issue is not so much particular knowledge and skills. I depend on 
the surgeon; when she has not slept well, I am at risk. I no longer depend 
on the pastor; our conversation opened resources in myself (if adequate; 
sometimes, pastors and friends can also close such resources, and do more 
harm than good; read the book of Job in the Bible). Th e surgeon is, to speak 
religiously, a mediator who stands between me and my salvation.
 In daily life we do not put our trust in prayer and pious words. When 
something needs to be done, we want an engineer, a doctor, a pilot: a pro-
fessional who is competent in the practice at hand. Only when the doctor 
is unable to offer a hopeful perspective, some may be tempted to spend 
money on aura reading, powdered shark cartilage (in the Dutch pseudo-
medical circuit a ‘cure’ for cancer), prayer healing, or whatever. When life 
becomes difficult we look for something to hold on to, but we prefer to 
begin with strategies that play by regular professional standards.
 In conversations on religion and science, there is the critical expres-
sion ‘god-of-the-gaps’. This refers to the tendency to focus on the holes 
in our knowledge, on limitations of our current understanding, and to 
assume that such gaps are where God is at work. Far more satisfactory, in 
my opinion, would be to see reality as we understand it as God at work. 
Emphasizing gaps is a risky strategy, like building upon ice; whenever we 
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become blessed with greater understanding, the role of any god-of-the-
gaps will be diminished.
 Not only in our dealings with science is there a god-of-the-gaps. In our 
dealings with technology we are also tempted to fall back upon a god-
of-the-gaps. Occasionally with some gratitude, but often without paying 
much attention, we use the fruits of science and technology – antibiotics, 
electrical light, water drainage, computers, the anti-conception pill, and 
so on. When the doctor fails, when there is no cure yet, we fall back upon 
God or upon other elements from the rich treasury of (pseudo-) religious 
offerings. The expression ‘god-of-the-gaps’ may have its home in conver-
sations on the theoretical side of science, where too many believers are 
anxiously looking for that which science is yet unable to explain. However, 
a similar danger arises in the context of the practical side of science – to 
look for God when our human skills still fall short of what we wish we 
could achieve. Introducing God when technology fails results in an in-
strumental type of religiosity; God is supposed to help us when we need 
help, but to keep out of our way as long as we do well.
 Rather than the tendency to assume that the religious dimension comes 
into play when the engineers and doctors are finished, it seems preferable 
to appreciate the efforts of the professionals – and not only appreciate 
them commercially, but also religiously. When the computer in the plane 
or on the intensive care unit of the hospital fails, I hope that the staff of 
the service department will not pray ‘that thou wouldst slay the wicked, 
o God’ (Psalm 139: 19). We look to the engineers for our salvation. This 
is not to be seen as an anti-religious move, as we may appreciate their 
knowledge and skills as gifts of God, as possibilities to serve one’s neigh-
bor ‘with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, 
and with all your mind’ (Luke 10: 27).
 Playing God
Sometimes the concern is voiced that we go too far in our technological 
activities; we are ‘playing God’. This metaphor has been used recently in 
debates on genetic modification and on cloning. Less than a century ago 
similar labels were used against those who put up lightning rods. Fred-
erick Ferré tells the story of his father who, in 1922 as a young boy in a 
farming community of Swedish immigrants in the US, heard the preacher 
fulminate against the ‘shiny spikes of faithlessness’. ‘Thunderbolts were 
God’s to hurl, not man’s to deflect. The fires of hell, deep under the earth 
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on which the congregation now sat and quaked, were even then being 
stoked for those who insisted on rising in rebellion against God’s will by 
installing newfangled lightning rods. Amen.’ Even if one would have no 
doubts about hellfire, there seems to be something deeply problemati-
cal about such a sermon. ‘Could God’s will truly be foiled by a steel rod 
and a grounding wire? Was it really wrong to protect family and livestock 
from the storms that swept in from the prairies with such seemingly un-
discriminating force? ... Should he believe that the God Jesus called “our 
Father in heaven” really would punish farmers for taking whatever meager 
technological precautions might be available?’ (Ferré 1993, 27).
 Why would even non-believers find ‘playing God’ a useful metaphor in 
criticizing new technologies? The American philosopher Ronald Dwor-
kin suggested in Prospect Magazine in May 1999 that this is because those 
new technologies do not merely raise ethical issues, but create insecurity 
by undermining a distinction that is vital to ethics. Underlying our moral 
experience is a distinction between what has been given and what our re-
sponsibility is. What is given is the stable background of our actions. We 
cannot change those issues. Traditionally this has been referred to as fate, 
nature, or creation: domains of the gods or of God. When new technolo-
gies expand the range of our abilities, and thus shift the boundary between 
what is given and what is open to our actions, we become insecure and 
concerned. It is especially in such circumstances that the phrase ‘playing 
God’ arises. There is a reference to ‘God’ when something that was expe-
rienced as given, not up to our choices, becomes part of the domain of 
human considerations. We accuse others of playing God when they have 
moved what was beyond our powers to our side of the boundary. The fear 
of ‘playing God’ is not the fear of doing what is wrong (which is an issue 
within the domain on our side of the boundary), but rather the fear of 
losing grip on reality through the dissolution of the boundary. Dworkin 
argues that this fear is not necessary; humans have always played with 
fire, and we ought to do so. The alternative is, still according to Dworkin, 
an irresponsible cowardice for the unknown, a weak surrender to fate.
 New technologies imply a different range of human powers, and thus a 
changing experience of fate, nature, creation or God. For instance, if God 
is associated with that which has been given – often identified as ‘cre-
ation’ – our technological activity will be perceived as pushing God back 
into the margin. Antibiotics and anti-conception have contributed more 
to secularization in Western cultures than Darwin; practices are more 
important than ideas. This God who is pushed to the margin is a god-of-
the-gaps, as considered above.
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 Going beyond the Given: Technology and Religion
If we do not accept this god-of-the-gaps, then how should we proceed? 
Theism with its root pair of metaphors of power (on the side of the tran-
scendent God) and dependence (on our side) is challenged to rethink itself 
in the light of the powers we have acquired. If we draw upon the Christian 
heritage, we find a variety of attitudes.
 Stewardship may be interpreted as a call to conserve this world, which 
then is appreciated as the best of all possible worlds, just as in arguments 
of traditional natural theology (see Brooke and Cantor 1998). However, in 
the biblical traditions, God is also associated with a vision of a kingdom 
of peace and justice, a city of light and glory, where death will be no more. 
Images of redemption and liberation are integral to the Christian under-
standing of God. In this light, humans are not merely stewards who are 
to keep and preserve what has been given. Humans are also addressed as 
people who should abandon their old ways and take up the risk of living in 
a new way, as witnessed by the narratives on the Exodus and on Pentecost. 
Humans are called to renew themselves and the world.
 Since the very beginning of the Christian tradition (as the first major 
heresy, that of Marcion, testifies) there has been a tension between the 
focus on God as creator – and thus on the world as a God-given created 
order – and on God as the gracious, loving father of Jesus Christ, who 
longs for the renewal of the world. Distrust of technology springs from 
emphasis on what has been given; in contrast, technology could be part 
of the Christian calling. Additionally, to shift to a naturalistic vocabulary, 
morally sensible ‘naturalists’ might share this responsibility by not em-
phasizing the given as normative, but thinking through the possibility of 
improving the natural.
 Preview
Our lives will change, for better or for worse. And so will our ideas and 
practices. We are not merely bystanders, but may contribute to this de-
velopment. Biotechnology and ecological problems are contexts within 
which these developments are clearly visible in our time. This interplay of 
technology and tradition, of ecology and religion, of self-understanding 
and moral vision is what the essays in this volume are about.
 The essays in part one of this book address our technological human 
condition. Bronislaw Szerzynski sets the tone by speaking of the religious 
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roots of our technological condition. Technology is not some develop-
ment by itself; its rise to prominence relates deeply to our values, our 
notions of nature, of the secular and of transcendence, as he argues, in 
the light of human history. Taede Smedes goes even farther back, to the 
early evolution of humans, but in the same article speaks of us as cyborgs, 
that is, organisms which have technology (cybernetics) built into their 
existence. Karen Pärna speaks of technophilia, the love of technology, in 
the case of ‘the Internet age’ – again, not just a practical technology, but a 
new context for religious dreams and meanings.
 Th e second part deals with religious resources that people appeal to in 
relation to ecological concerns. Tony Watling gives an overview of the 
multiple ways humans have appealed to religious traditions of East and 
West and to scientifi c insights such as the ‘Gaia theory’ to re-imagine the 
human situation and role relative to nature. James Miller’s analysis of the 
role of Daoism in China’s quest for a sustainable future provides an in-
depth example of such an appropriation of an ancient religious vocabulary 
in relation to modernization and in relation to ecological challenges. Fran-
cis Kadaplackal addresses the issues in a Christian context. His main focus 
is on the idea of human nature, drawing on the classical imago Dei concept 
and a more recent ‘created co-creator’ designation to speak of human em-
beddedness, freedom, and responsibility. Forrest Clingerman considers a 
variety of approaches, and speaks of a ‘theology of nature’ as well as of ‘re-
ligious naturalism’. Th e main focus is, however, not on these positions but 
on the preliminary question of how one comes to such positions, and what 
may be expected of religious or secular schemes. Th us, he speaks of the way 
we build religious models, in this case models of nature, that have suffi  cient 
depth of meaning to serve us well descriptively as well as prescriptively – 
conceptualizing our place as well as our responsibilities.
 The third part deals with biotechnology as a context in which similar 
questions regarding our values and visions arise. Frank Kupper reports 
on public debates on animal biotechnology, and thus addresses the fun-
damental issue of how discussions on sensitive issues can be organized 
such that the various voices are heard. Their methodology, ‘the value lab’, 
seems able to explore value diversity. Michiel van Well considers another 
Dutch debate, on genetically modified (GM) food. Following Mar tijntje 
Smits, Van Well interprets concerns about GM food with categories 
drawn from religious studies, such as concerns about purity (Mary Doug-
las) and the danger of monsters. Humans, and especially the possibility to 
extend the human lifespan, are the topic of Peter Derkx’s contribution. 
How do those possibilities extend with views on meaning and fulfillment, 
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and what moral issues of distributive justice arise in terms of access to 
life-extending technologies? Annika den Dikken considers not extension 
but enhancement technologies in relation to ideas on care, suffering, and 
limitations. An ethos of care will remain of utmost moral importance, 
even if we accept more enhancement technologies.
 In the fourth part, the focus continues on the public debate around 
these issues. What role might religious arguments have in a pluralistic 
democracy? Patrick Loobuyck draws on modern political philosophy, 
where calls for the exclusion of religious arguments as too particular have 
been countered by arguments for weaker or stronger forms of inclusion 
of such expressions of values and concerns. The contribution by Olga 
Crapels focuses on experts and lay people in public debates. Is there a 
knowledge deficit on the side of lay people involved in public debate on 
new technologies? Or are the experts insufficiently attentive to the val-
ues articulated in religious or other ways? Franck Meijboom takes up a 
similar issue of trust in relation to the acceptance of new technologies, 
for instance food technologies. Nancie Erhard considers the dynamics 
of multi-faith alliances, through which lay people are politically engaged 
in a secular democratic society and explores how these could contribute 
to the larger issue of human engagement with new technologies and the 
ecological challenges of our time.
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Part One
OUR TECHNOLOGICAL HUMAN CONDITION


1 The Religious Roots of Our Technological Condition1
Bronislaw Szerszynski
 Religion, Environment, and Technology
The relationships between religion, technology, and the environment are 
at least as important now as they were when Lynn White published his 
seminal essay ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’ in Science 
about forty years ago – an essay to which my own title is, of course, an 
homage (White 1967).
 For a start, religion, far from fading away as theorists of secularization 
would have us believe, seems to be becoming more significant than ever, 
even more so than when Peter Berger published the collection The Desecu-
larization of the World in 1999 (Berger 1999). For example, the events of 
the last years have seen various forms of Islam become hugely significant 
forces in world affairs; in the US, too, the influence of religion on politics 
was felt throughout the Bush administration; there is growing awareness 
of the numerical significance of the global south in Christendom, espe-
cially due to conflicts within the Anglican Church over gay priests – an 
estimated two-thirds of the world’s Christians live in Asia, Africa, and 
South America; and there is a growing awareness of how even apparently 
secularized Western societies contain an extraordinary range of alterna-
tive spiritualities (Heelas et al. 2004).
 Similarly, the environment too is now moving back up the political 
agenda: global climate change is becoming more recognized as a reality 
rather than a hypothesis; the spectre of ‘peak oil’ is prompting a revival 
of interest in issues about resource depletion; economic growth in China 
and India is raising the question of how the spread of Western-style levels 
of consumption can be supported by an increasingly overstrained planet. 
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Against this background, there is, understandably, increasing policy in-
terest in finding new ways of changing people’s behaviour to reduce eco-
logical footprints, in areas such as energy and water use.
 It is perhaps worth dwelling on this last point a little. The seasoned 
environmental campaigner Tom Burke has recently suggested that envi-
ronmental politics is moving into a new and more challenging era.2 For 
its first few decades, Burke argued, environmental politics was primarily 
concerned with issues such as air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, 
toxic chemicals, and radioactive substances, issues in respect of which 
there was a clear case for action, there were obvious courses of action to 
take, there were more winners than losers when action was taken, and 
there were easily identifiable victims and villains. However, with what 
he calls the ‘hard politics’ of the environment that we are now having to 
tackle, in relation to issues such as climate change, deforestation, ocean 
degradation, water scarcity, food insecurity, and biodiversity loss, the case 
for action is not always clearly perceived and the policy tools are far less 
obvious. If action is taken, there are more immediate losers than win-
ners: it is far more difficult to find win-win solutions, and the victims and 
villains are often the same people in different roles, such as citizen and 
consumer.
 This hard politics of the environment will require institutions to find 
radically new modes of intervention, ones that involve not pulling a few 
big regulatory levers, but influencing the micro-texture of human behav-
iour, shaping billions of unreflexive micro-decisions distributed across 
the social fabric. In such a context, it would not be surprising to see a 
renewed interest in using religion to help meet conservation goals. In 
September 1986 the World Wildlife Fund organized a two-day retreat for 
leaders of world religions in Assisi, Italy, to mark its twenty-fifth anni-
versary, a meeting that led to the Assisi Declarations on ecology from 
the major world religions, and to the creation of the Network on Con-
servation and Religion. It is said that Prince Philip, the president of the 
WWF, initially came up with this idea largely because of the numerical 
and hierarchical power of the world religions to shape human behaviour. 
Such moves might seem less likely twenty years later, in an increasingly 
globalized world, one in which modern society, as Zygmunt Bauman puts 
it, is turning from solid to liquid – from a society organized through com-
munities, institutions, and certainties to one of individualization, mobil-
ity, and uncertainty (Bauman 2000). But, ironically, in the broader context 
of globalization and neo-liberalism, many states, stripped of conventional 
regulatory levers with which to control their territories, are indeed start-
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ing to turn to ‘faith groups’ for the delivery of policy objectives. So it 
should not surprise us to see bodies like the UK Sustainable Development 
Commission exploring the role that faith leaders and faith communities 
might play in advancing sustainable development objectives (SDC 2005). 
We could see religion increasingly turned to as a possible way of achiev-
ing the massive behavioural change needed if we are to avert mounting 
ecological problems.
 Technology is of course of huge significance in policy debates – particu-
larly in those parts of the world that, like the European Union, are cur-
rently under the thrall of a particular political-economic imaginary, that 
of the knowledge-based economy, which sees future economic prosperity 
as depending on a continuous technological innovation underpinned by 
high investment in research and development, in order to prevent any 
temporary high-technology advantage evaporating as developing world 
economies ‘catch up’. And under the influence of this imaginary, when the 
public fails to welcome new technologies enthusiastically, this is typically 
seen as a kind of failure of nerve which threatens economic performance. 
One thing that has been particularly striking in the policy discourse since 
the EU agreed on its Lisbon Agenda in 2000, which committed it to the 
goal of making Europe ‘the most competitive knowledge-based economy 
in the world by 2010’,3 is the way that the European public is repeatedly 
cited as one of the reasons for not meeting the targets towards that goal, 
with European resistance to the introduction of genetically modified or-
ganisms (GMOs) into European agriculture and food an oft-cited exam-
ple. For example, the 2006 Aho Group Report, Creating an Innovative Eu-
rope,4 lists as one of the key actions necessary for meeting the challenges 
of globalization ‘fostering a culture which celebrates innovation’. It argues 
that:
Europe must break out of structures and expectations established in 
the post-WW2 era which leave it today living a moderately comfortable 
life on slowly declining capital. Th is society, averse to risk and reluctant 
to change, is in itself alarming but it is also unsustainable in the face of 
rising competition from other parts of the world (Aho et al. 2006, 1).
Whether explicitly or implicitly, religion is often invoked as part of this 
anti-innovatory culture. Religious opposition to medical biotechnology 
such as stem cell technology has, of course, been particularly prominent 
amongst Catholics and Evangelicals in the US. By contrast, much less of 
the opposition to agricultural biotechnology has been explicitly religious-
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ly motivated,5 though it is interesting that Lord Robert May, formerly 
chief scientific advisor to the UK Government and president of the Royal 
Society of London, recently described European opposition to GMOs as 
‘theological’ in nature – meaning presumably that it was not grounded in 
empirical proof of harm, but in less tangible, even metaphysical concerns 
over what DNA technology might signify. And, given the schadenfreude 
with which the UK biotechnology sector has viewed the slowing down of 
stem cell research in the US, we can surely expect other cases in which 
religious beliefs are seen as an exogenous brake on the seemingly ‘natural’ 
process of technological innovation.
 So it is not only the case that the three terms on which I will be focus-
ing in this chapter – ‘religion’, ‘environment’, and ‘technology’ – are each 
of significant interest in public discourse; we can also see that links are 
starting to be made between religion and environmental policy, and be-
tween religion and technology policy. But note that, whereas in terms of 
environmental policy, religion is often seen as part of the solution, when 
it comes to economic strategy, religion is more often seen as part of the 
problem. I want to argue that common to both sides of this contrast is 
an unhelpful assumption about the relationship between religion, science 
and technology. I can perhaps best indicate what I mean by looking more 
closely at these framings of religion as tool and as impediment, in turn.
 On the one hand, with the enrollment of faith groups in the promotion 
of environmentally benign lifestyles and practices, there is a danger of 
religion being instrumentalized. In 1992 Robin Grove-White and I pub-
lished an article warning against the use of values and beliefs simply as 
non-rational determinants of behaviour that can be manipulated through 
public policy instruments in order to gain policy objectives (Grove-White 
and Szerszynski 1992). According to this instrumental view of religion, 
and of values more broadly, the task is to identify which religious or secu-
lar world views are ecologically ‘destructive’ and which are ‘benign’, and 
to find ways of discouraging the first and encouraging the latter. In our 
paper we suggested that this is an ultimately technocratic project – as if 
science can tell us how we should live, what our goals should be, and then 
values are only manipulated to achieve those goals. Much literature in 
the religion and environment area is still vulnerable to that critique, of-
ten because it takes for granted the account of nature offered by science, 
thus making the sacred subordinate to the secular. It yokes religion into 
the service of the technical administration of the earth’s life processes as 
understood by science, instead of seeing religion and values as involving 
the inquiry into what is valuable in the first place.
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 On the other hand, in the case of technological innovation, there is 
an equal but opposite danger of religion being positioned not as a use-
ful instrument but as an annoying hindrance. In the imaginary of the 
knowledge-based economy, an extraordinary emphasis is placed on one 
particular aspect of what Gilbert Simondon (1958) called the ‘mode of ex-
istence’ of technological objects – their capacity to mutate, combine, and 
diverge into new forms. In short, within this discourse, technology is all 
but synonymous with new technology, and technological change is seen as 
an absolute good. Furthermore, technological innovation is understood 
as a process which is driven by knowledge processes purely internal to 
the world of science and engineering; the world of culture, religion, and 
public meanings is only relevant as a realm of potential reception for the 
technological products produced by the world of technology and com-
merce. The public, with their meanings and values, are thus relegated to a 
passive role, that of simply welcoming, and adapting to, these new arrivals 
in the family of created beings.
 These two worries are at once diametrically opposed and intrinsically 
connected. First, how can we overcome the enchantment which scien-
tific and technical accounts of nature hold over environmental politics, 
both secular and sacred? How can we create and defend an intellectual 
space for religious ideas to have more than a purely instrumental role 
in environmental politics? Must religion be relegated to simply offering 
new reasons why we should behave differently to nature, rather than of-
fering anything new concerning how we should behave? Second, how can 
we counter an understanding of technology as an inevitable, autonomous 
process, which positions culture and meaning as on the outside of that 
process? And, specifically, can the promissory nature of modern techno-
logical development itself be subjected to a religious analysis? In the rest 
of this chapter I will argue that the first step in thinking through either of 
these challenges is problematizing the idea of the ontological primacy of 
the secular.
 The Critique of the Secular
In 2005 I published a book on this topic, Nature, Technology and the Sacred 
(Szerszynski 2005), and one of the main contributions I hoped it would 
make to the literature on the relations between religion, environment, and 
technology is as an exploration of the religious roots of the apparently 
secular cultural meanings that underpin and sanction the modern domi-
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nation of nature. In this, the book was influenced by the argument made 
by the postmodern theologian John Milbank in his Theology and Social 
Theory (1990). Milbank sought to turn the tables on secular accounts of 
human beings and of society, suggesting that, rather than understand-
ing religion as a distinctive cultural phenomenon within a fundamentally 
secular world, it is the secular we should problematize, understanding it 
as a historically contingent cultural development within a fundamentally 
religious cosmos – and, most importantly, that the modern secular can 
never shake off its origin in, and dependency on, specific religious ideas.
 Milbank suggested that this has profound implications for the way we 
think about modern society. In particular, religious discourse, rather than 
being one which is open to being explained by reference to secular reali-
ties such as psychology, interests, or ideology, becomes a kind of master 
discourse – once again theology is the queen of the sciences. In my book I 
take Milbank’s basic idea (without necessarily taking on board his specific 
normative commitments) and extend it into the areas of our relationship 
with nature, especially as mediated through science, technology, and en-
vironmental politics – and argue that it has equally profound implications 
here.
 Let me explain the Milbankian move in a little more detail. Modern 
thought is dominated by a particular picture of the relationship between 
the sacred and the secular. Firstly, the secular is understood as a self-
dependent reality, one might say a self-evident reality – a world full of 
empirical beings, both animate and inanimate. The particular sacraliza-
tions offered by the religions of the world are then seen as cultural mean-
ings which supervene on this shared, secular reality that is described by 
the empirical sciences. Here, the secular is the ‘unmarked’ term, the side 
of the secular/sacred contrast which is in no need of explanation. Sec-
ondly, seeing the world this way, understanding the natural world in terms 
of cause and effect, through physics, biology, and chemistry, and under-
standing human beings through sociology, psychology, and economics as 
mortal, rational animals driven by a combination of animal instinct and 
rational calculation, is seen as a universal form of thought that was always 
waiting within human history as a potentiality – indeed the destiny – of 
humankind.
 Instead, we need to see the modern secular world as a peculiar and 
distinctive product of the religious and cultural history of the West, and 
as inextricably shaped by its religious roots. Originally, the concept of 
the profane presupposed the sacred; conceptually, they operated as a 
pair, with the contrast between them only relative, and one that could be 
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switched around as a person moves through different life stages and cir-
cumstances, so that he [sic] ‘one day sees the sacred where before he has 
seen the profane, or vice versa’ (Van Gennep 1960, 13). In its original sense 
in the Classical world, the profane or worldly was thus itself understood 
religiously – indeed, the Latin term pro-fanum originally referred to the 
space in front (pro) of the temple (fanum) (Gadamer 1975, 150).
 Yet modern secular thought and action understands itself as secular or 
profane in an absolute, not a relative sense – not as a pragmatic relaxing 
of sacral norms, or as heresy, idolatry, or apostasy within a shared sacral 
horizon, but as purely nonreligious, to be understood in its own, imma-
nent terms, with no need of any sacral reference point to make it intel-
ligible. One way I have described this move is to say that with the onset of 
modernity the world was turned inside out; once, the secular was simply a 
space within a sacral horizon, within a world understood in sacral terms; 
now, our cosmic horizon is secular, and sacrality, belief in religion, is un-
derstood as a phenomenon within that secular horizon. Indeed, I have 
suggested that this turning inside-out of the world is the reason we find it 
so hard to define religion. The secular, we can define. Religion, we can’t; 
we can’t find any core characteristics that are shared by everything we 
think of as religion, but not by anything we think of as secular. Any defini-
tion of religion either casts the net too widely, or too narrowly. And this, 
I suggest, is because the concept of religion is a political term. Before the 
elevation of the secular to constituting the horizon of our world, there was 
no such thing as religion in the modern sense; the category emerged as 
the result of an extraordinary piece of cultural labor, a gathering together 
of a huge range of phenomena, ideas, and practices, an immense othering 
performed by emerging secular modernity, as the vast and incommensu-
rate panoply of beings, ontologies, and practices that once existed outside 
that space were herded into the space that has come to be called ‘religion’ 
(Szerszynski 2006, 813-16).
 The Secular and Nature
So, what are the implications of applying this sort of approach, one that 
rejects the ontological priority of the secular, to the domination of nature? 
In my book I explored this through a critical reinterpretation of the idea 
of the ‘disenchantment of nature’ – the idea that in the modern era nature 
has been disenchanted, stripped of sacral meaning, rendered calculable 
and manipulable. This idea, most famously formulated by the sociologist 
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Max Weber as die Entzauberung der Welt (Weber 1989, 14, 30) has a long 
history, indeed is as old as modernity itself. This, I suggested, is the ‘cre-
ation myth’ of modern society, told in order to justify modernity’s sense of 
its own exceptionality, its discontinuity with earlier, ‘traditional’ cultures, 
its wiping the slate clean so as to start afresh (see Toulmin 1992). But a 
more-or-less standard version of this narrative also runs through the lit-
erature on religion and the environment. So, both those who see modern 
rationality and technology as liberating forces, and those who see them as 
a source of profound alienation, generally accept that nature has become 
disenchanted – that the way nature is understood underwent a decisive 
break with Western religion.
 My suggestion in the book is that the story of the disenchantment of 
nature is only a half-truth. It is true that the dominant way that nature is 
understood was transformed in the seventeenth century. It is true that na-
ture is no longer understood as being filled with gods, demons, or spirits 
who might assist, hinder, or terrify us. Nature is no longer shot through 
with occult connections between one object and another. Neither is it any 
longer seen as one of the two books of God,6 filled with signs and lessons 
for human beings from its creator (though with the rise of molecular biol-
ogy with its idea of genetic codes and commands, that metaphor has seen 
a bit of a renaissance).
 Instead (and here I am grossly simplifying the modern view of nature), 
today nature is mathematical – something to be counted, measured, and 
mapped. Nature is immanent – it operates according to its own internal 
processes, rather than being shaped or guided by a supernatural hand. It 
is mechanical – behaving according to cause and effect, not seeking te-
leological goals. It is a resource – to be owned or held in common, to be 
used or preserved. It is to be understood through careful observation and 
scientific theory, not through mythology or divination. This is a nature 
whose being is mastered by science, whose value is measured by econom-
ics, and whose potentiality is determined by technology.
 So I grant that, and some. But this is not because nature has been 
stripped of meaning, somehow rendered bare, rendered how it has always 
been, no longer hidden from view by the consolations of religion. On the 
contrary, the natural world has been filled with particular cultural mean-
ings – and it is at least as important to interrogate those cultural meanings 
as those which we think might hold technology in check.
 Of course, something like this idea was already present in Lynn White’s 
essay (1967), as he suggested that the domination of nature arose in West-
ern Europe because of the particular theological ideas of Western Chris-
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tianity. But what was dominant in White’s paper and the subsequent lit-
erature was the idea that Christianity simply permitted something which 
was being held back by religious ideas – that Christianity banished the 
spirits from nature, and thus removed taboos against its exploitation. Im-
plicit or explicit in this literature has been the idea that the reason why in 
the past humans enjoyed less exploitative relations with nature (although 
it is not always agreed how far back we have to go) was because they had 
religious beliefs about nature that acted as a constraint on their techno-
logical domination of nature: for example, the belief that nature is alive, 
that nature is God’s body, or that it is full of spirits. The implication here is 
that once these beliefs are removed, and you move thereby to a secular un-
derstanding of nature, then the latent technological attitude is somehow 
introduced. To use a metaphor with which I open my book, it is as if in the 
modern world religion simply recedes, like the sea of faith in Mathew Ar-
nold’s poem of the same name, leaving a denuded, unprotected nature.
 Instead, in the book I develop the argument that, in modernity, na-
ture is not disenchanted but is held under a different enchantment; not 
stripped of meanings, but has been filled, constituted, through particular 
meanings. I draw on religious studies, history, anthropology, philosophy 
of technology, and empirical sociology to suggest that contemporary soci-
ety is characterized by not so much a disappearance as a reorganization of 
the sacred, and that contemporary ideas and practices concerning nature 
and technology – whether associated with the technological exploitation 
of nature, or with resistance to that exploitation – remain closely bound 
up with religious ways of thinking and acting.
 Western Religion, Nature, and Technology
So, part of my argument is that the modern scientific view of nature takes 
shape within the womb of Western religion. To summarize the argument 
I developed in Nature, Technology and the Sacred, Western thought has 
passed along a highly distinctive historical trajectory through its two mil-
lennia of transcendental monotheism, one without which our modern 
ideas of nature and technology would not take the form that they do. In 
contrast to the unified cosmos of primal religions, this trajectory saw the 
establishment of a vertical, transcendent axis in thought and cosmology, 
one that divided that cosmos into an empirical world and a transcendent, 
other-worldly reality. As this axis emerged, the supernatural powers of 
ancient divinities were progressively gathered together into the idea of the 
 PART 1 – OUR TECHNOLOGICAL HUMAN CONDITION
monotheistic God, and expelled from the empirical world into a supernat-
ural reality. This axis, along with its correlate in the philosophical reason 
of classical Greece, established a new dimension in human experience 
which had a profound impact on ways of thinking about the world. With-
out such an axis it would not have become possible, as happened later, to 
regard nature as nature – as a unified secular realm, the laws of which can 
be discovered through empirical inquiry, and which can be manipulated 
technologically.
 But central to this story is also the radicalization of this axis in the Prot-
estant Reformation and the scientifi c revolution. Th e Reformation stripped 
away the institutional and supernatural hierarchies that both constituted 
and spanned the gulf between the transcendent divine and the world, mak-
ing that gulf at once infi nite and infi nitesimal, absolute and vanishingly 
small. With the divine’s even more absolute removal from this world, it 
became apprehended under the fi gure of the sublime – as infi nite, uncon-
ditioned, and unknowable. But at the same time as the Reformation radi-
calized the gulf between the empirical and transcendent worlds, the tran-
scendent was also brought close to each individual, and to nature. Th en, 
with the emergence of modern thought, the transcendent axis was pulled 
into the very empirical world that was constituted by its ejection, and both 
the human subject and the natural world came to take on attributes that 
had previously been assigned to the divine (Szerszynski 2005, ch. 2).
 So, rather than the emergence of modern science in the seventeenth 
century being a decisive event in the separation between religious thought 
and natural philosophy, it was the moment of a spectacular fusion. The 
scientific revolution did not simply jettison God; rather, its proponents 
drew their sublime and distant God even closer, into the empirical world, 
and in doing so changed the meaning of theological language. In order 
to carry out their project of reconfiguring the human understanding of 
nature to make it capable of mathematical certainty, figures such as Des-
cartes, Newton, More, and Leibniz took language about God’s attributes, 
being, and action in the world, stripped them of what medieval theologians 
such as Aquinas had seen as their analogical character, gave them clear, 
univocal meanings, and progressively absorbed them into their emerging 
account of the empirical world (Szerszynski 2005, 48). Thus the modern 
scientific idea of nature was born through a particular transformation of 
theological discourse, although these theological roots become progres-
sively obscured as decades and centuries passed.
 The emergence of this new understanding of nature was closely linked 
with that of modern technology (Heidegger 2003). For classical think-
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ers, techne – craft, or art – provided an inferior kind of knowledge than 
that promised by contemplation, because of its concern with particulars 
rather than universals, and with changing rather than unchanging things. 
Individual crafts were regarded as intrinsically uncertain and unpredict-
able in their outcomes, partly because of an almost animistic classical 
conception of matter as having its own desires, its own telos. The pro-
cess of manufacturing an object, of combining form with matter, involved 
not just imposing a form on matter but cooperating with matter, almost 
conversationally, so was not reducible to formal principles and had to 
be learned through experience (Mitcham 1994, 118-23). Crafts were thus 
tentative, quotidian activities located in the context of non-technical un-
derstandings of human flourishing which incorporated ideas of beauty, 
justice, and contemplation.
 But after the Reformation we see the rise of ‘technology’ in the modern 
sense as a project of reducing the arts to universal methodological princi-
ples – of finding the logos of techne itself, of overcoming the recalcitrance 
of matter and making it subservient to logos, thus bringing human activity 
into the realm of ‘clear, voluntary and reasoned concepts’ (Ellul 1964, 20). 
The idea of a transcendent God provided an Archimedean vantage point 
outside the empirical world at which the experimental scientist sought 
to stand to gain objective knowledge of the world, knowledge untainted 
by the perspectivism suffered by empirical creatures dwelling within the 
world (Arendt 1958, 257-68). In this new ordering of nature and technolo-
gy, Homo faber, the human as fabricator, is no longer one who co-operates 
with matter as another creature with its own desires and goals; instead, he 
acts on it from outside, yet as one who knows it more intimately than it 
does itself, as if he were its creator.
 So the quintessentially modern idea of ‘technology’ emerged as a fusion 
of craft practices with ideas from transcendental monotheism, effecting 
a radical transformation in ideas of knowledge. But this emergence also 
radically changed the meaning of the practical arts. From Francis Bacon’s 
Advancement of Learning ([1605] 1960) onwards, technology became con-
ceived as a project to liberate humankind from finitude and necessity, 
allowing it to share in the unconditionedness of a deity understood in 
increasingly sublime terms (Noble 1999; Song 2003). Modern technol-
ogy was thus framed from the outset as a soteriological project. Initially, 
the technological relation with nature came to be seen not just as a way 
of easing the human condition, but as a way of radically transforming it, 
of returning to the prelapsarian condition of ease and harmony between 
humans and nature – ultimately, as a fusion of art and reason, of techne 
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and logos, which promised to bring the certainty of reason to humanity’s 
technical dealings with matter. But with the later loss of a supernatural 
reference, the ends and purposes of this technological project come to 
be understood in purely technical ways, as requiring the adaptation of 
the human to technological imperatives. Technology became measured 
against neither quotidian nor supernal human needs and interests, but 
against its own, technical criteria. Technology became the measure of 
man – became autonomous, became sublime.
 Conclusion
I started this chapter by talking about the importance of religion, envi-
ronment, and technology in contemporary public discourse. All three, for 
different reasons, are of importance in policy discussions; but also, I sug-
gested, connections are increasingly being made between them. In the 
case of the environment, I suggested that there are signs that religious 
beliefs and what are called ‘faith groups’ are being enrolled in the difficult 
task of effecting radical behavioural change in order to meet environmen-
tal targets. Regarding technology, I commented on the way that technol-
ogy policy tends to construct public beliefs and values such as those la-
belled ‘religious’ as an impediment to the acceptance of new technologies, 
and thus to economic productivity and competitiveness in the knowledge 
economy. I suggested that both constructions of religion – as tool or as im-
pediment in relation to secular goals – were equally unhelpful, and rested 
on problematic assumptions about the relationship between the secular 
and the sacred. I then sketched an argument that problematized the idea 
of the ontological primacy of the secular, arguing in particular that mod-
ern, secular ideas of nature and technology are profoundly shaped by the 
religious history of the West.
 What are the implications of this move for debates around religion, 
environment, and technology? Firstly, it implies a rather different picture 
of the role of ‘religious’ voices in critical debates about environmental 
and technological priorities than the dominant picture; rather than re-
ferring to scientific and technical definitions of environmental problems 
and technological effects, and purely remaining at the level of ‘values’, cri-
tique should involve exposing and engaging with the theological roots at 
the very heart of modern science and technology. The anthropologist and 
philosopher of science Bruno Latour has recently called for a ‘seculariza-
tion’ of Science (with a capital ‘S’) – the abandonment of science’s mythi-
THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF OUR TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITION
cal claim to have privileged access to objective truth (Latour 2004, 30-1). 
He suggests that the sciences (with a small ‘s’), the particular, fallible ways 
we have of generating knowledge about the world, need saving from this 
myth, not least so that we can dispel the dangerous illusion that scientific 
knowledge-making can, and should, ever be insulated from politics and 
debate. Latour calls this ‘secularization’ to indicate that this would be a 
removal of science’s transcendental epistemic privilege, bringing it down 
to the level of the world, and leveling the terms of engagement between 
science and politics. Yet, ironically, this very secularization of science 
could also facilitate a more productive engagement between science and 
religion, by bringing to the level of conscious reflection and debate shared 
and conflicting theological assumptions about time, finitude, matter, and 
human epistemic powers.
 Secondly, the distinctive temporal structure of contemporary tech-
nology, its promissory and autonomous character – at once promising 
humanity progressive liberation from the limits of finitude, and requir-
ing humanity to be subject to its dynamic – cannot solely be analysed 
in terms of the institutional organization of contemporary science and 
technology, but also requires us to see how the meanings of nature and 
technology have been conditioned by religious ideas. The promise of sci-
ence and technology to enable humans to transcend the limits of crea-
turely existence has emerged out of a cultural history profoundly shaped 
by transcendental monotheism and associated ideas of salvation. This was 
by no means a necessary development; the emergence of what I have been 
calling the technological condition depended on a contingent transforma-
tion in Western religious and intellectual ideas associated with the Prot-
estant Reformation and the scientific revolution, which relied on a highly 
voluntarist image of God imposing his will on passive matter without re-
mainder. Such ideas closely link together issues of epistemology, ontol-
ogy, technics, and social power, as is very evident in the hopes pinned on 
contemporary biotechnology. Witness the similar rhetoric deployed by 
succeeding generations of social actors as traditional plant and animal 
breeding has been overtaken by scientific Mendelian breeding, then by 
genetic modification, and most recently by the promise of the biological 
engineering being pioneered at MIT.7 In each case, the ‘promise’ of the 
new technological paradigm has been the introduction of unprecedented 
levels of certainty and control in the production of traits and functions. 
As Lily Kay comments in relation to the rise of molecular biology as an 
industrial paradigm in the twentieth century, ‘[t]here is seductive empow-
erment in a scientific ideology in which the complexities of the highest 
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levels can be fully controlled by mastering the simplicity of the lowest’ 
(Kay 1999, 17, 18). An exposure of the substantive theological assumptions 
that underlie such dreams of control, and equally underlie the elevation of 
the technical as the highest form of knowledge, can play an important role 
in ‘humanizing’ technological development, so that we can begin to see 
alternative technological futures, grounded in very different social imagi-
naries and theologies.
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2 Technology and What It Means to Be Human
Taede A. Smedes
 Introduction: Technology and Nature
Sitting in my study, looking around me, all I see are human-made items 
– artifacts such as books (lots of them), book shelves, a computer and a 
PDA, a desktop lamp, pens and pencils, and so on. When I look out my 
window, I see houses, but also gardens with plants and trees. Plants and 
trees are generally regarded as natural phenomena, yet the way they are 
planted as parts of the town in which I live is purely artificial. As far as I 
can see, except for the blue sky and the sunshine, there is nothing in my 
direct vicinity that is not, in some sense, the product of human design and 
engineering. I am an inhabitant of what I term the technosphere – a place 
that itself is an artifact, designed and technologically manufactured by 
humans. Even more, there is hardly a place on earth that is not in some 
way touched by human influence.
 For many people, the influence of humanity in and upon nature is 
something that should be kept to a minimum as much as possible. Human 
influence on nature, especially involving technology, is somehow consid-
ered to be ‘unnatural’. The way many people speak about the relationship 
between humans and nature is as if humans are not part of nature; as if 
humans are somehow above or against nature, so that human actions that 
affect nature are ‘interventions’. Nature – traditionally a very slippery and 
vague concept – can in this context be described as that which develops 
by itself without the interference of humans. This concept of nature also 
seems to be tacitly present in many discussions concerning conservation 
of natural habitats: humans have to take a step back and should not inter-
fere. Nature should be able to take care of itself.
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 This is a strange and even paradoxical situation. On the one hand (and 
I will say more about this later), Darwin’s evolutionary theory in a sense 
destroyed the dualism between humanity and nature. The ascent of hu-
mans was just as much a natural process as the evolution of fishes, insects, 
birds, and so on. As Michael Ruse (1986, 104) describes,
If you take Darwin seriously – accepting evolution through natural se-
lection and not merely some Spencerian bastard version of evolution 
– then the special status of Homo sapiens is gone forever. Any powers 
we have are no more than those brought through the crucible of the 
evolutionary struggle and consequent reproductive success. It is true 
that, as a species, we are unique, with our own special combination of 
powers and abilities. But then, so also is Drosophila melanogaster (a 
species of fruit fl y).
Darwinian evolutionary theory (most recently in the form of sociobiology) 
has shown human culture to be just another dimension, or even product, 
of biological evolution. Yet in many discussions concerning the relation-
ship between technology and nature, human influence is still considered 
to be somehow unnatural, or not part of natural processes.
 Th is deep ambiguity is especially prominent in discussions concerning 
the human use of technology. It often seems as if the technosphere (as the 
realm of human technology) is not a part of the biosphere, but is a separate 
realm or layer. Th is view, of course, has deep roots, going back at least to the 
Puritan tradition that followed Francis Bacon, who in his Novum Organum 
(1620) foresaw technology as a means of regaining a lost paradise. Bacon’s 
ultimate goal with technology ‘was to redeem man from original sin and 
reinstate him in his prelapsarian power over all created things’ (Paolo Rossi, 
quoted in Noble 1997, 50). Th e philosopher René Descartes wrote in his Dis-
course on Method (1637) that, through science and technology, ‘we might be 
able ... to use [the actions of fi re, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the 
other bodies that surround us] for all the purposes for which they are ap-
propriate, and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of 
nature’ (Descartes 2000, 4). John Milton, in his Paradise Lost (1667) argued 
that humans with their mechanical arts and science would have dominion 
over nature. Th e view that science and technology are meant to give hu-
mans dominion over nature has since then become a deep-seated view of 
the relationship between humans/technology and nature.
 One example: the historian Thomas Hughes writes that early American 
settlers believed they were called to create the Promised Land for them-
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selves, which meant taming the wilderness they found when they arrived 
in America. The view that humans stood against a wilderness they needed 
to tame and control became entrenched in the American mind. Ameri-
cans in the nineteenth century ‘conceived of the transformations wrought 
by technology as a manifestation of mind over matter. ... Full of self-satis-
faction, they believed that the human mind was ordering chaotic nature, 
a wilderness, into a world of enlightened culture’ (Hughes 2004, 29f.). In 
effect, ‘Americans would become the lords of creation. Human design was 
supplementing the Creator’s plan for the universe’ (29). America’s nature 
was to become a paradise that was to be regained.
 As the French philosopher Rémi Brague writes, such a view of technol-
ogy as the human potential to tame wild nature is now generally accepted. 
Modern technology has become defined by domination.
Technological activity was considered up until the modern era as a 
perfection of nature. It was a matter of delivering nature of that which 
it could not produce by itself. One then appealed on behalf of eff ec-
tive nature to a superior jurisdiction, which might be seen as the not 
completely accomplished intent of nature, or the plan of the Creator. 
Henceforth it was a question of imposing external order upon nature. 
If technology could set out to ameliorate nature, it was because nature 
left a lot to be desired. Modern technology thus accepted a fundamen-
tal premise of Gnosticism. (Brague 2003, 209)
Such views of technology in human hands to regain dominion and control 
over nature presuppose and, to some extent, even promote a dualist view 
of humanity and nature.
 A Conceptual Exercise in Philosophical Anthropology
The dualist view of nature and human culture (including technology) thus 
seems to be engraved in the Western mind, although Darwinian evolution 
seems to question this dualism. In the following section, I want to suggest 
a perspective on technology according to Darwinian lines, a view of tech-
nology as a part of human culture and, as such, a part of and continuous 
with nature. Instead of seeing technology as merely an epiphenomenon of 
human culture, I argue that technology is a central and irreducible aspect 
of our human existence, even to such an extent that the philosopher Andy 
Clark has argued that humans are ‘natural-born cyborgs’. Developing and 
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using technology is something that apparently comes quite naturally to 
humans. I will argue that these scientific developments should stimulate 
us to reconsider the questions what it means to be human, and how hu-
mans and their technology relate to nature. As a consequence, this chap-
ter is a conceptual exercise in philosophical anthropology.
 As for the use of the term ‘technology’, I will use this term broadly to 
designate ‘the intelligent use and development of material elements which 
are designed, made, used, and modified for some purpose’.
 The Evolutionary Roots of Human Technology
An appropriate and interesting question to start with is this: Where does 
our capacity for developing technology stem from? Archeologists, pale-
ontologists, and paleoanthropologists all seem to agree that the use of 
tools, and thus of technology as defined above, is a defining characteris-
tic of human nature. Humans have never been without technology. The 
famous periodization of human history into Paleolithic (‘ancient stone’ 
age, the period of chipped stone artifacts), Mesolithic (‘middle stone’ age), 
Neolithic (‘new stone’ age, the period of polished stone artifacts), Bronze 
Age (when copper and bronze artifacts appear), and Iron Age, was inspired 
by human tool production and tool use. That division has become part of 
our culture, even though it has been modified several times including the 
addition of several subdivisions.
 This periodization mirrors the belief that all species of homo that have 
ever existed have been able to use, manufacture, and/or modify tools. This 
is, of course, a conjecture, since we can only make inferences about tool 
use in early hominids because of the discovery of stone tools (Schick and 
Toth 1993). It is possible and even likely that some human species used 
tools made of wood, bone, grass, fur, and so on, instead of, or in addition 
to, stone tools. However, unless these were fossilized, there are little to no 
remains of such tools because they were not preserved.
 By looking at these stone tools, an expert can tell how they were made 
and where they came from in both place and time. On the basis of such 
information, some have argued that one can even discern developments 
in the way stone tools were fabricated. For instance, in 1968, the archeolo-
gist Grahame Clark argued that one can discern five technological modes 
in the production of stone tools (Clark 1977, 21-38 and passim; Clark’s 
book was originally published in 1968; see also Foley and Mirazón Lahr 
2003, 113ff.). These five modes ‘express more complex ways of making 
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stone tools, leading toward greater control and a more effective use of raw 
material to produce particular end products’ (Foley and Mirazón Lahr 
2003, 113). In other words, Clark’s classification mirrors a progression in 
the fabrication and refinement of stone tools, from simply striking a flake 
off a core without much concern about shape (mode 1, Oldowan industry, 
2.5-1.4 million years ago) to the complex fabrication and refinement of 
multi-functional blades of various sizes and lengths, involving microlithic 
technologies (mode 5, transitional phase between the Ice Age and the Ho-
locene period). Different hominid species are associated with each differ-
ent mode: for example, Homo habilis and Homo ergaster are associated 
with mode 1 technologies; Homo erectus, sapiens, heidelbergensis, and 
 neanderthalensis are associated with mode 2 tools. Homo sapiens prob-
ably had the flexibility to use tools from all five modes.
 The pervasiveness of tool use among humans raises an interesting 
question: is the capacity to use tools restricted to humans? In his famous 
book, Kenneth Oakley wrote that ‘man may be distinguished as the tool-
making primate’ and that ‘employment of tools appears to be his chief bio-
logical characteristic’ (Oakley 1972, 1). Oakley points to tool use among 
chimpanzees, but argues that this ‘is a far cry from the systematic making 
of stone tools, the earliest known examples of which evidently required 
much premeditation, a high order of skill and an established tradition 
implying some means of communication’ (2f.). Nowadays, there is much 
evidence that shows that tool use among animals is ubiquitous. There are 
examples of otters using stones to crack crab shells, birds that use stones 
to crack snail shells, and chimpanzees that use twigs to catch termites, 
ants, or to extract honey from honeycomb. In all these cases, artifacts are 
being used to manipulate nature. Humans, thus, are not the only species 
that use technology.
 If that is agreed upon, then the question is: how special are we in our 
use of technology? Does our tool use differ qualitatively from those of 
other species, and if so, in what way? Or are we simply expanding the pos-
sibilities that are also present in ‘lower’ creatures? Otters and birds are 
using stones to acquire food, but they may have mastered the use of stones 
as tools through trial-and-error learning. If so, does this imply that they 
comprehend the underlying principles of the problem? Are they ‘aware’ of 
the cause-and-effect relations inherent in their tool use?
 There are still many questions here that are unanswered and many ven-
ues for further research. Yet it seems that the Tanzanian chimpanzees 
that are so fond of termite fishing and ant dipping at least have some clue 
about what they are doing. Ian Tattersall (2000, 52f.) writes,
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Twigs of diff erent kinds are selected for diff erent purposes, and recent 
observations reveal that stouter branches are used as levers or to dig 
out honey from bees’ nests. Signifi cantly, twigs are not necessarily dis-
carded when they become bent or frayed; as long as they can, chimpan-
zees will usually break off  the end of such a tool to ‘refresh’ it and will 
continue using it as long as such modifi cation is possible. Chimpanzees 
have also been observed to break off  branches for use in hooking in fruit 
from otherwise inaccessible tree limbs, for attacking potential preda-
tors, and for expelling the occupants of holes in trees. Branches [instead 
of twigs] are also brandished to enhance the eff ectiveness of aggres-
sive displays, and rocks and sticks are thrown in attempts to intimidate 
competitors or predators.
Clearly then, as Tattersall acknowledges, those chimpanzees have some 
insight into the principles of using twigs and, perhaps, using the power of 
analogous reasoning, the use of branches. Yet, as Tattersall writes,
Th is does not mean that chimpanzees are toolmakers (or even tool us-
ers) in the sense that modern humans are – clearly, they are not – but 
it shows that chimpanzees are capable of forming a mental picture of 
what attributes some simple tools, at least, need to have to accomplish 
a particular aim. (53; italics added, T.S.)
Shaping tools to improve their function shows insight into its workings 
and knowledge of the underlying principles. This, however, seems to in-
volve cognitive functions of a quite advanced type. These cognitive feats 
may have emerged from trial-and-error learning, but they go much fur-
ther. If stone-using otters or birds ever come to a territory in which there 
are no stones for them to use, they are facing a real problem. Because 
there are no stones they can use, these animals might even starve to death. 
They lack the cognitive capacities for improvisation and flexibility, for 
adapting their actions accordingly, because they lack the cognitive capaci-
ties for insight into the principles underlying the use of stones.
 Non-human primates such as chimpanzees do seem to grasp the un-
derlying principles. However, one of Tattersall’s central claims is that the 
cognitive abilities of humans even go beyond those of chimpanzees and 
other non-human primates. There seems to be a ‘cognitive gap’ between 
humans and chimpanzees. Ian Tattersall, Richard Leakey, and Stephen 
Mithen, for instance, argue that human tool use is somehow connected to 
the complexity of the brain (Tattersall 2000; Leakey 1995; Mithen 1996). 
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There thus seems to be a consensus among scientists that the human spe-
cies, which already had made a cognitive leap compared to other species 
such as the chimpanzee, somewhere and somehow during its evolution 
made another cognitive leap. It crossed a critical threshold, which led to 
the ‘big bang of culture’. And this ‘big bang’ led eventually to art, religion, 
science, and advanced technology (cf. Klein and Edgar 2002).
 If true, what does this say about technology? Perhaps there really is a 
cognitive gap between humans and other creatures. Nevertheless, if we 
agree that it was nature that caused the ‘big bang of culture’, can we plausi-
bly defend the modern idea that culture and technology stand opposed to 
nature any longer? Especially since we can see the use of basic stone tool 
technology by non-human species such as otters, birds, and chimpanzees. 
I agree with Frans de Waal (2001, 271) when he writes: ‘Thinking of nature 
and culture as distinct and separate domains is tricky: there’s plenty of 
nature in culture, just as there is plenty of culture in nature.’
 Technology and What It Means to Be Human
So, on the one hand, technology seems to be an entirely natural process. 
In the course of evolution, diff erent species have managed to use tools in 
quite advanced ways. However, scientists seem to agree that, in the case of 
humans, something peculiar is going on. Th ere seems to be a cognitive gap 
between tool use among non-human primates and other animal species, 
and the advanced and fl exible ways that humans are able to use tools.
 In the last couple of hundred years, technology has advanced up to a 
point where we seem to have lost contact with our natural environment 
entirely. In our times, our habitat has become the technosphere which 
seems remote from nature, from which we emerged. Guided by economic 
rationality we have become estranged from nature, and downgraded na-
ture to nothing more than a set of resources that we can use for our own 
well-being. There is a constant threat that we will see nature as the realm 
of the wild that has to be tamed, of that which does not belong to culture 
or has not (yet) been cultivated, of that over which humankind has do-
minion. Such an attitude that mirrors an existential remoteness of culture 
from nature can lead to patterns of behaviour that result in the destruc-
tion of other living beings, the biosphere, and even the destruction of our 
habitat and of our own species through technology.
 Getting rid of technology is not an option, for we can no longer survive 
without it. We have grown dependent upon the existence of technology, as 
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much as our technology depends on our cognitive abilities. Our relation 
to technology – whether we like it or not – has become one of symbiosis 
between humans and machines. What we need, then, is a perspective that 
is able to reconnect us, our culture, and our technology to the natural en-
vironment in which we are embedded. Such a perspective should also be 
able to guide our attitudes towards that natural environment when using 
technology. One such perspective that I find attractive and would like to 
explore further (although I do not have the space here to do so) is that of 
humans as natural-born cyborgs.
 Just think about it – think about cochlear implants or ‘simple’ hearing 
devices. Think about the pair of glasses that you’re wearing (or contact 
lenses), a pacemaker, an artificial heart or hip, or the medical application 
of steel pins in a human body. Human lives depend on these technological 
artifacts. And as theologian Gregory Peterson (2003, 217) writes, using 
medication ‘merges us in the most intimate way with our technology, as 
our bodies absorb chemicals that may never have existed in nature’. ‘En-
hancement technology’ – technology that supplements and sometimes 
replaces biology – is especially prominent in the medical sciences. In 
many medical applications there is truly a merging between humans and 
technology.
 The symbiosis between a human being and machine is described by the 
term cyborg, the abbreviation of ‘cybernetic organism’, which was coined 
in 1960 in a paper on space travel by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline 
(Clynes and Kline 1995, 29-33). Clynes and Kline wrote that because peo-
ple were not biologically adapted to survive the harsh conditions of outer 
space, science should alter human biology so that people would be able to 
survive in space. Such an alteration would result in what Clynes and Kline 
call a cyborg, an organism that ‘deliberately incorporates exogenous com-
ponents extending the self-regulatory control function of the organism 
in order to adapt it to new environments’ (31). Clynes and Kline describe 
a cyborg as an entity that incorporates external elements in its physical 
constitution as a survival strategy to adapt to changing influences from 
the surroundings.
 Cyborgs are no longer merely considered creatures in science fiction 
films or books; nor are cyborgs the ideals of ‘transhumanists.’1 Indeed, 
being a cyborg nowadays may be an appropriate metaphor for describing 
our technological human condition, as cognitive scientist and philoso-
pher Andy Clark argues (Clark 1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2003). Clark draws 
heavily on the recent neuroscientific approach of ‘embodied’ or ‘situated’ 
cognition – an approach that strongly emphasizes the role of embodiment 
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and in cognitive processes. Clark (2003, 10) argues that ‘What makes us 
distinctively human is our capacity to continually restructure and rebuild 
our own mental circuitry, courtesy of an empowering web of culture, edu-
cation, technology, and artifacts.’ For Clark, the term cyborg is not limited 
to the inhabitants of science fiction stories and films such as The Matrix; 
instead it signifies the fundamental human ability ‘to enter into deep and 
complex relationships with nonbiological constructs, props, and aids’ (5). 
Humans possess a peculiar though natural flexibility in being able to use 
all kinds of external objects to solve certain problems (in the broadest 
sense of the word). Therefore Clark speaks about humans as natural-born 
cyborgs: the use of technology comes as natural as walking, talking, eat-
ing, and having sex.
 Consider, as an example, a blind person using a stick to find her way 
around in the world. How are the person and the stick related? On a physi-
cal level, there may be a demarcation between body and the tool (stick). 
However, in using the tool that demarcation disappears: the tool at hand 
becomes an extension and hence part of the body. As a matter of fact, 
this example of a blind person and a stick is used by philosophers such 
as Michael Polanyi (1962, 55f., 58f.) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, 
143) to argue the same point: that our ‘body scheme’ – to use Merleau-
Ponty’s phrase – is not spatially fixed, but dynamic. What I see as be-
longing to ‘me’ (i.e. inherent to my body scheme) and not belonging to 
‘me’ (i.e. external to my body scheme) is highly context dependent. The 
boundaries between our bodies and the world can become – and often 
simply are – fluid. The car that is parked on my driveway is external to my 
body scheme. Yet, when I drive my car, my car becomes part of my body 
scheme, and what happens to my car feels like it is affecting me directly.
 In a sense then, and following Andy Clark, I believe we can agree with 
theologian Gregory Peterson (2003, 217) that we have always been cy-
borgs: ‘Human beings are tool users, and modern human beings are tool 
users par excellence. So familiar has our technology become that it is of-
ten invisible to us. But any individual who wears glasses or contacts is in 
a sense a cyborg.’
 Cyborg technology can be seen as a replacement of biology, for exam-
ple in the case of cochlear implants. Someone who has such an implant 
is (after a long and sometimes arduous process of getting used to it) no 
longer consciously aware that the implant is present – unless it malfunc-
tions. On the other hand, cyborg technology is also an extension of biol-
ogy. Telescopes and microscopes extend our visual senses because when 
we look through them, we see things that under normal circumstances 
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are hidden from sight. Our flexibility in adapting to such technology is 
amazing. Centuries ago, scientists literally could not believe their eyes as 
they gazed through Galileo’s telescope. They thought that Jupiter’s moons 
were artifacts produced by the telescope, and that they were witnessing 
an optical illusion. Nowadays you can go to any mall and buy a cheap tele-
scope that will reveal the craters of the moon in vivid detail. Glasses and 
contacts also extend biology. With the help of cars we extend our motor 
capacities and jet planes give us the wings we never had. A tennis racket 
extends a sports star’s arm, and so on.
 The notion of technological extensions of the body is not exactly new 
among philosophers of technology. In 1877 the German philosopher Ernst 
Kapp (1808-1896) wrote that many technological developments were root-
ed in ‘organ projection’ (Kapp 1877). A hammer looks like a fist, a saw like 
a row of teeth, and the telescope is a technological copy of the eye. Much 
of technology was, according to Kapp, an enlargement and externaliza-
tion of human organs, such that technology supersedes human capaci-
ties. The link between technology and human embodiment was also per-
ceived by the philosophical anthropologist Arnold Gehlen (1904-1976). 
In 1957 Gehlen wrote a classic essay on the relationship between humans 
and technology, in which he introduced three terms: Organentlastung, 
Organverstärkung, and Organsersatz. (Gehlen 1957). Gehlen speaks of Or-
ganentlastung (‘organ relief ’) in the case of a car or a boulder car, which 
makes the physical pulling or lifting of objects unnecessary. Organver-
stärkung (‘organ reinforcement’) is the case when technological artifacts 
enhance and reinforce human capacities, as is the case with a hammer or 
a microscope. In the case of Organersatz (‘organ replacement’) there is the 
adding of functions that are otherwise not present to humans: we are able 
to fly with airplanes, which ‘replace’ our absent wings.
 But Clark wants to go further. He believes humans as natural-born cy-
borgs are not only capable of creating extensions of their physical bodies, 
they also extend their minds. Pens and pencils are extensions of our hands. 
The paper on which we write things down, however, becomes an extension 
of our cognitive apparatus. By writing things down, we no longer need to 
remember them. Papers with notes, but also paper calendars, electronic 
PDAs that synchronize with Outlook, reference books and encyclopedias 
(whether made of paper or in electronic form) – Clark believes these are 
all external elements that are being used by us as extra-neural memory 
banks. And what about computers and the Internet? Cyberspace is start-
ing to become a collective memory bank.2 E-mail and chat rooms extend 
our communicative abilities (as did the telegraph, telephone, and fax ma-
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chine before) – and the end of these developments is not yet in sight; one 
example of this is ‘telepresence’ (the projection of one’s physical appear-
ance in, for instance, a global business meeting) is one of the future pos-
sibilities that may make business trips unnecessary.
 We have to remember, however, that Andy Clark speaks about humans 
as natural-born cyborgs. It is easy to forget that this fascinating technolo-
gy has a biological basis, and that it all began with the stone tools that early 
human species started to use as technology some 2 million years ago:
It was at this time that some of the early hominids equipped themselves 
with tools and moved into new evolutionary niches that proved to be 
enormously successful. Th is was the start of a new adaptation, seem-
ingly insignifi cant at fi rst, that continued and evolved over the next few 
million years and fi nally led to what and where we are today (Schick and 
Toth 1993, 18f.).
Clark’s concept of the natural-born cyborg is a powerful and imaginative 
metaphor to emphasize this natural character of human technology and 
the continuity between humans and the rest of nature without denying or 
ignoring the peculiarity of human tool use in comparison with animal tool 
use. There is a fundamental but natural ability in humans to build up a 
very intimate and flexible relationship with non-biological external tools 
and technologies. Using technology apparently is what comes naturally.
 Conclusion
I am still sitting in my study. And when I look around I still see human-
made items – artifacts such as books (lots of them), book shelves, a com-
puter, a desktop lamp, pens and pencils, a PDA, and so on. However, their 
nature has now changed. I look upon them as being somehow a part of me. 
The books, my PDA – they all are somehow intimately connected to my 
biology, including the cognitive processes going on in my mind. When I 
look out my window, I see houses, but also some gardens with plants and 
trees. Plants and trees are generally regarded to be natural phenomena, 
yet the way they are planted, as parts of the town that I live in, is purely 
artificial. However, the arrangement of the town may be artificial, but the 
way humans have made their own environment strikes me now as quite 
natural: this is what humans have done from the emergence of the human 
species onwards.
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 Does the use of technology equal the exercise of dominion? Certainly, 
technology has become dominion, but only at the moment people started 
to forget that they had emerged from nature. Religion (especially the Chris-
tian religion) has done a lot of harm to nature by placing humans halfway 
between the beasts of the earth and the angels of heaven – that is some-
thing I as a theologian have to admit. Moreover, because we have severed 
the bonds between technology and nature, we have let technology gain 
control over us, and allowed nature to become a demonic force. We need 
to fi nd a way to reconnect ourselves to nature, to change our perspective 
and not perceive nature as a resource for economic benefi t, but as a partner 
with which we need to cooperate in order to survive in the long run.
 I am an inhabitant of a technosphere, of a place that is itself an ar-
tifact, designed and technologically manufactured by humans. Yet this 
technosphere is not opposed to nature, but is a part of it, as the theologian 
Philip Hefner (1993, 154) writes: ‘The hybridized navel orange, the auto-
mobile, the asphalt parking lot, the computer – these are nature. We call 
them techno-nature, recognizing that techno-nature is, in a real sense, the 
only nature that now exists on our planet.’ The technosphere has emerged 
from nature, it is an emergent property. Through our technology we have 
gained a certain freedom from biological and evolutionary constraints. 
However, that freedom is not something that exceeds nature, but is, to 
use Hefner’s phrase (1998, 179), ‘nature’s way of stretching itself toward 
newness’.
 Perhaps the metaphor of the natural-born cyborg is a way of overcom-
ing the dualism between nature and culture, or between nature and tech-
nology, although it may inevitably be a metaphor that for some sounds 
too technological. The dualism between nature and culture represents an 
alienation that needs to be overcome: it is not only an alienation from the 
nature that bore us, but, moreover, an alienation from our own nature. 
The metaphor of the natural-born cyborg can reframe the continuity of 
humans and their technology and nature in modern terms, and hopefully 
thereby give people a new sense of being at home in the universe.
 Notes
1 ‘Transhumanism,’ according to Wikipedia, ‘is an international intellectual 
and cultural movement supporting the use of new sciences and technologies 
to enhance human mental and physical abilities and aptitudes, and amelio-
rate what it regards as undesirable and unnecessary aspects of the human 
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condition, such as stupidity, suffering, disease, aging and involuntary death.’ 
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transhumanism. 
2  Moreover, the virtual reality of cyberspace is an extension of physical spatial-
ity. This again is an aspect that forces us to rethink certain aspects of Western 
metaphysics. See: Wertheim ; Heim ; Heim .
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The front cover of an October 1999 issue of the American magazine Busi-
ness Week features a rendering of the Creation of Adam by Michelangelo, 
a scene from the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in Rome. On a dark blue 
background we see God’s finger reaching for Adam’s hand. This is a mod-
ern version of a familiar detail 
from the Donnadio and it has an 
unmistakable high-tech aesthet-
ic to it. Both hands are drawn in 
a style that reminds one of the 
wire frame models used in three-
dimensional computer graphics, 
and because of the bright yel-
low lines that delineate them the 
hands appear electrified. A spark 
of light emerges from the point 
of contact and from the space 
between the two hands the text 
‘the Internet age’ comes to the 
fore.
Figure 1. Artist: J. Calviello. Business Week 4 
October 1999. Front cover image. Business 
Week 3649. 
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It is not hard to decode the message; the religious undertones of the image 
are immediately recognizable. Associations with godly inspiration, new 
life, enlightenment and the zenith of creation come to mind. In this elevat-
ing scene a parallel is drawn between the potential and genius of the Inter-
net and the biblical miracle of creation. A divine invention has been born, 
bringing about a new era – ‘the Internet age’. However, Business Week is 
not a messenger for any specific religious organization or set of beliefs; it 
is concerned with the corporate world, finance and world affairs. Bearing 
this in mind, the allusion to a biblical tale in the otherwise strictly secular 
setting of a business publication is striking, for it suggests a connection 
between religion and the domain of technology and commerce.
 This seemingly contradictory relationship generates a number of ques-
tions that I shall tackle in this paper. Namely, what might be the signifi-
cance of religiously charged terminology in public representations of 
technologies such as the Internet? Which kinds of sentiments are being 
articulated and what, if anything, does the use of religious imagery and 
analogies in discourses about new technology say about religiosity in con-
temporary Western society?
 In what follows I will argue that, while the Internet is an exemplary 
product of the modern, rational-scientific mindset, in the (mostly en-
thusiastic) tales about it, it serves as a vessel of religious sentiments. As 
has been the case with several other technological inventions through-
out history (Corn 1986; Czitrom 1982), the Internet was credited with 
extraordinary powers to change and improve many aspects of life and 
it was granted a special, even sacred, status. A look at reports about the 
Internet in articles from international general interest and news pub-
lications, ranging from Time Magazine, The New York Times and The 
London Times to Forbes and Business Week, in the biographies of leading 
inventors and Internet visionaries, and in books on the history and fu-
ture of this new technology reveals that it was perceived as an object that 
transcended what was hitherto thought to be within the grasp of human-
ity. Placed on such an elevated pedestal, the Internet became an object 
of reverence to which truths and beliefs about the future of the society 
could be attached. At the heyday of the hyperbolic interest in, or ‘hype’ 
around, the Internet, this technology was granted a significance that, to 
all intents and purposes, can be called a religious one. Let us look at this 
expression of religiosity and consider how the Internet acquired the spe-
cial status that it had.
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 The Internet Age
The ‘Internet age’ edition of Business Week was but one specimen in a 
veritable avalanche of publications devoted to the Internet that marked 
the public interest for this new technology throughout the latter part of 
the 1990s. A lively utopian discourse emerged in the journalistic media 
and other popular publications in North America as well as in Europe, 
Australia, and parts of Asia. Although there were exceptions, much writ-
ing about new information and communications technology (ICT) in 
general and the Internet in particular overflowed with visions of wealth, 
enlightenment, and boundless freedom. Age-old dreams of comfort and 
the betterment of human existence, transcendence beyond the limitations 
imposed on people by time and matter, and hopes of greater harmony and 
growth of knowledge were attached to this technology.
 The aforementioned Business Week cover typifies the sort of language 
and imagery that was employed regularly in articles about ICT and the 
Internet. Accounts of the powers and anticipated effects of the Internet 
on society were often padded with (quasi-) religious notions and epi-
thets. Some visions, such as the ideas expressed by the American ex-Vice 
President Al Gore in his ‘information superhighway’ speeches, where he 
promoted the Internet with phrases such as ‘the network of networks 
... ultimately linking all human knowledge’ (Gore 1998), may call forth 
vague associations with some form of supra-human entity. Throughout 
Al Gore’s terms in government, the Internet and the knowledge econo-
my were important points on his political agenda. In several speeches he 
used the term ‘information superhighway’, and promoted the Internet as 
a powerful force that would make the world a better place. For instance, 
in a speech given at the conference of the International Telecommunica-
tion Union in 1998, Gore praises the Internet, or ‘the Global Information 
Infrastructure’ as the means of realizing some age-old dreams:
For all the stunning capabilities of the Global Information Infrastruc-
ture, we must remember that at its heart it is a way to deepen and ex-
tend our oldest, and most cherished global values: rising standards 
of living and literacy, an ever-widening circle of democracy, freedom, 
and individual empowerment. And above all, we must remember that 
– especially in this global economy and Information Age – we are all 
connected, from Minnesota to Mongolia, from Madrid to Mali (Gore 
1998).
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Other enthusiasts have made use of more explicit religious terminology: 
the Internet has been described as a ‘demiurgic force’ (Gilder 1997), the 
conditions expected to be created by this technology as ‘heaven’, ‘para-
dise’, ‘nirvana’, and so forth. (Kaplan 1999; Quittner 1999; Baker & Beaton 
1997; Economist 1995), and those active in the branch have been profiled 
as ‘messiahs’, ‘evangelists’, and ‘prophets’ of a new worldview (Economist 
1999; 2000; Pennar 1997; Malone 2000). For instance, in the articles 
‘Nerd theology’ (1999) and ‘God Is the Machine’ (2002), the former edi-
tor of the technology magazine Wired, Kevin Kelly, speaks of computer 
technology as a deity. In the same vein, in their book The Long Boom 
(1999) the American economists Schwartz, Leyden, and Hyatt refer to 
the Internet as the ‘Great Enabler’, an all-powerful agent of change and 
the prime cause of an era of unprecedented wealth (Schwartz et al. 1999, 
19). Similar language is used in commending prominent computer sci-
entists, web programmers and e-business innovators, who are variously 
portrayed as ‘mini-gods’ (Kelly 1999a) and virtuosi (Berger 1996). The 
business publication Forbes even describes Tim Berners-Lee, one of the 
main inventors of the World Wide Web as ‘St. Tim of the Web’ (Reiss 
& Levine 1999). References were also made to strong faith in the Inter-
net, the spreading of its ‘gospel’ and evangelical missionary fervour (Al-
exander 1999; Clarke 1999; Guardian 1998). Finally, it was not unusual 
for journalists and various experts to speak of ‘Internet religion’, ‘web 
religion’, or ‘digital religion’ (Cortese 1995; Mack 1999; Reinhardt 1999). 
For example, in his biography A Very Public Offering (2001) the youthful 
Internet entrepreneur Stephan Paternot describes the early days of e-
commerce as follows: ‘It was a potential new religion. This was a religion 
being invented’ (Paternot 2001, 57).
 In short, rhetoric about the Internet was filled with religious analogies 
and some felt able to describe feelings inspired by it as religious. But was 
this not a case of mere florid metaphor? Looking at the examples just 
mentioned, can one really speak of religion? In line with Paternot’s sug-
gestion that the craze for Internet-related businesses was giving birth to 
a new religion, I would posit that the public interest for the Internet was 
indeed a religious affair. However, unlike Paternot, I would not claim that 
a new religion was being invented. No religious organization or dogma 
in the conventional sense was born. Rather, the discourse concerning 
the Internet was a manifestation of a more implicit form of religion. By 
that I mean that, without any exclusive links to religious institutions, the 
technology concerned was nonetheless charged with characteristically 
religious notions: transcendence, salvation, and a strong belief in the 
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power of one’s object of admiration to transform one’s existence. Above 
all, the trust in the great potential of this technology fulfilled a basically 
religious function: it presented a frame of reference for making sense of 
the world.
 The Relocation of the Religious
The idea that religion need not manifest itself exclusively in an especially 
designated domain (i.e. within the boundaries of organized congregations) 
has been acknowledged by a number of sociologists. Thomas Luckmann 
and Robert Bellah, among others, have argued that instead of the claimed 
complete secularization of the contemporary Western society, a shift in 
religiosity is taking place. Religion is being relocated from its traditional 
institutions to the everyday, secular world.
 Both authors employ a functional definition of religion and hold that 
it is a system of meanings that is anchored to certain notions or ob-
jects that serve as transcendent guarantees of the truths and values of 
a particular worldview. The defining task of religion, then, is to pres-
ent frames of reference for making sense of the world and to provide 
answers to basic existential questions. It can be fulfilled by a variety of 
seemingly non-religious phenomena. Accordingly, Luckmann uses the 
term ‘invisible religion’ to denote the kind of ‘hidden’ religious sentiment 
that a variety of contemporary ideals, such as ‘familism’ (the veneration 
of the family unit), the cult of the individual, the social mobility ethos, 
and the democratic ideal entail (Luckmann 1967, 106, 113). Bellah’s con-
cept of ‘civil religion’ in public life reveals a similar understanding that 
certain secular phenomena display religious facets. According to Bellah, 
secularized versions of traditional (Christian) religious thought can be 
found in a variety of American social phenomena: Memorial Day, pres-
idential inaugurations, rituals at veterans’ cemeteries, the ideal of the 
‘American way of life’, and so on. He indicates that although references 
are made to religious convention (martyrdom, charisma, evangelism and 
the Promised Land), civil religion is divorced from this context and ulti-
mate meaning is found in objects that belong to the secular world (Bellah 
1970, 175-179).
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 Technophilia and the Internet
Collective ‘technophilia’ is another example of such relocation of the reli-
gious in the modern world. In the book The Internet. A Philosophical In-
quiry (1999) the British philosopher Gordon Graham refers to the cultural 
theorist Neil Postman’s use of the term ‘technophile’ when speaking of 
individuals ‘who gaze on technology as a lover does on his beloved, seeing 
it without blemish and entertaining no apprehension for the future’ (Post-
man quoted in Graham 1999, 9). Graham describes technophilia as the 
activity or attitude of technophiles: blind love of technology that implies 
complete trust in its omnipotence (Graham 1999, 9).
 According to the French philosopher Jacques Ellul, such love of tech-
nology is an ideology. As he sees it, technology and applied science have 
such a prominent position in today’s society that they have become its 
guiding myths. In The Technological Bluff (1990) he argues that modern-
day belief in technology is based on the conviction that it is essential to 
society and can provide solutions to all of humankind’s dreams. Antici-
pating the hopes that were to be pinned to the Internet some five years 
after the publication of the book Ellul asserts:
Not only is technology good, not only is it indispensable, but also... it 
alone can achieve all that human beings have been seeking throughout 
centuries: liberty, democracy, justice, happiness (by a high standard of 
living), reduction of work, etc. (Ellul 1990, 30).
In other words, Ellul holds that, in the modern world, technology has 
been granted a significance previously associated with mythical, heavenly 
forces. First, it is thought to have powers that go beyond human capacities 
and it holds the promise of delivering what we long for. From this perspec-
tive, technology can be seen as an agent of salvation – it offers hope of a 
world better than the one we know. Second, being the point of reference 
to which our culture measures its truths and ideals, technology moulds 
and steers society’s beliefs and values in a specific direction.
 To use Neil Postman’s formulation, in the contemporary world one 
can observe the ‘deification of technology’ (Postman 1992, 71). By this he 
means that technology has a growing influence on how life and the world 
are given meaning in Western societies. What he describes as a ‘techno-
logical culture’ ‘seeks its authorization in technology, finds its satisfac-
tions in technology, and takes its orders from technology’ (Postman 1992, 
72). In short, a technophiliac society refers to technology as a somehow 
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transcendent, omnipotent power that forms the framework for defini-
tions of what is important, desirable, and meaningful.
 In this process of constructing meaning, a number of facets come to 
the fore that mark technophiliac discourses as religious. Namely, the con-
struction of objects with a superhuman status, shared convictions and 
(utopian) beliefs, trust in the power of certain objects or individuals to 
bring about radically new and better ways of existence, and collective ex-
citement about the objects or ideas in question.
 The intense public fascination with the Internet was a prime case of 
technophilia and an exemplary manifestation of the religious dimensions 
just mentioned. Since its popularization and speedy commercialization 
from the mid-1990s onwards, this new technology has been praised as a 
radically new business opportunity, as the ultimate platform for democ-
racy, as a cornucopia of self-generating riches, and as an agent that will 
make work and communication easier and more pleasant. Media reports 
and various popular-scientific and futuristic publications, with titles such 
as Being Digital (Negroponte 1995), Meganet: How the Global Communi-
cations Network Will Connect Everyone on Earth (Dizard 1997), The Death 
of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Is Changing Our Lives 
(Cairncross 1997) and Telecosm: How Infinite Bandwidth Will Revolution-
ize Our World (Gilder 2000), reveal the popular sentiment that with the 
introduction of the Internet something extraordinary and marvellous had 
started to take place. As early as in 1995, in an article entitled ‘Techno-
mania’, a bewildered but enthusiastic journalist at Newsweek refers to the 
Internet as the mysterious and powerful entity that is bound to have far-
reaching effects on our lives: ‘as we grappled with the unanswered ques-
tions [with regard to the Internet], we’re in for the ride of a lifetime’ (Levy 
1995). The author regards the introduction of digital information technol-
ogy, such as the Internet as a momentous historical event. As he sees it, a 
‘Bit Bang’ – the Big Bang of information technology – has taken place that 
‘will change every aspect of our lives’ (Levy 1995).
 In the years to follow, the Internet continued to be portrayed in these 
terms: as a fascinating and awe-inspiring force of exceptional capacities. 
The belief that it was the prime agent behind the birth of a new kind of 
society formed one of the central themes of the public discourse about 
the Internet. Albeit for a brief period, this technology was presented as 
the object that defined the nature of modern society. To speak with Neil 
Postman’s words, the Internet became deified: it was seen as a superhu-
man force, an object capable of making sweeping changes in the world as 
we know it and thus worthy of worship.
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 Transcendence by Paradigm Shift
The Canadian scholar historian of technology, David Noble, describes 
technologies that are granted such extraordinary capacities to change the 
world as ‘technologies of transcendence’ (Noble 1999). To Noble, these are 
technological inventions upon which great hope is pinned and, typically, 
they are hailed as the means of overcoming the uncertainties and short-
comings of the human condition. In The Religion of Technology (1999) he 
argues that throughout history such ‘technologies of transcendence’ have 
been approached as the means to ‘the recovery of man’s lost divinity’ (No-
ble 1999, 6). He shows that since the beginning of the second millennium 
crafts and skills, scientific knowledge and technology have been regarded 
as a step closer to divine powers and knowledge: ever-greater control over 
nature, space, the fate of humanity, and even mortality. Noble’s examples 
from the more recent history are atomic weapons, space travel, artificial 
intelligence, and genetic engineering. In all these cases he recognizes the 
desire to transcend: to triumph over the forces of nature, to reach the 
heavens and rise above the limitations of the earth, to create life and over-
come death. In short, when revered as a vehicle of transcendence, tech-
nology is seen as a means of reaching further than what was thought to 
be within the grasp of humans. Visions are sketched of how the world will 
be transformed under the influence of a new invention and often, utopian 
scenarios of a new world are born.
 In the book Th e Digital Economy. Promise and Peril in the Age of Net-
worked Intelligence (1997) by the Canadian writer Don Tapscott, one en-
counters a typical formulation of the feelings associated with the imminent 
rise of a new kind of reality where the Internet would play a key role:
We are at the dawn of an Age of Networked Intelligence – an age that is 
giving birth to a new economy, a new politics and a new society. Busi-
nesses will be transformed, governments will be renewed, and individu-
als will be able to reinvent themselves – all with the help of information 
technology. (Tapscott 1997, 2)
Tapscott attributes remarkable powers to what is described as ‘Networked 
Intelligence’: it will transform society and redefi ne the very identity of in-
dividuals. In this new world ICT is to be the key to meanings, beliefs, and 
ways of acting. Of crucial importance to his argument is the emphasis on 
the radical break with the current, familiar worldview that the Internet era 
implies. As Tapscott sees it, new technology will be the cause of an all-en-
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compassing revolution (Tapscott 1997, 4). Th is understanding of technol ogy 
reveals a belief in its capacity as a vehicle of transcendence. In Tapscott’s 
vision of the future, technology will take humanity beyond the hitherto 
known and give birth to new systems of meaning. However, in the secular 
tale of transcendence that Tapscott’s book tells, we encounter an alterna-
tive, more scientifi c term for the process of exceeding the world as we know 
it: a ‘shift’, change or innovation in ‘paradigm’ (Tapscott 1997, 29; 54; 95).
 Originally derived from Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Rev-
olutions (1962), the idea of paradigm change was a favoured metaphor in 
attempts made in the public discourse to emphasize the far-reaching in-
fluence of the Internet on various aspects of society (Burman 2003; Grow 
2001; Tapscott & Caston 1992; ). For instance, the ‘high-tech high priest’ 
(Goodman 2001) and ‘techno-evangelist’ (Economist 2000b; Helmore 
1999) George Gilder, who saw cause for a ‘paradigm party’ to celebrate 
the rise of new technologies, spoke of a new, ‘Gilder paradigm’ in defin-
ing wealth and scarcity in the Internet era (Gilder 1996; 1998). Similarly, 
the Financial Times writes of a ‘paradigm-shift in our cognisance of real-
ity’ (Pearson 1995), in trade (Authers 1998) and in institutional hierar-
chies (Taylor 1999). If Kuhn’s term refers to fundamental changes in the 
set of accepted truths and practices that form a scientific discipline, then 
the paradigm of the Internet era also was associated with a revolution in 
truths and values.
 Fashionable catch phrases and neologisms of the era, such as informa-
tion superhighway, cyberspace, online world, electronic frontier, New or 
Knowledge Economy, network society, and so on all referred to this shift 
in paradigm. These terms suggested pioneering discoveries, innovation, 
and whole new conceptualizations of space, time, distance, social interac-
tion, and of doing business. They carried the connotation that with the 
implementation of networked information technology society would be 
lifted above its status quo to a novel kind of existence. For example, in 
the best-selling book, New Rules for the New Economy (1999), Kevin Kelly 
describes the so-called New Economy as a new reality and he mentions 
three ways in which it differs from anything preceding it. First, it is disem-
bodied and weightless, meaning that its main resource and object of trade 
are non-material products – ‘information, relationships, copyright, enter-
tainment, securities and derivatives’ (Kelly 1999b, 3). Second, he consid-
ers information technology and ‘ubiquitous electronic networks’ (Kelly 
1999b, 2) to be the sources of hitherto unknown wealth. Kelly notes that 
‘the network economy will unleash opportunities on a scale never seen 
before on Earth’, and adds that this is not a far-fetched utopian statement 
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(Kelly 1999b, 156). Third, he describes the New Economy as global. With 
much excitement and some pretence of prophecy he makes it clear that 
the current point in history is an important one for the whole world: ‘we 
are now at a moment when a cloak of glass fibres and a halo of satellites 
are closing themselves around the globe to bring forth a seamless eco-
nomic culture’ (Kelly 1999b, 156).
 A number of distinctive themes become clear from the optimistic vi-
sions that informed this notion of a paradigm shift. If we recall Jacques El-
lul’s allusion to the promise of technology to fulfil a range of dreams, then 
the Internet was indeed regarded as the long-awaited answer to age-old 
aspirations: wealth and the betterment of standards of life, freedom and 
equality, the redefinition of space, and finally, harmony among humans 
and better mutual understanding. I shall discuss two of these themes – the 
belief that the Internet would radically transform our notions of space and 
distance, and the trust in its capacity as a liberating force.
 Control over Matter and Space
In Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowl-
edge Age (1994) a number of outspoken Internet visionaries affiliated with 
the Progress and Freedom Foundation (Esther Dyson, George Gilder, Al-
vin Toffler, and George Keyworth) expressed their belief that the Internet 
would play an active part in the ‘overthrow of matter’ and the ascendance 
‘of the power of the mind’ (Dyson et al. 1994). In this collective statement 
an idea is presented that formed an important ingredient of the optimism 
about the Internet: in the information age greater emphasis would be 
on knowledge and digital data. ‘Intangibles’ – ‘intellectual capital, skills, 
research and development (R&D), brands, relationships and reputation’ 
(Zadek 2001, 28) – would eventually reduce the relevance of physical 
things.
 Accordingly, Don Tapscott imagines that ‘in the new economy, more 
and more of the economy’s added value will be created by brain rather 
than brawn’ (Tapscott 1997, 7). In a similar vein, in his New Rules for the 
New Economy Kelly posits that the influence of the Internet and other 
networked ICT will diminish the role of physical things in the world:
Th e principles governing the world of the soft – the world of intangibles, 
of media, of software, and of services – will soon command the world of 
the hard – the world of reality, of atoms, of objects, of steel and oil, and 
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the hard work done by the sweat of brows. Iron and lumber will obey the 
laws of software, automobiles will follow the rules of networks, smoke-
stacks will comply with the decrees of knowledge (Kelly 1999b, 2).
Such visions of a new kind of spatial experience were not propagated by 
science fiction and popular science writers alone. Reputable authorities 
from the academic world, such as Nicholas Negroponte and William 
Mitchell – both professors at MIT – claimed that bits and software were 
shaping the physical environments in which we live, and that they were 
increasingly transforming matter into data. As Negroponte says in Be-
ing Digital (1995): ‘Digital living will include less and less dependence on 
being in a specific space at a specific time, and the transmission of place 
itself will start to become possible’ (Negroponte 1995, 165). He imagines 
that in the near future, as the possibilities of cyberspace and the Internet 
are developed further, physical distances will become irrelevant for face-
to-face experience: one will be connected with far-away places as if they 
were just outside one’s window and even be able to smell the Swiss Alps 
and their ‘(digital) manure’ when on the other side of the planet (Negro-
ponte 1995, 7, 165).
 As the Canadian author Vincent Mosco observes in the book The Digi-
tal Sublime (2004), Negroponte’s writings on the digital world represent 
an unshakeable belief in the rise of a new way of life (Mosco 2004, 73). 
Indeed, no questions are asked about the move to a more immaterial kind 
of existence: ‘the change from atoms to bits is irrevocable and unstop-
pable’ (Negroponte 1995, 4). Digital technology and the Internet, then, 
run a course that appears independent of human intervention. They are 
astounding objects of trust and admiration that are elevated to a position 
higher than banal, daily existence, and have their own ‘sacred and sublime 
mission’, as Mosco puts it (Mosco 2004, 75).
 Related to the idea that the material world was being marginalized was 
the notion that, as the Internet was ‘fundamentally and profoundly anti-
spatial’ (Mitchell 1995, 8), it would have the effect of diminishing or even 
eliminating distances. This idea was elaborated in many publications, such 
as Frances Cairncross’ The Death of Distance: How the Communications 
Revolution Is Changing our Lives (1997), The Road Ahead (1995) by Bill 
Gates, and various best-selling books by the ‘digital guru’ George Gilder. 
The recurrent theme in these books was that the Internet would not only 
make contact between great distances possible but facilitate instant ex-
change of materials digitally. Thus, Cairncross foresees that ‘the death of 
distance loosens the grip of geography’, causing borders and barriers to 
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break down (Cairncross 1997, 5), Gilder describes networked information 
technology as the agent behind the ‘overthrow of matter’ (Gilder 1990, 15-
58), and Gates hails new ICT and the ‘global information market’ (Gates 
1995, 6) as the means of making distance and geography less relevant or 
eliminating them altogether (Gates 1995, 6, 152, 181). Again, one can de-
tect hopes of transcendence: the Internet is expected to give us power 
over matter and be the agent of a new kind of existence.
 Internet, a Liberating Force
The idea that the Internet would grant humanity access to new powers 
was a recurrent theme in accounts about this new technology. In addi-
tion to the anticipated control over space and matter, hopes of greater 
personal power and autonomy were projected onto this technology. The 
Internet was expected to bring about a general de-centralization of pow-
er, eliminate all manner of intermediaries, lift limitations set on people 
by gender, race, social class or physical disability, and further democracy 
(Barlow 1996; Cairncross 1997; Dizard 1997; Dyson 1998; Mitchell 1995; 
Negroponte 1995; Rheingold 2002). Newsweek summarizes the ethic of 
the Internet as follows: ‘voraciously free expression, a drive for individual 
empowerment, a loathing for authority and a strong libertarian strain’ 
(Levy & Hafner 1995). At long last, what the American author Andrew 
Shapiro describes as ‘control revolution’ was to take place and make it 
possible for private persons to participate directly and more actively in 
decision making processes (Shapiro 1999).
 The Internet and related new technologies would facilitate unknown 
freedom, create space for individual development and break down estab-
lished social hierarchies. For instance, Newsweek imagined that they had 
potential to topple dictatorships:
Obviously, the decentralizing nature of the computer poses a threat to 
dictators... But the same dynamic confounds managers everywhere, as 
computers and networks amplify the powers of individuals and twist 
the corporate organizational charts (Levy & Hafner 1995).
As Hand and Sandywell put it in their criticism of what they call ‘e-topia’ 
(utopian thought relating specifically to electronic communications me-
dia), under the influence of the Internet, future civic life was imagined as 
‘a continuous “town meeting” where active citizens devote most of their 
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time and energy to debating the public good to create a genuinely com-
munitarian culture of self-reflexive civic subjects’ (Hand and Sandywell 
2002, 201).
 The above-mentioned publication ‘Cyberspace and the American 
Dream’ is an exemplary illustration of such an e-topia. In this collective 
statement, ICT and the Internet are linked to aspirations that constitute 
American mythology. As the title of the document suggests, the Internet 
is presented as the next step in the realization of the American Dream and 
an appeal is made to the frontier mentality. The authors of the statement 
envision the Internet as the new American frontier, a fresh realm that has 
no established constraints and where everything is still possible. This is a 
place of complete pre-modern freedom: ‘[The Internet] spells the death 
of the central institutional paradigm of modern life, the bureaucratic or-
ganization’ (Dyson et al. 1994). Together with the promises of new riches 
and domains to discover and conquer, the Internet was to offer liberty and 
self-determination. It came to be associated with one of the highest values 
current in the United States: the freedom achieved by the first settlers.
 Internet, a Vessel of Religiosity
According to the authors of ‘Cyberspace and the American Dream’ and 
others, such as John Perry Barlow, the author of ‘A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace’ (1996), long-term dreams of liberty would 
be fulfilled and barriers would inevitably disappear. Others have claimed 
that the Internet would make us less dependent on the limitations of space 
and distances. Others still have declared the Internet to be the carrier of 
a lasting ‘age of prosperity’ (Schwartz et al 1999, title) and predicted a 
future of ‘ultraprosperity’ for everyone (Kelly 1999c). As Kevin Kelly puts 
it, ‘the good news is, you’ll be a millionaire soon. The bad news is, so will 
everybody else’ (Kelly 1999c).
 But, typically for the rhetoric of Internet enthusiasm, the precise rea-
sons for these developments remain unclear. As Mosco points out, the 
discourse about the influence of digital technology, including the In-
ternet, on society was filled with charismatic sentiments (Mosco 2004, 
74). The Internet had gained special authority and its enigmatic powers 
were not questioned. With examples of writings by Barlow, Dyson and 
her co-authors, and others, such as MIT professor Negroponte, Mosco 
shows that the enthusiastic rhetoric about the Internet throve on stories 
of ‘mythic transcendence’ (Mosco 2004, 75). That is, the optimistic tales 
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about the Internet celebrated digital communications technology as a 
force that rises above the banal and is capable of performing wonders. 
As Mosco says, the idea propagated among a number of Internet pundits 
was that this technology represented a historically unique phenomenon 
that could not be compared to anything preceding it and therefore had an 
exalted value of its own (Mosco 2004, 82). Technology was deified: it had 
a logic of its own; it could not and needed not be explained.
 Looking at the high expectations for the Internet, one cannot help but 
recognize an old vision of a long-awaited liberator that will eliminate op-
pressive systems and install a reign of freedom and independence. With-
out any clear links to religious tradition, this strong belief in better times 
nonetheless contains an essentially religious message: an all-powerful and 
awe-inspiring phenomenon will transform how we understand and expe-
rience the world. It will bring salvation, help us transcend to a new kind 
of existence and, above all, it will confirm with great clarity the defining 
values of our society: liberty and equality.
 Judging by the amount of media coverage and the infiltration of the 
theme of the Internet beyond specialist literature into general popular cul-
ture, the belief in the power of the Internet to bring about great changes to 
life as we know it was a source of shared, public exhilaration. During the 
heyday of Internet enthusiasm a number of dedicated lifestyle magazines 
were born (Fast Company, Mondo 2000, Wired, and Red Herring) and the 
Internet was subject to intense attention from established general interest 
magazines as well. For instance, between 1993 and 2002, Time magazine 
featured the Internet and its many visionaries and heroes on its cover on 
at least twenty occasions. The election of Jeff Bezos, the founder of the 
web-based bookstore Amazon.com, as the magazine’s Person of the Year 
in 1999 is a telling sign of the special status granted to the Internet in the 
public discourse. With Bezos’ title, the Internet and enterprises related to 
it are honoured as phenomena of historical import for the world. Simi-
larly, when Newsweek calls 1995 ‘The Year of the Internet’ (Levy & Hafner 
1995) or when Wired magazine claims that ‘We’re facing 25 years of pros-
perity, freedom, and a better environment for the whole world’ (Schwartz 
et al. 1997), the emphasis is on the collective experience of something of 
great social and emotional significance.
 According to Emile Durkheim, high-spirited communal expression of 
emotion or shared ‘effervescence’ is a key to the rise of religious feelings 
(Durkheim 2001, 164). It is at these instances that sacred objects are cre-
ated, shared beliefs arise, and ties between individuals in a community are 
forged and strengthened. In the case of technophile enthusiasm for the 
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Internet, this sort of effervescence arose in the public discourse carried 
out via the journalistic media and publications by various visionaries. Al-
beit a completely different setting than the corroborees of the Australian 
Aborigines to which Durkheim refers in his discussion of effervescence in 
The Elementary Forms of Religion (1912/2001), the same processes were at 
work. Namely, in the discourse about the Internet, a transcendent object 
of reverence was constructed and a set of values and aspirations were ar-
ticulated that served as the defining points in the formation of a specific 
worldview, that of the Internet Age.
 Conclusion
As several authors have shown, in some form or another, religiosity con-
tinues to play a role even in secular areas where modernization and ra-
tionalization seemingly reign supreme (Alexander 2003; Aupers 2004; 
Szerszynski 2005; Wertheim 2000). In various disguises forms of religion 
exist that are uncoupled from official religious institutions and whose re-
ligiosity has therefore been obscured or ignored. While one may accept 
the claim that in some parts of the world, organized religion has lost the 
importance it once had, religion as such shows no signs of disappearing. 
In the modern, Western world religious sentiments are often integrated 
and implied in seemingly non-religious social phenomena.
 The collective love for the Internet as it took shape in discourses in 
the media and other publications throughout the second half of the 1990s 
was one such vessel of religiosity. Religiosity manifested itself in the 
tales of paradigm change that envisioned the rise, or transcendence of 
humanity to a different kind of existence; there were religious facets to 
the representations of the Internet as a force capable of diminishing dis-
tances and controlling matter. Equally, the role of an agent of freedom and 
equality that was granted to the Internet has a religious significance, as it 
links technology to hopes of salvation. Furthermore, the techno-utopian 
dreams related to the Internet gave rise to collective emotions, provided 
shared objects of admiration and (re)articulated values that constitute the 
modern Western worldview (freedom, equality, progress).
 As to the allusions to biblical tales, such the Business Week cover men-
tioned in the introduction to this paper, phrases such as ‘the John the 
Baptist of the Digital Age’ (Malone 2000), the characterization of a man-
ager at Cisco Systems as an ‘evangelist of the Internet gospel’ (Economist 
1999) or the description of the Internet as ‘God’s gift to marketing’ (Millar 
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1996), these are primarily rhetorical tools. Although there are recogniz-
able echoes of religious tradition, the use of such vocabulary does not 
necessarily mean that an explicitly religious agenda is pursued that binds 
the described object to specific dogmas. Rather, it is often a token of a 
more implicit form of religion, which is embedded in secular phenomena 
and institutions. In discourses concerned with technological inventions 
such as the Internet, terminology and analogies that refer to religious 
traditions are expressions of strong faith in the extraordinary power and 
the special, even sacred status of technology. They are employed in order 
to express technophile sentiments and values with familiar and suitably 
emotive vocabulary.
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4 Re-Imagining the Human-Environment Relationship via 
 Religious Traditions and New Scientifi c Cosmologies
Tony Watling
 Introduction
This article explores how a number of religious traditions and science-
based cosmologies (as represented in a ‘field of religion and ecology’) 
understand nature, particularly in response to the environmental crisis, 
using metaphors, myths, and symbols, to ‘re-imagine’ it, attempting to 
create new environmentally-friendly meanings and actions.1 The en-
vironmental crisis in this sense is seen as being not only economic or 
technological but also moral and spiritual, based on a modern, Western, 
Enlightenment worldview (and associated secular/scientific myths) that 
sought to liberate humanity from dependence on nature, via reason and 
progress, but has, however, developed into an anthropocentric desire to 
master and transcend nature, replacing previous animistic, experiential, 
holistic, ways of perceiving the environment, with a mechanical, objective, 
reductionist view, with humanity separated from a commodified nature 
(separating mind/body, matter/spirit). This has led to a disenchantment 
and ecological illiteracy (the earth being denied spirit or subjectivity, be-
ing measured by economic or technological standards).2 Such perceptions 
about humanity and nature, then, have been seen to become dominant, 
defining reality, leading to destructive ecological responses. However, 
such a way of looking at the world is also seen as socially constructed; 
nature is a diverse and malleable concept, always a social practice. It is 
argued therefore, that what is needed is a critique of the construction of 
reality, dialogue about and counter views of (a politicization of ) nature; 
new worldviews with new ecological myths, embracing organic, subjec-
tive, or spiritual, views, reconnecting humanity with nature, enabling eco-
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logically orientated lifestyles, respecting and caring for the environment 
(Cronon 1996; Callicott 1997; Gardner 2002; Maxwell 2003; McGrath 
2003; Metzner 1994; Oelschlaeger 1994; Soule 1995; Tucker 2002; Tucker 
and Grim 2001; Weiming 1994).3
 It is argued that a new imaginative language is needed to re-root hu-
manity in the earth. Metaphors are seen as being fundamental to this pro-
cess. They express fundamental concepts through which humans under-
stand and organize experience, having the power (rational, emotional) to 
create (personal, social) reality. They may thus be crucial for re-creating 
the conception of the world and the human place within it. Cosmogo-
nies, or creation stories, for example, locate the present in sacred time, 
providing a common cognitive legitimacy and meaningfulness, linking 
moral orientations to cosmic origins. They create feelings of belonging, 
divulging humanity’s connection to a wider scheme, highlighting its role 
and destiny. Rethinking or re-appropriating accounts of creation may thus 
stimulate a rethinking of ecological behaviour. Such ideas link to myth in 
that they provide a meaningful and powerful imaginative or symbolic nar-
rative that orients humanity, providing the basis for knowledge and wis-
dom, and evoking ways of interpreting and acting within the world. Such 
images are cosmological, relating to the origin, order, and meaning, of the 
cosmos and the human condition. They relate ‘truths’ and principles that 
define possibilities and limitations, being the basis of creative activities 
of cultures. Humanity in this sense has been described as a ‘mythopoeic’ 
species, unable to exist without narratives or stories through which to un-
derstand, engage, and order, the world. Hence, to effectively address the 
environmental crisis it is argued that humanity must attend to its stories; 
creating a (metaphoric) re-imagination of the world and the role of hu-
manity within it (Bolle 2005a; 2005b; Callicott 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980; Long 2005; Oelschlaeger 1994; Tucker 2002).
 Traditionally, religion has provided such narratives, but in the modern 
world religion is seen to be in decline and lacking relevance; religious tra-
ditions are losing control of social life to secular bodies, their beliefs no 
longer providing existential meaning (e.g. secularization). However, reli-
gion may not be so static or unitary a phenomenon as previously thought 
(neither may secularization; such ideas may be a consequence of an ob-
jective, rational Western bias, creating an ‘official’ ‘religious’ category and 
ignoring unofficial views). It may rather be a complex, dynamic process 
of individual and social, official and unofficial, actions in particular con-
texts. Religion may thus be capable of interacting with new developments, 
creating new meanings, and re-ordering personal and social beliefs and 
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identities (albeit in more diverse and fluid forms) (Beyer 1994; Casanova 
1994; Woodhead and Heelas 2000). This may be especially so as recent 
social changes (economic, scientific, technological), and their often del-
eterious effects on the environment, cause instability and moral dilemmas 
while isolating individuals from the moral resources needed to address 
them. In particular, it has been argued that religion can be useful (even es-
sential) in addressing the environmental crisis. Religious traditions (with 
histories of ethical reflection and frameworks of myths and symbols) are 
seen to go beyond egoism and materialism, stressing the sacredness and 
order of nature, defining humanity’s place in it, highlighting its obliga-
tions to it, providing meaningful guidance. They are thus thought to have 
the (metaphoric) means, the critical and prophetic potential, and the in-
fluential moral authority to re-imagine the environment (and humanity), 
to contest dominant views of it, and to provide new values and social di-
rection through creating, recovering, and expressing, ecologically orient-
ed metaphors, myths, and symbols (Beyer 1994; Gardner 2002; McGrath 
2003; Oelschlaeger 1994; Tucker and Grim 2005).4
 To provide such ecological re-imagination, however, religions tradi-
tions may need to be re-interpreted in a more eco-centric way. Judeo-
Christianity, for example, has been seen as being too anthropocentric, 
and possibly anti-environmentalist, stressing humanity as dominant and 
nature as passive. Many religions have been seen as world-denying, con-
centrating on human salvation alone, or as being part of political regimes 
that are ecologically destructive.5 Such an ecological awareness of reli-
gions – what is seen as religion entering an ‘ecological phase’ – has been 
growing over a period of time, and has been termed the ‘greening of re-
ligion’ (Nash 1989; Tucker 2003). In particular, there is a growing ‘field’ 
of ‘religion and ecology’, a range of academic and religious literature and 
actions exploring and promoting eco-religious ideas, deepening spiritual 
awareness of nature, and encouraging ecological activism (Tucker 2003; 
Tucker and Grim 2001; 2005; Watling 2008a).6 Such initiatives aim to en-
gage the transformative possibilities of religion, reclaiming and recon-
structing traditions so as to promote flourishing human-earth relations. 
They aim to reconceptualize religious attitudes to nature and to create a 
cross-cultural reservoir and mutually enriching dialogue of imagination, 
commitment, and wisdom, providing interdependent ecological ethics 
based around the common ground of the sacred reality of the world, while 
still being sensitive to the cultural and historical context (assessing and 
using religions in a self-reflective, not self-promoting, way; respecting 
claims to truth, but exploring different avenues to truth) (Callicott 1997; 
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Oelschlaeger 1994; Tucker 2003; Tucker and Grim 2001; 2005). In this 
way, new ‘religious’ views may emerge alongside traditional ones. In par-
ticular, in this light, science is seen as a possible source of new views, of-
fering meaningful resources for understanding the world and humanity’s 
role in it, as well as combating environmental problems by suggesting new 
ways of acting, particularly since it is considered as having plausibility as 
well as global reach, and as being able to co-exist with and encompass 
other views. Such science is not envisaged as materialistic, objective, or 
reductionist, however, but rather interdisciplinary, holistic, and organic, 
possibly spiritual and teleological, what has been called ‘deep’ science, an 
imaginative epistemology of rational empiricism and spiritual awareness 
(a ‘scientific paganism’). This is seen as science entering its ‘wisdom phase’ 
and encountering mystery and meaning (possibly synthesizing with reli-
gion), going beyond purely rational explanations and objective facts, and 
using metaphor, myth, and symbol, to inspire new (subjective) visions of 
the environment and the human place in it, creating intimacy and inspir-
ing reverence (Barlow 1997; Brockelman 1999; Callicott 1997; Griffin 1988; 
Maxwell 2003; Metzner 1994; Taylor 2001).7
 It is argued, then, that cross-cultural comparisons of (and dialogue 
between) religious and scientific concepts of nature, human nature, and 
human/nature interaction, are needed to enable engagement with eco-
logical issues. New ‘earth literate’ religious or science-based cosmologies, 
highlighting the (holistic, organic, spiritual) cause, nature, and purpose 
of life, reconnecting and re-integrating humanity and nature (mind/body, 
matter/spirit) are seen as possible foundations for ecological ethics and 
actions in relation to the environment and the human place in it, able to 
inspire new visions and provide new guiding myths. In this article, there-
fore, I qualitatively and ethnographically explore such ideas by analyzing 
and comparing new ecological views being stressed among two Eastern 
and two Western religious traditions, Buddhism and Chinese religions 
and Judaism and Christianity,8 as well as two science-inspired cosmolo-
gies, Deep Ecology and Gaia9 (stressed in the field of religion and ecol-
ogy).10 I analyse and compare the ecological metaphors, myths, and sym-
bols stressed, exploring what they say about nature and the human place 
in it and examine what this may mean for future (ecological, scientific, 
religious) identities and actions. I will examine how religious and scien-
tific individuals and traditions may be re-assessing their views, recovering 
forgotten ecological themes or stimulating new ones, while exploring and 
highlighting how religion and science are creatively and dynamically be-
ing re-addressed in the modern context.
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 Eastern Religious Traditions and Ecology
Buddhism
‘Th e Six Great Elements are interfused and are in a state of eternal har-
mony. Th e Four Mandalas are inseparably related to one another. When 
the grace of the Th ree Mysteries is retained (our inborn mysteries will) 
quickly be manifested. Infi nitely interrelated like the meshes of Indra’s 
net are those we call existences’ (Ingram 1997, 75).
These lines of an esoteric Shingon Buddhist poem are, for Ingram (1997), 
seen as highlighting a Buddhist, organic, holistic view of nature. Here the 
six elements, earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness, highlight 
the timeless, non-dual, harmony of the universe, all life arising simulta-
neously with mutual causality via their interaction, with the aim of exis-
tence the awareness and experience of this. To achieve this awareness, 
four mandalas (paintings of Buddha in colours representing the interpen-
etrating elements) encourage meditation towards harmony with nature, 
integrating the three mysteries, body, speech, and mind. This is correlated 
with ‘Indra’s net’ of many-sided jewels, each reflecting the other, high-
lighting their (and the world’s) interdependence. If one jewel becomes 
cloudy (e.g. environmental pollution, species decline) or clear (e.g. en-
vironmental clean-up, species protection) this is reflected in the others 
(unbalancing or balancing the whole, emphasizing humanity’s wider con-
nections and responsibilities) (Barnhill 1997; Callicott 1997; Kaza 2002; 
Loori 1997; Sponberg 1997; Swearer 2001).
 Such ideas highlight ‘Green Buddhism’, a movement using Buddhism as 
a source for eco-friendly advice. In this scheme, Buddhism is seen as an 
‘ecological religion’ with concern for nature integral to its beliefs and prac-
tices. Buddha’s Four Noble Truths – the universal reality of suffering, the 
cause of suffering through desire, freedom from desire as freedom from 
suffering, and freedom as lying in moral discipline and spiritual depth – 
are especially highlighted for their ecological importance. In this sense, 
the basis of any Buddhist ‘eco-ethics’ is the recognition that suffering is 
caused by trishna, a selfish attachment to existence (‘I self ’; alienation from 
the world), and that to overcome this requires moral and spiritual learn-
ing in order to realize the ‘true’ nature of reality, which is the ontological 
interrelation of the world (‘we self ’, uniting with the world), and hereby 
experience ‘enlightenment’. These ideas are linked to Buddhist teachings 
of dharma, meaning a path to truth and things in nature, highlighting 
interdependence, that all inner and outer phenomena are inseparable: all 
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beings are dharmas or have ‘dharma nature’, a universal essence, and the 
potential to attain enlightenment through acting compassionately, culti-
vating interdependence, and creating sangha, or community. In line with 
this the doctrine of karma, or cause and effect, and the concept of sam-
sara, or rebirth, where all thoughts, words, or deeds, shape experiences, 
affecting the whole, are also seen to link life in the (moral) continuum 
of the enlightenment process (and stress human responsibility to wider 
nature) (Barnhill 1997; Callicott 1997; Gross 2002; Kaza 2002; Loori 1997; 
Sponberg 1997; Swearer 2001).
 Enlightenment, then, is the path not only to truth and a fuller realiza-
tion of existence, but also to environmental, personal, social, and spiritual 
health. To achieve it involves, for Swearer (2001), a ‘particular-general 
principle’ process, following the Buddha’s example: understanding per-
sonal karmic history, then the karmic history of humanity, and finally 
the principle underlying the cause of suffering. This is seen, by Spon-
berg (1997), as a ‘hierarchy of compassion’ where, unlike Western indi-
vidualistic views, ‘progress’ is an evolution of consciousness toward the 
awareness and cultivation of interdependence: more evolved beings ac-
cept inter-dependence and thus have greater compassion, wisdom, and 
responsibility, towards life. This is a progress that moves away from self-
ishness and consumerism, a ‘virtue ethic’ involving the ‘threefold learn-
ing’ of morality, meditation, and insight, leading to a ‘mindful awareness’ 
and ‘middle path’ moderate lifestyle, overcoming dualism (self-denial/
self-indulgence), providing stability and balance. To achieve it involves 
using nature as a teacher of balance and interrelation, or abiding by tradi-
tional ‘precepts’ such as not creating evil, practicing good, or being truth-
ful (the ‘eight-fold path’ of right understanding, intention, speech, action, 
livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration). In this scheme sim-
plicity and discipline of lifestyle is a moral virtue, something highlighted 
by Buddhist temples and monasteries, which are seen as ideal eco-friendly 
sanghas or communities (and whose example can be enlarged globally in a 
‘Great Earth Sangha’) (Gross 2002; Kaza 2002; Loori 1997; Maguire 2000; 
Palmer and Finlay 2003; Sponberg 1997; Swearer 2001).
Chinese Traditions (Confucianism and Daoism)11
In ecological terms, Chinese religions are stressed as sharing a worldview 
that is organic, vitalistic, and holistic, seeing the universe as a creative, 
harmonious process (what is termed sheng-sheng, or ‘production and re-
production’). In this scheme the universe is complete and self-generating, 
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combining heaven and earth, spirit and matter, with all things interde-
pendent via ongoing relationships, and the aim of life is to realize har-
mony with natural rhythms of the cosmos – what is seen as ‘the Way’ 
(Dao), the ‘primeval wisdom of reality’. This dynamic of harmonic rela-
tionships is seen to occur through the cosmos being filled with qi, a vital 
energy that links the material and spiritual, composed of and expressed 
via two complementary elements, yin and yang, in balanced interaction 
(represented in opposites, e.g. positive/negative, male/female). Relational 
change, therefore, is the principal characteristic of nature and (correct) 
human existence is the process of flowing with rather than resisting this 
change (in this sense there may be good and bad ways of channeling qi 
with Chinese gardens, medicine, painting, or feng shui, argued as produc-
ing relational balance between landscape or objects, allowing qi to flow) 
(Kinsley 1994; Maguire 2000; Tucker 1994; Weiming 2002; Weller and Bol 
1998). Confucianism and Daoism are seen to interpret and experience this 
worldview in different ways: the former stressing the secondary causal-
ity of humans and a harmonious human society via social and political 
commitment, the latter stressing the primary causality of the Dao and a 
withdrawal from social and political affairs and spontaneous closeness 
to nature. Confucians thus encourage a rethinking of individual/society/
nature connections, stressing moral education and responsibility and a 
moral ruler representing humane government and ethical practice, while 
Daoists encourage re-examination of human/earth relations and the un-
folding of natural processes and see the non-involved hermit as an ideal 
(Tucker 1994; see Callicott 1997; Kinsley 1994).
 Confucian views are seen to involve ‘cosmic humanism’, focusing on 
human society and virtues. Humanity forms ‘one body’ with the cosmos 
(virtue of qi) but has a special role: it has the highest expression of qi and 
most sentience, and is, therefore, charged with enhancing the balance of 
nature. This is seen as an ‘anthropocosmic’ view – a unity and mutual 
responsiveness of Heaven-Earth-Humanity. Humans are situated within 
the organic processes of nature and exist in concentric circles of rela-
tionships – family, community, nature (a kinship based on qi) – with a 
mutual reciprocity of obligations and larger sense of common good. The 
Mandate of Heaven, or moral law, thus enjoins humans to take part in 
cosmic transformation. This requires a ‘relational resonance’ in tune with 
a ‘cosmic resonance’ – a mutual (moral) response to myriad things. In this 
scheme, human thoughts, feelings, and actions, respond to movements of 
qi in the world. Furthermore, there is a proper or appropriate response to 
this in accordance with li, or patterns of the cosmos. ‘Authentic’ Confu-
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cian humanity, then, involves continuous self-transcendence, overcoming 
egoism through practicing jen, or ‘humaneness’, something that is exem-
plified by the ‘sage’, who is attuned to the environment (with the Dao), 
instantiating the perfection of natural order in thought and action (Adler 
1998; Callicott 1997; Cheng 1998; Maguire 2000; Weiming 2002; Weller 
and Bol 1998).
 Whereas Confucianism is seen to stress cultivation of self and nature, 
Daoism is seen to stress nature for its own sake, seeing simplicity, spon-
taneity, intuitive knowledge, and non-interference as appropriate ways of 
interacting with the world. This is described as wu-wei, a ‘non (asser-
tive) action’ that is indirect and respectful, involving ‘feminine’ behaviour 
(yielding rather than asserting, soft rather than hard), eliminating compe-
tition or desire. In this sense ‘appropriate’ actions are those that produce 
the best results from minimum effort, avoiding over-doing. The aim is to 
penetrate beyond the physical to the primordial essence of Dao and mir-
ror its operation (something termed ‘self-so’). The aim is to be like water 
– soft and yielding, yet able to wear away rock – a potentiality of genera-
tive action. This follows the Dao, which is empty and full of potentiality, 
allowing things to develop in their own ways. ‘Daoist ecology’ then, in this 
sense, is not an intellectual principle; ‘knowing’ involves comprehending 
existence though relationships attending to the rhythms of the cosmos, 
not ‘improving’ them. Daoism trusts the world and natural processes to 
operate as they are supposed to – in harmony. Non-action is compas-
sionate whereas action can cause unintended problems by upsetting the 
harmony (therefore, if things run counter to the harmony of nature they 
must be abandoned even if they are in human self-interest). The practical 
result of this is asceticism, training the will to follow nature’s ways (Ames 
2001; Callicott 1997; Kinsley 1994; Kirkland 2001; Tucker 1994).
 Western Religious Traditions and Ecology
Judaism
Jewish ideas on ecology are seen as integral to relationships between God, 
humanity, and the world. In this scheme, the world belongs to God, who 
created it (and renews this creation daily), and created everything ‘ac-
cording to its kind’, assigning unique value to species and arguing for their 
conservation; all species thus have meaning and purpose and need to be 
respected and cared for due to their God-given place and role. God thus 
has regard for all of creation, its individual species and its overall pattern. 
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Bio-diversity in this sense relates to the rightness of God’s pattern for 
creation which meets His intent independent of human concerns or no-
tions of cause and effect. The world in this sense is an allusion to God, full 
of His glory, and an object of divine concern (inspiring amazement and 
humility, tempering human egoism) (Goodman 2002; Hutterman 2002; 
Rose 1992; Solomon 1992; Tirosh-Samuelson 2001; Waskow 2002).
 In line with this, the concept of bal tashchit, or ‘do not destroy’, is 
stressed. This is seen to emphasize that creation is to be conserved and 
not wasted. This is also seen as highlighting a Jewish ‘tradition’ of mod-
eration, limiting lavishness and conspicuous consumption – creation is 
God’s gift, humanity is to help preserve and improve it, being of the earth 
but also (virtue of imago Dei) its crowning achievement, this conferring 
privilege and also responsibility; humanity is a caretaker or steward leas-
ing the land in covenantal trust (not the owner of it) (Goodman 2002; 
Jacobs 2002; Solomon 1992; Tirosh-Samuelson 2001). Maguire (2000) 
highlights the theme of exile in this, seeing humanity being alienated (via 
egoism) from its true role and its destiny of a harmonic Eden, which is a 
vision of the future, a ‘promised land’ not yet reached. Judaism’s historical 
escape from destruction, in this sense, thus mirrors humanity, which ex-
ists in a lost desert at present. Along these lines, Jacobs (2002) emphasizes 
teshuva, repentance or ‘beginning again’, and argues for an ‘ecological te-
shuva’, restoring harmonious ecological balance (also related to tikkun 
olam or ‘repair of the world’). Such a new, repentant humanity creates 
justice (sedaqah, argued as being the heart of Judaism), for people and 
nature, via the cultivation of both. In a similar vein, Palmer and Finlay 
(2003, 115) argue that all creation deserves mercy (Psalm 89: 3 ‘the world 
is built on tender mercy’). Humanity, therefore, is restricted in its use of 
nature, forbidden to show cruelty, or take excess, but rather has to prevent 
suffering (Goodman 2002; Solomon 1992).
 Along similar lines kashrut or the kosher code – food obligations and 
restrictions as a connection between Jews, the land, and God – is stressed 
and extended in an ‘eco-kosher’ code. Humanity’s consumption of coal, 
oil, and wood, in this sense, may be seen as a form of idolatry, and needs 
to be consumed in a more sacred (less polluting, wasteful) way. In line 
with this blessings, festivals, prayers, or rituals (Rosh Hashanah, Sukkot, 
Tu B’shevat) that purify the body via consumption of food and express 
gratitude for creation, are seen as creating a sacred connection to the 
earth (and bearing witness to God’s power in it; similarly biblical injunc-
tions to avoid cutting fruit bearing trees are symbolic cynosure of human 
responsibility to nature). In line with these ideas Shabbat, the sabbath or 
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rest day (month/year), a retreat from labour or consumption and mne-
monic of humanity’s ties to nature (argued as the last thing God created 
but first in intention), is seen as restoring nature’s balance (Goodman 
2002; Green 1996; Jacobs 2002; Pick 1992; Rose 1992; Tirosh-Samuelson 
2001; Waskow 1996; 2002). Such ideas highlight that religio-moral pu-
rity is necessary for residence in God’s land; the flourishing of nature and 
humanity are causally linked; following God’s ordinances, especially the 
Torah, ensures prosperity, doing otherwise causes suffering. In this light 
Fishbane (2002) envisages an ‘Oral Torah’, where the world is an expres-
sion of God’s breath, a syntax of His wisdom embodied in existence, and 
argues for (emotional, physical, spiritual) alignment to its natural rhythms 
via prayer or ritual. Such ideas link to the Jewish mystical tradition that 
respects and reveres nature through seeing God revealed in it, highlight-
ing communion with nature as being communion with God. Kabbalism, 
for example, sees an underlying divine reality behind the corporeal world, 
connecting the many (creation: H-W-Y-H) to the one (God: Y-H-W-H, 
the ‘primordial Torah’) with humanity’s task being the realization of this. 
Such ideas are also linked to the Hasidic ideas of Martin Buber, especially 
the ‘I-Thou’ relationship, where the aim of existence is to relate to nature 
via the ‘whole being’, nature being a ‘waiting Thou’ (connected to God, the 
‘eternal Thou’) not an ‘It’ (Gellman 2002; Green 2002; Hutterman 2002; 
Tirosh-Samuelson 2001; Waskow 2002).
Christianity
Within Christian attitudes to nature, several themes are stressed: God 
created a good (harmonious) world; God created humans in His image 
(imago Dei) from the world to have a relationship with Him (and cre-
ation); humanity sinned against this by seeking self-awareness, becoming 
alienated from God (and creation); God provides the means to overcome 
this in a ‘new creation’ in Jesus (God dwelling and suffering in creation) 
and the subsequent passing on of the Holy Spirit to the Christian com-
munity. To these themes can be added Jesus’ commandments to ‘love 
God’ and ‘love your neighbour’, and the Old Testament statement that 
the ‘fear of God’ is the beginning of wisdom. These themes provide the 
groundwork for what has been described as an ‘ecological reformation’ to 
an earth-centered Christianity that values and cares for nature. Central to 
such ideas is the ‘integrity of creation’, the idea that the world is created 
and sustained by God (His ‘breath’, ruah), being a gift and covenant, to 
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reveal His creativity. God, in this sense, loves nature and its creatures and 
cares for their well-being (giving them intrinsic value). To love and care 
for them is thus to love and care for God, to abuse them is to abuse God. 
Nature in this sense worships God in its being and to worship God in a 
human sense means caring for it. Nature in this respect is also a means to 
know God (His ‘Book of Works’), not only by the learning of it but also by 
‘experiencing’ its ‘being’ (subjectively interacting with it) (Callicott 1997; 
Deane-Drummond 2004; Kinsley 1994; McFague 2000; McGrath 2003; 
Page 1992; Reid 200; Wallace 2000).
 Humanity’s role in creation is a somewhat privileged virtue of imago 
Dei. However, this is interpreted not as giving it dominion over nature but 
as giving it responsibility for it: humans are seen as ‘stewards’, in fellow-
ship (being neighbours) to other creatures, embedded in nature yet given 
the task of tending it, being channels for God’s grace. This is God’s inten-
tion for them, a benign authority exercising power with praise and humil-
ity (hence biblical sayings emphasizing this, such as ‘salt of the earth’ or 
Jesus as ‘vine’, and the ‘sabbath’ principle, letting the earth rest and recov-
er, as well as rituals using earth elements, such as bread, oil, water, wine). 
However, the effects of sin are seen to have affected this, with humanity 
not caring for creation as God intended; humanity is seen as fallen and 
self-centered, alienated from creation, and harming it. To recover a right 
(harmonious) relationship to creation (God), in this sense, means over-
coming sin. To this end God became incarnated in Jesus and embodied in 
nature, highlighting its special-ness and pointing to its redemption (ideas 
of the ‘cosmic Christ’ also see Jesus redeeming not only humanity but all 
of (cosmic) creation). Nature in this respect is also seen as part of God’s 
body or a sacrament of God, such ideas arguing for a sacramental ap-
proach to it, accepting it as evoking/mediating the sacred and interacting 
with it in a relational (Trinitarian) ‘I-Thou’ relationship (Callicott 1997; 
Deane-Drummond 2004; Kinsley 1994; McFague 1996; McGrath 2003; 
Page 1992; Reid 2001; Ruether 2000).
 Along similar lines the Holy Spirit, present at creation as a life-giving 
force and still dwelling in the world, courtesy of Jesus, is seen as providing 
a useful approach to nature, giving intrinsic value to life and providing the 
‘power of becoming’, the possibility of redemption and capability of at-
taining the perfection of (a new) creation. In this sense it guides humanity 
in discerning the appropriate (harmonious) way of interacting with nature 
(fulfilling humanity’s role of bringing creation to fulfillment). In a similar 
way the concept of ‘Wisdom’, also seen as inherent in creation and dwell-
ing in the world, is seen as providing an eco-friendly Christianity. A ‘wise’ 
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interaction with nature, in this sense, is seen to be based on a ‘practical 
wisdom’ or ‘virtue ethic’ of justice, prudence, and temperance; a natural 
law in dialogue with human inclinations (Deane-Drummond 2004). Wis-
dom is also seen as female, and eco-feminist ideas have also been seen 
as a way of being critical of the modern worldview and creating care for 
nature. In this sense, there is a need to overcome patriarchal dominance 
(God as transcendent, male) and its dualism (mind/body, matter/spirit 
separation), which destroys nature, through seeing God/nature as moth-
er, something that is seen to highlight God’s immanence and promote 
ideals of care and harmony. Such ideas also link social justice to environ-
mental justice; nature becomes the ‘new poor’ with ecological and social 
degradation occurring in ‘sacrifice zones’ while ‘eco-living’ requires social 
inclusion and ‘fair consumption’ (Edwards 2001; McFague 2000; McGrath 
2003; Ruether 1992; 2000; Wallace 2000).
 New Scientifi c Cosmologies and Ecology
Deep Ecology
Deep Ecology has been described as a philosophical, political, scientific, 
and social movement as well as a nature religion, rethinking human iden-
tification with nature (traced to intuitive experiences of nature (of eco-
logical diversity/symbiosis) by field ecologists). Inspired by the science of 
ecology that holistically studies ecosystems it sees nature as intrinsically 
valuable, rather than for use as in ‘shallow ecology’, with humans embed-
ded in it. Its worldview, ‘Ecosophy T’, is seen as an ecological wisdom 
(combining ‘eco’ or earth and ‘Sophia’ or wisdom), based around a ‘wide 
identification’ thesis and an ultimate norm of ‘Self-realization’, being a 
‘relational total field image’ stressing ‘bio-spherical egalitarianism’. Its es-
sence is to ask questions about humanity, society, and nature, going be-
yond factual science to the level of self and earth wisdom, leading to an 
awakening of wholes greater than the sum of their parts, seeing through 
what it sees as the illusory and erroneous modern worldview (Devall and 
Sessions 1985; Kinsley 1994; Macy 2002; Naess 1991, 1995; Sessions 1994; 
Taylor 1996). This is seen as a ‘transpersonal ecology’, moving from per-
sonal identification, the experience of commonality through personal in-
volvement, to ontological identification, the experience of commonality 
through a sense of or openness to being; a wide, field-like, sense of Self 
with no ontological divide in existence, no bifurcation between human/
non-humans. This is argued as leading to ‘Self-realization’: nature (and all 
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the individuals, human/ non-human, of which it is comprised) realizing 
itself (becoming fulfilled). This is seen as a psychological/social/ecologi-
cal maturity, stressing that humanity underestimates itself by equating 
self with ego; with sufficient maturity it cannot avoid identifying with 
nature as it is in, of, and for it, in its very being. Self in this sense equates 
to organic wholeness, an ‘ecological self ’, where humanity is grounded in 
the metaphysical fact of interconnectedness, this leading to an ecologi-
cal lifestyle of harmony or equilibrium. Thus it is natural for humanity to 
care for nature, for its true humanness is part of it; acting more environ-
mentally friendly in this sense creates greater happiness and satisfaction 
(Devall and Sessions 1985; Fox 1990; Kinsley 1994; Naess 1991, 1995; Ses-
sions 1994).
 Such a deep-ecological self is seen as possibly tapping into an innate 
eco-friendly humanness, what has been termed ‘Biophilia’; a tendency to 
focus on and care for life and lifelike processes (opposite is ‘biophobia’, 
aversion to nature). This is a human dependence on nature, an emotional 
need for a deep and intimate association, something that is seen as part of 
humanity’s evolutionary heritage, evolving in a bio-centric, not machine-
regulated, world (and shaped by cultural patterns through which ‘primal 
(indigenous, tribal) cultures’ integrated into the world). Such a love of 
life and right relation to nature is seen as the key to (continued) human 
existence, a sign of mental/physical health; humanity’s sanity depends on 
it (environmental degradation is thus a deprived existence). An ethical re-
sponsibility for nature, then, in this sense, is an aesthetic, biological, cog-
nitive, emotional, and spiritual, imperative (Kellert 1993; Wilson 1984). 
Such a view of humanity and nature has been seen as ‘eco-psychology’, ex-
ploring the foundations of human nature, expanding the human self, and 
healing its alienation from nature. This sees the needs of the planet and 
the person as a continuum (human nature being embedded in the world, 
as it is often thought to be so by primal peoples). Here, psychosis is an 
environment-deficiency disease with modern humanity ‘ontogenetically 
crippled’, immature, and neurotic, separated from true (sane, mature) feel-
ings of connection. Thus the aim is to awaken healthy (earth-connected) 
human nature; a transactional, relational, ecologically grounded form of 
animism (Macy 1996; Roszak 1993).
 Ritual is highlighted as a practical part of this, reconnecting humanity 
to nature through re-experiencing the earth. Examples of these types of 
ritual are: shamanic or traditional healing rituals as practiced in primal 
peoples, discoursing with the spirits of nature; or in a modern sense, the 
Council of All Beings, a communal ‘re-earthing’ ritual, creating an expe-
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rience of intimate connection to nature, giving voice to the earth’s suf-
fering, and creating a commitment to defend it, awakening a ‘shamanic 
personality’ (Roszak 1993; Seed, et al. 1988; Macy 2002). Deep Ecology 
thus also embraces spiritual aspects of reality, having Buddhist, Christian, 
Confucian, Daoist, Hindu, and Jewish influences, especially with regard 
to self-realization and the oneness of/reverence for life. For example: the 
right to live and blossom for all and the desire to achieve liberation from 
egoism and cultivate/realize an interconnected self, based on a harmo-
nious underlying principle, where order is emergent, and diverse parts 
enrich each other via non-violence instead of destruction. In this sense it 
has an ethical and religious attitude of valuing nature for its own sake and 
seeing it as divine or spiritual. It thus may be the newest and oldest reli-
gion and an emerging corpus of myth, symbol, and rite, awakening human 
nature to its connections with, and responsibility for, the environment 
(Barnhill and Gottlieb 2001; Gottlieb 1996).
Gaia
The Gaia hypothesis considers the activities of living organisms using 
the earth’s atmosphere and changing its composition. The earth – named 
‘Gaia’ after the Greek earth goddess – in this sense is a complex ‘cybernet-
ic’ or feedback system seeking an optimal physical and chemical environ-
ment for life. It is a self-regulating (autopoietic), interdependent, entity, 
an organic whole greater than the sum of its parts, possibly a living thing 
(a super-organism). It is served by its constituents, adjusting and regulat-
ing itself in the same way that the organs of a body serve a person (what 
is seen as ‘geo-physiology’ or ‘wisdom of the body’; and it may thus have 
vital organs, e.g. rain forests, keeping the whole stable and needing to be 
protected). The earth can be considered the unit of colligative evolution, 
with self-regulation emergent, and it may thus be organized or behave 
purposely, being animate, with spirit or consciousness (the culmination 
of a living process, analogous to an embryo). In this sense, understanding 
and enabling the processes of regulation, rather than unbalancing them, 
may be planetary medicine, something that may be humanity’s natural 
role; acting within the system rather than outside it (Callicott 1997; Joseph 
1991; Lovelock 1979; 2000; Midgley 2001).
 This idea of the world as alive has been held throughout history: God-
dess religion especially celebrated the ongoing rhythm of life, death, and 
regeneration, seeing the earth as the source of being, a living force, con-
cerned with creative, peaceful interaction. A Gaian ‘rebirth of the god-
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dess’ thus stresses humanity as part of nature, able to call forth its power, 
such intuition of the aliveness and interconnectedness of the earth seen 
as able to lead to a responsibility to all that lives, inspiring a less materi-
alistic society. Re-embodying the goddess in the human self in this way 
is seen as a sacred psychology recovering intimacy with and tapping into 
a natural earth creativity; an awakening, re-birthing, re-indigination, re-
covering a lost sense of place, and ‘primal perception’ leading to a ‘primal 
mind’ in healthy interdependency (humanity’s natural experience, exem-
plified again by primal/tribal peoples) (Callicott 1997; Christ 1997; Gadon 
1989; Joseph 1991; Lovelock 1979). Such female-centered views are seen as 
partnership based, being about connection and wholeness, nourishment 
and therapeutic action, enabling and enhancing, not dominating and de-
stroying life. They are related to eco-feminism, analyzing ecology from 
a female point of view, locating environmental degradation in (rational, 
dualist) male thinking, seeking to reintegrate humanity with nature and 
create life-sustaining mutuality and relationality through (intuitive) care, 
compassion, and empathy; a cultural, psychological and spiritual earth 
healing; healing relationships between men/women, humanity/earth. A 
healed society in this sense is one of non-dominating relations, a bio-
spheric community of biophilic mutuality (humanity’s destiny is of and 
for the earth and it needs to listen to the voice of Gaia and respect other 
life-forms as inherent parts of the energy that it is a part, acting with re-
sponsibility) (Adams 1993; Eisler 1990; Ruether 1992; Spretnak 1989).
 Such an ethic of care links to autopoietic or ecosystem ethics, an ethical 
holism where individual interest lies within the whole. Life in this sense 
is a process of autopoiesis, or self-production, constantly renewing parts 
(organisms) to form a whole (the earth); humanity therefore co-evolves 
and is dependent on other life/earth in a ‘Gaian body wisdom’. The world 
is thus a pattern of reciprocal relations, or ‘gift events’, impelling respon-
sibility and commitment. Related to religion, this sees God (autopoietic 
and participant in the evolutionary process) as the original giver in an 
ontological or relational theology of the sacred whole. Such a Gaian per-
ception shifts the locus of creativity from humanity towards the world, 
the two being living presences in reciprocal interaction. Human creativ-
ity thus is an elaboration of a deeper (holistic) creativity and it may be 
psychologically (and evolutionary) rewarding to interact with the earth 
in a particular (balanced, co-operative) way (or unrewarding to do oth-
erwise) that has been termed ‘Gaiasophy’ (linking Gaia to another female 
concept, Sophia or wisdom). This idea of communicating with an animate 
earth is seen as shamanic wisdom; an innate ability to tap into a ‘super-
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sensory’ awareness or energy field of the earth (dissolving the boundar-
ies of ordinary perception, divining the spirit of the earth), rediscovering 
the reciprocal energetic relationship with a dynamic earth – a ‘shamanic 
renaissance’ or ‘geomantic revival’ that Deveraux et al. (1992) call ‘Earth-
mind’ (Abram 1990; Callicott 1997; Joseph 1991; Lovelock 2000; Midgley 
2001; Primavsi 2000; Sahtouris 1989; Zoeteman 1991).
 Conclusions
The present environmental crisis is seen to be a result of a dominant mod-
ern worldview delineating assumptions about reality that are anthropo-
centric, materialist, economic and technology-based, separating human-
ity from and devaluing nature. Addressing this crisis is seen as requiring 
a challenge to this worldview, a politicization of nature and an ecological 
re-imagination; creating new empowering conceptual schemes recon-
necting humanity (psychologically, socially, spiritually), to a re-envisioned 
nature and simulating new ecological ethics and environmentally friendly 
thought and action. Religious traditions (reinterpreted, beyond anthro-
pocentrism, embracing the whole of creation) and new scientific visions 
(more holistic, interdisciplinary, spiritual) are thought to be able to pro-
vide such challenges and new conceptual schemes, acting as channels for 
humanity to reconnect to nature and articulate ecological concern, being 
avenues for the re-imagination of nature and the human role in it (both 
religion and science are seen as pertaining to the construction of reality, 
with emotional and rational, personal and social, influence, frameworks 
of metaphor, myth, and symbol, moral authority, and plausibility). Such a 
‘greening’ of religion and science is occurring within a field of religion and 
ecology that seeks to inspire religious traditions and science-based cos-
mologies to explore and express ecological metaphors, myths, and sym-
bols, and provide a mutually enriching dialogue between them.
 In this article I have analysed such ecological re-imagining among two 
Eastern and two Western religious traditions and two science-inspired 
cosmologies (as represented in the field of religion and ecology), explor-
ing the ways they (metaphorically) express ecological awareness. Eastern 
religions, like Buddhism and Chinese traditions, see nature as a balanced, 
interconnected, process, an egalitarian, reciprocal, web of life. Humans 
have (natural) abilities to enhance this ecological balance, through tap-
ping into a natural underlying life energy via an expanded sense of self, 
freed from selfish desires, through awareness of a particular/ general, per-
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son/cosmos, linked and acting in a careful, sensitive way, creating com-
munity. Western religions, like Judaism and Christianity, by contrast, en-
visage God as creating and sustaining a harmonious nature (that alludes 
to God), giving it intrinsic value. Humanity has a special but flawed place; 
charged with tending nature but failing due to sin, only recovering by 
embracing the spirit of God/nature and behaving in a caring, humane 
manner. Lastly, the cosmologies of Deep Ecology and Gaia stress identifi-
cation with an earth that is a living, self-regulating, symbiotic organism. 
Humanness, in this sense, is realized in interconnectedness, via an innate 
attachment to existence, that is psychological, social, and ecological, and 
related to health, maturity, and sanity; a primal perception of biophilic 
mutuality, achieved via myth and ritual, compared to (Goddess) religion 
and female ideas of caring relationality.
 Such religious and scientific re-imagining challenges dominant mod-
ern conceptions of humanity, nature, and human-nature interaction, both 
personal (ideas of self-identity) and public (consequences of ecological 
problems). Although expressed in diverse ways, such re-imagining has 
a common purpose and commitment (re-enchanting nature, curtailing 
human action by tying human morality (and prosperity) to (prosperity 
of ) the environment, seeing progress in an ecologically holistic way). 
Common (possibly convergent, syncretic) ideas and themes can thus be 
witnessed (science-inspired views in particular incorporate religious or 
spiritual ideas, while both converge on the overall ecological ideal of a 
harmonious, sustainable humanity and environment): the environment is 
seen as having intrinsic worth, virtue of (continuing) creation, indepen-
dent of human values, being envisioned as an interdependent whole; it is 
a reciprocal web of life infused with a flow of energy or spirit embodying 
the divine; humanity, virtue of self-consciousness, has a limited but spe-
cial role, being part of the web of life yet also enabling creation to achieve 
its harmonious state, something egoistic action upsets; humanity, there-
fore, needs to experience the flow of energy/ spirit and interdependent 
being, widening its boundaries, embracing relationality and selflessness 
(a life of self-sacrifice, its natural evolutionary state).12 Such re-imagining 
may fulfill a priestly and prophetic role, conceiving of environmental bal-
ance and justice, envisioning and stimulating an ongoing (metaphoric) 
dialogue about/between humanity and nature (and religion, science, and 
secular society). New religious and scientific ecological visions may thus 
act as arenas of ecological dialogue; powerful, influential, efficacious 
symbolisms through which to re-imagine the world, being both cosmo-
logical and moral, situating humanity in nature as well as defining its role 
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in it, providing new organizing principles and epistemologies, fusing sci-
entific insight and religious imagination.13 They may thus (be used to) in-
form, inspire, empower, and unite new views and actions, stimulating new 
cultural outlooks or paradigms, and heightening awareness of ecological 
necessities and responsibilities, hereby (ideally) revitalizing religion, sci-
ence, and society.
 Notes
1 The terms ‘environment’ and ‘nature’ tend to be used interchangeably to de-
note the non-human world (although the latter seems to show a somewhat 
more all-encompassing and subjective use; other terms also used in this way 
are ‘cosmos’, ‘creation’, ‘earth’, or ‘world’). Following the field of religion and 
ecology I also use the terms ‘ecology’, ‘ecological’, and ‘ecologically’ as these 
are seen as including humanity in the definition, implying a holistic inter-
dependent, process of human, animal, and world (and possibly the sacred), 
sentient and non-sentient (rather than objectifying or externalising an ‘envi-
ronment’ or ‘nature’ outside and unrelated to humanity, which is seen as part 
of the problem) (see Tucker and Grim ).
2 Szerszynski () argues that the modern worldview, instead of being a dis-
enchantment, may be an enchantment, a product of the sacral history of the 
West, building upon Judeo-Christianity’s separation of a transcendent God 
from immanent nature and Protestantism’s concentration on individual human 
action leading to secular rationality. Nevertheless, the modern worldview did 
in some respects challenge and disenchant the previous (dominant, Christian) 
worldview (which itself may have disenchanted an earlier animistic worldview) 
and replace it with a new one that became hegemonic. Th e problem, then, may 
be the dominance of one view over others (which may still coexist with it); thus 
challenging the dominant view may, in Szerszynski’s terms (this volume), ‘open 
up a space’ for new visions in a diverse ‘post-modern’ worldview, allowing di-
verse constructions of reality in mutual dialogue and action.
3 Changing worldviews and ‘protecting’ the environment or nature, in this 
sense, may not be as simple as it seems. There is the danger that such changes 
may also treat the world as an object, similar to (but opposing) the modern 
worldview (e.g. ‘romanticism’ opposing ‘rationalism’). It is argued, therefore, 
that what may be needed is a reconnection of humanity to nature while rec-
ognizing diversity. Thus the aim may not be to wholly overcome the modern 
worldview (to be hegemonic) but to channel its successes (e.g. better health, 
greater freedoms) in new, creative (diverse, eco-friendly) directions, which is 
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seen as the liberating impulses of the enlightenment grounded in earth pro-
cesses (see Cronon ; McGrath ; Soule ; Tucker ).
4 By coalescing around global ethical issues such as the environmental crisis, 
religions may thus regain (provide) moral, cultural, political, and social (and 
transcendent) capital. Th ey may engage the opportunities (or problems) creat-
ed by modernity (i.e. its ethical, environmental, or social, consequences) and 
create innovative responses, going beyond the ideas articulated in modern 
discourse (including the offi  cial defi nition of environmentalism), providing 
alternative (ecological) ideas with a larger qualitative frame of reference, be-
coming resources for recreating private beliefs (e.g. existentially re-connecting 
individuals to the environment), as well as publicly addressing (e.g. ecological) 
issues. Such eco-religious action may thus have eschatological implications 
for all humanity, inspiring new attitudes and actions with respect to nature, 
defi ning and maintaining the common good, giving meaning to the environ-
ment and promising the power to overcome environmental problems (Beyer 
; Casanova ; Oelschlaeger ; Woodhead and Heelas ).
5 Lynn White () famously goes so far as to argue that Judeo-Christianity 
may have been a root cause of the ecological crisis through imago Dei and the 
command in Genesis for humans to have ‘dominion’ over the earth, with the 
latter serving man. Other authors have pointed out that Judeo-Christianity’s 
overcoming of pagan animism (and its interdependence of humanity and na-
ture) and anthropocentric, dualistic, hierarchical, and patriarchal, ideas may 
also have had such an effect as well as leading to an avoidance of environmen-
tal issues and lateness in engaging with them. It may also be that interpreta-
tions of biblical texts, linked with Greek sources and later secular scientific 
ideas, may have contributed to such views. However, such ideas have been 
seen to be somewhat biased and oversimplified. They may ignore the Bible’s 
and Judeo-Christianity’s views of God sustaining nature, the need to over-
come sinful humanity, and other commands to care for life, seeing imago Dei 
as involving responsibility for creation, mirroring God’s care, with human-
ity’s role being to serve God (and creation). Interpreted differently, there-
fore, Judeo-Christianity may be said to have theocentric rather than merely 
anthropocentric views (see Callicott ; Deane-Drummond ; Kinsley 
; Nash ; Oelschlaeger ).
6 There is a large and growing body of literature and actions in this area. For 
a wide-ranging overview see (Taylor and Kaplan ); www.religionandna-
ture.com, as well as the Forum on Religion and Ecology (www.yale.edu/reli-
gionandecology).
7 Such a ‘new science’ that converges, discourses, and/or embraces, with reli-
gion or spiritual ideas is seen to result from developments within biology, cos-
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mology, genetics, neuroscience, and physics, as well as the history/ philosophy 
of science, that lead to a questioning of the modern, rationalist, mechanical 
worldview and awareness of and involvement with ethical and religious issues 
(especially questions of transcendence, value, and meaning). Th is has led to 
what has been described as the ‘fi eld of science and religion’ a diverse interdis-
ciplinary dialogue, with science and religion in creative mutual consonance, 
co-operation, interaction, or harmonization (see Van Huyssteen ).
8 Religions are diverse and thus there may be no defi nitive Buddhist, Confucian, 
Daoist, Jewish, or Christian perspective on the environment. Rather there may 
be a (cultural, geographical, historical, social, theological) diversity of (possi-
bly competing/contradictory) perspectives. Interpretations of religious tradi-
tions within the fi eld of religion and ecology then are new ecological-based or 
inspired interpretations of Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, Judaism, and 
Christianity, made by individuals or groups concerned with environmental 
issues, using them as constructive sources of environmental ideas. Th ey are 
new religious forms, not the whole story and have not been without challenge. 
Th e idea of unifi ed ‘religious traditions’ or ‘world religions’, themselves, fol-
lowing Talal Asad () and Tomoko Masuzawa (), may be questioned 
(especially when assessing Eastern forms which are quite diverse), these being 
seen as Western-based concepts and constructions appropriating and unify-
ing contextual and diverse social forms. Nevertheless, it can be said that there 
are (diverse, dynamic) historical processes that are self-identifi ed as Buddhist, 
Confucian, Daoist, Jewish, or Christian, and which transmit narratives and 
written records of interactions between human communities and local eco-
systems which are distinct from one another and from secular approaches and 
which can be explored. Furthermore, as religions are diverse and dynamic, not 
monolithic and static, new interpretations and forms have always occurred 
(although not always recognized or legitimated) and thus those expressed in 
the fi eld of religion and ecology may be accepted and become infl uential.
9 Deep Ecology is traced to philosopher Arne Naess (plus Bill Devall and 
George Sessions). Other influences include eco-centric (Eastern) religions, 
Christian thinkers (e.g. St Francis of Assisi); ‘primal’ (tribal) peoples; the phi-
losophers Heidegger and Spinoza; the romantic movement and literary tradi-
tion of naturalism; the eco-centrism and social criticism of Aldous Huxley, 
Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, D.H. Lawrence, and Robinson Jeffers; and 
the ‘ecological perspective’ of ecologists and conservationists, such as Aldo 
Leopold, Rachel Carson and Dave Brower. Leopold especially is seen as in-
fluential, his ‘Land Ethic’ stressing the web-like interrelated complexity of 
the earth and urging humanity to ‘think like a mountain’. The Gaia hypoth-
esis is traced to scientist James Lovelock (plus microbiologist Lyn Margulis). 
RE-IMAGINING THE HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP
Historical antecedents to it are seen in the philosophies of Hegel, Spinoza, 
and Whitehead, Herbert Spencer and Aldo Leopold, all of whom spoke of 
nature in terms of an organism, Russian scientist Vernadsky, who viewed the 
biogeochemistry of the earth as a unity, and scientist James Hutton who saw 
the earth as a ‘super-organism’. Gaia ideas are also seen to be ‘resonant’ with 
‘primal’ peoples, animism, Buddhism, paganism, shamanism, and totemism, 
as well elements of Theosophy. 
10 This is an inevitably selective group, dependent on space and chosen for con-
trast and comparison. Other religious traditions, such as Baha’i, Hinduism, 
indigenous traditions, Islam, Jainism, Shinto, Sikhism, or Zoroastrianism, 
could be explored in this way, of course, (and are) as could a scientific con-
cept such as the ‘Epic of Evolution’ (see Callicott ; Gottlieb ; Kinsley 
; Watling b). 
11 Chinese terminology involves two systems, the ‘Pinyin’ (e.g. Dao, Daoism, qi) 
and ‘Wade-Giles’ (e.g. Tao, Taoism, ch’i), used by different Daoist and Confu-
cian scholars. For clarity I use the former.
12 Bassett et al. (, ) see ‘Points of Religious Agreement in Environmental 
Ethics’: the natural world has value in itself and does not exist solely to serve 
human needs; there is a significant continuity of being between human and 
non-human living beings (which can be experienced), even though humans 
have a distinctive role; non-human living beings are morally significant, in 
the eyes of God and/or in the cosmic order; the dependence of human life 
on the natural world can and should be acknowledged in ritual; moral norms 
(justice, compassion, reciprocity), apply both to human and non-human be-
ings; the well-being of human and non-human beings are connected; there 
are legitimate and illegitimate uses of nature; greed and destructiveness are 
condemned, restraint and protection are commended; human beings should 
live in harmony with nature (via their traditions). Similarly, Kinsley (, 
-) suggests common recurrent religion and ecology themes: reality 
being viewed as organic; an emphasis on knowledge of and rapport with the 
land; a stress on human kinship with nature; mutuality and reciprocity as the 
appropriate framework for relating to nature; the embeddedness of human-
ity within nature; existence envisioned as a unity; a stress on an underlying 
moral or ethical unity; the need for human restraint in dealing with nature; a 
criticism of the prevailing worldview; a recognition that ecological concerns 
have religious meanings.
13 Questions, of course, may be raised concerning such religio-scientific eco-
logical ideals and activities. For example, there is the challenge of comparing 
or reconciling different religious or scientific beliefs, theories, or traditions, 
or differences within them over the authority to use traditions or create new 
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visions. Secondly, there is the question of whether it is inevitably an aca-
demic, liberal initiative, with overarching ecumenical concerns, based on du-
alist Western assumptions (of an objective ‘nature’ needing protection, or of 
a singular ‘religion’ or ‘science’), this overriding non-Western assumptions, 
imposing a universal eco-ethic on them (and possibly simplifying religious 
or scientific concepts and traditions, ignoring diversity or depriving them of 
deeper meaning or relevance). Counter-arguments to such points are that nei-
ther religion nor science is static; they always adapt and change, which means 
they are open to re-interpretation (as are concepts of nature) and adherents 
themselves interpret them in different, complex or simple, ways, dependent 
on context. Furthermore, any ecumenical commonalities or practices with 
respect to ecology may be seen as legitimate new forms of religion or science. 
It may be, then, that such ideas and activities may need to be viewed as a 
process, a variety of beliefs, dialogues, and movements, in mutual communi-
cation, posing possible future directions (see Tucker ; Tucker and Grim 
). In this sense, then, I stress these visions as ‘arenas’ and ‘dialogues’ to 
emphasize that they are dynamic, evolving visions, collages constantly be-
ing reinterpreted. They may be challenged (particularly the religious-based 
visions) and (in the science-inspired visions) the people and theories within 
them may not always explicitly identify or be identified as active ‘members’ 
of them. Nevertheless, they may be linked to, referenced, or interpreted and 
used, encouraging, influencing, and stimulating, new thought and action, 
within an ever-evolving (co-ordinated, diverse, expanding) discourse.
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5 Religion, Nature, and Modernization in China
James Miller
One of most important concepts in the Weberian theory of modernity is 
summed up in the German term Entzauberung, usually translated into 
English as ‘disenchantment’ or ‘rationalization’. A concise summary of this 
concept can be found in an essay published in 1987 by the British sociolo-
gist Ernest Gellner. He writes:
Th e modern world is organized in a rational way. Th is means that clear-
ly specifi ed goals are pursued by a calculated allocation of means; the 
means include not only tools but also human activity and men them-
selves. Th ese things are treated instrumentally and not as ends in them-
selves. Eff ectiveness and evidence are kings. Th e procedures are also 
rational in the sense of being orderly and rule-bound: like cases are 
treated alike. (Gellner 1987, 153)
According to this view, therefore, modernity presupposes a rational, logi-
cal and orderly view of the world, one that is best managed by rational 
procedures and gives rise to the legalistic, bureaucratic institutions of the 
modern state. Rationalization, moreover, is not something that ‘happens’ 
to society. It also has consequences for the way that moderns view and 
engage the natural world. Gellner continues:
It is not only the procedures of organizations which are in this sense 
‘bureaucratised’; the same also happens to our vision of nature, of the 
external world. Its comprehensibility and manipulability are purchased 
by means of subsuming its events under orderly, symmetrical, precisely 
articulated generalisations and explanatory models. Th is is Disenchant-
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ment: the Faustian purchase of cognitive, technological and adminis-
trative power, by the surrender of our previous meaningful, humanly 
suff used, humanly responsive, if often also menacing or capricious 
world. Th at is abandoned in favour of a more a more predictable, more 
amenable, but coldly indiff erent and uncosy world. (Gellner 1987, 153)
As Gellner’s explanation makes clear, the Weberian concept of Entzau-
berung has at least two aspects to it, evident in the two English terms that 
are commonly used to translate it, rationalization and disenchantment. 
On the one hand, Entzauberung involves a belief in the possibility of the 
rational ordering of the world; on the other hand this belief is predicated 
on an instrumental view of nature, one in which nature is not valued as 
an end in itself, but becomes a means for the attainment of rationally cal-
culated ends. Entzauberung is thus more than a process that takes place 
within the ordering of society. Rather it also ‘happens to our vision of na-
ture’ conceived as the world that is ‘external’ to the self. Thus, according 
to this theory, the rationalization and bureaucratization of society that we 
are familiar with in the modern period, is also accompanied by the secu-
larization of space and the disenchantment of nature.
 Recently, however, this understanding of disenchantment has begun 
to be questioned by social theorists. In particular, Bronislaw Szerszynski 
(2005) has argued that the reordering of society and nature in modernity 
should not be viewed as a final stage in the process of disenchantment and 
secularization, but rather as a moment within the ongoing transforma-
tion of the sacred throughout history. This transformation is not so much 
a gradual process of the sacred’s absenting itself from society and from 
nature, but rather a continuous reordering of the sacred within the world. 
The view of modern society as the highest stage in some gradual evolution 
towards rationality and secularism is a view from a particular evolution-
ary perspective, one that has been informed by centuries of Western theo-
logical history, or as Szerszynski terms it, ‘the long arc of monotheism’. As 
Szerszynski writes:
Th e illusion that the sacred has disappeared is arguably a feature of all 
historical transitions from one form of the sacred to the next in a given 
society. Each transition can seem like an eclipse of the sacred in the 
terms in which it was organized in the closing epoch; from a larger his-
torical perspective, however, it can be seen as the emergence of a new 
sacral ordering. (Szerszysnski 2005, 26)
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The secularization of society and the disenchantment of nature summed 
up in the concept of ‘absolute profane’ are thus not to be seen as a final 
stage in history but as ‘an event within the ongoing history of the sacred 
in the West’ (2005, 27).
 This paper aims to consider the disenchantment of nature in modern 
China from the perspective of this debate within social science theory. 
First it examines the process of modernization in China as a self-con-
scious process of disenchantment and rationalization. In this process the 
state assumed rational control over religious spaces and religious orga-
nizations. It was able to do so in part through the development of the 
concept of ‘superstition’ in which the religious activities associated most 
overtly with nature were prohibited. All this seems to indicate the value 
of the Weberian view of modernization. This chapter follows Szerszynski, 
however, in arguing that this process should not be understood as the 
absolute secularization of Chinese society but rather as the creation of 
a new form of the sacred in Chinese society, this time the creation of a 
transcendent monotheism focused on the abstract concept of the state 
and concretely embodied in the Communist Party. In effect, therefore, 
the process of modernization in China has not been about secularization 
but rather about the establishment of a new sacred order in which the 
diversity of Chinese religious values became increasingly subordinated to 
a new transcendent monotheism.
 The Rationalization of Sacred Space
In an article entitled ‘Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Moderni-
ty: The Campaigns against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century 
China’ Prasenjit Duara (1991) argued that the newly emerging modern 
Chinese state in part based its ascendancy on its ability to destroy the local 
religious associations and local geographies of power so as to reorganize 
them within a monolithic ideology of the modern nation state. Even be-
fore the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the mod-
ernization of the Chinese state was achieved through a reorganization of 
local power and social networks, chiefly by appropriating land owned by 
local temples. ‘Monks and priests who had depended on religious proper-
ties were deprived of their sources of livelihood; local religious societies 
that fulfilled social as much as spiritual needs were dispossessed and re-
placed by government offices that seemed mainly interested in extracting 
revenues and uncovering unregistered property’ (Duara 1991, 76). Duara 
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viewed this reordering of local religion as socio-economic activity, with 
the state assuming control over the economic resources and social struc-
tures previously under the control of the religious organizations. But per-
haps this was not simply a reordering of the religious economy, but also 
a reordering of the sacred. Perhaps in crushing the social and economic 
power of the local temple networks, the modern Chinese state was also 
establishing itself as the only legitimate source of spiritual authority with-
in the nation. In short, this transformation might not be about seculariza-
tion, as Weberian theory understands it, but, in Szerszynski’s terms, as 
one of these various moments in human history when an old sacred order 
gives way to a new one.
 In order to understand how this forced disenchantment of China’s 
countryside could legitimately be viewed as a transformation within the 
sacred in modern China, it is necessary to understand the relationship 
between the sacred, nature and geography in traditional China. In the 
history of China, power was not only constituted ideologically and theo-
logically, but geographically too. This was evident most clearly in the sa-
cred cosmography that held China to be the ‘middle kingdom’. This term 
originated in the Warring States period, and was originally understood in 
the plural. It referred to the various ‘central states’ that shared the culture 
of writing in characters. These ‘central states’ were thus distinguished 
from outer regions who did not share the same literary and cultural tradi-
tions. After unification under the first Qin emperor, these ‘central states’ 
became the ‘middle kingdom’, that is, the single China that is familiar to 
us today. At the centre of this middle kingdom was the capital, and at the 
centre of the capital was the imperial palace, and at the centre of the im-
perial palace was the court from which the emperor governed the distant 
corners of the empire. This cosmology was replicated everywhere. The 
magistrate had his offices in a courtyard at the centre of the city. The city 
was surrounded by walls. Outside the walls was the countryside that pro-
vided the food to keep the city functioning and beyond the countryside 
was the wilderness inhabited by bandits, beasts, and barbarians. This 
cosmology was replicated also in the heavens, which were viewed as a 
circular canopy rotating around a central ridge-pole known as the Great 
Ultimate (taiji), an axis mundi connecting the pole star down through 
the earth into the underworld. In some Daoist religious movements, the 
most significant deities were thus the ones associated with the stars of 
the Big Dipper (Ursa Major) who lit the way to the apex of heaven and 
around which the lesser constellations revolved. Power, in earth and on 
heaven, was manifested in the construction of space. It was about the 
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disposition of things, structuring human relations in a certain way within 
their surroundings so as to promote a cosmic vision of order and har-
mony (see Lewis 2006).
 Central to this worldview was the network of sacred mountains that 
symbolized the centre and the four corners of the empire. In addition, 
both Buddhists and Daoists claimed their own sacred mountains and es-
tablished monasteries and retreat houses there. At certain times and in 
certain locations these sacred geographies overlapped with each other. 
Mt. Tai in Shandong province, the Eastern mountain of the imperial cult 
was also sacred to both Buddhists and Daoists. On this mountain, the Qin 
emperor who reunited the country following the dissolution of the War-
ring States period instituted new sacrifices to the supreme cosmic rulers. 
Only the emperor was permitted to offer these feng and shan sacrifices. 
Through this exclusive ritual the emperor asserted his own personal con-
nection to the cosmic powers that governed heaven and earth. He es-
tablished himself not only as the chief mediator between the gods and 
the people but as an indispensable element in the theological geography 
that constituted the Chinese understanding of their place in the universe. 
The Wu emperor of the Han dynasty reinstated these sacrifices and built 
a temple at the base of the mountain where the entire cosmic pantheon 
could assemble to witness the rituals over which the emperor personally 
presided (see Bokenkamp 1996). The imperial cult thus served to rein-
force the authority of the emperor over his people, an authority vested in 
the ritual construction of sacred space by means of which the nation could 
orient itself in relation to the heavens above and the peripheral spaces to 
the north, south, east and west.
 This network of sacred spaces, however, should not solely be interpret-
ed in ideological and epistemological terms about what Chinese people 
believed about the nature of the cosmos. Rather we should interpret this 
construction of sacred space as the way in which power and authority 
were actually constituted in terms of the geography of the nation. The 
significance of the feng and shan sacrifices did not lie solely in the sym-
bolic nature of the liturgy and the ritual, but in the fact that they were 
performed at the base of a vast and imposing mountain reaching vertigi-
nously up into the sky. Through the ritual the emperor was appropriating 
power vested in the physical geography of that particular space.
 The technological limits of the pre-modern era, however, meant that 
the official state orthodoxy was not imposed uniformly throughout Chi-
na. China was thus a land of religious diversity in which local religions 
constructed their own interpretations of sacred space and competed with 
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each other for the allegiance of the people. Dynasties were established 
on the back of religious fervour and were destroyed in the same way. 
As much as the Imperial court sought to impose its vision of unity and 
harmony on the empire, such an imposition was inevitably imperfect, 
fracturing at its various intersections with the authority of local cults 
and popular religions. In order for this vision to become a reality, it was 
necessary for the modern state to dismantle the networks of theological 
power and religious authority traditionally associated with the sacred 
mountains and local cults. This was made possible part by rapid develop-
ments in communications technology that, for the first time, enabled the 
central authorities to impose their vision of the world upon the various 
regions of China. Although from the perspective of traditional Chinese 
religious history this could be viewed as the secularization of these natu-
ral and local spaces, the campaigns against popular religion could equally 
be interpreted as the reordering of the sacred into a single, overarching, 
transcendent monotheism constructed around the abstract notion of the 
state.
 It would come as no surprise, therefore, that religion and the state 
would come into conflict where the function of religion was not clearly 
allied with that of the state. In such cases religion had to be controlled by 
the state because it was, in effect, a theological competitor. Duara traced 
the modern history of conflict between religion and the state to an offi-
cial document published in 1928, called the ‘Standards for Preserving and 
Abandoning Gods and Shrines’ (Duara 1991, 79). This document marked 
a milestone in the process of legitimating certain forms of religion and 
delegitimizing others. Some gods such as Confucius, Guandi, Laozi, and 
Buddha were permitted to be worshipped. Other gods, such as the city 
god and the god of wealth were proscribed. The main distinction to be 
drawn between these two lists of gods is that the former could be identi-
fied in terms of their function with the overarching goals of a nation state, 
whereas the latter list contains gods who chiefly serve the interests of in-
dividuals or localities. In short, some gods had a place within the temple 
of nationalism and other gods were seen as subversive of the overarch-
ing agenda of the state. Just as the rise of the nation state in Europe has 
been seen as a theological consequence of the Protestant Reformation 
(Loy 2002, 94), so also the invention of the modern Chinese nation state 
could be seen a type of theological activity that demanded the restraint of 
religious competitors.
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 Religion, Nature, and Modernization
The debate about the place of religion in the modern Chinese state was 
not, however, understood simply within the framework of the overarching 
theology of the nation state. It was also an ideological conflict predicated 
on competing visions of nature. This conflict was made possible by the 
invention of the category of ‘superstition’ (mixin). Duara demonstrates 
in the same article that although popular cults and local religions had 
previously been regarded with disdain by elite religious leaders and cat-
egorized as ‘heterodox’ (xie) they were now increasingly placed under the 
new category of superstition (mixin). The category of ‘superstition’ thus 
functioned as an ideological tool by means of which the state was able 
to make normative judgments about religious institutions so as to assert 
power over them. It did so by framing the ideology of local and popular re-
ligious movements as ‘superstition’, that is to say, ‘deluded beliefs’. A devi-
ant or unorthodox institution might have the possibility of being aligned, 
reformed or normalized in some way. An organization founded on super-
stition, or deluded belief, would face a far harder task of surviving in the 
modern state. Just as the birth of the nation state in Western Europe and 
North America was accompanied by the proscription of witchcraft and 
magic, so also the birth of the modern Chinese state witnessed a violent 
struggle over the ideologically correct way to view and engage the natural 
world. In both cases, magic and superstition were seen as the direct en-
emies of technology and science.
 The attempt to define superstition in China began in 1930 with the 
‘Procedure for the Abolition of Occupations of Divination, Astrology, 
Physiognomy and Palmistry, Sorcery and Geomancy,’ the ‘Procedures 
for Banning and Managing Superstitious Objects and Professions,’ and 
the ‘Prohibition of Divinatory Medicines’ (Duara 1991, 80). The so-called 
superstitions of divination, astrology, physiognomy, palmistry, and geo-
mancy were all key elements of popular religion in China, frequently con-
ducted in local temples, and were not generally associated with the for-
eign religions of Buddhism or Christianity. In effect the proscription of 
these activities was designed to promote the demise of traditional Chinese 
popular religion. But there was also a significant ideological component 
at stake here that revolved around the philosophy of nature. Although 
astrology and physiognomy are generally dismissed in modern society as 
‘fortune-telling’, in traditional Chinese religion they were part and parcel 
of the fabric of religious meaning that enabled people to make sense out 
of their lives, and also part of the local temple economy. What binds all 
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these forms of ‘fortune-telling’ together, however, is a shared philosophy 
of nature, one that is diametrically opposed to the ideology of science and 
rationality on which the modern Chinese state was building its authority. 
All the proscribed activities described as ‘superstitious’ held in common 
the view that physical nature, whether in the form of human bodies, the 
stars or geography, had the capacity to reveal truths that are of value for 
human beings. As such they were sources of religious meaning and moral 
capacity that originated beyond the control and authority of the state, 
or, indeed, any formal religious institution. The development of science, 
on the other hand, was accompanied by an instrumental rationality that 
viewed nature not as the revealer of spiritual truths but as neutral, value-
free space capable of being shaped by human will through technology and 
so forth. In the former case, nature revealed truths to humans through 
religious processes; in the latter case, humans imposed their values on 
nature through technological and economic processes. In the modern na-
tion state the imposition of values on nature is directed by the organs of 
the state through its various science and technology research institutes 
and the modern university system.
 The attack on superstition persisted in modern China through to the 
Communist period. At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1979, freedom of 
religion was restored in China only for the five state-sanctioned religions 
of China. All other forms of traditional religious culture were deemed su-
perstition. The policy on the regulation of religions adopted in 1979 states 
that:
By superstition we generally mean activities conducted by shamans, 
and sorcerers, such as magic medicine, magic water, divination, for-
tune telling, avoiding disasters, praying for rain, praying for pregnancy, 
exorcising demons, telling fortunes by physiognomy, locating house 
or tomb sites by geomancy and so forth. Th ey are all absurd and ri-
diculous. Anyone possessing rudimentary knowledge will not believe 
in them. (Document 3 from Selected Documents of the Th ird Plenary 
Session of the Eleventh Party Congress, 1979; MacInnis 1989, 33-4)
From this excerpt we can see that the principal question about the rela-
tionship between religion and the state has been formulated around the 
capacity of nature to shape and direct people’s religious experiences. The 
so-called superstitious activities mediate the relationship between hu-
mans and nature in a way that lies outside of the bureaucratic processes 
of the state, or the established religions with solid institutional structures 
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that could more easily be brought into line with the goals of the modern 
Chinese state.
 Thus the conflict between religion, science and superstition was not 
just about epistemology, or the rational procedures for verifying belief. 
They were also about the capacity of nature to be a source of sacred power 
and even moral authority outside of the structures of the state and the ra-
tional procedures of science. The campaigns against superstition and local 
religions that were begun in the Republican period and carried through 
most forcefully in the Communist period were not only contesting ideo-
logical and epistemological space within the Chinese psyche; nor were 
they solely struggles to assert central power over local areas; rather they 
were also struggles over the value of nature, and the capacity of nature to 
function in some way as sacred space, as a source of divine revelation, or 
as a theological reality.
 It would be a mistake to underestimate the serious nature of this conflict 
between science and ‘fortune-telling’. The various activities proscribed 
under the rubric of ‘superstition’ were by no means fringe activities re-
stricted to a few uneducated people. Rather, they expressed a fundamen-
tal aspect of the traditional Chinese worldview, namely the view of nature 
as a source of sacred power. This view is neatly summed up in a third-
century poem by Cao Zhi. The subject is Mt. Tai, the sacred mountain of 
the east, mentioned above as the location of the feng and shan sacrifices.
I roamed the mountain in the dawn
Secluded in its misty depths
When suddenly I met two boys
With faces that were fair and fresh.
Th ey gave me herbs of the immortals
Th e Numinous Supreme had made,
Medicaments that when absorbed
Revive the seminal essence and brain,
So life, like a rock’s or metal ore’s,
Passes through eons, but does not age.
(Trans. Elvin 2004, xxii-xxiii)
Here nature, in the form of Mt. Tai, is the space in which the poet encoun-
ters two boys. They are described as having ‘fair and fresh’ faces, which is 
the clue that they are not ordinary mortals but immortal beings. This view 
is confirmed when they give the author ‘herbs of the immortals’ to ‘revive 
the seminal essence and brain’. Here, nature is not simply the location for 
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an encounter with divine beings, but is also the source of cosmic power 
which has the capacity of conferring immortality on the one who ingests 
the herbs. Finally, nature in the form of unchanging rock is a metaphor 
for the sacred ideal of immortality. In these three cases, nature is not 
valued in terms of some rational economic calculus but as the medium 
through which the adept can transcend the mundane world. Nature is 
sacred inasmuch as it is the Way to attain a transfigured and more perfect 
reality. When the state proscribed ‘divination’ and ‘magic medicine’ it was 
in effect proscribing this view of nature, which formed the bedrock of 
traditional religious culture.
 Remarkably, however, this view of nature was never extirpated from 
the Chinese mentality; instead it continued, albeit in a transformed way, 
into the modern period. Despite the ideological rhetoric of the modern 
Chinese state, the view that nature is a source of sacred power and moral 
authority continues into the present day. Take for instance, the following 
song from the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s:
Let’s attack here!
Drive away the mountain gods,
Break down the stone walls
To bring out those 200 million tons of coal.
(Zhang Zhimin, Personalities in the Commune; quoted in Shapiro 2001, 
vii)
At first glance it would seem that this song supports the Weberian hy-
pothesis that modernization involves the disenchantment of sacred space. 
Here modernization, in the form of coal mining, demands the secular-
ization of the mountain space where the mining takes place, described 
as ‘driving away the mountain gods’. From the perspective of traditional 
Chinese religion this indeed is tantamount to the secularization of sacred 
space, but from a larger perspective it is more accurate to interpret this as 
the reordering of the sacred. Driving away the mountain gods does not re-
veal the mountain to be an inert place devoid of any sacred power. Rather 
it reveals the mountain to be harbouring a new form of sacred power, that 
of coal. Coal is not here simple ‘stuff ’, but during the Great Leap Forward 
was the means by which China would achieve its Great Leap Forward into 
the future. It was, in effect, the numinous substance that was essential in 
the concoction of a new elixir of immortality: steel. The view of nature as 
harbouring secret powers, whether conceived as 200 million tons of coal, 
or herbs with numinous powers remains constant. The only thing that 
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changed from the time of Cao Zhi to the time of Mao was the understand-
ing of the role of the traditional gods as guardians or mediators of the 
sacred power of nature. These were dispensed with and replaced by the 
gods of the human will. As Jasper Becker writes in China’s Hungry Ghosts 
(1996, 308; quoted by Shapiro 2001, 68):
Mao wanted to modernize China but could not grasp the basis of mod-
ern thought, the scientifi c method: that the way in which the natural 
universe behaves can be proved or disproved by objective tests, inde-
pendent of ideology or individual will.
Becker’s critique of Mao, and also Shapiro’s, was that Mao did not in fact 
secularize nature in the ‘correct’ way. Rather he simply replaced one form 
of ideology with another, asserting the supremacy of the human spirit, not 
the celestial gods, over nature.
 Reading Chinese modernization not as ‘secularization’ but as an endur-
ing theological contest over the location and power of the sacred might 
also help explain contemporary Chinese leaders’ fascination with grand 
works of environmental engineering. Projects such as the Three Gorges 
Dam can be understood as modern equivalents of the acts of mythological 
heroes who brought order out of the watery chaos. Such projects continue 
to reveal the enduring power of sacred mythology in modern China. Thus 
the destruction of the natural environment continues not through the 
rationalization and disenchantment of nature, as conservative religious 
critics of modernity might suggest, but because of the enduring power 
of ‘secular theologies’ to subordinate human interests to irrational ideals 
(see Gray 2004).
 Religion and Nature in Contemporary China: Three Cases
The debate over the place of religion and nature in modernity was not, 
therefore, decisively settled in the twentieth century and has begun to 
take on new forms in an era of relative religious freedom in China. The 
following three brief case studies display something of the complex situa-
tion of religion, nature and modernity in contemporary China.
 The first case concerns that of religious sites located in areas of out-
standing natural beauty, which have been developed and reorganized 
chiefly as tourist attractions in China, and function under the authority of 
local tourism offices. Although the reopening of temples might lead one 
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to think that religion is somehow resurgent in China, the fact that reli-
gious spaces are often contained firmly within tourist economic develop-
ment zones makes clear that the sacred is secondary to the economic. The 
recent flourishing of religious activities in China thus leads, paradoxi-
cally, to serious problems faced by wealthy monasteries located in tourist 
development zones. Referring to Buddhism, Jing Yin (2006, 90) writes:
Problems associated with the impact of the market economy on Bud-
dhism can be divided into two categories. Th e fi rst can broadly be 
termed external problems that arise when government offi  cials, par-
ticularly low ranking local ones, infringe upon the rights and interests 
of the monasteries. Th e more wealthy monasteries become the more 
frequently this occurs, and this constitutes a rather serious problem in 
some areas. Th e second category of problems are internal disputes that 
arise when the state returns property to the monasteries following the 
implementation of the policy of religious freedom in 1979.
The recent freedoms bestowed on religious institutions in China have 
thus come at a price, that of keeping sacred space contained within the 
bureaucratic control of the state as a means to achieving rational eco-
nomic ends. Jing Yin (2006, 91-92) goes on:
From a Buddhist perspective, one can say that the one-sided economic 
development in many monasteries has made them lose their distinc-
tively Buddhist characteristics. I have accompanied many overseas 
Buddhist delegates on visits to monasteries in China. In my experience, 
visitors often feel that despite the proliferation of monasteries, there 
is a lack of character here. Monasteries commonly operate vegetarian 
restaurants, guest houses, souvenir shops, and food and drink booths. 
Some even go to the extreme of running factories and operating com-
panies. Th e long-term eff ect is that the market economy is seriously 
hurting the religious nature of the monasteries. Once monasteries be-
come large-scale enterprises, it is diffi  cult for them to back out. And 
when monasteries become principally tourist attractions, the danger is 
that the energy of the monks becomes devoted chiefl y to receiving tour-
ists, leaving no time for the sangha or to engage in Buddhist practice.
In other words, even in an era of religious freedom, it seems that religious 
activities continue to be subordinated to rational, economic functions 
and are increasingly unable to stand as moral or ethical challenges to the 
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dominant values of the state. Such a view is borne out by the Chinese 
state regulations on religion issued in 2004, which paint a clear picture of 
the place of religion within the secular space of the Chinese state. These 
new regulations do not deal with the thorny theoretical questions such as 
the definition of religion, or the relationship between religion, supersti-
tion and scientific belief. Rather they tend to focus on more bureaucratic 
questions such as which government agency is the competent authority 
for dealing with various types of religious issues, and economic questions 
such as the relationship between religious pilgrimage and secular tour-
ism. Article 18 of the new regulations, for example, governs the manage-
ment of religious sites and typifies well the new direction in Communist 
policy towards religion:
A site for religious activities shall strengthen internal management, 
and, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant laws, regulations 
and rules, establish and improve the management systems for person-
nel, fi nance, accounting, security, fi re control, cultural relics protec-
tion, sanitation and epidemic prevention, etc., and accept the guidance, 
supervision and inspection by the relevant departments of the local 
people’s government. (State Council 2004)
As this regulation indicates, the overall goal now is to promote the smooth 
management of religious spaces in such a way that they do not disrupt 
social harmony or pose a threat to the authority of the government. It 
seems that party officials are no longer concerned with understanding the 
nature of religion in terms of political theory, but only with managing its 
social and economic functioning. In contrast to the divisive ideological 
debates of the May Fourth and early Communist era over secularization, 
tradition, and modernity, the contemporary framework for understand-
ing the relationship between religion and society emphasizes economics, 
management and social harmony. The CCP no longer seems intent on 
attempting to control the religious beliefs of Chinese citizens, but rather 
on ensuring that religious organizations, whatever they believe, work to 
support the nation and its economy
 Th e second case study concerns the revival of interest, at least in a theo-
retical sense, of the value of traditional religions in contributing to the 
emergence of environmentalism in contemporary China. Most notable 
in this regard has been the work of Pan Yue, Vice-Minister of the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). In a notable speech in 
2003, he called for the creation of an ‘environmental culture and national 
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renaissance’ that forged traditional views of nature with the demands of 
the modern Chinese state into a nationalistic vision of Chinese develop-
ment, and one that would avoid the ecologically destructive excesses of 
Western modernization. He quoted chapter 16 of the Daoist classic, The 
Way and Its Power (Daode jing), ‘The myriad creatures all rise together / 
And I watch their return / The teeming creatures / All return to their sep-
arate roots’ to argue for a ‘circular economy,’ his vision of an ecologically 
sustainable society (Pan 2007, 11). Such a society would be at once at the 
forefront of ecological economics and sustainable development theory, 
and at the same time indigenously and authentically Chinese:
Th e pursuit of harmonious relations between man and nature is the 
mainstream of traditional cultures in the past thousands of years. Th e 
Confucian school advocated ‘the unity of nature and man’, which em-
phasizes that all human behaviours must conform to the law of na-
ture. 
...
Th e Daoist school proposed the theory of ‘Tao following nature’, which 
elevates the concept of ‘nature’ to a metaphysical height. ... According 
to Laozi, natural laws shall not be violated, and human principles must 
conform to the natural laws. (Pan 2007, 6-7)
In Pan’s view, therefore, China’s religious traditions are sources of moral 
capacity and intellectual authority which could be reconfigured to fit in 
with China’s new goals of sustainable development. China’s economic de-
velopment, its accompanying environmental and social pressures, and its 
state-sponsored nationalism are thus ushering in new transformations of 
the sacred.
 Finally, the contemporary Chinese scene reveals a popular interest in 
understanding the relationships between religion, science and nature. 
Such an interest has most recently been evident in the 2005 debate about 
whether environmental protection in China was best served by an attitude 
of reverence (jingwei) towards nature. He Zuoxiu, a prominent scientist, 
argued that reverence for nature was the product of anti-scientific think-
ing and was not helpful in fighting diseases or natural disasters (He 2005). 
Liang Congjie, the founder of the Chinese NGO Friends of Nature, on the 
other hand, argued that nature cannot be viewed simply as a tool, and that 
having a sense of reverence for the natural world was itself natural and 
rational (Liang 2006). Although Liang was careful to define his use of the 
word ‘reverence’ in a humanistic way, the very use of the term ‘reverence’ 
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or ‘awe’ (jingwei) in the first place, clearly struck a negative chord with 
some members of the scientific establishment. The very debate reveals 
that issues of the environment are not simply a matter of science and tech-
nology in China, but also ethics and values.
 These three examples from the contemporary Chinese scene reveal that 
in China’s quest for modernization, religion and nature continue to be 
sites of ideological conflict. Religious organizations continue to be active-
ly managed by the state’s religious affairs administration. This oversight 
is especially strong where religious sites are located in areas of natural 
beauty and there is thus a large potential for making money by developing 
the local tourist economy. On the other hand, there seems to be a willing-
ness among some of the elite to consider the value of traditional ideas in 
helping to solve China’s dire environmental problems. Their views are 
regarded as controversial because they seem to contradict the official ide-
ology of modernization and scientific development (kexue fazhan) and 
yet figures like Pan Yue hold senior positions within the government. At 
the same time the question of respect for nature remains highly contested 
among scientists and environmentalists. All this seems to suggest that 
despite the rhetoric of science and modernity, there has not been an ir-
reversible process of disenchantment in China. Some traditional values 
persist, whereas others have been transmuted into nationalism and sci-
entism. The relationship between science, nature, and religion continues 
to be contested both theoretically and practically.
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6 In Search of an Adequate Christian Anthropology
Francis Kadaplackal
 Introduction
We currently live in challenging times. The role of the human being should 
be placed under scrutiny due to the rising tide of progress and develop-
ment, scientific discoveries, technological innovations, and the reality of 
ecological catastrophe. Our unquenchable thirst for profit and for mak-
ing our life more comfortable, cosy, and easy, has a direct relation to the 
degradation of the natural environment (McDonagh 1986, 8-9; Wirzba 
2003, 62). The Judeo-Christian tradition has been accused of perpetrat-
ing an inhuman, careless, environmentally unfriendly, and even destruc-
tive attitude towards nature and the natural environment. In this essay, 
I intend to enter into a theological investigation regarding the place and 
task of human beings in creation. First, Christianity’s theology of creation 
seems to propose a strongly anthropocentric worldview, as a result of the 
extreme personalistic character of the operational theological categories, 
which can be considered as theologically insufficient, one-sided, and in-
adequate. Second, we can identify imago Dei, which is considered to be 
the backbone of the prevailing theological anthropology, as theologically 
insufficient, too broad and too exclusivist, because it does not really pro-
vide enough grounds to care for the whole creation. Third, this means that 
we need to plunge into a reinterpretation of imago Dei in order to suggest 
a compatible theological anthropology, which can help us to value the 
creation as a whole. Only an adequate theo-anthropology can maintain 
the equilibrium between the unique role of human beings in creation (in 
their relationships with God, other human beings, and nature) and the 
care for nature as God’s creation. Based on these hypotheses, I will take a 
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two-fold step to reinterpret the human beings in creation. In the first part, 
I will expound upon the theological nature of the problem. Here, I will 
also dwell on the limitations of ‘mago Dei because of which I argue that it 
cannot function properly in theological anthropology. In the second part 
I will present the ‘created co-creator’ as a better theo-anthropological cat-
egory. I shall conclude my theological reflection by comparing both these 
categories to prove why I opt for the ‘created co-creator’.
 The Theological Nature of the Problem
Christian theology finds its basis in the fundamental tenets of our faith 
that were formulated already in the earlier centuries of Christianity, es-
pecially in the Creed. The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (381) sets 
out the basis of our belief in a God who is described as ‘...Deum, Patrem 
omnipotentem, factorem caeli et terrae, visibilium omnium et invisibilium’ 
(Denzinger and Schönmetzer 1963, 67). Whenever Christians use the word 
‘credo’, it is pregnant with the full meaning of the belief in a God who is 
Almighty and who causes the whole world into ‘being’. As Houtepen says: 
‘Het geloof in de scheppende God wil juist fundamenten leggen onder 
alle religieuze en esthetische ervaring en richting geven aan ons gedrag’ 
[‘Faith in the God of Creation aims to give good foundations for all our 
religious and aesthetic experience and guide our behaviour’] (Houtepen 
1990, 59). It is therefore our task to understand rightly and to interpret our 
traditions properly in order to discover our place in creation.
 Many scientists and philosophers have charged the Judeo-Christian 
creation theology as guilty of perpetrating a dreadful exploitation of 
nature. So, for example, Lynn White published an article in 1967, ‘The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,’ which was a great attack on 
Christianity’s way of treating nature and nonhuman beings. White was 
of the opinion that the crisis can be traced back to the way Christianity 
taught its believers about the creation of the world (White 1994, 9-14). ‘By 
destroying pagan animism’, says White, ‘Christianity made it possible to 
exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects. 
... Man’s effective monopoly on spirit in this world was confirmed, and the 
old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature crumbled’ (White 1994, 12). 
Scholars like Douglas John Hall and René Coste do recognize that there 
is a problem, a grave ecological crisis, which is ‘the distorted relationship 
between human and nonhuman nature’ (Hall 1986, 5-13; Coste 1994, 42-
47; Moltmann 2001, 172; Oelschlaeger 1994, 19-26; Ratzinger 1995, 33-39). 
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While recognizing the crisis and a certain culpability, Hall goes on to ask 
if we have been good and faithful stewards of the earth (Hall 1986, 24; 
Hall 1990, 188-191; Cobb 1972, 34-36). It is not enough that we look at the 
technologists and scientists with indignation, but we must evaluate the 
whole lot of our beliefs and actions and we should ‘begin in the spirit of 
self-examination and metanoia’. (Hall 1986, 24; Grenz 1994, 168; McEvoy 
2001, 196). In my opinion, we must clarify, reinterpret and redefine the 
operational theo-anthropology that regulates our relationship with each 
other, God, nature, and nonhuman beings.
 Imago Dei
Imago Dei is a theologically loaded term that expresses the relationship 
between God and human beings. From the early history of humankind, 
this has adopted a technical, theo-anthropological connotation in the con-
fession of faith within the church (Hall 1986, 61; Langemeyer 2000, 369-
371; McGrath 2000, 379-382). Humanity becomes the point of attention 
based on the Wirkungsgeschichte in the book of Genesis, 1: 1-2:4, since the 
image of God is imprinted on us as human beings. The concepts ‘steward-
ship’ and ‘dominion’ were used and interchanged in an effort to specify 
the role of the human being. It is the staunch wish of God to raise the 
place of humans above all creation and to give him control and power over 
all creation. The Judeo-Christian tradition argues that humans receive the 
most prominent place in creation and the human assignment in nature is 
to ‘dominate’ and ‘control’ the creation by being a ‘master and ruler’ just 
like God is a master for him. This ‘dominion thesis’ is often seen to be the 
fundamental cause of the ecological crises in the world. This ethical im-
perative for upholding ‘dominion and stewardship’ is strongly coloured by 
deep anthropocentric convictions, inspired by the Judeo-Christian faith 
traditions and encourages the exploitation of nature.
 As imago Dei, humans have a unique and privileged place within cre-
ation, with special authority that also brings along due responsibility. This 
implies that creation as a whole can be a promise as well as a threat, since 
‘human beings are the most vulnerable aspect of creation, the linchpin 
of success and failure’ (Fern 2002, 167). According to Joseph Ratzinger, 
the human being is the venue where heaven and earth meet each other. 
As the image of God, ‘in the human being God enters into his creation; 
the human being is directly related to God. The human being is called by 
him’ (Ratzinger 1995, 45). Being confronted with the enigma of the ‘human 
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condition’, argues Grenz, we end up in an identity problem. But we must 
realize that ‘our foundational identity rises from the fact that our ultimate 
origin lies in God’ (Grenz 1994, 166).
 Th e theological world reckons imago Dei as the ‘backbone of theo-
logical anthropology’, as that which is foundational in determining hu-
manity’s relationship with God, each other, and nature. Furthermore, it is 
considered as the qualifi er, determinant, and regulator of how we should 
discover our place in the world. It is precisely this that I want to bring 
into question. I am of the opinion that this cannot be accepted as the only 
theological standard to regulate, to assess, and to make sense of our role 
in creation, unless it has been subjected to theological refl ection, moral 
analysis, and evaluation. Can it render us with the possibilities to cope 
with the challenging situations that we face today? Does it provide us with 
a framework to bring together theology and anthropology (and ecology) 
for shaping a coherent vision about the role of the human being?
 Theological Limitations of Imago Dei
In my opinion, imago Dei does not provide us with an adequate anthro-
pology. First, as God’s images, our origin lies in a God who creates human 
life, the whole world and everything in it. This belief forms the very foun-
dation of our existence. But in my opinion, imago Dei overemphasizes 
the dignity of human beings. It is here that I would like to make my first 
theological argument. Our ‘being in the world’ is not just a presence, but 
it should be a theologically qualified presence, that reflects and radiates 
the dignity that we have received from Him in love. In this way, dignity 
is not only an ontological category, but also a call and a vocation at the 
same time. An overemphasis of the concept can endanger the theological 
ideas behind it, that is, that we have our origin in God. Taking part in the 
dignity of God should not be a reason for us to exploit nature without 
restrictions. We need to realize that every creature has its own place in 
God’s circle of love. God found all created things ‘good’ and therefore we 
must respect this ‘goodness’ in nature. In my opinion, in spite of its many 
positive aspects, imago Dei does not seem to succeed in this.
 Second, being imago Dei, the human being is created not to be alone, 
but to be in communion and relationship with the Creator, with other 
humans, and the natural world. It is through these spectrums of relation-
ships that we realize our dignity as persons. Creation is valuable not just 
because it is useful to us, but also because it is valued by God and is found 
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to be ‘good’ (Grenz 1994, 186). We must value nature through our relation-
ships, and as Houtepen (1990, 75) says, we need to foster a caring attitude 
towards the natural world. Imago Dei gives importance to the relational 
dimension, but restricts it mostly to the interpersonal level. Relationship 
with other human beings and God are important, as imago Dei upholds, 
but stopping there would be against the plan of God for creation. It is 
therefore necessary that we go beyond interpersonal relationships and 
extend our care to the rest of creation. Fostering relationships and re-
spect for all life are fundamental theological choices that the human being 
should make, so that we may improve the quality of our relationship with 
the Creator and the whole of creation. Any sound theological anthropol-
ogy must take account of this holistic dimension. In my opinion, imago 
Dei does not recognize this sufficiently.
 Third, we can emphasize that the capabilities for moral reasoning, free 
choice and responsible activity differentiate the human being from the 
rest of creation. This brings humanity not only to a privileged position, 
but also to a responsible one. The human capacity to think rationally and 
critically cannot be seen as a licence to exploit the natural world accord-
ing to one’s whims and fancies (Labuschagne 1990, 10-11). As beings en-
dowed with rationality and freedom of choice, we are to act in a morally 
responsible manner in dealing with nature. Every human action, there-
fore, that does not comply with the demand for responsibility has to be 
brought into question. To image God responsibly, the human being has to 
extend the sphere of responsibility beyond its kin (mankind), to the non-
human world. In my opinion, imago Dei closes down the avenues for an 
inclusivistic approach with regard to nature, by overemphasising the role 
of the human beings and thus falls into a theological fallacy.
 Fourth, theologically speaking we have good foundations to encour-
age the human being’s creativity. True freedom means that our talents 
and capabilities should be at the service of God and directed towards the 
enhancement of His creation. By sharing in this creative activity, we share 
in the fullness of life that God has willed for us. Humans are called to be-
come themselves. ‘Human persons are not to be understood merely from 
the perspective of their past histories or from that isolated moment that 
we refer to as the present. They are oriented towards their future’ (Ratz-
inger 1995, 49). This opens up the horizons from the distant past, to the 
present and from there to the future, to that which is not-yet. Very often 
people understand the role of the human being as a passive one. But I am 
of the opinion that we have enough theological foundation to promote the 
human being’s active role in creation. In my opinion imago Dei does not 
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succeed in maintaining a proper balance between human being’s ‘creative 
capacity’ on the one hand, and the ‘createdness’ on the other. With the 
abilities received from God, the human being is called upon to perfect the 
earth and to continue God’s creative action (creatio continua) in the world 
(Labuschagne 1990, 16).
 I do acknowledge that imago Dei has played an important role in reg-
ulating our relationships with God, with other human beings and with 
the natural world (Case-Winters 2004, 813-826; Wirzba 2003, 123-124). 
In spite of the many positive aspects, it fails on several grounds and turns 
out to be theologically incompetent, ethically inadequate and strongly 
anthropocentric in regulating our relationships and our treatment of na-
ture. This has to do with its overemphasis on the dignity of the human 
being, the inclination to be exclusive in attributing value and concern, its 
partiality in dealing with creation by maintaining an extremely personal-
istic viewpoint and through its unbridled glorification of interpersonal 
relationships. In the following part, I would like to suggest ‘created co-
creator’ as a more viable, theologically qualified and morally competent 
theo-anthropological category.
 Towards a More Adequate Anthropology: The ‘Created Co-Creator’
As is evident from our previous discussion regarding the limitations of 
imago Dei, it is a necessity that the role of the human being be rethought 
and redefined from a theological perspective. What should be the role 
of the human being within the natural world? Should the human being 
play the role of a servant, of a steward or that of a tyrant? The question 
as to the ‘rightful place of the human being’ is a very pressing issue. The 
interesting part of the whole discussion is that sometimes these questions 
are asked by humanity itself and at other times, these are addressed to 
humanity (Hefner 2004, 733). On the one hand, we ask how the situation 
can be improved, how our relationships can be bettered, how the envi-
ronmental degradation can be reduced and how we can contribute to the 
protection of nature. On the other hand, as Hefner says, ‘in their mute 
and yet dramatic way, our fellow citizens in the commonwealth of the natu-
ral world – plants and animals – ask us the question (Hefner 2004, 733)’. 
These questions need to be answered, because we cannot afford to wait 
any longer. In this section, I will attempt to reinterpret and rediscover the 
rightful place of human beings within creation, based on a theological 
reflection on the ‘created co-creator’.
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 Historical Development of the Term ‘Created Co-Creator’
The beginnings of the proposal for understanding the human being as 
created co-creator can be traced back to ‘Unsere Verantwortlichkeit ge-
genüber der Schöpfung’, an article published by Frits Blanke in 1959. In 
this article he called for the acceptance and appreciation of ‘co-creat-
edness’ which he called ‘Mitgeschöpflichkeit’ and suggested that we all 
belong to the one family, no matter if we belong to the human race or 
not.
Alles, was da lebt, ist vom selben Schöpfergeiste durchwaltet. Wir sind, 
ob Mensch oder Nichtmensch, Glieder einer groβen Familie. Diese 
Mitgeschöpfl ichkeit (als Gegenstück zur Mitmenschlichkeit) verpfl ich-
tet. Sie auferlegt uns Verantwortung für die anderen ‘Familienglieder’ 
(Blanke 1959, 198).
In 1970, Karl Rahner used the same idea in his discussion about the prob-
lem of genetic manipulation in his article ‘Zum Problem der genetischen 
manipulation aus der Sicht des Theologen’, although the explicit use of 
‘created co-creator’ was not yet introduced as such (Rahner 1970, 135-
166). The term ‘created co-creator’ as is presently used in scholarly cir-
cles was introduced in 1984 by Philip Hefner. This was developed into 
a full-fledged theory through the publication of his book The Human 
Factor. Evolution, Culture, and Religion in 1993. In this book he develops 
a theology of the ‘created co-creator’ and brings it in relation to divine 
purposes for all creation. The term has attracted wide attention not only 
from theologians, but also from philosophers, scientists, and people who 
have been on the lookout for finding a category that could do justice to 
the unique role of the human being, while taking the whole creation into 
account. From the time of its introduction, it has exerted a lot of influ-
ence in theological anthropology. Just as with anything new, people have 
reacted very differently to this new term. Many accepted it with great 
satisfaction. Some rejected it since they looked at it from the point of 
view of ‘playing God’ and yet others have found it a vital concept that 
should be developed further (Willer 2004, 844-847). In my opinion, this 
concept is significant to make breakthroughs in understanding our role 
in creation.
 PART 2 – RELIGIOUS RESOURCES FOR THE  ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
 Theological Core of the Vision: Interpreting Human Beings
Philip Hefner’s efforts to come to an adequate theo-anthropological cat-
egory can be considered as an original contribution in understanding the 
place of humans in creation. According to him:
Human beings are God’s created co-creators whose purpose is to be 
the agency, acting in freedom, to birth the future that is most whole-
some for the nature that has birthed us – the nature that is not only 
our own genetic heritage, but also the entire human community and 
the evolutionary and ecological reality in which and to which we be-
long. Exercising this agency is said to be God’s will for humans. (Hef-
ner 1993, 27)
It is interesting to note that this concept is very original, useful and com-
pact in several ways. First, it puts forward ‘one unified image’ in theo-
logical anthropology by which we can summarize the whole lot of our 
understanding about the human being. Second, it makes room for the 
‘conditionedness of human existence’ and suggests that the human be-
ing can be seen as the crucial element in the evolution of the whole 
world. Third, we can see ‘freedom as the qualifier’ of this conditioned-
ness, through which God enables His creation and achieves His purposes 
(Hefner 1993, 31-32; Hefner 2005, 186). In my opinion, the theory opens 
up new horizons and offers us new possibilities to reinterpret the role 
of human beings within creation. Hefner points out the three important 
elements of his theory as follows:
1.  Th e Human being is created by God to be a co-creator in the creation 
that God has brought into being and for which God has purposes.
2.  Th e conditioning matrix that has produced the human being – the 
evolutionary process – is God’s process of bringing into being a crea-
ture who represents the creation’s zone of a new stage of freedom 
and who therefore is crucial for the emergence of a free creation.
3.  Th e freedom that marks the created co-creator and its culture is an 
instrumentality of God for enabling the creation (consisting of the 
evolutionary past of genetic and cultural inheritance as well as the 
contemporary ecosystem) to participate in the intentional fulfi lment 
of God’s purposes. (Hefner 1993, 32)
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 Human Beings Are ‘Created’
In the term ‘created co-creator’, both the noun and the adjective are 
equally important. The ‘created’ in the ‘created co-creator’ calls for some 
explanation. The term ‘created’ refers to our own ‘createdness’ which af-
firms that ultimately we are also creatures, and as such, dependent. This 
dependency is to be referred to God and we are totally dependent on the 
creative grace of God for our very origin and existence (Hefner 1988, 522). 
The terms ‘the way things really are’ and ‘what really is’ are to be used in 
reference to God. Since we are ‘created’, we belong to ‘the way things really 
are’ through our conditionedness and freedom. This also acknowledges 
the fact that as ‘created’ beings, we are not the designers of our own place 
and role in the world. As Hefner says, ‘to be created is to be derived, to be 
dependent upon antecedent factors (environmental, biological, cultural) 
as well as contemporary sources (environmental, cultural)’ (Hefner 1993, 
35-36). The term gains its theological significance when we make the ref-
erence to ‘God’. The conditionedness of our existence that we experience 
has its origin in the divine creative activity. God should be seen here as 
the foundation and the corner stone of the process from which the human 
beings have emerged (Hefner 1993, 36-38).
Homo sapiens did not emerge to be conquistador, dominating and pil-
laging as the opportunity arose. Rather, as creature, the human serves 
the process of the creator, and all of the possibilities, activities, and 
achievements of the creature are to be referred to the created order and 
the purposes with which it has been endowed. (Hefner 1993, 36)
Two qualities that characterise this being ‘created’ are the aspects of belong-
ing and receptivity. We must be conscious of the fact that for long, the hu-
man being has been thought of and understood in dualistic terms. More 
than ever, our times insist on the fact that ‘we can no longer tolerate under-
standings of human nature that insist upon separating us from our fellow 
human beings, from the natural ecosystem in which we live, or from the evo-
lutionary processes in which we have emerged’ (Hefner 1997, 198). Our be-
longing to the world is a specifi c property of our existence. Th is also brings 
us in contact with the other human beings and surpasses the interpersonal 
realm and extends the sphere of concern and care to the nature and other 
living beings. I am of the opinion that a coherent vision on the human being 
should certainly take into account not only the relationship to God and to 
other human beings but also to the natural world and nonhuman beings.
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 Human Beings Are ‘Co-creators’
By using ‘created co-creator’ as a new category in theological anthropolo-
gy, we emphasize not only the ‘created’ dimension (with reference to God, 
other human beings and the natural world), but also the ‘creative’ one. 
The term ‘co-creator’ refers to the freedom of the human being, which is a 
fundamental condition of existence. Through this freedom, human beings 
are capable of facing situations in which they have to make choices, which 
have an enormous influence in shaping their life. They are called to make 
these choices in freedom and furthermore, they also need to give good 
reason for these choices. The specificity of the human being consists in 
the fact that it is only humans who are able to make the decisions, and are 
in charge of shaping their life and are called to justify their choices (Willer 
2004, 841-858). To put it in Hefner’s own words:
Humans cannot avoid the freedom to make the choice, and only humans 
can construct the stories that justify such choices... environmental poli-
cies require a myriad of value judgments concerning the comparative 
values of the earth and of humans and other forms of life. Humans can-
not avoid such policy-making and the value judgments inherent to that 
policy. Further, only humans can construct the stories that provide the 
justifying arguments for such judgments. (Hefner 1993, 38)
Richard Fern offers similar ideas in Nature, God and Humanity where he 
speaks about the freedom of the created order. The possibility to make 
choices is a gift that God has given His creation:
God grants creation its own, creative freedom for the sake of a love, a 
mutuality, that cannot exist apart from genuine freedom and risk. It is 
not enough to have created creatures with whom he can talk, creatures 
capable of grasping creation and analogically, himself in thought, God 
must give these creatures and, thereby, creation, the nature he has so 
lovingly made, the capacity to choose their own future, to form and act 
for reasons, ends, and goals, of their own... Having placed the future of 
creation in its own refl ective awareness, God waits for the free reciproc-
ity of his continuing, sustaining love. (Fern 2002, 160)
The qualities of belonging and receptivity are morally qualified since hu-
man beings are self-conscious and are therefore able to plan their life 
in the world. While carrying out their plans, they are conscious of their 
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sense of belonging to the natural world of which they are part of and they 
are able to receive feedback and alter the process by making use of the ac-
cumulated wisdom. The freedom of the human being is a determined hu-
man condition. (Hefner 1993, 97-98) Rational reflection and moral action 
are essential elements herein. This also emphasizes the possibilities for 
‘human becoming’. Without freedom, the human beings will not be able 
to play a creative and constructive role in the world to which they belong. 
They are designers of their own destiny, but always in reference to God 
and his purposes for the world. As creatures, human beings are called to 
be ‘co-creators’ with God, in fulfilling God’s purposes for creation.
 Freedom as the defining condition of the human beings highlights the 
extraordinary characteristics of the human creature and the special place 
that this creature has within the ecosystem of the planet. But this freedom 
should not be mistaken for equality with God, the Creator. As we have 
described above, human beings are creatures and can therefore never be 
considered equal to God, since they are dependent on the Creator for 
their creative activity (Hefner 1993, 39). The ‘co’ in the co-creator has to 
be emphasized sufficiently if we are to take the term in its right meaning. 
This suggests that we are participating in the creative action of God, not 
on our own, not in subordination, but in partnership. It also confirms 
that the future is open and undetermined. The human being can give it 
direction whenever needed, or change the course whenever found neces-
sary (Hefner 1989, 524; Peterson 2004, 829). As is explained above, the 
creative activity of the human being finds its source in God the Creator 
who gives it to humanity with love. It is an essential characteristic of hu-
man beings as ‘co-creators’ that we can participate actively in the unique 
plan of God.
 To have a proper understanding of the ‘created co-creator’ we have to 
place it in the context of creation and its purposes. Without this essential 
dimension, ‘created co-creator’ loses its meaning. The purposes of God 
for creation connect the human beings to the destiny willed by God. ‘Both 
the creation and the human being have purposes for their existence, and 
the two are intertwined within the larger notion of God’s destiny for the 
entire creation’ (Doncel 2004, 794; Hefner 1993, 39; Russell 1994, 148-150). 
From a theological point of view, nature is to be understood and valued 
as God’s creation. Nature is actually all that we have in our efforts to un-
derstand the world. Hefner opines that even those religions that speak of 
revelation, have to recognize ‘that revelation happens within nature, and 
that it is received, understood, and interpreted through the thoroughly 
natural structures of a natural animal, Homo sapiens’ (Hefner 1993, 41).
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 As human beings we are embedded in this world, out of which we 
ourselves have evolved. The world (nature) becomes the stage for all 
our operations. From this perspective, Sittler considers the world as the 
‘theatre of God’s grace’. Viewing nature in this way can help us to value 
nature and to care for it (McFague 1997, 153-154). The natural web of 
interrelationships and interdependence, within which we find our place, 
suggests that the purpose of human existence should be referred to this 
web of interrelationships. The human construction of purposes has a 
great influence in the natural world especially if we place it in the circle 
of relationships. The concept of ‘wholesomeness’ can help us to find an 
appropriate manner in which humans can contribute to the purposes 
in creation. In our understanding of the human being, nature receives 
great significance.
... nature is the arena for human purpose and that concern for nature’s 
wholesome state provides a pragmatic criterion for our thinking... Na-
ture is the medium through which the world, including human beings, 
receives knowledge, as well as grace. (Hefner 1993, 42)
The idea of ‘wholesomeness’ should be scrutinized thoroughly in order to 
come to a consensus regarding what is good for nature. Our behaviours 
have different effects and outcomes and therefore, they do not bring the 
same result for human beings and the whole of nature. This is true es-
pecially with regard to the application of technological innovations and 
possibilities. We have to make choices in this technological civilization 
within which we live. This particular aspect demands of us that we take 
decisions that are scientifically and technologically responsible and theo-
logically coherent. If we take the evolution of humans into account, we 
can understand the meaning of nature as follows: ‘... the appearance of 
homo sapiens as created co-creator signifies that nature’s course is to par-
ticipate in transcendence and freedom’ (Hefner 1997, 197). Human beings 
are called upon to discern the requirements for adequate living and they 
must learn to meet the challenges that are posed to them. The environ-
mental collapse that we face today can be seen as a result of our incapacity 
to cope with the technological era. It is not enough that we make choices 
and transform them into actions. We need to be morally responsible and 
give justification for our actions.
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 Opening Up New Theological Horizons
Christian theology reiterates the fact that God is the ultimate source of 
everything. The belief in God as ‘Creator’ is the most fundamental state-
ment of our Christian faith, and it is the foundation on which our life 
as Christians revolves around. The emergence of the ‘created co-creator’ 
opens up new horizons in theology, in our thinking about God as the 
Creator, the place of the human being as ‘created co-creator’ within it and 
the value of nature as creation. The ‘created co-creator’ is the plan of God 
for the world and it is through the human being as created co-creator that 
God wants to bring His purposes for the world to fulfilment. Keeping this 
in mind, I would like to reflect on the possibilities that the created co-
creator can offer us in dealing with the environment.
 First, the created co-creator emphasizes the fact that the human be-
ing is first and foremost a creature, together with the natural world. Hu-
mankind is not to be seen as an autonomous entity, but has to be seen in 
relationship with a God who creates in love. In this way, we are dependent 
on the Ultimate Reality, God. This dimension of ‘createdness’ and ‘depen-
dence’ qualifies our existence in the world. The correlation between the 
nature of the world and the nature of the Creator manifests itself fully in 
the human being. It is this ‘createdness’ that connects the human being to 
God and to the natural world (Hefner, 1988: 522; Hefner 1997, 203; Peter-
son 2004, 828-829).
 Second, the ‘created co-creator’ opens up new avenues for taking care 
of nature. As we have already stated, creation is grounded fully in God 
who has freely desired and caused everything into being. The fact that we 
are ‘co-creators’ with God is not a licence to act as we like. Furthermore, 
there is no reason for us to be arrogant as ‘co-creators’ because we need to 
acknowledge that this gift comes from God and that it is a state of ‘given-
ness’. It should be seen as ‘God’s will for human beings to be co-creators’. 
Nature, together with the human beings, as creation should be seen as the 
realm of intentionality, which is to be perceived within the realm of God’s 
intentionality. As Hefner says, ‘this theological framework illuminates the 
fact that human intentionality exists not for its own sake, not only for the 
sake of the human species, but as the expression of and for the sake of the 
larger intentionality of God’s creation, nature’ (Hefner 1997, 203).
 Third, the concept ‘creatio continua’ acquires its fullest meaning in the 
human being as ‘created co-creator’. Creation has to be understood, not 
only as that which is present here and now, but it also refers to the manner 
in which God sustains His creation continually. The world depends con-
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tinuously on the ongoing grace of God. From the point of view that God 
continues to care for the natural world, we can accept that the nonhuman 
creation is valuable and that it is an entity that humans can trust. We are 
not to view the natural world as antagonistic to our life and progress, but 
as complementary, supportive, and strengthening to our well-being. The 
earth has to be seen as a friendly home for humans (Hefner 1989, 523; 
Lobo 1991, 79-80, Russell 1994, 144). The earth is not an enemy whom we 
have to fight, but a friend who needs our care and concern. There is also 
a correlation between God, humans, and the natural world because these 
three are partakers in the creative activity. We are called to make choices 
and to direct the course of events as ‘created co-creators’ (Grenz 1994, 
168-172; Hefner 1989, 523). Humans have to keep in mind that our creative 
activity and the way we are able to develop and bring things into being, is 
a ‘dependent’ creation, which is in no way a restriction, but a possibility to 
contribute our share constructively in the continuation of creation. The 
use of the latest modes of science and technology are encouraged here, 
only if they are in consonance with the freedom that God has given and 
the responsibility this demands of us (Drees 2002, 643-654).
 Fourth, through the creation of the ‘created co-creator’, God lays bare 
his plan for the further evolution and future of the world. Our example 
in this undertaking is Jesus Christ, the new Adam, who can also be called 
the ‘prototype of the true humanum’. It is in and through Jesus our model 
that God reveals to us the possibilities and potentialities of humans and 
what humanity can yet become. The Christ event can be taken as the 
event to which we are called to adapt ourselves. ‘In his life, death, and 
teachings, Jesus offers us the possibilities for raising human living to a 
higher plane, one which will reveal new ways of adapting to the reality 
system of nature and of God’ (Hefner 1989, 524; Stone 2004, 761-762). 
The love principle that Jesus proposed and the Trinitarian relationship 
can be seen as guidelines to go beyond the boundaries of our interper-
sonal relationships and to extend our love also to the natural world. Go-
ing beyond the boundaries of kinship is a basic Christian attitude that 
can be of enormous importance in caring for nature and in building up 
the natural environment (Hefner 1989, 524; Hefner 1997, 203; Hill 1998, 
263; Irons 2004, 777-778; Ruether 2005, 112-113). By taking Jesus as our 
role model, we can bring about changes in our attitudes towards nature 
and inculcate qualities that can strengthen our relationship with God, 
other human beings, and nature.
 From a theological perspective, we can summarize this new theo-an-
thropological concept, created co-creator, as follows:
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Homo sapiens is God’s created co-creator, whose purpose is the ‘stretch-
ing/enabling’ of the systems of nature so that they can participate in 
God’s purposes in the mode of freedom, for which the paradigm is Jesus 
Christ, both in respect to his life and to his understanding of the world 
as God’s creation. (Hefner 1997, 203-204)
 Conclusion
In this essay, I have attempted to reinterpret the role of human beings 
within the framework of Christian theology. It is beyond doubt that imago 
Dei is too broad and ambiguous as a theo-anthropological category. It lays 
too much emphasis on the dignity of human beings, to the extent that the 
nonhuman nature has no possibility to enter into the sphere of concerns. 
Besides, it takes only humanity into account and the rest of creation is 
sidelined and easily forgotten. But the ‘created co-creator’ opens doors 
and windows and allows the nature and natural systems to enter its sphere 
of concerns. This is based on the belief and realization that creation has 
its origin in God and that the human being is also a ‘created entity’, just 
like the rest of nature, taking its place in the evolutionary process. Due to 
its anthropocentric overtones, imago Dei encourages an arrogant attitude 
towards nature, by glorifying the interpersonal dimension beyond limits. 
It does not really open up possibilities for entering into a relationship with 
nature. But the ‘created co-creator’ is situated within the nature and its 
processes. The ‘created co-creator’ is truly part of nature and thus enters 
into relationship with it. The relational dimension is not restricted here 
to God and other human beings only, but is extended towards the natural 
world.
 One of the drawbacks of imago Dei is that the sphere of concerns and 
thus also the sphere of responsibility are restricted to the human beings. 
The ‘created co-creator’ acts in freedom and exercises responsibility not 
only for oneself or for one’s own species. The realm of responsibility is 
extended here to the whole creation. This holistic view of creation en-
ables the ‘created co-creator’ to take a holistic view of responsibility as 
well. The human being is placed within creation with the responsibility 
to be a ‘co-creator’ with God, with the ethical imperative to care for the 
whole creation. As part of God’s creation, the human being is within the 
creation, not above it. The concept ‘created co-creator’ accepts the fact 
that humans are special, but this speciality is to be placed within creation 
and is to be realized by being at the service of creation.
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 Imago Dei does not give enough room for the human being to realize 
fully the creative dimension, which is a gift of God. Though Christian the-
ology emphasizes the significance of this creative dimension, there seems 
to be a hesitation in taking it up as our legitimate role in creation. The 
‘created co-creator’ accepts this gift of creativity from God with gratitude. 
The human being is in close collaboration with God in order to bring 
God’s purposes for creation to fulfilment, in freedom and responsibility. 
It is not seen as the chance to become equal to God, but as a possibility to 
take part in God’s creative activity so that the act of creation may go on. 
‘Creatio continua’ is an existential condition of the world and the role of 
the ‘created co-creator’ is to bring this condition to its full realization and 
fulfilment.
 To conclude, I do not intend to suggest that we have to get rid of imago 
Dei as a category altogether, because I am conscious of the fact that it 
has a number of positive aspects which are significant. In my proposal of 
the ‘created co-creator’ as a better category in theological anthropology, 
I have tried to integrate the positive aspects of imago Dei and I have at-
tempted to go beyond its limitations and to expand the realm of possibili-
ties. The theological arguments that I have presented above make the case 
for the affirmation of the ‘created co-creator’ as a better, theologically 
qualified, and constructive theo-anthropological category to reinterpret 
the role of human beings in creation.
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7 Seeking the Depth of Nature in a Scientifi c World
Forrest Clingerman
While differences of opinion abound on how religion ought to confront 
environmental issues, one potential point of agreement is that contem-
porary scientific knowledge and religious knowledge are all too often de-
tached from each another – to the detriment of the environment. The 
divide between scientific and religious thinking (starting with the rise of 
mechanical philosophy and in some respects culminating in various nine-
teenth-century tracts on the ‘warfare’ between science and religion) can 
be correlated with a ‘secularization’ of nature by science. Technological 
advances created new ways of changing and destroying the environment, 
especially after scientific thinking was freed from religious strictures and 
conceptualizations. However, the ‘environmental crisis’ that has resulted 
from modern technological living has forced us to rethink our almost ex-
clusive reliance on such ‘calculative thinking’, even as such large problems 
(to name a few, climate change, loss of biodiversity, resource depletion, 
wide-scale drought) are discussed prominently in the media. A completely 
secular foundation for our scientifi c worldview has been found wanting, 
yet we cannot simply return to pre-refl ective religious views on science 
and nature (cf. the essay by Szerszynski in this volume). As heirs to both 
the Enlightenment and postmodernity, contemporary Christian theology 
must re-evaluate how it interprets the meaning of nature in light of the im-
possibility of returning to a pre-modern garden paradise. In other words, 
we must reintroduce spirituality and religion in our understanding of na-
ture, without denying the power and usefulness of scientifi c knowledge.
 But how might Christian theology work toward a re-evaluation of its 
understanding of nature? To be sure, most ‘eco-theologians’ recognize 
that both the sciences and theology together are necessary for interpret-
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ing nature. What is often lacking is the elaboration of an adequate method 
through which ‘eco-theology’ can bring these disciplines together. In this 
regard eco-theology can learn from recent discussions on modelling that 
have occurred in religion and science dialogues. Th e contemporary de-
bates over the environment show the need for a reinvigorated religious and 
spiritual interpretation of nature, just as they show the continued need for 
scientifi c and other forms of knowledge. In many cases, however, scholars 
subordinate theology to science, or vice versa. Allowing for parity across 
disciplines can occur only through a refl ective and systematic methodol-
ogy. If we are to overcome the scientifi c and religious dogmatic ‘calculative 
thinking’ of the past, this method cannot grant primacy to either scientifi c 
or theological dialogue. Instead, the method of an ecological theology must 
place disciplines into true dialogue, fi nding a mediation between scientifi c 
explanation and theological understanding. Th e present essay thus enters 
the methodological debate by arguing for a more hermeneutical eco-theol-
ogical method – a method that emphasizes theological modelling and the 
use of ‘emplacement’ as an organizing principle.
 As a contribution to this methodological debate, this essay fi rst will pres-
ent a characterization of the context of types of environmental theology 
and explain how the method of modelling can be advantageous for envi-
ronmental theology. Next, I will explain a specifi c process of theological 
modelling that will be benefi cial for environmental theology, drawing on 
the work of Klemm, Klink, and Scharlemann. Finally, I will argue for the use 
of ‘emplacement’ as a way of identifying the domain of a theological model 
of nature. Th eology, in dialogue with other disciplines, can advance our un-
derstanding of nature only when it becomes more conscious of the process 
of constructing theological models. Th eological models, using methods 
akin to those found in the construction of scientifi c models, off er a nuanced 
comprehension of nature and open the possibility of a testable and clearly 
defi ned theological knowledge of the natural world. Using the process of 
modelling, theology can determine the depth dimension of the abstract and 
lived elements that conjoin the human relationship with nature.
 Theological Modelling and the Theology of Nature
Many theological projects have emerged in an effort to address the ecolog-
ical crisis and the religious dimensions of nature more generally. Assess-
ing these attempts, we find that several theological projects unwittingly 
create barriers between theology and science through their conception of 
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the communication between the two areas of study – perhaps partially a 
result of the complex history of the ‘disenchantment with nature’. At the 
risk of oversimplification we can divide these projects of environmen-
tally-focused theology into two broad categories. In both cases, what of-
ten occurs is that one discipline dictates the parameters of discussion for 
the other discipline. In effect, science or theology presents a monologue 
without allowing for dialogue.
 The first type of environmental theological project might be described 
as what Ian Barbour calls, in the context of the field of religion and sci-
ence, a ‘theology of nature’ (Barbour 1990, 26). A theology of nature, says 
Barbour, starts from Christian theology and tradition in an effort to un-
derstand our contemporary experience. Thus, some theologians address 
environmental problems by revivifying confessional and biblical language 
as a means to alter Christian attitudes (e.g. H. Paul Santmire). Others seek 
to identify a spiritual or mystical dimension within the tradition, seeing 
nature as a sacramental subject (e.g. Larry Rasmussen) or lifting figures 
like St Francis up as exemplars (e.g. Lynn White, Jr.). Thus, one theological 
approach to nature is found in the attempt to mine the tradition in order 
to justify Christianity as a worldview that is adequately explanatory and 
continually relevant for ecological concerns. But this conceptual reliance 
on tradition can obscure the way in which we live in a secularized world, 
and thus how we can see nature independently of its supposed mystical 
or traditional dimensions. Further, this method often fails to examine or 
to understand concrete instances of nature and the environment, and in-
stead relies on vague generalizations or idyllic portrayals of the natural 
world.
 The second broad type of project moves in the opposite direction, be-
ginning with scientific understanding (broadly speaking) as the frame-
work by which to redefine Christian theology. While Barbour identifies 
this with forms of natural theology, we might better identify this with 
recent programmes of ‘religious naturalism’. Religious naturalists such 
as Ursula Goodenough focus on scientific understanding to rebuild doc-
trines consonant with a scientific paradigm. In order to develop religious 
doctrines derived from science, a minimalistic definition of religion is 
often required. Science is argued to be the most valid and persuasive de-
scription of the world and thus scientific understanding provides the ba-
sis for any adequate religious worldview. But religious naturalism might 
also present problems. Often religious naturalism uses a minimal defini-
tion of its object of description, which does violence to religion. Under 
such a definition, the complex interaction between thought, ritual, belief, 
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morality, community and individual is frequently rendered largely invis-
ible. Equally as troublesome, it can move from a clear understanding of 
the norms and canons of scientific knowledge to an unclear and imprecise 
definition of what constitutes religious knowledge.
 Both of these categories move between religion and science in a single 
direction, implying that our knowledge of nature arises from either reli-
gion or the scientific disciplines first and foremost. Not only does this in-
accurately show the complexity of our understanding of the natural world, 
this can produce an estrangement between the work of theology and that 
of other disciplines. To avert this estrangement, therefore, environmental 
theology must focus on a method that draws on the strengths of both of 
these categories, while off ering a way that avoids the fl aws that might arise 
in each. Foremost, ecotheology must find a method that systematically 
fosters mutuality and parity among disciplines while simultaneously seek-
ing knowledge of nature within the context of theology. Put otherwise, 
environmental theology must seek a method that instantiates a true dia-
logue on nature.
 I would like to argue, thus, that a more hermeneutical and dialectical 
framework is the preferred alternative to the two categorizations of envi-
ronmental theology noted above; what is needed is a method that offers 
critical reflection on the dialogue between theological understanding and 
scientific forms of knowing. This, I further argue, is found in the process 
of constructing theological models.
 Why are theological models relevant in light of the current concerns? 
Theological models demand a rigor that allows for a common ground be-
tween theology and the sciences, thereby promoting an equal footing be-
tween disciplines while also maintaining their uniqueness. The creation 
of models in both science and theology has several important qualities. 
Building models requires knowledge of the given domain, providing a ‘fit’ 
with the data. It also requires imagination and creativity – something that 
Sallie McFague’s work on modelling has pointed out. Echoing McFague’s 
emphasis on metaphor and imagination in modelling, David Klemm and 
William Klink point out: ‘Models participate in the metaphorical capacity 
of provoking the mind to think something new by seeing a resemblance 
previously unnoticed and unthought’ (Klemm and Klink 2003, 503). Fur-
ther, models are constructed and are developed in light of both cultural 
and historical conditions, are innovative, and open to change pending 
new data. Models are unable to portray the entirety of the data, and thus 
can be placed alongside competing models. Even when successful, models 
are continually questioned and tested in an effort to determine new facts 
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and blind spots. Ultimately, a model that is successful and more encom-
passing becomes a paradigm, or an ‘overarching conceptual framework’ 
for the domain.
 These qualities of theological modelling are exemplified in the pro-
posals of Robert Scharlemann, David Klemm, and William Klink. Klemm 
and Klink elaborate and systematize the idea of models initially brought 
forth in Scharlemann’s essay, ‘Constructing Theological Models’. Scharle-
mann begins by noting that theories (defined simply as ‘well-established 
models’) and models get data from the two places: their ‘basic structure 
of domains’ and the conjunctives that arise from these structures. Schar-
lemann sets the rationale for utilizing models in any discipline: a model 
is not an observational description or placeholder, and it doesn’t seek to 
be a replica of how a thing really is. Instead, a model is a construction 
that attempts to show how we can cognitively deal with an object. Thus, 
models are constructed, non-natural, and they are testable. ‘In sum, what 
we mean by a model is a construct that provides us with a methodologi-
cal way of dealing with an object being investigated’ (Scharlemann 1989, 
130). The difference between theological and other models is found in the 
domain to which the model belongs. Theology can build models indepen-
dently of other areas of study, but it is dependent on other domains for 
content – theology has no material domain of its own.
 Klemm and Klink argue that such models offer an opportunity to move 
beyond certain impasses present in the contemporary theological scene. 
For them, this is the challenge: ‘Theology is often perceived as a marginal-
ized discipline in contemporary intellectual life’ (Klemm and Klink 2003, 
495). According to the authors, modelling is a way for theology to address 
its previous silence regarding the perils confronted by contemporary so-
ciety. As Klemm and Klink state it: ‘the silence of the theologian has con-
sequences. Thinkers who do try to understand and to interpret what is 
happening in our world today do not look to theology to assist them in the 
task of making sense of our cultural and social lives’ (496).
 Consequently, contemporary theology is forced into the horns of the 
secular and the confessional, causing a ‘marginalization of theology’ in 
the academy. What is needed to overcome this is a way of showing how 
theological discourse constitutes knowledge in the contemporary world. 
By moving beyond social constructivism and naïve realism, science main-
tains a critical stance that has allowed the scientific disciplines to domi-
nate intellectual discourse in contemporary culture. For Klemm and Klink, 
theology must move in similar fashion to reclaim its place in the cognitive 
sphere of cultural discourse. ‘We claim that theology can and should as-
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sume an important place in the current scholarly debates. However, the 
price of admission is the capacity both to make testable knowledge claims 
and to justify the possibility of so doing’ (498). This emphasis on test-
ability is a key dimension of modelling, but it is not often adequately ad-
dressed. For Klemm and Klink, testing is an activity that places theology 
squarely as a scholarly discipline: ‘The point we are making is that at each 
stage of evolution and development of a model, it must be testable; that is, 
it must be capable of making predictions that can (perhaps only in prin-
ciple) show the model to be wrong’ (504).
 Testing is at the heart of legitimating theology in the context of con-
temporary intellectual discourse, therefore, and it is by way of models that 
theology offers testable claims. Models – both scientific and theological 
– are constructed to manipulate and test data; thus, it is not the case that 
theological models have not been used in the past, but that they have not 
been constructed in such a way that we can independently verify and test 
them. The main purpose of a model is to ‘investigate the structure of a do-
main... More generally, models enable one to ‘see’ why something behaves 
the way it does’ (503). It is the ‘why’ question that makes models unique, 
for their purpose centers on showing why certain things are correlated. 
In other words, models provide a sense of meaning to a given correlation. 
Further, a model is built in an attempt to show the structure of a domain; 
‘a structure is what gives unity to the essential elements that constitute a 
determinate domain’ (502). Models are not dogma or inalienable proposi-
tions, but rather ‘models are created as tentative exploratory means for 
understanding new phenomena’ (507).
 The broader situation in which theology as a discipline finds itself is 
analogous to the two broad categories of theological approaches to na-
ture and ecology; the division between theologies of nature and forms 
of religious naturalism echoes the bifurcation between confessional and 
secular theologies noted by Klemm and Klink. Therefore, if the method 
that Klemm and Klink offer assists in overcoming these problems, then it 
should also suggest an alternative position at the divergence between con-
fessional and secular theologies on the topic of nature. What makes theo-
logical modelling a unique and viable alternative for studying the natu ral 
world? It offers a way for theology to present knowledge claims that take 
seriously environmental science and other disciplines, in such a way that 
offers legitimacy, uniqueness, and independence to both science and the-
ology. In other words, modelling resolves the methodological situation by 
presenting a way of systematically placing theology and the sciences in 
dialogue in a truly mutual way.
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 The Procedure of Modelling for Environmental Theology
If modelling is an appropriate and advantageous method for an environ-
mental theology, what is the process through which one models nature? 
To begin, we must remember that the domain of theology is unique, be-
cause theology does not have a domain of its own. It seeks to find the 
religious and spiritual dimension of all other domains, without having a 
domain that is demarcated as exclusively theological. Therefore, the pur-
pose of a theological model of nature is to find the religious dimension of 
nature, which entails accepting and valuing the variety of ways we under-
stand nature’s other dimensions. Theology must account for the work of 
other disciplines, but it is not beholden to them; there is an openness to 
dialogue within theology.
 The process of constructing a theological model has several steps. 
Scharlemann presents a basic view of modelling originating from the 
claim of the lack of domain in theology. For Scharlemann, theological 
models are built through two tasks. First, one identifies the basic struc-
ture of a domain, and second, one adds a ‘theological conjunctive’ (the 
phrase, ‘God is...’) to the structure. In theology, models form an identity 
in difference, allowing us a dimension of transcendence in the midst of 
disparate facets of the structure – in other words, a different unity, ‘one 
established by the transcendence or depth in the domain’ (Scharlemann 
1989, 132). Such a model can potentially start from any domain, although 
some domains might be more useful than others. Scharlemann is careful 
to point out that theological models can use material from any domain 
without having to give a metaphysical reading of it. ‘“Theology”, then, re-
fers either to the whole set of conjunctives, in whatever domain, or to a 
theologics that, like mathematics, is an a priori symbol system needing 
some incorporation into models before it can provide knowledge of actual 
reality’ (Scharlemann 1989, 139).
 Klemm and Klink take Scharlemann’s basic outline and elaborate on it, 
showing five steps for the construction of a theological model. The first 
step is that a domain must be chosen; since theology has no material do-
main of its own, this means that any domain of study can be used as the 
basis for a theological model. Next, we must describe the structure of the 
chosen domain. At this point, there is no substantial difference between 
theological and scientific models. Furthermore, there is not a sense that 
theology is a different or complementary science. Instead, the researcher 
seeks to identify and describe the structure of a domain in ways that ac-
curately reflect the framework of the domain itself.
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 Third, we must identify and outline the depth of this structure. By 
‘depth’ of the structure, Klemm and Klink are making a contrast with 
the ‘surface’ of the structure, which simply posits the different elements 
without presenting their overall meaning or identity. ‘The ‘depth,’ there-
fore, means the standpoint from which the investigator can see the unity 
in difference of the structural elements. This standpoint enables one 
to see how the elements in the structure are necessarily related yet ir-
reducible to each other. The depth of the structure is a presentation of 
the fundamental principle according to which the basic elements of the 
structure are seen as both unified and preserved in their difference. In 
this sense the concept of depth is always implied in the concept of struc-
ture: any structure has depth insofar as the structure is a unified, coher-
ent structure. The depth of the structure is thus immanently present in 
the structure itself as its ground, basis, and principle’ (Klemm and Klink 
2003, 515).
 The usage of the metaphor of ‘depth’ is greatly indebted to Paul Tillich’s 
theology of culture. In turn, Tillich’s discussion of ‘depth’ is based on a 
correlational understanding of theology, which offers a more nuanced and 
dialectical understanding of interdisciplinary scholarship. Klemm and 
Klink thus move past many objections found in other proposals. Fore-
most, if their understanding of the relationship between structure and 
depth is accurate, then it allows theological models to move beyond be-
ing mere metaphors for a specific confessional community. A theological 
model of nature offers a structure that is testable, in order to then study 
the depth of this structure. In the case of theological treatments of nature, 
a model is valid only if it coincides with the results of models of nature 
from other disciplines. The importance of the depth of the structure is 
that it provides a unique element to theological discourse, but it simul-
taneously shows us how theology can participate within a unified episte-
mology wherein it can be questioned by other disciplines.
 The fourth step correlates the depth of a structure with its religious di-
mension. That is to say, Klemm and Klink make explicit that the theologi-
cal connection of God and world is paralleled in the model’s connection of 
depth and structure. A model is theological when a theological conjunc-
tive, such as ‘God is...’ (Scharlemann) or ‘God appears as...’ (Klemm and 
Klink), is added, for this correlates the depth of meaning with God. ‘God 
is not literally equated with the depth of the structure, nor is the depth of 
the structure predicated of God. Rather, the formulation asserts that in 
God’s being God, God appears as what is literally not God but the depth of 
the structure. The depth of the structure is where we find the manifesta-
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tion of God’s being as God’ (Klemm and Klink 2003, 516). This correlation 
presumes reflexive thinking about God, in other words; it is thinking that 
‘bends back reflexively on itself: thinking thinks its own act of thinking’ 
in reflexive thought in such a way that the here-and-now act of thinking is 
conscious of itself (516).
 The final step is that the model is critically viewed and tested. There 
are several tests for models. Models in any domain must be tested for 
fruitfulness, coherence, and fit. A model must adequately present that 
which it models in order to be useful – it ‘must account for all of the de-
tails at the surface of the phenomenon under analysis’ (517). There are also 
discipline-specific tests. For theology, we must test the model to ensure 
that the depth acts as both the ‘principle on the basis of which one can see 
the opposing structural elements as both unified and different,’ while si-
multaneously pointing toward a transcendence within the structure (517). 
That is to say, the depth must be tested to show its being as an ‘is/is not’ of 
the structure. For this test, Klemm and Klink outline the use of Anselm’s 
‘that than which none greater can be thought’.The second type of test for 
a theological model should show that the depth is able to ‘...manifest the 
being of God when presented as part of a complex symbol’ (518) of the 
theological conjunctive. This test attempts to show that the depth is an 
adequate symbol for ‘God’s being as what God is not’ (Scharlemann 1989). 
This relates to a final test, which is to show that the symbol created out 
of the theological conjunctive of the model enables our thinking of God – 
that is, that the model is useful as a model.
 The method of modelling described above presents a fruitful way for 
theology to investigate nature because it allows for a theological concep-
tion of nature that accounts for scientific ideas, without simply co-opting 
scientific results or collapsing into scientific domains of study. We can 
build a model of nature that reflects theologically on the scientific, re-
ligious, and other discourses concerning nature, precisely by seeing the 
fruitfulness of science as science, aesthetics as aesthetics, economics as 
economics, and the like. The theological model attempts to discover and 
test the depth of a given domain, but thereby does not negate the value or 
independence of a multifaceted study of the domain itself. Thus, ecologi-
cal science (and other dimensions of the study of nature) contributes to a 
theology of the environment when theology models the sense in which the 
structure of nature – seen in the dialogue between varieties of fields – has 
a ‘depth’ that theology identifies and studies.
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 Emplacement and the Modelling of Nature
Developing a fully adequate model of nature is impossible in the limited 
space available here. What is possible is to explain how theological model-
ling can identify a fruitful domain in order to overcome some of the prob-
lems that overwise plague environmental theologies. The choice of do-
mains is difficult when investigating nature, principally because humans 
are strangely both detached observers and entrenched participants in the 
natural world. Thus, a theological model of nature must focus on a do-
main that explicitly accounts for humans as subjects and nature (includ-
ing humans) as objects. Thus, the concern is to strike a proper balance: 
a naïve objectivity (assuming nature is an object apart from humanity) 
would lead to a narrowly confessional or secularized perspective, while a 
naïve subjectivity (focusing on the human alone) would not allow for ap-
propriate testing.
 To identify a domain for the theological study of nature, then, we must 
resolve a principal problem of the human-nature relationship: humans are 
simultaneously within and apart from nature, acting through and upon 
natural processes. We are ‘biohistorical’ (Kaufman 2001 and elsewhere) 
or ‘biocultural’ (Hefner 1993) creatures of nature and culture, an embodi-
ment of the dialectical relationship between the two. In other words, na-
ture can be modeled only insofar as it is understood in light of the complex 
relationship between subject and object, overcoming both naïve objectiv-
ity and subjectivity in favour of a more nuanced viewpoint. Thus a purely 
objective model is effectively impossible, for no other reason than that 
we are participating in the thing we study. That is, our very experience of 
nature includes an interpretation of experience. Humans do not behold 
nature in simple, passive immediacy, but through a complex mediation 
that defines our experience of the world. But nature is more than our in-
terpretations – it is, at least in some respects, ‘out there’.
 Examining this need for mediation between human and nature, I ar-
gue that we must focus on the similarity between our relationship with 
texts and our relationship with nature. There are parallels between the 
way humans encounter a text and the way that they encounter the natural 
world. Harkening back to the medieval metaphor of the ‘Book of Nature’, 
the parallels between text and nature offer an entry into the modelling of 
natural places. Just as the interaction between reader and text rests upon 
the sense of a shared world, so also the ‘reading’ of nature opens up a 
shared space that can be studied. Further, just as we read particular texts 
but not the concept of ‘text’, so also can we not investigate ‘nature’ in the 
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abstract. We ‘read’ nature in terms of particular places, and in light of 
our embodied relationship within a given space and time (or ‘place’). Our 
model must account for the experience of the dimensions of place, its tex-
tuality, its emplacement. The recognition of a sort of ‘textuality’ of nature 
opens the way for the construction of a model, by highlighting how nature 
presents itself in an exchange of conceptualization, experience, and inter-
pretation. This is done reflexively, meaning that the model concentrates 
on ‘thinking about thinking’ or ‘thinking about what it means to think’. 
Such reflexivity in thinking means that theology does not seek a model of 
nature (a form of thinking), but a model of how we think and experience 
nature (a form of thinking about thinking). Such a reflexive model recog-
nizes the hermeneutical situation in which we relate to nature, rather than 
attempting to develop an objective model of nature.
 What we are delineating amounts to a hermeneutical approach to 
the natural world. But how are we to model the ‘Book of Nature’ as a 
more focused domain of study? It is here that the concept of ‘emplace-
ment’ becomes essential as a characterization of our reflexive place in 
the world. ‘Emplacement’, closely tied to a hermeneutical account of na-
ture, describes how nature arises from the mediation between human 
and the natural places they live within. As defined here, emplacement 
identifies the form of the interaction between human and nature. More 
specifically, ‘emplacement’ is a hermeneutical mediation between (1) a 
general conceptual framework of place, (2) a concrete instantiation of 
a particular place, and (3) our (i.e. the experiencing subjects) place in 
place. We can further clarify these three elements of emplacement. Em-
placement includes (1) our objective and abstract conceptualization of 
nature. Generalized concepts, categories, and theories are a necessary 
element of our study, even though they are ideal constructs. Our obser-
vational frameworks must be systematically analysed and included as 
constitutive elements of our understanding of place. Emplacement also 
includes (2) individual, subjective experience of specific natural places. 
The manifestation of nature is not an abstract concept, but lived and em-
bodied – including the participation of humans as natural beings within 
the context of a locale. We must also reflect on specific instantiations of 
nature, such as a particular tree, ecosystem, or place. Emplacement final-
ly (3) includes the structured conversation that occurs between the pre-
vious two points. Emplacement reflexively thinks through the existential 
manifestation of how the human observer relates conceptual thinking 
with experiential engagement, generalized explanation and specific en-
counters with nature.
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 ‘Emplacement,’ as it might be used in modelling nature, echoes a concept 
that comes from Paul Ricoeur’s description of narrativity: ‘emplotment’ (Ri-
coeur 1984 and elsewhere). ‘Emplotment’ identifi es the ways in which nar-
rative resolves the tensions between discordant and concordant elements, 
especially those found in temporal elements of the story. In the present cir-
cumstance, it is important to note that we cannot assume that emplacement 
is merely a temporal or verbal description; rather, it adds a spatial dimension 
that is absent in Ricoeur’s concept of ‘emplotment’ and other accounts of 
narrative. Th at is, it includes human presence and absence within the physi-
cal manifestation of a place as place. Th is manifestation is seen in the ways 
that the inscription of place extends into spatial features and elements.
 Nature is almost the paradigmatic theological text when structured via 
emplacement: the intention of the text (versus an ‘author’), its ending, and 
our understanding of its truth and meaning can obtain only within the 
mediation between subject and object. Yet, unlike other texts, we inhabit 
the text of nature not only figuratively, but quite literally – we are em-
placed in it, such that the meaning that is negotiated is both from within 
and without, and questioning the simple necessity of past and openness of 
future. Ultimately, emplacement offers a textual structure that overcomes 
the tendencies of ‘technical thinking,’ and without denying the paradox 
of nature overcomes it. In sum, the domain of our model is not nature as 
such, nor is it a particular natural place or manifestation. Rather, given 
our desire to model nature for theology, the appropriate domain for a 
theological model is the text of nature as it is manifested in a place and 
in light of our experience of ‘emplacement’ within (a) place. Emplacement, 
then, provides a beginning point for modelling the textuality of nature. 
However, the price of this interpretation is that nature does not present 
itself in a purely objective or immediate way.
 The benefits for using ‘emplacement’ as a domain of study, I argue, are 
readily apparent, insofar as ‘emplacement’ presents a discernable struc-
ture that can be modeled and tested. Emplacement offers a core concept 
for structuring nature. Not only do we see the formal structure of em-
placement as a systematic way of describing the structure of our encoun-
ters with nature, we also see how (for reasons explained below) our em-
placement entails aesthetic, ecological, utilitarian and communal forms 
of interaction. Emplacement moves beyond its own structure toward a 
meaningful depth of nature – and thus, the cornerstone for gaining theol-
ogical knowledge from the natural world.
 If we conceptualize nature in terms of ‘emplacement,’ a discernable ra-
tional structure emerges through conversation with Tillich’s understand-
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ing of reason. For Tillich, reason combines the static and the dynamic, the 
subjective and the objective. ‘In every rational act three elements inhere: 
the static element of reason, the dynamic element of reason, and the exis-
tential distortion of both of them’ (Tillich 1951, 78). The interplay between 
subject and object divides reason into four sub-types, which are based 
on how the mind corresponds with reality: cognitive, aesthetic, organiza-
tional, and organic. We can furthermore argue that reason confronts the 
‘Book of Nature’ – at least, when reason moves beyond mere technical-
ity – through a similar division. When taking up the concept of place and 
the manifesting experience of a place, each of these four aspects or types 
of reason reflect aspects of the mind (or the subject) and reality (or the 
object). This means that reason itself defines the way that we integrate the 
concept of place, the manifestations of a place, and the mediation of these 
two with our experience of them as subject. Therefore, we can identify 
four types of emplacement, as manifestations of more general types of 
reason.
 If reason structures the human-world relationship as cognitive and 
aesthetic, organizational and organic, then our view of nature – as place 
and emplaced – is structured as place of science and place of aesthetics, as 
place of community and place of resource. These four aspects of emplace-
ment each constitute a dimension of how humans understand the mean-
ing of the text of nature, when nature is encountered as place (through 
space and time) and as a place (as defined by the event of dwelling and 
migration). The first two are, as stated, based on the theoretical, grasping, 
or reactive side of reason. First, nature can be seen as a place of ecology. 
Ecologically, place is defined through concepts taken from biology, chem-
istry, geography, and other sciences. The place can be described through, 
for instance, its ecological function in a watershed, or its habitat value. 
Second, apart from our scientific encounter with place, we can ‘appreci-
ate’ nature as, for example, landscape, scenery, or as a ‘vista’. When nature 
is a place of aesthetics, the place is constituted in ways akin to – but not 
identical to – aesthetic encounters with cultural works such as art. The 
second pair of categories of emplacement stem from the practical, shap-
ing, or molding side of reason. The third dimension is best seen when we 
describe nature through concepts of resource or ‘raw material’ – in ways 
that resonate with Heidegger’s remarks of the world as ‘standing reserve’ 
(Heidegger 1977; cf. Heidegger 1966). Finally, there are views of nature 
where nature is seen as communal. In this, nature is shaped according 
to its use as participant in or setting for communal constitution or self-
understanding.
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 If we seek to model nature in these terms, we are seeking to model how 
we approach ‘nature’ in a variety of perspectives: through environmental 
science, for example, or in terms of technology, no less than as ‘creation’ 
or other religious terms. While each of us has different experiences, we 
nonetheless can attempt to model the general ways that we interact with 
that experience – and how a depth of meaning emerges.
 Conclusion: Value and Meaning in the Depth of Nature
I have argued for a methodology and a domain of study as the first steps 
toward a successful environmentally focused theology. The strengths 
of this approach are several. Most importantly, a model focused on em-
placement can include a diversity of voices – scientific, aesthetic, politi-
cal, communal, and pragmatic, among others – while at the same time 
presenting theology as a vital participant in any conversation about our 
understanding (and implicitly, our treatment) of nature. Unlike other 
approaches, however, modelling the domain of emplacement is a more 
hermeneutical enterprise, meaning that these disciplines are in dialogue 
with each other, contributing from their own spheres of expertise without 
one discipline holding a place of priority. By arguing for such a model of 
nature, we also supply expectations for theological discourse in the form 
of testability, which presents the possibility of furthering our understand-
ing. Furthermore, a model of emplacement takes seriously the complexity 
of the human participation in the environment – especially given the real-
ities of religious commitment and our scientific, technological worldview. 
In sum, what I have argued is that theological reflection on nature is best 
served through the modelling of our emplacement in place, as the way to 
provide a systematic and testable approach to nature.
 What is left undone is a presentation of a specifi c model of nature for 
theological use. Th e presentation of such a model was not the purpose of 
this essay, but it is the logical next step. What would such a model look 
like? Foremost, it would take seriously the particular places of our expe-
rience, by describing a particular place or ecosystem. Th rough this, any 
theological model of nature identifi es the ecological, aesthetic, utilitarian, 
and communal aspects of that place. It would also place these descriptions 
into conversation with our theological and scientifi c concepts, as well as 
our mediation of experience through interpretation. Th at is to say, insofar 
as it is a model, it would describe the structure in such a way as to be both 
interpretive and testable – we must interpret the given locale based on the 
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concepts of the categories we use, but these descriptions are open for veri-
fi cation. Importantly, this structure would seek to ascertain the depth of 
emplacement and place this depth in relation with a ‘theological conjunc-
tive’. We might posit that, on a more general level, the depth of emplace-
ment is the unity of (a) the envelopment of the transcendent subject in the 
complexity and order of place/space, and the (b) participation and mutual 
transcendence of place and emplaced from each other in time.
 For every place, the possibility of finding and delineating a depth is 
potentially present. This means that the general statement above would 
be tailored to the experienced realities of the particular place itself. This 
‘is/is not’ understanding of the depth of emplacement might be seen to 
hold for emplacement simpliciter. Particular places exemplify this depth 
in different ways. The theological element that is presented by this basic 
structure is found in the statement that God appears in the unity of tran-
scendence and immanence that coexist in the way that humans partici-
pate and discover order (in light of the perspectives of science, humanistic 
concerns, etc.) in the places of nature around them. Constructing a model 
along the lines described above provides the opportunity to expand and 
test this basic description, as well as to explore how values emerge from 
competing perspectives on nature.
 In sum, this type of model off ers a new way of opening the metaphorical 
‘Book of Nature’ – taking seriously the theological tradition – while also 
affi  rming the importance of scientifi c knowledge of nature as primary for 
our contemporary understanding. By taking science, aesthetics, technol-
ogy, and other disciplines into account, the role of a theology of nature 
becomes to seek the unity in diff erence of these dimensions. By using mod-
elling as a method for seeking this unity in diff erence, theology can off er its 
voice to the important intellectual debate on the environment.
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8 The Value Lab: Deliberating Animal Values in the 
 Animal Biotechology Debate
Frank Kupper
The development of animal biotechnology is shaped in the interaction 
between knowledge, technology, and the choices of the actors involved 
(Nowotny et al. 2001; Jasanoff 2005). The complexity of the biotechno-
logical system makes its development an open-ended, inherently uncer-
tain process. At the same time, it bumps into the limits of values and 
lifestyles. Democratic societies like the Netherlands have a diversity of 
views on what is ‘right’. Regarding the execution of biotechnological pro-
cedures on animals, a plurality of perspectives has been present since its 
introduction in the Netherlands in the early 1980s. Different stories are 
told that each express a different vision on the animal, technology, and 
the relation between humans and animals. Furthermore, what is valued 
within these perspectives is expressed using different concepts and vo-
cabularies. In other words, various ways of framing are present in the 
Dutch public debate. They each construct a different interpretation of the 
value of animals and thereby even of the animal itself. They constitute a 
typical way of thinking and talking about animals, referring to a distinc-
tive framework of moral values considered to be important with respect 
to animals and the human-animal relationship. By this act of thinking and 
talking citizens are making the human-animal relationship meaningful to 
themselves and others.
 This chapter introduces the interactive workshop methodology we have 
developed to articulate (possible) value conflicts in the Dutch public de-
bate about animal biotechnology. We have dubbed this method the value 
lab. We focused on the deliberation of values regarding animals, although 
values about humans and about technology also play a role in this debate. 
Ultimately, this methodology is a first step to transform the public discus-
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sion of animal biotechnology into a moral dialogue in which moral values 
are deliberated. The value lab reconstructs the various value frameworks 
that are in possible conflict with one another. These frameworks should 
not be regarded as mental entities, thematic wholes inside the heads of 
people. Their use is instrumental, in order to facilitate moral delibera-
tion. The reconstructed value frameworks are means for further inquiry 
by providing structuring insight into the morally problematic dimensions 
of the pluralistic social context in which animal biotechnology develops.
 An extensive methodological discussion of the value lab has been pub-
lished elsewhere (Kupper 2007). Here we will discuss the major reasons 
for choosing a discursive method to explore value diversity as well as the 
most important elements of the method. The chapter ends with a short 
description of the moral value frameworks we reconstructed and some 
implications of these frameworks for animal biotechnology ethics.
 The Dutch Public Debate: Talk about Intrinsic Value
The Dutch government has made a considerable effort to incorporate the 
concern for animals in their legislation on animal biotechnology. Since 
1997, the Dutch government has recognized the ‘intrinsic value’ of ani-
mals as the central tenet of their regulatory policy. Another objective is 
to promote public deliberation of the biotechnological use of animals. 
Despite these efforts, values are not the central theme of discussion. Al-
though they do of course operate in the background, they are not delib-
erated explicitly. This observation correlates with Van Well’s analysis of 
the adjacent Dutch public debate on GM food. Also here, the organizing 
committee ‘Biotechnology and food’ reported that broader moral con-
cerns were not discussed (van Well, this volume). Van Well analyses that 
even the committee itself excluded moral values from the discussion by 
conceptualizing ethics as a separate – and thereby empty – category of 
deliberations.
 The debate on animal biotechnology has been largely framed as a legal 
discussion rather than a process of moral deliberation. One of the main 
reasons is the opacity of meaning of the concept ‘intrinsic value’. Intro-
duced by philosophers and legal experts to reinforce the moral position 
of the animal, the concept acquired various meanings in the public arena. 
Different social actors refer to different animal values when they use the 
concept of ‘intrinsic value’ to express their concerns about animals (De 
Cock Buning 1999). In the Dutch parliamentary debate on the ethical reg-
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ulation of animal biotechnology it was noted that ‘intrinsic value is not an 
issue: what we are concerned with here is its interpretation, which is dif-
ferent for everyone’ (see Brom 1999). The floating meanings of the ‘intrin-
sic value’ concept hamper moral deliberation because they fail to provide 
a conceptual framework to structure public debate. Therefore, the only 
possible structure of the Dutch public debate is legal hegemony. It is the 
one available framework for social actors to meet for discussion (Paula 
2001). Because violation of their ethical values can only be disputed with-
in this juridical context, these actors find themselves repeatedly trapped 
in a ‘ritual dance’ against licensing procedures. The legal framework does 
not provide the appropriate grips to engage in an in-depth moral discus-
sion about values. It does not contain the proper concepts and language 
to do so. As a result, the (possible) underlying value conflict is not articu-
lated nor deliberated.
 ‘Intrinsic value’ served as the conceptual opposite of the instrumental 
value animals have for their human users (Musschenga 1994; Dol 1999). 
The concept seemed to address perfectly the moral concerns that go be-
yond the animal’s health and welfare. Its monistic conceptual structure 
however, appears to limits the consideration of the relevant variety of 
relationships between humanity and non-human nature. If we want to 
engage in a meaningful social dialogue on animal biotechnology, applied 
animal ethics should take a different turn. In order to take the apparent 
value pluralism into account, we argue for a shift to ‘contextualism’, en-
couraging an open and experimental approach to moral inquiry, inspired 
by the philosophical pragmatism of John Dewey (see the final section of 
this chapter). A first step in this process of moral inquiry would be the 
identification and articulation of the (possible) value conflicts between 
various social actors. As Loobuyck indicates in this volume, the nego-
tiation of positions and the exchange of perspectives can only take place 
when the identity of the other has become clear.
 Social Interaction and In-Depth Understanding
Involving the public in policy-making about animal biotechnology implies 
listening to what citizens have to say. We were interested in the diversity 
of value frameworks. Therefore, we chose to look at the widest range of 
interested publics and to discuss the broader moral concerns. The partici-
pants in this study were explicitly addressed as citizens, members of the 
Dutch democratic society in which animal biotechnology is developing. 
 PART 3 – MORALITY AND THE MODIFICATION OF LIFE
One of the assumptions of this research project was the idea that unpro-
fessionalized citizens did indeed have an important contribution to make 
in the moral deliberation of animal biotechnology, since the discussion is 
about values that we all exhibit.
 In cross-national studies of European consumer attitudes towards ge-
netically modified food, it was observed that an individual’s opinions and 
beliefs about animal biotechnology are deeply embedded in more general 
attitude domains like the attitude towards nature and the attitude towards 
technology (Bredahl 1999; Bredahl 2001). Also, values, beliefs, and ideals 
are among other factors dependent on their context of expression (Pot-
ter 1996). From a discourse analytical perspective, the meaning of value 
concepts is seen as emerging in the process of social interaction (Pot-
ter & Wetherell 1987; Burningham 1995). When people talk about their 
perceptions of animals they will do so in highly complex ways (Water-
ton & Wynne 1999) have argued that values, beliefs and ideals, that is, 
the frameworks we set out to explore, are generally expressed in relation 
to a relevant social context and also as a process of negotation of trust. 
They are actively negotiated and constructed during the course of inter-
action with others. Therefore, according to these authors, research into 
the meaning structure of values, beliefs and ideals needs a more reflexive 
research framework than is offered by surveys or individual interviews. 
Adopting this perspective, we felt that the value frameworks underlying 
public perceptions of animal biotechnology in the Netherlands can at best 
be investigated by a close examination of the social interaction process 
through which the meaning of values is constructed.
 So we set out to create a setting that enabled social interaction as well 
as in-depth understanding. In recent years, the focus group interview has 
been recognized as a powerful site of social interaction through which 
meaning and understanding are co-constructed (Madriz 2000). Focus 
groups are distinguished from ordinary group interviews by the explicit 
recognition of group interaction as a crucial part of the research process. 
The group is ‘focused’ in that it involves some kind of collective activity 
(Barbour & Kitzinger 1999). They are also ‘focused’ in the sense that a 
selective set of individuals discusses a specific topic from their own expe-
rience (Morgan 1997). Usually, they are set up as once-only meetings that 
take up to three hours. The recommended number of participants varies 
between five to twelve participants (Greenbaum 1998). Data derived from 
focus group discussions relies to a large extent on the interactions be-
tween participants themselves (Barbour & Kitzinger 1999). As Kitzinger 
puts it, the ‘group work ensures that priority is given to the respondents’ 
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hierarchy of importance, their language and concepts, their frameworks 
for understanding the world’ (Kitzinger 1994).
 The objective of this research project was to articulate the (possible) 
underlying value conflicts in the public debate on animal biotechnology. 
This entails listening to what citizens themselves have to say. So, in line 
with the experiences with focus groups we organized small group discus-
sions in order to reconstruct moral frameworks. This way the participants 
of the value lab acted as co-researchers, reconstructing their own frames 
of reference while reflecting and deliberating on animals with others. 
These frameworks involve the concepts, beliefs and ideals about animals 
that people personally value. Our qualitative research design aimed at un-
derstanding the various meanings participants themselves assign to their 
own life-worlds and experiences. Following a grounded theory approach 
we aimed at the inductive development of theoretical concepts from the 
ways our participants themselves order their thoughts and experiences 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967).
 Designing the Value Lab Method
The objective of the value lab method was the exploration of the width 
and depth of different ways in which citizens in the Netherlands frame 
the value of animals. In order to facilitate a fruitful discussion of moral 
values we had to take several steps. First, we had to establish conditions 
that created a conversational context in which participants would feel at 
ease and deeper values could be discussed freely. Then, the selection and 
grouping of participants had to preserve the fruitful conversational con-
text and warrant inclusion of the diversity of viewpoints. In the actual 
workshop design we strived for a balance between free-floating discus-
sion and structured exploration. The final step in the value lab methodol-
ogy was the systematic analysis of the discussion products. All together, 
the value lab is an interactive methodology merging social interaction and 
in-depth exploration.
 Creating a Conversational Context
In this research process we aimed at encompassing diversity as well as 
in-depth exploration of ideas about animals. In order to enable this pro-
cess, it was of great importance that a fruitful conversational context was 
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created. According to the literature on public participation mechanisms, 
such a conversational context is characterized by an atmosphere of mu-
tual respect and openness, and by equal opportunity for every participant 
(Abelson et al. 2003; Rowe & Frewer 2000; Webler & Tuler 2000; Caron-
Flinterman 2006). Mutual respect and openness require a safe and relaxed 
environment in which participants would feel at ease and open to freely 
express their thoughts and beliefs. If personal values were to be shared, 
the conversation environment has to be trustworthy and non-threatening 
(Greenbaum 2000). Equal opportunity entails a fair deliberative process 
in the sense that it provides every participant the opportunity to put for-
ward her position and to reflect on the position of others.
 These conditions were met by the implementation of two guiding 
principles. First, we strived for homogeneity within the groups and het-
erogeneity between the groups. In this study, homogeneity meant that 
the participants joining in a particular focus group meeting more or less 
shared the same worldview. Our results show that working with homo-
geneous groups indeed showed a positive effect on the group process, 
creating group adhesion and a strong sense of solidarity. Generally, par-
ticipants indicated they felt free to express their thoughts. Furthermore, 
they mentioned that it felt good to discuss these matters among like-
minded people. The mixed groups we also organized showed less of the 
sense of solidarity and spent more time on convincing instead of clarify-
ing one another. Because of the waste of time and energy, mixed groups 
had a tendency to become superficial, compared to the homogeneous 
groups.
 The second principle entailed working with structured exercises dur-
ing the focus group sessions. There is always a balance between structure 
and freedom. Although a free floating discussion certainly helps in the 
creative construction of ideas, sometimes a directive structure is needed 
to allow in-depth examination of what has come forward or to prevent 
dominant participants to claim superiority over other participants. One 
of the participants of the value lab discussions put it like this: ‘I appreci-
ated the idea that the exercises granted everybody’s opinion equal atten-
tion.’ Another one: ‘There was a fair division of attention.’
 Our experience with the value lab discussions demonstrates that the 
use of structured exercises contributed to an equal distribution of atten-
tion during the discussion.
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 Selecting and Grouping the Participants
Representativeness is regarded as one of the most important criteria for 
evaluating the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms (Rowe & Frewer 
2000; Abelson et al. 2003). In our study, we were explicitly interested in 
cognitive representation, inclusion of the qualitative diversity of views on 
animals and the human-animal relationship.
As was mentioned, we aimed for homogeneity within the groups and 
 heterogeneity between the groups to facilitate open and in-depth explora-
tion of ideas. To achieve these aims, we have made use of various criteria 
to establish groups of congenial minds. We grouped on profession, mem-
bership of social organizations and anticipated worldview.
Range of 
viewpoints
Group Thematic grouping parameters
hg1 industrial farming
hg2 animal research in the laboratory
hg3 pet breeding & retail/ fishing sports/ zoo workers
hg4 farming/ countryside/ hunting/ foresting/ veteri-
nary medicine 
hg5 Catholic and Protestant Christianity
hg6 Islam
hg7 organic farming/ nature conservation/ nature 
protection/ nature recreation/ vegetarianism/ 
humanism 
hg8 pet owners/ assistance animals/ animal shelter/ 
animal protection
hg9 Buddhist/ Hindu/ Baha’i religions
hg10 biodynamic farming/ veganism, deep ecology, 
anthroposophy, nature religion
mg1-5 random cross-sections of society
Table 1  Selection and grouping of discussion group participants for a range of 
viewpoints. hg: homogeneous group; mg: mixed group.
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 Using a cognitive representation sampling strategy probably entails 
missing out on some socio-demographic categories. In line with Fishkin 
(1995), this is only a problem when these groups would provide new or 
not yet described ideas about animals. Fishkin has argued that if not every 
person, at least every view must be represented.
 We expanded our research population to groups of a specific religion 
or philosophy of life, because their voices are often considered unheard 
in the public debate about technology issues, a phenomenon also de-
noted by the contributions to this volume by Van Well (with respect 
to the GM food debate) and Loobuyck (with respect to political deci-
sion making). A remarkable result of the value lab discussions however, 
is that the Christian and Islamic discussion groups appeared not to be 
homogeneous with respect to their ideas about animals, despite the fact 
that they shared their religion. Apparently, religion was not the strong-
est determinant of animal values in these groups. On the level of pro-
cess, these groups did show the same pattern as the other homogeneous 
groups. There were no observations that this heterogeneity disturbed 
group interaction.
 Qualitative research literature recommends to conduct a series of dis-
cussion groups, while simultaneously monitoring the development of a 
range of issues to see whether new issues come up or the development of 
themes and categories becomes ‘saturated’ (Krueger 1994; Sim 1998). We 
started out with the two groups we expected to construct the two outer 
extremes of value patterns (see table 1: hg1 and hg10). The homogeneous 
groups we conducted subsequently showed no transgressions of these ex-
tremes. Also the mixed group discussions, which were cross-sections of 
society, did not show additional value patterns. The range of value cat-
egories observed in the homogeneous groups has been produced in the 
mixed group discussions as well. These results indicate that the selection 
strategy utilized in this study encompassed the width of ways in which 
Dutch citizens frame the value of animals.
 The Discussion Workshop
The value lab design was standardized for all groups, and was semi-struc-
tured. Each group discussion was guided by a facilitator. The facilitator 
was accompanied by a monitor, who observed the group dynamics and, 
roughly, form and content of the discussion. Also, the monitor assisted 
the facilitator in carrying out the assignments. The overall structure of 
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the programme was designed to enable in-depth exploration of animal 
values in a relaxed and trustworthy environment where participants can 
easily share their thoughts and beliefs.
 The collective activity of the focus group consisted of a step-by-step cir-
cling in on the variety and richness of ideas. The focus group programme 
therefore moved from intuitions to conceptualized values through the re-
petitive use of structuring exercises.
 A session started out with sharing and collecting the participants’ di-
rect intuitions and associations about animals. The next step was to ar-
ticulate the stories behind the associations. The facilitator therefore re-
peatedly asked ‘why questions’ in order to move from intuitions towards 
value concepts and the articulation of contextual stories. The next step 
was to systematize the value concepts by clustering them in value catego-
ries and ranking them in order of importance. Then, the group focused 
on a specific category and the process of association, articulation and sys-
tematization recommenced. Working this programme, the participants 
constructed an interrelated network of concepts, beliefs and ideals they 
particularly valued about animals. The facilitator and monitor continually 
visualized the outcomes of discussions and exercises on flip-over sheets 
to make sure the group was able to continue working on the material that 
had come up in their interaction. Furthermore, the workshop design made 
sure that value frameworks were constructed by the groups themselves, 
using their own language and concepts.
 Mixed Group Sessions
As was mentioned above, three of the mixed groups worked the same 
programme as the homogeneous groups did. For the other two mixed 
groups a different setup was chosen. In the standard programme, dis-
cussed above, the participants started at the level of intuitive associa-
tion and slowly moved towards making moral intuitions explicit in a 
group-specific conceptualization of the intrinsic value of animals. The 
two remaining mixed groups started directly with an introduction of 
the intrinsic value concept and its role in the public debate. Subse-
quently, these groups completed the same exercises but now from the 
perspective of the intrinsic value concept. We wanted to find out what 
meaning the participants would attribute to this concept and whether 
they would use it at all if they were to give their ideas and opinions 
about animals.
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 The Reconstruction of Value Frameworks
The value lab discussions yielded a collection of group stories encompass-
ing the variety and richness of ideas about animals in the Netherlands. 
The next step in the research process was to reconstruct the value frame-
works in which the group stories were grounded. First of all, during the 
group discussions, the participants themselves worked on the articulation 
and structuring of their own beliefs and ideas. Second, the group stories 
were analysed by the researchers using a grounded theory approach (Gla-
ser & Strauss 1967). A basic qualitative coding system was developed in 
an iterative process in a continuous exchange between raw data and the 
analytical and theoretical ideas researchers developed during the study 
(Strauss & Corbin 1998; Baarda 2005).
 There are three different levels of interpretation in the coding system: 
value descriptions, value concepts, and value categories. Value descrip-
tions are phrased in the participants’ own language and correspond to 
the explanation that was given by the participants to convey why they 
felt a particular animal value was important. It was crucial to preserve 
this language because our investigation specifically aimed at understand-
ing the language and concepts citizens themselves use to express their 
thoughts.
 Value concepts refer to the values underlying the expressions of the 
participants when they talked about what they appreciated in the animal. 
Value categories comprise specific sets of value concepts, linking them 
through a common feature they share. The systematic coding procedures 
produced relationships between various value concepts and categories. 
Through this process of categorization and linkage a complex network of 
interconnected value concepts was reconstructed. This activity of cod-
ing, categorizing and linkage clarified which value concepts were used in 
the participant stories. During the sessions participants already ranked 
the priority of value concepts. Furthermore, the frequency by which a 
particular concept was expressed was taken as a measure for the rela-
tive weight of value concepts. Comparing concept maps and concept fre-
quencies showed to what extend groups exhibited a mutual coherence. Of 
course, each of the focus groups went through a unique process of inter-
action, producing singular differences in how value concepts are framed 
and how often they are expressed. However, in line with Kitzinger (1994), 
using the same structured exercises for every group made it possible to 
compare their stories. Iterative cycles of interpretation by independent 
interpreters warranted the shared interpretative validity of research pro-
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cess and products (Maxwell 1992) and established the reconstruction of 
four distinctive value frameworks.
 Four Ways to Frame the Value of Animals
Each of the frameworks constitutes a typical way of valuating, thinking 
and talking about animals. It comprises a descriptive sense (a vision of 
what an animal is) and a normative sense (a vision of why animals are im-
portant and how people should treat animals). The frameworks assemble 
a set of value categories concerning specific elements of the image of the 
animal itself or the human-animal relationship. The value categories con-
tain a specific subset of animal values. These values are broadly defined 
as those features of the animal or the human-animal relationship that the 
participants of the value lab cared about, that mattered to them. The four 
frameworks are named after their central value concept: Use, Relation, 
Balance, and Source.
 We consider the value frameworks produced in the value lab to be de-
liberated constructions of the value of animals and the human-animal 
relationship. In line with a discourse analytical perspective (Frouws 1998; 
Layder 1997) we regard those constructions as social representations. 
Whenever actors like farmers, scientists or other kind of citizens make 
sense of the issue of animal use, articulate their ideas, they selectively 
use a reservoir of social representations (i.e. value concepts and catego-
ries.) Whether a particular representation is used depends on the ideas 
and interests of the actor as well as on the changing context of discus-
sion. Probably, for everyone a specific pattern is predominant or func-
tions as a default mode. Other social contexts may however invoke a use 
of language and concepts that belongs to one of the other patterns.
 Four Perspectives
The four frameworks put their emphasis on different levels of their re-
spective worldviews. We have distinguished the level of the individual 
animal, the species, the ecosystem and the greater whole. Table 2 on page 
170 shows the resulting perspectives for these four frameworks. The em-
phasized level colours the entire perspective on the animal and its rela-
tionships to humans and the surrounding world.
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The Use framework draws on an I-perspective. The interests of humans 
shape the meaning that is attributed to the animal itself. Furthermore, the 
individual animal is approached as a manifestation of its species. Not the 
individual but the general is what is perceived and appreciated.
 On the contrary, the Relation framework first and foremost values 
the individual qualities of the animal. The perception of an animal as 
an individual being colours the entire Relation view. Furthermore, the 
I-YOU perspective focuses on the relationship between humans and 
animals.
 The Balance framework exhibits an I-WE perspective, focusing on the 
role of individual animals and species in the ecosystem they inhabit. A 
balance is sought between human and animal needs.
 Also the Source framework holds a system perspective, the I-THOU 
perspective. However, also the individuality of the animal is recognized. 
The valuation of the system here acquires a spiritual dimension. The indi-
viduality of every animal is perceived as a manifestation of the supremacy 
of the whole of which both humans and animals are a part.
Table 2  Four different perspectives on the animal. For each frame, the important val-
ue concepts are depicted at the level they address. The arrows indicate that 
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 Diff erent Interpretations of Intrinsic Value
The concept of intrinsic value acquires a different position and meaning 
in each of the four frameworks described above. Of course, aspects of the 
different interpretations also overlap. Even when two frameworks refer 
to the same aspect however, differences remain in how this aspect is pre-
cisely understood. Furthermore, the different perspectives on the animal 
and its relationships to humans and the world colour the understanding 
of each aspect of a particular intrinsic value interpretation.
 In the Use framework interpretation the intrinsic value of animals par-
ticularly as the recognition of the animal as a sentient being. The concepts 
of health and welfare are therefore valued as the most important (and 
relevant) interests of the animal itself. The capacity for species-specific 
behaviour is valued in so far as it contributes to the animal’s welfare. The 
Relation framework shares the recognition of the animal’s health and 
welfare as an important element of the animal’s intrinsic value. Addi-
tionally, the animal’s individual quality is seen as a part of the animal’s 
intrinsic value. The animal is appreciated as an independent companion 
in the human-animal relationship. This idea contributes to the quality of 
this relationship. Due to the human-centeredness of the perspectives of 
both the Use and Relation frameworks, some elements of the animal’s in-
trinsic value are simultaneously appreciated for their instrumental value. 
The Use framework for example perceives the animal’s species-specific 
character and behaviour as something that belongs to the animal but 
also gives humans the opportunity to use animals in order to fulfil hu-
man needs. The Relation framework also appreciates this character and 
behaviour in an aesthetic sense, referring to the joy it grants the human 
spectator.
 The Balance framework interpretation of intrinsic value primarily em-
phasizes the animal’s independent role and position as a co-inhabitant of 
the greater whole of ‘system earth’. Further constituents of the animal’s 
intrinsic value are the appreciation of the animal as a subject of life, with 
its own subsequent needs and interests, and the animal’s naturalness, 
grounded in the concepts of species-specific character and behaviour but 
particularly in the recognition of the animal as a part of a natural environ-
ment. A similar ‘system’ perspective can be observed in the language and 
concepts of the Source framework. However, there is a more spiritual di-
mension to it. The greater whole of which man and animal are part is con-
ceived as incomprehensible to us human beings. The interconnectedness 
of animals with all other things is perceived as one of the most important 
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elements of the animal’s intrinsic value. The other element is the animal’s 
individuality. Together, interconnectedness and individuality are viewed 
as a manifestation of the animal’s purpose.
 Implications for Animal Biotechnology Ethics
Each of the four reconstructed ways of framing conveys its own narrative 
of the value of animals and their relationships to human beings and the 
surrounding world. Th ese narratives are grounded in diff erent frameworks 
of animal values. Th e diversity of values between the four frameworks pro-
vides a strong validation of moral pluralism in the refl ection on animals in 
the Netherlands. Th e value diversity observed in this study includes both 
instrumental values, like the animal’s functionality, and non-instrumental 
values, like the animal’s being a subject of life. It is important to note that 
not only between frameworks but also within each one a mixture of in-
strumental and non-instrumental values is expressed. Like Smith (2003) 
noted with respect to environmental politics, both individuals and groups 
simultaneously appreciate values of nonhuman nature that are diffi  cult to 
reconcile and pull them in contradictory directions. Th e ethical monism 
of intrinsic value theory is proposed to expel this uncertainty and settle 
the confl icts. In the meantime, it needlessly limits the broad range of in-
teractions between humans and animals and thereby misrepresents the 
diversity of moral experiences and values. Th e dichotomy of intrinsic vs. 
instrumental value construes participants in the moral debate as adver-
saries on either side of a dilemma. Th is results in a mere simplifi cation of 
the morally problematic context. Minteer and Manning (1999) have argued 
that any form of rigid monistic ethics runs the risk of jeopardizing the 
democratic tolerance of public ethical pluralism. Above, we already men-
tioned that the current practice of animal biotechnology ethical regulation 
in the Netherlands indeed does not provide the framework to incorporate 
the diversity of values into ethical decision making.
 With the undeniable complex and uncertain character of animal bio-
technology in mind, we believe a more pragmatic and pluralistic approach 
to animal biotechnology ethics would be better equipped to engage in 
moral deliberation of the wide range of moral concerns about the biotech-
nological use of animals. Here we join up with the fairly recent pragmatic 
turn in environmental ethics (Light & Katz 1996; Minteer & Manning 
1999; Keulartz et al. 2003). These writers are inspired by the school of 
philosophical pragmatism, originating from the work of Charles Sanders 
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Peirce, William James, and John Dewey in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Mainly the work of John Dewey, offers some fruitful 
options to deal with the flaws of ethical monism and intrinsic value the-
ory. In Dewey’s view the world is a continuous and contingent process of 
change. His philosophical pragmatism therefore is anti-foundational. In 
an ever-changing world, the response to a morally problematic situation 
cannot be justified by some external and absolute criterion. Creative-in-
telligent inquiry into the context of the morally problematic situation is 
what is needed. Thus, Dewey aims at an open, flexible and experimental 
approach to moral problems. Like Minteer (2001) noted, Dewey’s philo-
sophical project demonstrates a strong faith in the ability of human expe-
rience to produce from within itself the justification of values and beliefs. 
Moral deliberation in this view ultimately rests on the potential of indi-
viduals to collectively engage in the creative-intelligent activity of moral 
inquiry. We believe incorporating value pluralism through the activity of 
public debate and criticism is central to the justification of any animal 
biotechnology policy in a democratic society like the Netherlands.
 Application of the value lab method produced in-depth understandings 
of the various ways in which Dutch citizens frame the value of animals 
and the intrinsic value in particular. Our results show that in each of the 
value frameworks the concept of intrinsic value acquires a different place 
and function. The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for animal 
biotechnology policy in the Netherlands, operationalized the concept of 
intrinsic value as the health, well-being, and integrity of the animal. Integ-
rity is further operationalized in three aspects: the wholeness and intact-
ness, the capacity for species-specific behaviour and self-sustainment. All 
of the framings produced in this study are different from the legislative 
framing of intrinsic value used by the government. The concept of in-
tegrity does not play a role in the Use and Relation frameworks. It is not 
perceived to be a meaningful concept in the evaluation of animal bio-
technology practices. At the same time, the Relation framework expresses 
valuation of the individuality and uniqueness of animals, concepts not 
reflected in the operational definition. The idea that animals are taking 
part in a greater whole, important concepts in the Balance and Source 
framework, is also not reflected in the definition used by the government. 
In further public deliberations about animal biotechnology, this legal 
definition will therefore remain subject to critique. Adopting a different 
definition however will not be likely to change this.
 It is strongly advisable to actively incorporate this insight in devising 
and facilitating the public debate on animal biotechnology. There will 
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never be one absolute truth about the intrinsic value of animals. Given 
the pluralistic reality of the Dutch public debate, it would be better to cre-
ate a platform for democratic communities to deliberate the implications 
of various interpretations then to strive for justification from a detached, 
external perspective.
 As Walzer (1987) once put it: ‘It is better to tell stories, even though 
there is no definitive and best story’. According to Beekman and Brom 
(2007) modern societies are not used to the discussion of these kind of 
ethical issues. They argue that ethics as a platform for value debates is 
therefore necessary in pluralist democracies. In line with the ideas of deli-
berative democracy (see for example Dryzek 2000), it would be a platform 
for citizens from all directions and orientations to meet for discussion. 
Like Crapels is saying in this volume, quoting Nowotny et al. (2001), a real 
dialogue about biotechnology is a way for society to speak back to science 
in the production of contextualized, robust knowledge. Benhabib (1996) 
writes that all citizens must feel free to bring up any moral argument to 
such a discussion. In his contribution to this volume, Loobuyck too states 
that pluralism is ‘the very essence of the right to exist of our democracy’. 
But, he also rightfully acknowledges that it requires a deliberative atti-
tude. Like Dewey advocated, it requires the critical appraisal of the values 
and beliefs of oneself and others. This would be the role of biotechno-
logy ethics. Ethics as a platform for value debates should facilitate such 
appraisal and criticism. It is the task of animal biotechnology ethics to 
change a dogmatic clash of belief systems into a critical process of moral 
inquiry and open democratic deliberation. To fulfil this role, it needs the 
development of ethical tools, instruments to structure a collective process 
of moral inquiry. The value lab method we have discussed here can be 
understood as such an ethical tool. Th e frameworks produced in the value 
labs are heuristic tools for understanding the relationship between diff er-
ent values and positions in the public debate. Th ey are instruments that 
provide a structuring insight into the morally problematic dimensions of 
the pluralistic social context in which animal biotechnology develops. De-
velopment and trial of the value lab was the fi rst phase of a larger project, 
commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture. Th e second phase of 
the project focused on the articulation of (possible) value confl icts by orga-
nizing dialogue sessions in which participants using diff erent frames had to 
make decisions on biotechnology cases (in preparation). Th e project aims 
to contribute to integrative and context-sensitive policy-making on animal 
biotechnology. Ultimately, we hope to contribute to the development of a 
pragmatic and pluralistic approach to animal biotechnology ethics.
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9 ‘Not by Bread Alone’ – Religion in the Dutch Public 
 Debate on GM Food
Michiel van Well
 Introduction
Religion plays a role in every debate on innovative food technologies. Th ese 
debates cannot be understood well without paying attention to the reli-
gious aspects of these debates. I will demonstrate this with the help of the 
work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas and by analysing the Dutch pub-
lic debate on GM food as organized by the Terlouw Committee in 2001.
 Food and Religion
Food is a central theme in almost every religion, and food and religion have 
been closely intertwined for ages. Th ere are many religious stories and ref-
erences in which food plays an essential role. Food has been a religiously 
loaded theme in diff erent ages and places. In the Bible, more specifi cally in 
the Torah, the fi rst reference to food is made immediately after the stories of 
creation, in Genesis 2: 16-17; in the words of the King James version: ‘And the 
LORD God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou 
mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou 
shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.’ 
In the Qur’an (2:35) a similar story is told and also in Hinduism there are nu-
merous stories in which food plays a central role. But not only in words, also 
in religious practices, rituals, and experiences food plays an essential role, 
in fasting, feasting, and off ering. Connected to those stories and practices 
many religions have dietary rules and purity laws describing which food is 
pure and which is impure and therefore not to be eaten (or to be sacrifi ced).
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 That practically every religion relates to food does not necessarily im-
ply that religion plays a role in all debates on food. However, a closer 
look at especially the religious dietary rules and purity laws gives at least 
theoretical reasons to conclude that religion plays a role in every debate 
on innovative food technologies.
 Dietary rules and purity laws are a good entrance to see the intricate 
connections between food technology and religion. For modern people, 
dietary rules and purity laws at first sight seem to have an obscure or arbi-
trary nature. Many theologians and scholars of religion have tried to come 
up with a clear interpretation of the purity laws of the Israelites. Many in-
terpreters based their interpretations on motives of hygiene, blood, death, 
and creation order (Boersema 2001). The anthropologist Mary Douglas 
gives another interpretation of the purity laws that is different from those 
her predecessors. She divides those former interpretations into two cat-
egories. The first she coins ‘medical materialism’. In this approach it is 
implied that if we only knew all the circumstances, we would find a ra-
tional basis of primitive ritual amply justified. Douglas denies this line of 
reasoning a she states:
Even if some of Moses’ dietary rules were hygienically benefi cial, it is a 
pity to treat him as an enlightened public health administrator, rather 
than as a spiritual leader. (Douglas 2002, 37).
As to the second and opposite view in which primitive ritual has nothing 
whatever in common with our ideas of cleanness, this is by Douglas de-
ployed as equally harmful to the understanding of ritual:
One cannot state that our modern practises are solidly based on hy-
giene, and theirs are symbolic: we kill germs, they ward off  spirits 
(Douglas 2002, 40).
Yet, for Douglas the resemblance between some of their symbolic rites 
and our hygiene is sometimes uncannily close. For Douglas, purity and 
danger are closely related to classification schemes that order the world 
and are grounded in religion. As I will show in this article, this gives a 
new entry to modern debates on high tech food as GM food. Therefore an 
analysis will be made of the Dutch public debate on GM food caled ‘Eten 
en genen’, which was organized by the temporary governmental commit-
tee ‘Biotechnologie en voeding’ chaired by Jan Terlouw in 2001.
RELIGION IN THE DUTCH PUBLIC DEBATE ON GM FOOD
 Introducing Monsters
Th e debate ‘Eten en genen’ was not an isolated event; it was part of broad-
er developments in the fi eld of biotechnology and the public debates that 
were connected to them. In the 1970s, recombinant DNA technology was 
developed. With this technology it became possible to change an organism 
at a genetic level and by this it became possible to steer its phenotypical 
appearance and functions. It also became possible to implant human genes 
in micro-organisms which therewith produced human insulin. Th e tech-
nology was further developed and in 1983 the fi rst plant with recombinant 
DNA was constructed. At that time the technique of DNA recombination 
was known, both in science and in society, as genetic manipulation.
 This development opened up a broad range of possibilities for new 
food products and food production methods. Since then, biotechnology 
has been booming. New research fields appeared, new companies opened 
up and new industries have developed. In 1995 the first soy and toma-
toes with recombinant DNA were presented for sale. The tomatoes and 
soy were made herbicide resistant which was expected to give production 
profits. In 1996 the first ships loaded with recombinant soy tried to en-
ter the Netherlands via the Rotterdam harbour. Greenpeace campaigned 
strongly against harbouring the ships and especially against unloading the 
recombinant soy.
 In the media a huge debate developed on the topic of genetically mani-
pulated food. Th e debates were fi erce and had some name calling in them. 
Proponents of the recombinant DNA technology started to use the term 
genetic modifi cation instead of the till then common term genetic manipu-
lation. Th is made the opponents call for and defend the name genetic ma-
nipulation, which from that moment on had a more negative connotation. 
In this essay I will use the inconclusive abbreviation GM. Th e names and 
their connotations did not end the debates. Th ey just started a new phase 
in the debate. Th e Dutch debate on biotechnological food has shown to be 
an ongoing story ever since – a story in which names like ‘Frankenstein 
food’ came up and got much attention, but too little refl ection.
 In the media the name ‘Frankenstein food’ was frequently used and 
debated. In one way or another it gave expression to severe feelings about 
GM food which were hard to express in another way. With the name 
‘Frankenstein food’, GM food acquires the connotation of being an abomi-
nation, a monster. In this chapter I will argue that it is not a bad name for 
GM food, without implying that GM food should or should not be eradi-
cated. There are other ways to treat a man-made monster.
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 Douglas on Dirt
To find out why it might be appropriate to call GM food a monster, let us 
delve into the work of Mary Douglas on purity. Douglas explains that a 
precise reading of Leviticus shows a strict classification scheme behind 
the purity rules and dietary laws. This classification scheme was used by 
the old Israelites to order the diversity of creation. Distinctions were made 
between land animals, water animals and air animals with their separate 
characteristics and their own way of moving. The Israelites saw it as their 
duty to live to this order. Animals that could not be categorized because 
they had characteristics of different categories were considered an abomi-
nation. The pig for instance, was considered impure because it was the 
only animal that did not ruminate but does move on four legs without 
cloven hoofs, and therefore did not fall into any category of the creation 
order. Impurity is a breach of ruling classifications (Douglas 2002).
 The object of Douglas’ comparative religion is order. The way people 
order their world by classification is a central theme in the work of Mary 
Douglas. Interestingly enough, she does approach this theme via disor-
der and chaos. What is considered as impure or dirty gives, according to 
Douglas, insight into ideas about what is clean, pure, and ordered (Reis 
1996). Or as she states it herself:
Refl ection on dirt involves refl ection on the relation of order to disorder, 
being to non-being, form to formlessness, and life to death. Wherever 
ideas of dirt are highly structured, their analysis discloses a play upon 
such profound themes. Th is is why an understanding of rules of purity 
is a sound entry to comparative religion (Douglas 2002, 7).
In daily life dirt or impurity are mostly seen as properties of goods. Doug-
las however relates them to actions in a specific context. Shoes are not 
intrinsically dirty; it is dirty to put shoes on the dining table. Impurity and 
dirt is that what is situated in the wrong place of the classification scheme. 
Or as Douglas summarizes it, dirt and impurity are ‘matter out of place’. 
The boundaries of the order in which humans, animals, and goods all have 
their place, are exceeded. This place does not necessarily mean an actual 
location; it mostly refers to a cultural or material order (Douglas 2002).
 Following Durkheim it can be stated that religions give classification 
and order an objective or God-given status. Essential therefore is the 
concept of the holy which has an untouchable and autonomous charac-
ter and conceals human aspects of the classifications. Religion unites the 
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different classifications used by a group (Durkheim 1995). Durkheim ap-
plies this view only to non-modern societies. Durkheim was primarily 
interested in the question how modernity was different from primitive 
or pre-modern societies. Douglas applies Durkheim’s approach also on 
modern societies and her central question is therefore no longer about 
the difference but about the similarities between societies. Douglas de-
nies the conventional idea that traditional ideas about impurity are the 
result of ignorance, superstition and religious imagination, while mod-
ern ideas about hygiene would be the result of scientific knowledge and 
true insight into nature. For Douglas both traditional and modern forms 
of impurity are the result of the same cultural mechanism. The central 
notion of this mechanism is that impurity is ‘matter out of place’. It is the 
result of an unsuccessful classification. Impure are objects that do not fit 
in the cognitive classification scheme. And since the activity of classifica-
tion is a human universal, which implies unclassifiables, those cannot be 
eradicated. Dirt, impurity and as we will see ‘monsters’ are part of every 
culture and of everyday life.
 The Dutch philosopher Martijntje Smits uses Douglas’ ideas on reli-
gion, classification, and purity to understand responses on new technolo-
gies (Smits 2002). Like dirt, impure animals, or food, new technology can 
be unclassifiable ‘matter out of place’. Technologies are innovative, not 
only in a technological sense but also on a cultural level. With reproduc-
tive technologies for example, new ways to become pregnant are intro-
duced, but with it also embryos ‘out of place’. Embryos are now held out-
side the womb inside a test tube. Technological innovation can challenge 
existing ideas about ourselves, our environment and our relations. Smits 
considers these new and unclassifiable technologies and their products 
as monsters. Monsters are ambiguous, they combine elements that are or 
at least were not combinable (like bio-technology or in vitro fertilization) 
and therefore bring both tremendum et fascinans – fear and fascination. 
Monsters may not be classifiable, that does not mean they are considered 
to have a bad nature. Monsters can be appointed both as sacred and as a 
taboo. Monsters not only represent the destructive force in the existing 
order, they can also be taken as a creative shapelessness with the force of 
creation (Smits 2002). For the Lele (a Congolese tribe), the holy pangolin 
(scaly anteater) is a contradiction of all categories used. It has scales like 
a fish, climbs trees, looks like a lizard and is a mammal. It is apparently 
highly impure, but practically most sacred. The pangolin is prepared and 
eaten by initiates and considered as a source of fertility. Monsters are am-
biguous, but that does not necessarily mean they cannot be attractive.
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 Monsters!
In what ways is GM food a monster? In the debate, a recurring theme was 
if GM was fundamentally different from classical ways to improve the 
species, or if GM could be considered to be just a next step in a longer tra-
dition of improvement. With existing classifications there is no straight-
forward answer to that question. GM food cannot easily be categorized 
in an existing classification, it is matter out of place or, due to its innova-
tive character, matter without a place. It transcends boundaries that were 
taken for granted until then.
 In GM qualities of different species are exchanged. In response to that, 
people bring up worries about contamination. For instance in biological 
agriculture there are ‘especially many worries about “contamination” by 
blowing over of pollen from plants that are genetically modified’ (Terlouw 
2002). Others apply great value to the preservation of original species and 
are worried about irreversible changes. GM food does make an appeal on 
ideas of naturalness and does not fit into the existing ‘natural’ categories 
used by people in the debate (Terlouw 2002).
 Besides the ‘unnatural’ character, GM food also brings up a lot of ques-
tions about the risks, dangers and uncertainties of this type of food. In 
June 2001 the Terlouw Committee asked the public by advertisements 
in newspapers which aspects should be part of the public debate. Most 
brought up the matter of safety for humans and the environment (Terlouw 
2002).
 Purity and danger, risk and safety are directly brought up when GM 
food is debated. I would state that these themes illustrate that GM food 
has a monstrous character. We cannot classify GM food in existing cate-
gories. To a lot of people GM food is an ambiguous product, which brings 
in both unprecedented options and changes but also unknown risk and 
dangers. GM food can be fascinating but also fearsome.
 One can reasonably state that GM food is a monster, at least in the way 
Smits uses the term. Frankenstein food is therefore not a bad name for 
GM food. Especially when we consider that the problem of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein was not that he created a monster, but that he did not care 
enough for it (Bijker 1995). With that, the question that comes to the fore 
is: how does one relate to this monster?
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 Organizing Open Debate
In 1999 a resolution was passed in which A.M.A. Van Ardenne-van der 
Hoeven and other members of the Dutch Parliament asked to organize 
a public debate on GM food. The second cabinet of Prime Minister Kok 
incorporated the request in the Integrale Nota Biotechnologie (Ministry of 
VROM 2000). Minister of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Safety, Laurens 
Jan Brinkhorst of the political party D’66, carried out the resolution on 
behalf of the cabinet.
 The motive for the debate was formulated by the minister of Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Safety in a letter to the parliament (all translations 
from Dutch are by the present author):
Th e cabinet sees modern biotechnology as a key technology, which 
should be used in a responsible and careful way. Th e introduction of 
genetically modifi ed corn and soy a few years ago ... has given rise to 
discussion in society. It is expected that new uses of modern biotech-
nology in the future will lead to recognizable advantages for consum-
ers, such as health advantages. Th e process of opinion making about the 
formerly mentioned uses has till now not taken place in a structured 
manner...Much of these discussions are hardly accessible to the broader 
public. (Brinkhorst 2001)
The outspoken position on biotechnology as a key technology taken by 
the cabinet does structure the agenda for the debate. The goals of the de-
bate as formulated by minister Brinkhorst are informative on this matter. 
The cabinet sees the goal of the debate as twofold:
Primary goal for the public debate (is) ... to make clear the conditions 
under which biotechnology for food is acceptable by the public. Th is 
does not mean the cabinet aims to stimulate the acceptance of the use 
of modern biotechnology in food in society via the debate. To accen-
tuate this, the organization of the debate is distanced from the gov-
ernment. Th is stimulates independent information dissemination and 
facilitates the public debate in an objective manner. Th e public debate 
about biotechnology and food aims primarily to spread information 
under a public as broad as possible. (Brinkhorst 2001)
The cabinet denies aiming at acceptance of biotechnology with the or-
ganizational argument of placing the committee at a distance from the 
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government. However, the leading question for the debate clearly antici-
pates the acceptance of modern biotechnology by the public. Only when 
acceptance is presumed, does the question regarding under which condi-
tions biotechnology is acceptable for the public make any sense. This does 
not mean that a free exchange of ideas and opinions is not a value for the 
cabinet as it states a bit further in the memo:
Th e fi rst goal of the public debate is to disseminate information under 
a public as broad as possible. Th e second goal of the debate is to give 
the public and other involved parties the opportunity, by structured 
discussion, to exchange and formulate opinions and standpoints about 
the question under which conditions the use of modern biotechnology 
in food is acceptable to them. (Brinkhorst 2001)
Although the debate should be open to public and other parties involved, 
the agenda is directly limited to the conditions under which the use of 
modern biotechnology in food is acceptable to them. The goals of the 
debate seem to be halted between two options: an open debate and or a 
campaign for this key technology.
 Minister Brinkhorst installed the Committee for Biotechnology and 
Food under the chair of former minister of Economic Affairs, Jan Terlouw. 
Both Brinkhorst and Terlouw are members of D’66, which characterizes 
itself as a progressive-liberal party. It is a pragmatic party which has little 
affinity with traditional political ideologies or religion. It purports to build 
on rationality and aims at governmental reform. Together with the liberal 
party (VVD) and the socialist party (PvdA) they formed a so-called ‘pur-
ple’ cabinet, the first cabinet since 1918 in the Netherlands which reigned 
without the Christian democrat party (CDA) or its predecessors. In 2001, 
this purple coalition began its second term. It was, as they characterized 
themselves, pragmatic rather than ideological.
 In this political constellation the Committee is installed and after instal-
lation, the Committee closely stuck to the formulated assignment. They 
used both qualitative and quantitative methods to get insight into public 
opinions and arguments, organized several debates and offered help to 
other organizations who would do the same. From their report it is clear 
the Committee put a lot of work in informing people about the debate and 
was successful in that. But it became also clear that the Committee had 
difficulties to get and keep organizations involved in the debate.
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 Managing Monsters: Monster Adaption by the Committee
Given the presumption that biotechnology is a key technology, which is 
here to stay, the question for the Committee to answer becomes how to 
deal with this innovative technology and public opinions on it. The advice 
of the Committee to the government after the debate can be characterised 
as a procedural programme for monster management. The Committee 
formulates it as follows:
Genetic modifi cation is an impressive new technology, but the appli-
cation needs the support of the public... Th e government and political 
parties have to learn to deal with that. Recovery of trust in the govern-
ment is most important, because the government sets the boundaries 
for science and industry. Th e committee has taken this into account 
in her recommendations. Th e recommendations will be summarized 
here:
–  A national or European Food Authority should be installed which 
can operate completely independent.
–  Th e government should develop better methods to start a dialogue 
with the broader public in an early stage.
–  Freedom of choice should be optimally guaranteed by making good 
accessible, detailed product information obligatory (Terlouw 2002, 4).
Based on her work on order and religion, Douglas concludes that the way 
cultures react to monsters is related to the character of the group. Smits 
translates this to a ‘theory of monsters’ in which four ideal typical styles 
of monster management are introduced. As we will see, the style of the 
Committee can easily be characterised as a ritualistic style.
 The four styles that Smits describes are:
a)  Dogmatic style – monster exorcism: Cultural classification is in the 
dogmatic style strict and permanent. Knowledge and morals are inflex-
ible. Monsters are in the most positive case ignored; more often will 
they be handled as aberrations and therefore exorcised.
b)  Ritualistic style – monster adaptation: The cultural classification is 
less rigid and more subtle; the dichotomy is less straightforward. In-
stead there are rituals and a complex structure of rules. When these 
are closely followed it is normally possible to fit in the monster. The 
monster is considered nothing – fundamentally – new.
c)  Pragmatic style – monster assimilation: In this style both monsters and 
classifications can be adapted. Cultural boundaries are considered as 
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human conventions, and become more instrumental than fundamen-
tal. Monsters are assimilated and in the process of assimilation both the 
monster and the cultural classification are modified.
d)  Romantic style – monster embracement: Fascination instead of fear is 
the leading idea in this style. Contradictions are considered to be of a 
higher order which cannot be reached with mundane rationality. Cul-
tural classification will be kept intact since there is no urge to solve the 
contradictions. Monsters are not refused but accepted (Smits 2002).
The advice of the Committee is a good illustration of the ritualistic style 
of the Committee. This style is well suited for an utilitarian approach 
of ethics. Although the Committee’s use of the concept of ethics is not 
very straightforward or explicit, it shows an utilitarian idea of ethics. The 
Dutch philosopher Swierstra once characterized utilitarian ethics as ‘reg-
ulatory ethics’. Regulatory ethics is easily incorporated in policy making 
and procedural regulation, since its goal is to answer the practical ques-
tion how to live together without doing (unnecessary) harm to each other. 
Regulatory ethics is much less interested and involved in virtues or ques-
tions about the good life (Swierstra, Bruggen, et al. 2000).
 Although ethics is not considered to be the most relevant aspect of 
the debate by the Committee, it is still very present in the report of the 
Committee. But they use ethics in a peculiar way. Reading the report one 
gets the impression that ‘ethics’ is an autonomous category of arguments 
and deliberations in the debate, which have no connection whatsoever 
with other themes like freedom of choice, health, risks, use of nature and 
environment or fair relations between the Netherlands and developing 
countries. This boxing of ethics is most clearly illustrated by the statistics 
done on reply forms filled in by grammar school students. The results of 
the statistics were presented in a matrix. In this matrix the advantages 
and disadvantages of biotechnology in food were given for several catego-
ries. ‘Ethics was one of the boxed categories and put besides categories as 
“agricultural production, environment, third world, safety, consumers”’ 
(Terlouw 2002, 45). The Committee makes ethics a special category to 
such an extent that it disappears as a relevant part of the debate:
As far as there are objections to biotechnology for food, it appears that 
only for a few people they arise from ethical or principal sources. Utili-
tarian deliberations are for the Dutch public in general more impor-
tant. (Terlouw 2002, 19)
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In the eye of the Committee utilitarian deliberations seem not connected 
with ethics. Already before the actual debate objections are made to this 
way of conceptualizing ethics.
Mr Meijboom from the Centrum voor Bio-ethiek en Gezondheidsrecht 
at Utrecht University stated in the fi rst debate of this series that the 
government in the Integrale Nota Biotechnology (INB) wrongly makes 
no relation between ethics and questions about safety, transparency of 
government and freedom of choice of the consumer. Ethics is presented 
as an isolated domain; the domain in which complicated identity-defi n-
ing questions are at stake. In reality discussions about the acceptability 
of risks and the autonomy of the consumers (expressed in his freedom 
of choice) are not isolated from morality, states Meijboom; to the con-
trary. (Terlouw 2002, 74)
Since Meijboom makes his remark early in the first debate of a series 
(Wageningen, March 2001) he cannot and does not draw conclusions 
about the debate itself. But by referring to the Integrale Nota Biotech-
nologie, he criticizes the concept of ethics as used in governmental policy 
making on biotechnology in general. His remarks can be taken as an ad-
vice to the Committee to act differently.
 In the report of the Committee the remark of Meijboom is presented 
as an individual statement, with little use for the debate. The Committee 
does not give any reflection on its own use of ethical concepts and in-
sights. Meijbooms remark is placed in annex G, meaning that it was heard 
by the Committee but did not have much impact on its work.
 By its focus on utilitarian arguments, the conclusions by the Commit-
tee that other than utilitarian arguments have little relevance in the de-
bate, seems to be much guided by presuppositions, and less a result of the 
debate itself.
 The strict but implicit boundaries between utilitarian arguments and 
fundamental arguments or arguments of principle conceal the interac-
tion between those (analytic) categories. Utilitarian arguments are closely 
related to more fundamental ideas. The argument of safety of biotechno-
logical food may be utilitarian in nature but it implies also more funda-
mental ideas about the value of life and relevance of human health or the 
environment.
 The Committee presents the mentioned utilitarian arguments of the 
participants in the debate as a decision of the participants to have a debate 
on a utilitarian level. However, for many participants in the debate those 
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utilitarian arguments are directly related to principles and more funda-
mental ideas:
For most participants, when the goal is considered suffi  ciently useful 
the end justifi es the means of genetic modifi cation, irrespective of the 
fundamental judgement one has on improvement (Terlouw 2002, 7).
Th e application of gene-technology on animals for food production ap-
pears to raise much more opposition for many people compared to ap-
plications with plants. Only when very urgent matters are at stake, like 
medical use for a genuine problem (and not only fi ghting symptoms), 
the public is willing to deviate from this principle (Terlouw 2002, 7).
Besides that, several participants in the debate used both more fundamen-
tal and utilitarian arguments in the debate. Several NGOs who resigned 
from the debate organized by the Committee, brought up both missing 
utilitarian arguments on safety and risk but also criticized the absence of 
fundamental questions as stated before.
 Monster Exorcism by NGOs
Of this aselect group, 37 per cent held that these crops should not be 
grown at all (Terlouw 2002, 13).
This thirty-seven per cent of the public has a dogmatic style towards GM 
food. They do not want any relation with this monster. There is no place 
for GM food at all in society. The monster should be exorcised. Green-
peace has a similar dogmatic style in its advocacy of a strict interpretation 
of the precautionary principle. This states as long as risks are not clear, 
one is not allowed to use the technology on a larger scale (Smits 2002). 
The monster can only be hold captive in a well-guarded laboratory and 
should not be around in society.
 With Greenpeace, fifteen NGOs from the fields of environmental is-
sues, third world aid and animal welfare1 were critical about the assign-
ment of the Committee from the start but they were prepared to give 
the debate a chance. Their critique was both on form and content of the 
debate. They formulated their main point of critique most clear in a press 
announcement:
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Th e public debate (as organized by the Committee) deals with the con-
ditions under which genetic manipulation is acceptable; it does not ad-
dress the question whether genetic manipulation is desirable (Green-
peace, Alternatieve Konsumentenbond, et al. 2001).
In the assignment of the Committee and the agenda for the debate the 
conditions under which GM food is the central topic, leaving insufficient 
space for more fundamental discussion and for the more dogmatic stance 
of monster exorcism. Besides critique on the agenda of the debate, the 
information used by the Committee in the debate is criticized. The video 
the committee showed was considered more like a promotion movie than 
a source of objective information.
 These objections are discussed with the Committee and adaptations 
were made by the Committee. Having seen the new information material 
and having visited the opening event of the debate, and in accordance 
with their dogmatic style, these NGOs decided to no longer participate 
in the debate organized by the Committee since they still could not agree 
with the information provided on GM food, the methodological set up of 
the debates and the agenda used for the debates.
 Monster Assimilation by Kerk en Wereld
Without being dogmatic, one can still ask fundamental questions. Kerk en 
Wereld, a church and society organization of the main Dutch Protestant 
churches, stated, for instance:
Kerk en Wereld pleas for giving attention to presuppositions from 
philosophy of life and to the questions hidden behind ethical aspects. 
Th at does not mean particularly questions as about ‘playing God’ or ‘to 
go against the order of creation’, since these are not live questions for 
church members. More relevant are questions like: how do we relate 
to our own vulnerability and to the ‘imperfections’ of nature, do we 
keep fi ghting against these of do we accept limits? Are we still able to 
handle the (inevitable) tragic aspects of life? What are our moral values 
and judgements based on? What do we give our deepest trust: our own 
capabilities, science, nature, God? Th ese questions lead to the funda-
mental question whether we want to continue with genetically modi-
fi ed food. Th is question too asks for attention in the debate (Terlouw 
2002, 99).
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These questions are not aimed at exorcising the monster, nor at stating 
that there is nothing new under the sun and accepting the monster after 
some ritual debate and regulatory ethics. This is a plea for a debate on 
how one wants to live and how we want to live together with monsters. 
These are questions of ‘ethics of life’, as Swierstra calls them. They are 
hard to answer, and often even harder to agree on, but fundamental if one 
wants to position oneself to the monsters we create and meet. With these 
fundamental questions, the answers are open. Nothing is God given or a 
natural fact, an open debate becomes possible. Both the monster and the 
cultural conventions are open for debate and can be, if decided upon, be 
modified according to new insights and or experiences. With these funda-
mental questions the pragmatic style comes to the fore.
 No Religion?
It is not coincidental that Kerk en Wereld introduces ethics of life ques-
tions. These questions are religious questions, questions about the funda-
ments of life and living together in this world. This makes the public debate 
‘Eten en genen’ interesting for those interested in the relations between 
technology, religion and food. This may not be clear at first instance since 
in the 131-page-long final report and conclusions of the Committee the 
word ‘religion’ does not appear once and there are only three references 
to ‘philosophies of life’ of which two just deny its relevance:
Th ere were hardly any purely ethical or ‘philosophy of life’ discussions. 
But during the debates ethical deliberations were made. A big majority 
of the participants is reasoning from a utilitarian perspective (Terlouw 
2002, 45).
A minority of the participants reasons from principles like holding out 
the boundaries of species. An even smaller minority reasons from prin-
ciples based on philosophies of life (Terlouw 2002, 45).
The Committee has a hard time appreciating the religious layers in the de-
bate. The utilitarian agenda, where the conditions under which biotech-
nology for food is acceptable are central, leaves little space for questions 
about views on life, let alone religion. To see the religious layers and con-
nections becomes even harder if one searches for purely ethical or philo-
sophical views on life in the discussion. Pure religion is not to be found, 
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nor is pure science, politics, ethics, or economics. These are analytical 
and not empirical categories. One misses the religious agenda when one 
uses a utilitarian agenda and boxes religion as an autonomous category. 
However, that does not imply there are no religious layers.
 The focus of the Committee on utilitarian aspects results in several 
leftovers in the debate. The category of ‘ethics’ as referred to by the Com-
mittee is one such leftover. These cannot be denied, but in the utilitarian 
eye of the Committee they cannot be valued nor used in its analysis of 
the debate. The same counts expression in which GM food is related to 
the idea of playing for God, feelings of disgust and discomfort, unnatural 
behaviour or characterizing names as ‘Frankenstein food’.
 These leftovers are to be better understood when we take Douglas’ ideas 
on purity and danger once more into account. The leftovers all refer to 
feelings or ideas of transgressing natural or God given boundaries. Things 
become out of place and monstrous. There is an order in the leftovers of 
the Committee. As Douglas has shown, all ideas on purity and danger are 
connected to the order we create with our cosmologies. Monsters have no 
intrinsic monstrous character. Monsters are the result of our ideas about 
life and what we think is natural, God given or an abomination. It is re-
ligion with which we decide what is monstrous, dangerous or pure. One 
can be dogmatic and live strictly to the precautionary principle, or adopt a 
ritualistic style relying on self-appointed rationality and regulatory ethics. 
It is no less religious than asking fundamental questions about how to live 
with monsters and being open to discuss all options. Every style produces 
and uses its own order and leftovers.
 Conclusions
Since this monster called GM food was constructed and now does exist in 
our world, it is not fruitful to deny its existence nor to deny its monstrous 
character. We have to learn to deal with the monster. Th e question that 
should be discussed is how do we relate to this monster and (where) do 
we want to place it in our society and culture? Th e answer can be that we 
choose to destroy or exorcise the monster, but we can’t deny its existence.
 We have to relate to the monster and place it in the world. To decide 
on our style of managing the monster, functional insights and utilitarian 
arguments are not enough. One could even say that, in case of a monster, 
information on functions, risks, and dangers are not available in detail. 
The monster is too new, unknown, and ambiguous for that. From its na-
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ture it does not fit in our classifications and orders of thinking. We cannot 
simply reproduce our ideas and insight into order and classification on 
the monster. Monsters challenge our institutions, intuitions and knowl-
edge. The challenge is to decide on our approach of the monster, without 
the backup of scientific knowledge, strict procedures or fit institutional 
structures.
 Managing monsters is about dealing with purity and danger and these 
are directly related to order and classification. For Douglas, classification 
is a human universal and part of religion. This view makes our approach 
of monsters a religious endeavour. Managing monsters is about making 
connections and relations between us, the monster and others. It is about 
reserving a place for monsters but also for ourselves and others. One could 
say that in Mary Shelley’s story of ‘The monster of Frankenstein’ this has 
been the problem. The monster was created but not domesticated and 
given a place. If Frankenstein had educated and domesticated his monster 
well, it may have become a more pleasant and cooperative monster to the 
world and thereby could have contributed to a better world.
 The idea that monster management is a religious activity, means that 
one has a new perspective on the role of religion in the debate. For the 
Committee, religion was not part of the debate. With Douglas, I would 
state the contrary. Religion is fundamental to the debate, although in the 
set-up of the Committee this fundament is disguised. ‘Kerk en Wereld’ 
tried to put the religious aspects on the agenda of the debate. The Commit-
tee did not incorporate these points. Religion became marginalized and 
went ‘underground’ in the debate. Regularly uttered terms and phrases as 
‘unnatural’, ‘disgusting’, or ‘playing God’ gave expression to that. Besides 
that, one could claim that religion’s questions on purity and our relation 
and role in the world were translated into more utilitarian terms on risks, 
health and need and necessity for GM food.
 Connected to the problem of ‘religion’ going underground in the de-
bate, is the problem of the religion of the Committee. The Committee 
makes the ritualistic style and utilitarian ethics starting points and refer-
ence points for the debate. This leaves little room for other opinions, ap-
proaches, questions and styles. The study of the religious aspects of the 
debate can be a valuable source to develop a debate that is more informa-
tive and in which all participants and subjects are done justice. Anthro-
pological approaches (like Douglas’ and Smits’) can help us to rediscover 
the relations between monsters/technology and religion and besides that 
give insight in the dynamics of debates. This can help us to track down 
our (presupposed) ideas, values and practises about specific monsters. It 
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might also inspire us to new ways and lead us to useful traditions in this 
world full of unclassified monsters.
 Note
1 Alternatieve Konsumentenbond, Both Ends, Platform Biologica, Dierenbe-
scherming, Greenpeace, Hivos, ICCO, Inzet, Kerken in actie, Milieudefensie, 
Natuur en Milieu, Nederlands Platform Gentechnologie, Novib, Proefdier-
vrij, XminY.
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10 Substantial Life Extension and Meanings of Life
 Peter Derkx
 Introduction
Substantial extension of the human lifespan has become a subject of lively 
debate. One reason for this is the completion of the Human Genome Proj-
ect in 2001 and the experimental avenues for biogerontological research 
the project enables. Another is recent theoretical progress in biogerontol-
ogy (Austad 1997; Hayflick 1994; Holliday 1995; Kirkwood 1999; Ricklefs 
& Finch 1995). The character of modern culture is at least as important a 
factor in explaining why life extension intervention is currently debated. 
Three existential factors that play a role here are fear of death (fear of no 
longer existing), fear of the suffering involved in the process of dying, and 
the sometimes obsessive desire to preserve good health in order to pursue 
personal life projects and goals (Turner 2004). The historical background 
of this motivational pattern is ‘the decline since the Renaissance of faith in 
supernatural salvation from death; concern with the worth of individual 
identity and experience shifted from an otherworldly realm to the “here 
and now”, with intensification of earthly expectations’ (G.J. Gruman quot-
ed in Post 2004a, 82, see also Baumeister 1991, 77-115).
 There is a lot of interest in substantial life extension, but would it really 
be a good thing? Experience with other revolutionary technologies shows 
us that once they exist, they can no longer be stopped. Too much has been 
invested in them: once research has produced an effective technology ca-
tering to all-too-human desires, there is seldom a way back. So we had 
better investigate the worldview aspects of considerable human lifespan 
extension now, before this extension has become genuinely practicable, 
or, before large sums of money have been spent on it.
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 In this article I will first consider what ‘substantial life extension’ and 
a ‘meaningful life’ means. After that I will deal with some arguments and 
considerations concerning the relationship between the two.
 Substantial Extension of Human Lifespan:
 What Are We Talking About?
Before embarking on a discussion about the meaning of ‘substantial exten-
sion of human lifespan’, it has to be clear what we mean by it. We can dis-
tinguish between four possible outcomes of a biotechnological enhance-
ment of the human lifespan. Drawing on work by Harry Moody (1995) and 
Eric Juengst and others (Juengst et al. 2003) we can name these extended 
morbidity, compressed morbidity, decelerated senescence, and arrested 
senescence.
 Extended morbidity means that the average human life becomes longer 
because the period of (co)morbidity at the end is lengthened. Through 
good hygiene, nutrition, education, housing, medical care, welfare ar-
rangements, and social services, old people with one or more chronic dis-
eases stay alive longer. This means that average life expectancy increases, 
but this need not be an increase in human flourishing or a cause for joy. 
Extended or prolonged morbidity does not imply an increase in maximum 
human life expectancy. A typical time structure for a human life with ex-
tended morbidity could be: growing up from 0 to 20, adult health span 20 
to 55, period of growing morbidity up to 95 as the average age at death and 
with an unchanged maximum of around 120. Some scientists (Baltes 2003) 
fear extended morbidity as the most likely scenario, with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease as one of the main threats. Since nobody wishes it to become reality, 
we shall not discuss the desirability of this type of life extension here.
 Compressed morbidity is a scenario in which the onset of serious age-
associated maladies, the infirmities at the end of life, is delayed as long as 
possible and thus these are compressed into a shorter period. The maxi-
mum human lifespan of around 120 is accepted as fixed. The focus of 
compressed morbidity is that the average human health-span is extended 
to a much longer period from 20 up to ‘the ideal average lifespan, ap-
proximately 85 years’ (Fries 1980, 130), followed by a relatively short pe-
riod of decline before death, a period of one or two years at the most. The 
feasibility of compression of morbidity for the life stage between 55 and 
85 was first argued for by James Fries in 1980 and it has been embraced 
by many, for example the biogerontologist Robert Arking (Arking 2004). 
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Not long ago three officials of the World Health Organization wrote that 
Fries’s tenets and vision ‘now lie at the heart of today’s approach to NCDs 
[non-communicable diseases], ageing and health with its focus on the life 
course, health promotion, and “active ageing” [use it or lose it]’ (Kalache, 
Aboderin & Hoskins 2002). Because its original assumption is that the 
maximum human lifespan is biologically predetermined at around 120 
and that death at an average age of 85 is ‘natural’ and even ‘ideal’, com-
pression of morbidity is not a form of substantial life extension. It has to 
be noted, however, that several gerontologists think that compression of 
morbidity is actually impossible. They think it is highly unlikely that we 
will be able to increase the health-span without simultaneously increas-
ing the lifespan and the period of morbidity at the end (Neugarten 1996). 
Compression of morbidity would then be practically the same as delayed 
or decelerated senescence.
 In decelerated senescence the processes of biological ageing are slowed 
down, resulting in a higher average life expectancy and probably a higher 
maximum life expectancy. Decelerated senescence means that the period 
of good health in a human life is extended (as in the scenario of com-
pressed morbidity), but the period of morbidity remains the same or is 
lengthened as well (as in extended morbidity). The average pattern of a 
human life in this case could be: growing up 0-20, adult health-span 20-
90, and period of decline after that with death at an age of about 110. 
Maximum life expectancy at birth might be 140 years. Richard Miller is a 
respected biogerontologist who thinks that such a decelerated senescence 
is the most likely development. ‘Nature can slow down aging, and so, it 
turns out, can we. There are so far two approaches that work for sure: 
diminished total caloric intake and changes in genes that regulate the rate 
of early-life growth’ (Miller 2004, 233). A recent and clear manifestation 
of the idea of decelerated senescence can be found in an article by Jay 
Olshansky and others, including Miller. They can be regarded as repre-
sentatives of a growing chorus of scientists calling themselves ‘moderate’, 
‘modest’, and ‘realistic’. They firmly believe that a current investment of 
3 billion US dollars annually will make it possible to decelerate ageing 
and to delay the onset of ageing-related diseases and disorders among the 
baby boom cohorts by seven years.
People who reach the age of 50 in the future would have the health pro-
fi le and disease risk of today’s 43-year old; those aged 60 would resem-
ble current 53-year-olds, and so on. Equally important, once achieved, 
this seven-year delay would yield equal health and longevity benefi ts for 
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all subsequent generations, much the same way children born in most 
nations today benefi t from the discovery and development of immuni-
zations (Olshansky et al. 2006, 32).
Arrested senescence refers to relatively complete control of the biologi-
cal processes of senescence. In this scenario, ageing in the sense of se-
nescence or physical and mental deterioration does not occur anymore, 
or the human organism is cared for very well (maintenance) and the se-
nescence that occurs is periodically repaired by a rejuvenation cure. For 
decades, or centuries, the chance (probability) of dying does not increase 
with age anymore, but stays rather constant. People still die, but they no 
longer die from the slow accumulation of damage and chronic deteriora-
tion. Instead they die from accidents, murder, or war. In this scenario 
people can become very old. Average life expectancies of 150, 500 or even 
5000 years are thought to be possible. Talking about engineering arrested 
senescence may sound as if we have entered the field of quackery, pseudo-
science, or science fiction. However, one of the strongest defenders of the 
scientific credibility of Strategies for Engineering Negligible Senescence 
(SENS), Aubrey de Grey (De Grey 2003; 2005; De Grey et al. 2002), force-
fully argues that humanity needs to set aside massive sums of money for 
a War on Aging. He has also, together with relevant specialists, outlined 
and embarked on detailing a set of biotechnological measures we could 
use to beat the ‘seven deadly things’ that accumulate with age as side ef-
fects of metabolism. According to De Grey these seven problems together 
constitute the core of aging. The seven categories of damage to be solved 
are: 1. cell death without matching replacement (especially important in 
the heart and the brain); 2. unwanted cells, e.g. visceral fat and senescent 
cells (important in arthritis and diabetes); 3. nuclear (epi)mutations caus-
ing cancer; 4. mitochondrial mutations; 5. extracellular protein/protein 
cross-links (e.g. leading to high blood pressure); 6. extracellular aggre-
gates (e.g. resulting in amyloid involved in Alzheimer’s disease); and 7. in-
tracellular aggregates (e.g. resulting in hardening of the arteries). De Grey 
proposes to remove and repair the damage that has accumulated every ten 
years or so. He does not believe in prevention of damage. His type of ar-
rested senescence is rejuvenation. He expects that in the period between 
2025 and 2040 we will be able to fix the seven problems of senescence (to 
a large extent through genetic interventions and stem cell therapies) and 
that around 2050 ‘robust human rejuvenation’ will be generally accessible. 
He realizes that the first fixes will not be perfect, but they will give us 
time to develop better repair methods. Highly respected biogerontolo-
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gists have attacked De Grey’s ideas forcefully (Estep et al. 2006; Warner et 
al. 2005). It is important to note, however, that the difference of opinion 
is mainly political, ethical, and related to funding and estimates about 
the speed of future developments, not about the possibility of substantial 
life extension in itself. A last remark to conclude this preliminary sec-
tion: the [US] President’s Council on Bioethics has taken ‘the possibility 
of extended youth and substantially prolonged lives’ very seriously. In its 
2003 report Beyond Therapy (President’s Council on Bioethics 2003, 159-
204) the Council warns against substantial life extension as a threat to the 
meaning of human lives.
 Meanings of Life: A Theory
Before going into arguments on life extension and meanings of life we 
also have to explicate the concept of meanings of life. A useful point of 
departure is social psychologist Roy Baumeister’s book Meanings of Life 
(Baumeister 1991) in which he develops a theory which gives us some 
grip on the elusive concept of a meaningful life. According to Baumeister, 
meaning is about connection. People have a need to put things, actions, 
and projects in a broader context and this need can be subdivided into a 
number of needs for meaning. An important one is the need for purpose. 
The vital thing here is to interpret one’s current activities in relation to 
future or possible goals or fulfillments. A second need for meaning is the 
need for moral worth. People want their life to be of positive value and 
their choices to be right and good and morally justifiable. A third need is 
for efficacy, competence or control. People do not only want to have pur-
pose in a life of moral value, they also want a certain capability or power 
to achieve these goals and realize these values. They want to feel free and 
competent and able to make a difference. They do not want life to happen 
to them, they want to direct it at least to some extent, and often people 
prefer the illusion of control over a more realistic sense of powerlessness. 
The last need for meaning mentioned by Baumeister is the need for self-
respect, self-esteem, or self-worth. Humans not only want a life of positive 
moral value, they also want to have worth themselves. They want to find 
some basis for positive self-worth, they want to have some claim on re-
spect, both self-respect and the respect of others. Usually this need takes 
the form of finding an aspect in which one is better than others, a reason 
to be respected by others. But this reason need not always be moral. Al-
though self-worth is often related to a combination of moral worth and 
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efficacy, it is not the same as this combination. Someone who has left his 
or her partner, may feel greater self-worth because of this tough decision 
(it feels better than being rejected and abandoned by the other), but he 
or she may feel guilty at the same time, in doubt about the moral value of 
the act.
 Baumeister’s theory has been improved by others. Jan Hein Mooren 
(1998) has argued that a meaningful human life is a life that is sufficiently 
understood as part of a world with a certain structure and causality. Peo-
ple have a need for comprehension. They want to be able to understand 
and explain the world they live in, what happens to them and why they act 
as they do. They want to be able to create a coherent life narrative, to tell 
an intelligible story about their life. They want their new experiences to 
fit their past and to conform to what they know about their environment, 
their world. Through ‘interpretive control’ the need for comprehension 
can be linked to the need for efficacy. Adri Smaling (unpublished) adds 
a last need for meaning; the need for (comm)unity, which to some extent 
can be seen as the flip side of the need for efficacy. People not only have a 
need for controlling things, but also a need for release, for abandonment, 
they want to let go. They do not want everything to depend on themselves, 
but they also want to be part of something bigger, to feel connected and 
as one with others or the other. Altruism is related to the need for moral 
worth and the need for (comm)unity.
 Baumeister has argued that it is very implausible to think of the mean-
ing of life as one single overarching good thing everything in life connects 
with, completely and eternally. This is what he calls the myth of high-
er meaning. Life is bound to have several meanings and to have trivial, 
meaningless, and unruly fragments as well. Moreover, it often happens 
that meanings of life conflict with each other (Berlin 1991). Life is inescap-
ably characterized by absurdity, conflict, and change. However, human 
beings keep searching for meaning, which is often woven together into 
a connecting narrative, a story to live by (Dresden 1990; McAdams 1997). 
Living your story turns out to be important, even though your life story is 
not your whole life and even though your story has more than one impor-
tant plot. Meaning is one of life’s principal tools for stability, continuity, 
and identity.
 This theory of a meaningful life is partly based on findings of empirical 
psychology, but it is obvious that a fully fledged theory needs historical, 
sociological and ethical input. Baumeister’s conviction that in modern 
Western society the self has become the major base of values (not need-
ing further justification itself ) shows this clearly. Baumeister thinks that 
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seeking, knowing, or finding yourself (personal identity), creating your-
self (self-actualization), and self-worth have become more important than 
religion, morality and tradition. He also indicates (1991, 127) that in mod-
ern society it is more difficult to satisfy the needs for moral worth and 
purpose than those for efficacy and self-worth. In this context, Charles 
Taylor’s Sources of the Self (1992), Anthony Giddens’s Modernity and Self-
Identity (Giddens 1991), and Joep Dohmen’s Het leven als kunstwerk (Life 
As a Work of Art) (2008) raise important philosophical issues about au-
tonomy, authenticity, life politics, the art of living, hypergoods, and tran-
scendence. Moreover, a meaningful life is not equally within everybody’s 
reach, and some social circumstances are more favourable for achieving it 
than others. ‘[I]n many societies that we call advanced, such as the United 
States, whole segments of the population grow up with so much chaos 
and so little order that “planning” is a foreign word’ (Hagestad 1996, 208). 
Given all these issues, it is clear that the theory of meanings of life is still 
in its infancy, and that much more empirical, theoretical, and philosophi-
cal research needs to be done.
 An important issue is how a meaningful life relates to the quality of 
life, to happiness, life satisfaction, or subjective well-being (Diener 1984; 
George 2000; 2006; Pavot & Diener 2004; Ryff 1989; Ryff & Singer 1998; 
Veenhoven 1996), and to the more objective concept of human dignity as 
proposed in human rights theories or human capabilities theories (Buiten-
weg 2007; Nussbaum 2001; 2006; Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Pogge 2002). In 
this context, Baumeister’s analysis of the parenthood paradox, described 
in the following paragraph, is relevant (1991, 160-166).
 A large amount of evidence supports the conclusion that having chil-
dren produces worries and reduces happiness, but in spite of this many 
people want children. The difference between a happy or satisfactory and 
a meaningful life may largely explain the parenthood paradox. However, 
much here depends on the meaning given to the concepts ‘happy’ and 
‘meaningful’. Baumeister’s parenthood paradox seems to presuppose a he-
donic interpretation of happiness, life satisfaction, and subjective well-
being, as argued for by Ed Diener (1984) and Ruut Veenhoven (1996). Life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and absence of negative affect are central here. 
If, following Carol Ryff (1989), subjective well-being is interpreted eudai-
monically, emphasizing purpose in life and thus ‘clearly imposing a defini-
tion of life quality on individuals who may or may not evaluate their own 
lives on those criteria’ (George 2000, 7), the difference between ‘well-be-
ing’ and ‘meaningfulness’ becomes smaller. Ryff ’s eudaimonic subjective 
well-being originally had six dimensions: self-acceptance, purpose in life, 
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personal growth, positive relations with others, environmental mastery, 
and autonomy. After some more empirical work she reduced the relevant 
dimensions to four, of which the first two are primary: purpose in life and 
quality connections to others, and the other two are secondary: positive 
self-regard and mastery (Ryff & Singer 1998).
 To my knowledge little theoretical and empirical research has been 
done to improve Baumeister’s theory of ‘meanings of life’. The alternative 
theory of ‘eudaimonic subjective well-being’ has turned out to be much 
more fruitful, up to now. Starting from this theory a considerable amount 
of research has been and will be published (see www.midus.wisc.edu). 
However, as indicated above, Ryff ’s concept of subjective well-being shows 
much overlap with Baumeister’s and our theory of a meaningful life. The 
most important remaining difference appears to be our emphasis on the 
need for moral worth. And because in my considered opinion morality 
and ethics posit objective or at least intersubjective norms for relations 
with others, moral worth makes a meaningful life – in the same way as 
human dignity – a more than purely subjective concept. To achieve prog-
ress in the theory of meanings of life interdisciplinary research, which 
combines psychology, philosophy (especially ethics), and other academic 
disciplines such as sociology, history, cultural anthropology, and evolu-
tionary biology, is necessary.
 In the remainder of this article I will indicate a few important con-
siderations around the meanings of life that regard effective substantial 
extension of the human lifespan; a detailed examination of all of these 
considerations is not my purpose here, nor is it even possible. By substan-
tial extension I mean decelerated senescence and arrested senescence as 
outlined earlier on in this chapter. Decelerated senescence is much more 
probable as the scenario for decades to come, but arrested aging certainly 
is an interesting scenario. It cannot be completely ruled out for the long 
run and it is interesting because it forces us to think in new ways about 
what we think most important in our lives and societies. This is important 
even if arrested aging will never happen.
 Life Extension and Sense of Purpose
A very ‘natural’ argument in favour of substantial life-extension is that 
in a very long life we will be able to complete important projects we have 
planned and embarked upon (Hagestad 1996). For example, at confer ences 
I have met quite a few biogerontologists and philosophers who argued 
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that it is unfortunate that when we finally start to understand the topic we 
study, our cognitive abilities begin to dwindle and our death comes near. 
However, a sense of purpose does not depend on finishing our projects. 
When we complete a project or see a long-standing desire fulfilled, this 
will bring a sense of satisfaction and sometimes efficacy, but to experience 
a sense of purpose in life it is necessary that we keep striving for some-
thing in the future, for something that is unachieved but imagined to be 
possible. As every scientist and scholar knows, achieving better knowl-
edge of a subject is possible, but it always opens up new questions we had 
not yet thought of before. Complete knowledge always has the character 
of a receding target. This means that a much longer life will make it pos-
sible to finish larger projects, to plan longer careers, to not only see our 
children and grandchildren grow up but also our great grandchildren. Es-
sentially, however, the situation will not change as far as sense of purpose 
is concerned.
 Authors criticizing substantial life extension often point to loss of 
meaning. Thus, Hans Jonas wrote: ‘Perhaps a non-negotiable limit to our 
expected time is necessary for each of us as the incentive to number our 
days and make them count’ (Jonas 1985, 19). The objection to life exten-
sion seems to be that, when we have a lot of time to reach our goals, 
reaching these goals becomes meaningless, because we have known all 
along that we would reach them, this year or another. Yet much can be 
said in response to this. What does ‘making our days count’ exactly mean? 
Horrobin (2005, 14) points out that it is an odd argument to assert that 
people enjoy playing football today and experience no ennui in doing so 
only because they are aware that they cannot do it three centuries hence. 
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of Jonas’s argument is expressed 
by Christine Overall (2004). She states that we should not argue against 
increasing human longevity by reference to the limited parameters set by 
current life expectancies. According to her, this is the fallacy of begging 
the question. When the context changes and life expectancies become 
much longer, our judgment of life’s possibilities and meanings will also 
change. Not only will childhood and age be redefined, but concepts like 
schooling, education, marriage, partnership, friendship, sexuality, gen-
der, father, mother, parent, grandparent, family, career, retirement, na-
tionality, and citizenship will also take on other meanings. Together these 
changes will constitute new moral systems, purposes, and contexts for 
meaning. But I think Overall exaggerates. The way we think about human 
fulfillment now, of course, is relevant to our well-considered present-day 
judgments on prolongation of life. I would agree with her, however, if she 
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argued that we ought not to evaluate substantial life extension only by 
reference to the kind of life that we know now. Certainly, a comprehensive 
evaluation of future possibilities requires not just norms, values, facts and 
extrapolations, but also imagination.
 It is a fact, of course, that lives with less than the average life expec-
tancy can be experienced as meaningful. But even if life extension would 
not increase the possibility to lead a meaningful life, it might result in new 
(better?) ways of having a meaningful life, as has happened in the past:
[T]he increase in life expectancy [since 1900] means that individuals 
now have a greater chance of growing old. In a sense, the course of 
people’s lives has become more predictable. People expect to reach a re-
spectable age and they live their lives accordingly. Th e growing certain-
ties in life have been accompanied by a shift in norms and values. In the 
early twentieth century, people had a more fatalistic approach to life: 
things simply happened, and changes in life unavoidably befell people 
(...) Th is fatalistic approach to life has been replaced by a more proactive 
attitude, or ‘choice biography’, the notion that people can shape their 
own lives (Dykstra 2002, 10; see also Hagestad 1996, 208).
Another round of substantial life extension might cause people to take on 
an even stronger managerial attitude towards life. However, that human 
lives can be planned towards chosen purposes in the future will remain 
a matter of degree. Human vulnerability remains. A society with more 
(expensive) health care technology for its members creates the condi-
tions for more instead of fewer insurance policies and other risk-avert-
ing strategies. New risks (among them corporate and state uncertainties 
transferred to individual citizens, see Dannefer 2000, 270) and the old 
risks that remain, might even become more oppressive and threatening 
because there is more to lose. That is why Aubrey de Grey does not want 
to lecture in dangerous countries and why he thinks that the prevention 
of traffic accidents will be given absolute priority in societies with greatly 
extended life expectancies.
 Life Extension and Effi  cacy
Research shows that having a fair amount of control over life’s circum-
stances and having a relatively high degree of self-esteem are factors in 
determining a more than average life expectancy (Marmot 2005). So hav-
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ing (a sense of ) control is good for longevity. But do control, life extension 
and a much longer life contribute to a more meaningful life? The desire 
for control can go so far as to be self-defeating and counterproductive. 
Furthering longevity might involve such hard and manifold efforts that 
life becomes meaningless rather than meaningful. A body repair every ten 
years, as envisaged by De Grey, is not too big a price to pay for a long and 
healthy life, but when a substantially extended lifespan and health-span 
demands constant attention every day, the gain in years might be offset by 
a loss in quality of life. Medicalization could turn out to be a serious prob-
lem connected with life extension (Porter 1999; Verweij 1999). A good bal-
ance would have to be sought, as otherwise the controlling efforts needed 
for a longer life might start to make human life meaningless (and lives 
experienced as meaningless might tend to become shorter again).
 Life Extension and Moral Worth: Distributive Justice
An important aspect of a meaningful life is that it can be justified morally, 
and one of the most important moral problems concerning the engineer-
ing of substantial life extension relates to justice. Justice is about the dis-
tribution of (the lack of ) things we value. At the beginning of this article I 
distinguished between different kinds of life extension, but I left out one 
very important factor: the ‘social gradient’ of longevity. Life expectancies 
differ according to social status. Michael Marmot’s recent summary starts 
with an illustration from the United States capital:
If you take the Metro from the southeast of downtown Washington to 
Montgomery County, Maryland, in the suburbs – a distance of about 
14 miles – for each mile traveled life expectancy rises about a year and 
a half. Th is is the most life-enhancing journey in the world. Th ere’s a 
twenty-year gap between poor blacks at one end of the journey (male life 
expectancy fi fty-seven), and rich whites at the other (Marmot 2005).
Such inequalities in life expectancy at birth exist all over the world (Mack-
enbach & Bakker 2003; Marmot 2004). How do we understand these in-
equalities? Marmot’s analysis comes down to this. An important determi-
nant of an individual life’s longevity is (1) a favourable genetic endowment 
and early life history, but, though important, this is only a small part of 
the story. Other important elements are: (2) living in a country above the 
absolute poverty level – a GDP of about USD 5,000 – above this, level 
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differences in GDP between countries do not matter very much; (3) high 
relative social position (as regards status, employment grade, relative 
wealth and extent of social participation); and (4) high relative freedom, 
autonomy, or control over life’s circumstances – in many Western coun-
tries this still means for men especially at work, for women at home. The 
third and fourth factors are connected with the fact that a more equal dis-
tribution of household income in a country seems to be related to a higher 
average life expectancy. The second factor indicates a similar thing, but 
then with reference to a threshold kind of equality between countries. 
In some countries infant and child mortality is still terribly high, while 
the means to do something about it have been known to humanity for 
a long time, which shows that we live in a world full of injustice. What 
counts as injustice depends on the theory of justice that is used. However, 
whether one refers to human rights (Buitenweg 2007), Rawls’s theory of 
justice as fairness (Rawls 1999a; 1999b), Dworkin’s equality of welfare and 
resources (Dworkin 2000), or Nussbaum’s capabilities theory (Nussbaum 
2001; 2006), differences in average life expectancy at birth of forty years 
between countries (Japan and Zimbabwe) and more than twenty years 
for socio-economic groups within countries – differences which can be 
removed and prevented by collective social action – are hard to defend as 
morally acceptable. Now imagine what would happen if in such a world 
substantial life extension became possible through initially very expen-
sive biotechnology such as longevity pharmaceuticals or gene therapy. 
The demand, backed by purchasing power, certainly in the beginning, 
would mainly come from young adults, the better educated, wealthier 
and higher-income individuals and those with higher initial endowments 
of health. Socioeconomic and health inequalities would be amplified. A 
small group of people with an already high life expectancy would have 
access to lifespan and health-span extension, but many less-privileged 
people would not. Surely this is ethically undesirable, is it not? ‘The need-
based claims of the worse off to have reasonably long lives have more 
moral weight than the preference-based claims of the better off to have 
longer lives’ (Glannon 2001, 167, see also McConnell & Turner 2005, 61 
and Mauron 2005).
 The existence of social injustice can never be a valid reason for morally 
objecting to any improvement in the fate of human beings who do not 
belong to the most underprivileged ones. ‘If we were to insist that tech-
nological developments of all sorts wait until the world becomes perfectly 
just, there would be absolutely no scientific progress’ (Post 2004b, 537, see 
also Harris 2003 and Davis 2004). This is true, but I think one should not 
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stop there. Demanding equality and perfect justice within and between 
countries as a prerequisite to the development of life-extension technol-
ogy is asking too much. Here, as often, ‘perfection’ would be the enemy of 
the good. The remedy for injustice is not denial of benefits to some with 
no corresponding gain to others, but redistribution (Dworkin 2000, 440). 
Not being able to do everything, or enough, should be no excuse for do-
ing nothing. Efforts like the UN Millennium Development Goals are very 
important. It is important before 2015 to try to reduce the proportion of 
people living on less than a dollar a day by half, to reduce the mortality 
rate among children under five by two-thirds, to try to reduce the mater-
nal mortality ratio by three-quarters and to halt and begin to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major diseas-
es (Garrett 2007, 32). These are challenging goals, but they are technically 
feasible and mainly depend on political will. In the same vein, ambitious 
but feasible goals could be formulated to do something about the shock-
ing disparities in longevity between and also within countries. Christine 
Overall proposes a qualified prolongevitism (expanding the ‘natural’ max-
imal lifespan) within countries, one that will genuinely be for all, a kind of 
affirmative action in the field of life extension. She writes that increased 
research into conditions and diseases that affect groups of people with 
low life expectancy, like people of colour and poor people, is morally indi-
cated (Overall 2003, 200). However, note that for longer life expectancies 
of less-privileged people more equality of income is more important than 
new achievements in high-tech biomedicine. As highlighted by Marmot, 
only three of the thirty-nine recommendations in the Acheson Report to 
the British government – Inequalities in Health: Report of an Independent 
Inquiry (1998) – are related to health care. ‘The others covered the tax and 
benefit system; education; employment; housing and environment; mo-
bility, transportation, and pollution; and nutrition’ (Marmot 2004, 251). 
Reducing health inequalities might both be the ethically indicated and 
the most effective way to substantially extend the (remaining) life expec-
tancies of many people; it will be more effective than biotechnological 
approaches aimed at decelerating or arresting senescence of human be-
ings as a species. Many healthy human years can be gained by this heavily 
neglected form of life extension: more equal longevity.
 One should realize, however, that priorities do not have to be absolute 
and generally allow for compromise. Serious and strenuous attempts to 
tackle the national and global social gradient of longevity certainly do 
not require that biogerontological research into the diseases of the oldest 
old and into the general underlying processes of senescence is stopped 
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completely. As far as international injustice is concerned, one should not 
forget that the numbers of the old and oldest old in developing coun-
tries will also increase rapidly. Already the remaining life expectancy of 
a woman who has managed to reach the age of sixty in Brazil (21 more 
years), India (18 years) and Nigeria (17 years) is not so different from the 
number of years an average sixty-year-old female inhabitant of the Unit-
ed States can expect to add to her life (24 years). The WHO anticipates 
that the per centage of people over sixty living in developing countries 
between now and 2050 will rise from 60 to 85 per cent of the total global 
number (Kalache, Barreto & Keller 2005, 36, see also Aboderin 2006 and 
Kirkwood 1999, 8). In China and India the elderly will outnumber the to-
tal current population of the US by mid-century (Olshansky et al. 2006, 
31). It is possible that understanding the fundamental processes of bio-
logical ageing is the most effective way of fighting age-related diseases 
such as Alzheimer’s (Post 2004b). Because of this, because we do not 
really know how to make the distinction between biological processes 
of ‘normal’ ageing and age-associated diseases, and because this distinc-
tion continues to change, it would be short-sighted to stop fundamen-
tal biogerontological research (Derkx 2006; Izaks & Westendorp 2003; 
Juengst 2004).
 This whole section about justice relates to the sense of moral worth, 
an important component of a life which is experienced as meaningful. All 
things considered it should be very difficult for human beings to enjoy a 
substantially extended and at the same time meaningful life without con-
tributing anything to the fight against ethically unacceptable longevity 
inequalities in the world.
 Life Extension, Subjective Well-Being, and Meanings of Life
I have already made some remarks about the relation between life-ex-
tension and sense of purpose, but more has to be said. A longitudinal 
survey done in the US showed that people over 64 reported significantly 
lower levels of life purpose than younger adults. In addition, physical and 
emotional health were perceived as decreasing with age, and people over 
74, especially women, rated themselves substantially lower on sense of 
control than younger age groups. At the same time, however, women over 
54 and men over 64 rated their relationships with others more positively 
than younger adults did, and overall life satisfaction of men and women 
over 54 was more positive than that of younger people (Ryff 2006). De-
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spite a decline in many areas, overall subjective well-being is as good, if 
not better, for older people as for their younger counterparts. This has 
been regarded as strange, but socio-emotional selectivity theory shows 
that there need not be a contradiction here:
Th e theory maintains that two broad categories of goals shift in im-
portance as a function of perceived time: those concerning the acquisi-
tion of knowledge and those concerning the regulation of feeling states. 
When time is perceived as open-ended, as it typically is in youth, people 
are strongly motivated to pursue information. ... In the face of a long 
and nebulous future, even information that is not immediately relevant 
may become so somewhere down the line. In contrast, when time is 
perceived as constrained, as it typically is in later life, people are mo-
tivated to pursue emotional satisfaction. Th ey are more likely to invest 
in sure things, deepen existing relationships, and savor life (Carstensen 
2007, 45).
Not so much a preoccupation with the past but with the present may be 
a sign that a person’s life is felt to be coming to an end (see Hagestad 
1996, 207). The decisive factor in socio-emotional selectivity theory is not 
chronological age but perceived remaining life expectancy. When condi-
tions create a sense of the fragility of life, for example after the September 
11 attacks in the US, or during the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, younger 
as well as older people prefer to pursue emotionally meaningful experi-
ences and goals in the short term (Fung & Carstensen 2006). So, what 
does this mean for substantial life extension? It is plausible that with a 
substantially higher life expectancy people will keep making plans and for 
a longer time will have a sense of purpose in life, but they will also pay the 
price of having to wait longer before they reach the state of more positive 
relations with others and higher overall satisfaction with life. When the 
expectations of the longevity of life increase, people will be more inclined 
to keep gathering information that might be useful some time in the fu-
ture and to postpone gratification of emotional needs. However, it is not 
immediately clear what is the better situation. Is it more important to 
have a meaningful life or a happy life? Will later life be more emotionally 
gratifying if one has had a longer period of (successful?) striving for goals 
and fulfillments? Will ‘old age’ be happier if one has had a longer ‘youth’? 
Will it be possible to live longer and at the same time to learn to be ‘older 
and wiser’ at a relatively early stage? Part of the answers will depend on 
the socially expected life course. ‘The life course has become a princi-
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pal cultural connection between individual lives and the larger society 
through an image not only of the good life, but of the timetable according 
to which it should be achieved’ (J. Keith and others quoted in Hagestad 
1996, 209).
 A Final Issue: Is Life Extension Unnatural?
Important authors on life extension such as Hans Jonas (1992), Leon Kass 
(2004), Francis Fukuyama (2002), Daniel Callahan (1995), and Bill McKib-
ben (2003) have exhorted us
to live more or less according to nature, and warn that our eff orts to 
depart from what we are will result in new evils that are more perilous 
than old ones. (...) Our focus (...) should be on the acceptance of aging 
rather than on its scientifi c modifi cation. Th e intergenerational thrust 
of evolution, by which we are inclined toward parental and social in-
vestment in the hope, energy, and vitality of youth, provides the basis 
for a natural law ethic that requires us all to relinquish youthfulness 
(Post 2004b, 536-537).
It is very easy to dismiss these ‘natural law positions’ as an untenable de-
ontological stance by pointing out that if substantial life-extension starts 
to occur in nature it begins to be ‘natural’, or by emphasizing that humans 
have always changed nature (including their own natural features) in the 
course of civilization. More or less the same goes for the religious versions 
of these arguments, referring to a God who has established the natural 
law. That humans should respect the will of God or that they should not 
attempt to play God, runs into similar intellectual difficulties as the ex-
hortation to respect nature, and into additional difficulties as well. Re-
ferring to the will of God is not a very strong argument in a pluralistic 
democratic society that includes atheists and agnostics.
 However, it is possible to discover something important behind these 
arguments from nature or God, even if one rejects the absolute deon-
tological positions and is more inclined towards consequentialist ethics. 
Human nature is not blank, nor completely and always easily malleable. 
It is the result of millions of years of natural selection. Human beings are 
the result of evolution and as such they are very complex organisms with 
many trade-offs involved, referring back to environments of the past. We 
cannot design humans from scratch. Stressing that we ought to be wary 
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of bad unintended consequences is not the same as claiming that nothing 
should be changed. It is possible for a society to opt for a less-than-one-
child-per-family policy to counteract undesirable effects of population-
growth due to increasing old age survival, but will its individual citizens 
accept this policy and live up to it? Human nature is very flexible, but it is 
possible to ask too much of human beings. It seems relevant, for example, 
to consider the emotional implications of a population scenario with 9 bil-
lion people in 2300 with an average life expectancy at birth of about 100 
years, few children and a high proportion of very old people (Basu 2004, 
93). And we should not only be talking about what is possible for human 
beings, individually and as a group. We should also consider what is good 
for them and what makes their lives meaningful. To ask what desires and 
emotions are humanly ‘natural’ can be translated into a question about 
what desires and emotions are good and proper for human beings to have 
and deserve the opportunity to be acted upon.
 More discussion about meanings of life is needed. But in individualistic 
secular societies people have many different ideas about what constitutes 
a meaningful life, so it will be difficult to reach consensus or even under-
standing about the value of life extension. Part of the difficulty is that in 
modern Western societies it is rather generally accepted that meanings of 
life are a private matter, not something about which to engage in public 
debate.
 The variety of ideas about meanings of life will be very difficult to han-
dle in a democracy, because the differences can be wide and not a matter 
of degree. ‘Transhumanists’ like Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil & Grossmann 
2004), Nick Bostrom (2003; 2005), Gregory Stock (2002), and Aubrey de 
Grey (De Grey & Rae 2007) feel that we should not accept biological age-
ing as inevitable. They argue that the fundamental biology of human be-
ings should be changed in order to get rid of death caused by senescence. 
Other thinkers, not only of the natural-law variety, see this as a dangerous 
illusion, holding that the propagation and cultivation of ideas like this 
are very detrimental to the meanings of human lives. This difference in 
worldview is a crucial aspect of the debate on substantial extension of hu-
man life expectancy. Much of what is involved is expressed in these words 
of Michael Lerner:
[We] need to do the spiritual work as we grow older to accept the inevi-
tability of death rather than acting as though aging and death could be 
avoided if only we had a better technology. Th e enormous emotional, 
spiritual, and fi nancial cost of trying to hang on to life as long as pos-
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sible (and to look as though we were not aging) is fostered by a market-
place that tries to sell us endless youth. It is also fostered by our cultural 
failure to honor our elders, provide them with real opportunities to 
share their wisdom, and combat the pervasive ageism with its willing-
ness to discard people long before their creative juices have dried up, 
to stigmatize the sexuality of the elderly (...), and to provide little in 
the way of adequately funded and beautifully conceived long-term care 
facilities (Lerner 2006, 308-309).
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11 Enhancement Technologies: An Opportunity to Care?
Annika den Dikken
Critics of enhancement technologies emphasize that enhancement tech-
nologies essentially differ from medical treatment in the sense that their 
aim is not to sustain or restore good health. Enhancement technologies 
produce interventions designed to improve human form or functioning 
beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good health (Juengst 1998). 
Examples of so-called enhancement technologies are cosmetic surgery, 
genetic manipulations, psycho-pharmaceuticals, and genetic drugs. Dis-
cussion about the distinction between medical treatment and enhance-
ment has become a large part of the ethical debate.
 The treatment versus enhancement debate takes place in the context 
of at least two larger backgrounds. First, the quest for a just distribution 
of scanty resources in the health care system asks for criteria to appoint 
the care most needed. Ethicists see it as their task to define these criteria. 
Second, the debate seems to be a touchstone for those who search for the 
moral boundaries of the growth of biotechnology. In the treatment-en-
hancement distinction some claim to have found a definable boundary for 
the acceptable use of human creational powers. Remarkably, the enhance-
ment debate thus seems to be focused mainly on political, philosophical 
and theological objectives: political objectives, because moral boundaries 
must be transferable into a policy; philosophical, because moral distinc-
tions can only be made through the rules of logic; and theological, because 
the conclusions of the debate have to coincide with larger worldviews. 
The above-mentioned contexts are of great importance, but ethicists and 
theologians in their search for definitions seem to have forgotten one of 
the main objectives of the bioethical origin, namely to protect vulnerable 
people from the social practices that arise in modern medicine (Cahill 
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2005). Central to the ethical work should be the people who are affected, 
those who need care, and those who suffer. Their situation should be the 
core of ethical interest.
 A more important question than finding the differences between medi-
cal treatment and enhancement therefore seems to be whether so called 
‘enhancement technologies’ can provide a possibility of care. Therefore 
it is necessary to describe what we understand as care and how we can 
estimate whether care is needed. When is it morally obliged to give care? 
I will show that social norms related to the body – such as norms of beau-
ty, health, and performance – can cause human suffering and stimulate 
people to use enhancement technologies. Therefore these body-related 
values should be included in the ethical debate. An ethics of care and 
theological notions of love and redemption could shine another light on 
this topic, for they show responsibilities related to the social contexts of 
people who wish to alter their bodies. The task of ethics is not only to 
better the lives of people who have a disease, it also cares for people who 
suffer as a whole being.
 Suff ering, Illness, or Needs?
Why would we use the word ‘suffering’ in the context of the enhance-
ment debate? It is more common to speak of ‘illness’, or ‘needs’ as a cause 
for moral responsibility. I choose not to use the term ‘illness’, because I 
want to move away from the treatment-enhancement distinction. Illness 
is a medical term. Thereby it is not the simple opposite of health, when 
we, for example, use one of the holistic approaches of health as written 
down in the definition of ‘health’ used by the World Health Organization 
(WHO): ‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-
being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’ (Preamble to 
the Constitution 1946). Social well-being is thus also an important factor 
in the concept of health formulated by the WHO. Because ‘health’ itself 
also has a medical connotation, I would rather use the general term ‘well-
being’.
 Some examples will show that it is problematic to use the term ‘illness’ 
in cases where we can hardly deny that the well-being of people is at stake. 
The first example comes from the book From Chance to Choice where 
the authors use it as a case in their argumentation about the treatment/
enhancement distinction:
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Johnny is a short 11-year-old boy with documented growth hormone 
(GH) defi ciency resulting from a brain tumor. His parents are of av-
erage height. His predicted adult height without GH treatment is ap-
proximately 160 cm (5 feet 3 inches).
 Billy is a short 11-year-old boy with normal GH secretion according 
to current testing methods. However, his parents are extremely short, 
and he has a predicted adult height of 160 cm (5 feet 3 inches). (Buch-
anan 2000, 115)
The authors of From Chance to Choice assume that Johnny and Billy will 
‘suffer disadvantage equally if they are not treated. There is no reason to 
think the difference in the underlying causes of their shortness will lead 
people to treat them in ways that make one happier or more advantaged 
than the other’. (Buchanan 2000, 115) Although Johnny obviously stays 
short because of an illness, Billy does not. No biomedical malfunction-
ing is measured to cause his predicted shortness. It would be awkward 
to call Billy ill, just because he will be shorter than the average male 
person.
 Other examples can be found in the field of reproduction as we can see 
in the next case:
Mary is a lesbian woman of 28 years old. She and her partner Clare have 
been together for six years now and they both feel a strong wish to have 
children. Mary speaks of her biological clock ticking. She also knows 
how much a grandchild would please her mother, who was not too hap-
py to hear that Mary was a lesbian. Furthermore, Mary and Clare often 
have to listen to their friends who all had children during the last few 
years. Th ose friends often tell them how sad it is that they have to miss 
this joy. Th e couple understands that they have only a few years left to 
try to have children. Th ey hope to fi nd a sperm donor and to become 
pregnant through reproductive technology methods.
Obviously, there is no illness preventing Mary and Clare from having chil-
dren together. There is no biomedical malfunction, but they cannot con-
ceive a child together because they are both women. However, although it 
is not a case of illness, these women experience the same problem as in-
fertile women. Whether caused by medical indication (such as a blocked 
fallopian tube) or by social indication (such as the lack of a male part-
ner), these women can suffer from the inability to conceive a child of their 
own.
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 These examples show that ‘illness’ is not an appropriate term for all 
cases in which people’s well-being is at stake, even if the suffering in-
volved is equal to cases where we can speak of illness and the alleviation 
of the suffering could be reached through the same methods.
 One could of course consider the use of the term ‘illness’ for all cases 
of absence of health or well-being. This would mean an even further med-
icalization of social life than we already have in our society nowadays. 
Furthermore it would not clear up the moral debate. Calling Billy, Mary, 
or Clare ‘ill’ does not bring us any nearer to the problem they experience, 
which mainly has a social character, not so much a medical one. It seems 
more appropriate to acknowledge that their suffering equals the suffering 
of those who do have a diagnosed illness.
 I mentioned above that the term ‘needs’ as an alternative for ‘suffering’ 
is more commonly said to evoke moral responsibility. Needs, however, is 
a very broad term. Nussbaum, for example, made a distinction between 
primary needs and secondary needs based on the core capabilities that 
are necessary to live a human life with dignity (Nussbaum 2006). If closely 
scrutinized, the distinction between primary needs and suffering will not 
be great. The use of the word ‘suffering’, however, has some other impli-
cations. First, it brings us to a moment that precedes our speaking about 
needs. Suffering concerns the core experience of a person who might not 
yet know what she needs. And second, whereas there are needs that do 
not necessarily oblige others to satisfy those needs (for example second-
ary needs), suffering always calls for care, whether by alleviating the cause 
of suffering or by just supporting the person who suffers.
 Suff ering and the Problems of Using Suff ering as a Moral Compass
To speak of suffering seems to be problematic in the medical field. Eric 
J. Cassell (2004) claims that ‘the relief of suffering is considered one of 
the primary ends of medicine by patients and the general public, but it 
is not by the medical profession, judging by medical education and the 
responses of students and colleagues’ (31). Cassell emphasizes that phy-
sicians are primarily concerned with the physical, and that medical and 
social literature mostly explain ‘suffering’ in connection to pain. But pain 
and suffering are not synonymous. Physical pain does not have to lead to 
suffering and suffering does not only consist of pain, although pain can be 
a large factor in suffering. Cassell describes suffering as follows: ‘Suffer-
ing occurs when an impending destruction of the person is perceived; it 
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continues until the threat of disintegration has passed or until the integ-
rity of the person can be restored in some other manner’ (32). Suffering is 
experienced by people. A person is not merely mind, but consists of many 
facets. Cassell sums up: a person has a past with life experiences, a fam-
ily, a cultural background, roles, relationships with others, a relationship 
with himself or herself. A person is a political being, people do things, a 
person is unaware of some things happening to her. A person has regular 
behaviours, a body, a secret life, a perceived future, and a transcendent 
dimension. Suffering occurs with the (impending) destruction of one or 
more of these facets and when the intactness cannot be maintained or 
restored (36-43). The integrity of a person as a whole is at stake.
 This comprehensive concept of suffering can make physicians sceptical 
about their task to alleviate suffering in general. In part this is with good 
reason, for how should they offer care when people lose a relative or their 
job? However, only emphasizing physical conditions has a risk of over-
looking important facets that undermine physical or mental health and 
contribute to personal suffering.
 To use this understanding of suffering in the context of ethics raises 
several problems. How to define when people suffer? How to know what 
aspects of a personal life cause suffering and how to relieve this suffering? 
Some people say they suffer when we would not expect them to, whereas 
others deny that they suffer in situations from which we would expect 
them to. We should also consider that ‘suffering’ is a loaded term and that 
many people will not admit that they suffer. Can we use such a subjec-
tive experience as a moral compass? Although suffering is person-related, 
we can recognize factors in human life that sooner evoke suffering than 
others. Physicians, psychologists, and pastoral workers are specialized in 
finding these factors in their field of work. But it is not possible to make 
general claims about suffering. Only the context of the person involved, 
and if possible her own opinion about it, can show whether a person suf-
fers, whether facets of her personhood are harmed.
 If we think suffering is important in the context of moral responsibil-
ity, we have to acknowledge there can be no general rules that define 
when moral responsibility has to be taken. One of the tasks of ethics 
should be to explore which factors in life cause personal suffering, and 
analyzing the role of several actors and social practices that influence 
these factors.
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 Body-Related Values
In the context of the enhancement debate at least one group of factors that 
cause suffering seems to be neglected, namely ‘body-related values’. Dif-
ferent values are related to our bodies, depending on culture and period of 
time. Roughly we can divide body-related values into three categories:
 First we can think of values that influence the evaluation of our bodies. 
According to these values we consider ourselves or other people healthy, 
attractive, or beautiful. Those values for example mark whether we have 
desirable bodies and whether we consider ourselves as being a real man or 
woman.
 Second, body-related values can be values that influence the evalua-
tion of ourselves in general. With this I do not want to make a distinction 
between our bodies and ourselves as if our bodies do not belong to our-
selves, but in the first category the body-related values are directly aimed 
at the body as a specific part of ourselves, while the second category is 
more general and focused on character or moral evaluation of the person 
as a whole. Eve Ensler provides an example of this second category by 
speaking about herself: ‘I have bought into the idea that if my stomach 
were flat, then I would be good, and I would be safe’ (Ensler 2004, x). Peo-
ple connect personal values to bodily appearances: when a person is thin 
she is good. When she is fat, she is bad and lazy. A tanned skin is a sign of 
health and wealth. A trained body shows a person to be disciplined.
 Third, other values we adopt can be body-related. The wish for having 
children is body- related, because bodies have to come together to realize 
this wish and a woman’s body has to carry the child for nine months. In 
the case where reproductive technology is used, bodily interventions are 
performed in order to fulfill the wish for a child. Values of performance 
can also be body-related, when the body has to be trained and put on a 
diet to obtain the best performance. Another example of a body-related 
value in this category is the wish to have control over life. If a society 
highly values a control over all aspects of life, this will also concern the 
body, for instance by controlling the aging process.
 These three categories overlap and influence each other. It is hardly 
possible to categorize a value in only one of the categories. The three cat-
egories mainly show the different kinds of influence body-related values 
can have.
 If we look at the first case described above, we can see how such cul-
turally determined body-related values can cause suffering. For example, 
we assume that both Billy and Johnny will not meet concrete physical dis-
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advantages like pain or dysfunction from their being short. But they will 
both most likely encounter comparable practical and social discomforts. 
We can find examples of this at the Short Persons Support’s website:
Research has shown that short men have fewer opportunities for ro-
mantic relationships, have fewer children, and on average are paid less. 
Finding adult fashion clothes is diffi  cult. Short women report that they 
are not taken as seriously as their taller peers (www.shortsupport.org, 
29-08-2006).
Some of these situations can cause suffering when social practices push 
people into situations they cannot integrate with their self-image. Al-
though we assume that both Billy and Johnny suffer equally, because they 
will both stay short, this assumption is too easily made. Whether they will 
suffer is dependent on many circumstances. Perhaps one of them lives 
in an environment that teaches the boy to cope with his shortness, to be 
self-confident, and maybe he will meet other short people and in that way 
find comfort.
 An Ethics of Care
If we think that it is a moral responsibility to respond to human suffering, 
as in fact all ethical theories defend, there needs to be an attentiveness to 
recognize suffering. Such attentiveness is a core concept of an ethics of 
care. Feminist ethicists, who have developed different kinds of care eth-
ics, make the attentiveness to a person’s needs the centre of their ethical 
theory. Attentiveness to needs is an important aspect of the concept of 
care. Nel Noddings places emphasis on this attitude of caring:
Caring involves stepping out of one’s own personal frame of reference 
into the other’s. When we care, we consider the other’s point of view, his 
objective needs, and what he expects of us. Our attention, our mental 
engrossment is on the cared-for, not on ourselves (Noddings 1984, 24).
Although it is common in care ethics to speak of needs, I prefer to use the 
word ‘suffering’, for reasons mentioned above. If I do use the word ‘needs’, 
I use it related to suffering, as those needs that aim to relieve or prevent 
suffering. Of course, caring does not only occur in the context of suffer-
ing. If a woman cares for her child, her care will in general not be seen 
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as a reaction to suffering. However, her care will prevent her child from 
suffering, even if this will not explicitly be her conscious motivation to 
provide care. By caring we relieve or prevent suffering.
 What is care? The Encyclopedia of Ethics describes care as a distinct 
moral sentiment – an emotional attitude embedded in a relationship with 
another person. ‘Caring for another individual involves a concern for the 
other’s well-being’ (Becker 2001). This description of care, however, seems 
to be too narrow. Caring does not only consist of the concern for another 
person. Care ethicists have described ‘care’ as both an attitude or value 
and a practice. Caring without action is not real care. One could not say: 
‘I care for my children’ without being prepared to actually provide them 
care. Such an inconsistency would immediately question the value of care. 
Daniel Engster describes caring as a practice aimed at helping individuals 
meet their basic needs, developing and maintaining basic capabilities, and 
living free from suffering as much as possible (Engster 2005). Examples of 
caring practices are child raising, educating people, nursing wounds and 
cultivating social relations. Although care ethicists have put the atten-
tion on caring practices, Virginia Held urges that ‘[M]oral theorizing is 
needed to understand the practices and to reform them’ (Held 2006, 37). 
Many practices are not seen as caring practices. In this paper we question 
whether the use of enhancement technologies could be regarded as a car-
ing practice.
 Caring can only take place in the context of relationships. People care 
for other people. The central aim of an ethics of care is to determine the 
conditions of good caring relationships, with others but also with one-
self. However, standards for a concept of care cannot be found in abstract 
principles or rules guiding us what good care should look like, which is 
congruent with the context-specific character of suffering. Rather, values 
of care can shape a framework showing us what caring relationships look 
like. Care ethicists motivate to establish a mutual caring relationship be-
tween the caregiver and the cared-for. ‘Caring is a relation in which carer 
and cared-for share an interest in their mutual well-being’ (Held 2006, 
34-35). Providing care is therefore informed by the contexts of both the 
cared-for and the caregiver. Good care is only possible if caregivers are 
attentive, but also when care receivers are open to receive care and to sup-
port their caregivers as far as possible. The task of caregiving is often very 
difficult and takes a lot of energy from the caregiver (Kittay 1999; Levine 
2004). Care receivers can therefore support those who offer care by not 
demanding too much from them.
 Critics of an ethics of care claim that care ethics cannot offer any con-
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tent because care does not mean anything else than a general term such 
as ‘good’. If we say that we have to care about X, we do not yet know 
what we should do (Reich 1978). It is not correct to say that ‘caring’ is an 
empty concept. Caring attitudes and practices can be verified by affirm-
ing that they are attentive for needs, aimed at the other or oneself, part of 
mutual relationships and informed by the context of persons as a whole 
(including the body-related values). Caring attitudes and practices relieve 
or prevent suffering, which is defined as an impending destruction of the 
(integrity of a) person. Suffering shows when care is needed and when it 
is our moral responsibility to care.
 So we can determine when care is called for and we have set the con-
ditions care needs in order to form good caring relationships, but as for 
content we still do not know what good care is exactly, because good care 
is not based on rules and principles but is directly context-related. This 
can be seen as a problem, as most ethical theories wish to provide clear 
answers and boundaries. At the same time it can be seen as a big advan-
tage for ethical consideration, because it offers openings to particular 
contexts, personal experiences, and creative thinking. Although I agree 
with the last option, I do recognize the problematic aspect of a concept 
of care that is too open. Without limiting it, through the addition of rules 
or principles, I hope to offer some guiding tools to recognize good care. 
This I will do by introducing the theological concepts of love and re-
demption.
 Love
Although ‘love’ is a central aspect of social behaviour, modern ethicists 
hardly reflect on the topic of love, for several possible reasons. Love 
seems to be the opposite of rationale, and could often even be considered 
as non-rational. Love can be seen as an individual emotion, and love is 
mostly associated with romantic love. For feminist theologians the lat-
ter has been a reason to avoid speaking about love. They stressed that in 
the name of love power relationships were justified and they preferred to 
rethink concepts of a relationship, by using other terms. The absence of 
thorough reflection on love can be considered an inadequacy in the field 
of ethics, as our understanding of what love is influences our social rela-
tionships. What is considered to be love? Who do we love, who may we 
love, how do we act out of love? How does love for another influence our 
moral considerations?
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 The Protestant debate about love (agape) has emphasized the concept of 
other-regard in contrast with self-regard. This distinction was initiated by 
Anders Nygren’s Agape and Eros in which Nygren understands Christian 
love as moving in two directions: God and the neighbor (Nygren 1953). 
This is in contrast with natural self-love, which is presented as a morally 
negative quality (Andolsen 1981). The grounding for Nygren’s understand-
ing of love can be found in the traditional understanding of love through 
the Christological explanation of the crucifixion of Jesus, which under-
stands Jesus’ self-sacrifice at the cross as the salvation of humankind. This 
selfless love of Christ should also be present in the actions of his follow-
ers. Feminists have criticized this understanding of agape because it did 
not do justice to women’s experiences. They described women as already 
being inclined to self-abnegation, having serving roles and not being able 
to develop themselves. In contrast to the distinction between self-regard 
and self-sacrifice they offered the concept of mutuality (Andolsen 1981). 
Focusing on mutuality, friendship, kinship, and relationships, they avoid-
ed speaking about love.
 In this context, however, I prefer to speak about love. Kinship and 
friendship refer to particular relationships and although it is possible to 
transfer the characteristics of kinship relationships to broader contexts of 
social behaviour, the Christian concept of love is appropriate in this con-
text precisely because it is not limited to particular relationships. Chris-
tians are called to love even those who do not return love, because it has 
no merit to love those who give love in return. The value of love can be 
found in its general character.
 Interestingly, the Christian concept of love seems to correspond with 
the concept of care in many aspects. Both concepts share the necessity 
of relationships and mutuality. Just as care requires attentiveness, love is 
not possible without an open attitude towards the other and the self. Like 
care, love is not only a value, it is also a practice. Love directly implies 
action. But if care and love are so much alike, why bother speaking about 
love? A theological concept of love can offer care ethics some values that 
are less obviously derived from the concept of care.
 Care ethicists emphasize the importance of an attentive attitude for 
needs. Attentiveness can still be understood as being rather detached, 
involving no particular emotions of the caregiver. Love on the other hand 
requires that the loving person is deeply moved. Love is a deep affection. 
The Protestant ethicist Margaret Farley uses the concept of compassion 
to refer to this being moved by the other (Farley 2002). But compassion 
directly refers to already existing suffering, not so much the suffering that 
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needs to be prevented. We do not feel compassion for children we care 
for, we love them. A person who loves allows herself to be deeply moved. 
Furthermore, the Christian concept of love is always placed in a larger 
context. The love between people is a reflection of God’s love for people. 
Our love is a part of the divine love, which binds human love together as 
a network aimed at redemption.
 Love differs from care in one important aspect. Love cannot be a moral 
responsibility. We cannot be obliged to love, we can only be inspired to 
love. We might consider calling it a religious or spiritual responsibility. 
Anyway, love can function as a strong motivation and inspiration to be 
attentive and provide care.
 Redemption
Susan Frank Parsons in the Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theol-
ogy writes about redeeming ethics based on the Dialogue with God of 
St Catherine of Siena (Parsons 2002). Catherine’s prayer shows Parsons 
how knowledge of God’s goodness is followed by love and the desire 
to be turned into this goodness. In this movement from knowledge of 
God’s goodness towards the desire to be turned into this goodness Par-
sons recognizes the intrinsic connection of ethics with redemption. The 
theological concept of redemption traditionally has been connected to 
Jesus’ crucifixion. The tremendous love of the Son for his Father and 
the world made him accept the cross. His crucifixion and resurrection 
counted as the salvation of humankind. Radford Ruether summarizes it 
as:
For traditional Christianity redemption means the reconciliation of the 
fallen soul with God, won by Christ in the cross, applied to the soul in 
baptismal regeneration, and developed through the struggle to live vir-
tuously sustained by grace. Salvation is completed after death in eternal 
contemplative union with God (joined by the spiritual body in the res-
urrection). (Ruether 1998, 273-274)
This understanding of redemption has been forcefully criticized by femi-
nist theologians, for it did not change the actual oppressed situation of 
many women. In modern feminism redemption shifts from otherworldly 
hope to this-worldly hope, according to Radford Ruether:
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Redemption is not primarily about being reconciled with a God from 
whom our human nature has become totally severed due to sin, re-
jecting our bodies and fi nitude, and ascending to communion with a 
spiritual world that will be our heavenly home after death. Rather, re-
demption is about reclaiming an original goodness that is still avail-
able as our true selves, although obscured by false ideologies and social 
structures that have justifi ed domination of some and subordination of 
others. (Ruether 1998, 8)
The example of this original goodness feminists find in the life of Jesus, 
and not so much in his crucifixion. Jesus’ life is paradigmatic because it 
shows ways to dissent from oppressive systems, to take the side of the 
oppressed, to follow a praxis of egalitarian relations and to provide care. 
Redemption is no longer regarded as one savior’s sacrifice and a hope for 
salvation in a future world. Redemption becomes a responsibility here 
and now, because we can be the source of redemption for others and our-
selves.
 Changing Ourselves
Why do our moral standards often change when bad things happen to our 
loved ones, or to ourselves? One could call it hypocrisy, but it seems more 
appropriate to acknowledge that our moral opinions are better informed 
about the context when we consider cases that are near to us. It is not too 
difficult to form abstract principles and rules about moral questions that 
do not concern situations we know much about. An ethics of care tries to 
bring distant cases nearer to us by articulating the importance of particu-
lar contexts. A Christian notion of love can inspire us to open our eyes for 
the needs and sufferings of other persons, being aware that taking moral 
responsibility can create moments of redemption.
 In the context of enhancement technologies an emphasis on suffering 
can lead to moral responsibilities that become ambiguous when we only 
focus on the boundaries between medical treatment and enhancement. 
An ethics of care focused on human suffering shows how particular situ-
ations determine whether people are in need of care. Attentiveness for 
those needs makes apparent that some people who are ill do not suffer, 
while others who are not ill do suffer. People who wish to enhance their 
bodies can suffer from social values that limit their well-being to a large 
extent. From the perspective of care ethics their suffering cannot evoke 
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other responsibilities compared with equal suffering caused by illness.
 A theology of love and redemption can remind us that attentiveness 
to human suffering can open us up to those we do not personally know, 
or whose suffering we do not understand. Through taking moral respon-
sibilities, by creating good relationships of care, we can offer each other 
redemption.
 By no means would I argue that enhancement technologies can relieve 
all human suffering caused by social values. If we look at the impact of 
some body-related values that cause suffering, we might rather consider 
whether we can remove the social pressure from those who do not con-
form to the average norm. But before we arrive at a society that can reach 
such an ideal, there is a moral responsibility to provide care for those who 
suffer from social practices. The use of enhancement technologies could 
be one way of providing this care.
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Part Four
A MATTER OF ARGUMENT OR OF TRUST?


12 Religious Arguments in Political Decision Making
Patrick Loobuyck
 Introduction
This contribution sketches the different political philosophical positions 
in the debate about the use of religious arguments in political decision 
making. We distinguish exclusionism from strong and weak versions of 
inclusions, and argue that from a deliberative democratic perspective, 
strong inclusionism gives us the most consistent approach to this subject. 
We will not only see that most arguments against inclusionism fail; it also 
seems that the critics of strong inclusionism work with an abstract notion 
of moral subjects and a problematic concept of autonomous morality.
 The Political Philosophical Landscape: Exclusionism, Weak and 
Strong Inclusionism
Nowadays, it seems ‘not done’ in our secular Western European socie-
ties to use religious arguments in the political sphere. When Christians 
or Muslims publicly condemn the law permitting euthanasia or same-sex 
marriages for religious reasons, many people call it a threat to democ-
racy and a violation of the principle of the separation of church and state. 
There is an increasing unwritten consensus that religious doctrines and 
institutions should play no role in political decision making. Many Chris-
tian democratic politicians also seem to accept this view. They acknowl-
edge that religious beliefs can inspire their political engagement but in 
their political choices and in the public presentation of arguments that 
support these choices, they avoid appeals to their religious background. 
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We can call this standard understanding of public reason the ‘exclusive 
view’ (cf. Rawls 1993, 247; Perry 2003, x; Boettcher 2005, 499).
 Versions of this exclusive view have been defended by liberal philos-
ophers such as Charles Larmore, Bruce Ackerman, Richard Rorty, and 
Robert Audi. For Audi, religious people should be guided by a principle 
of secular rationale and of secular motivation in the political realm. In 
the attempt to justify political beliefs and actions, ‘a commitment to a 
free and democratic society requires that one have, and be sufficiently 
motivated by, adequate secular reasons’ (Audi 1989, 293; also 2000, 86ff.) 
Several authors defend a kind of ‘conversational restraint’ as a necessary 
condition to keep the political dialogue going. Larmore (1987, 53) argues 
that ‘in the face of disagreement, those who wish to continue the conver-
sation should retreat to neutral ground’ and Ackerman (1989, 16) goes 
even further, when he writes that ‘we should simply say nothing at all 
about this disagreement and put the moral ideals that divide us off the 
conversational agenda of the liberal state’.
 However, most of the liberal political philosophers argue now for an 
approach that is more inclusive. The debate now mainly focuses on ques-
tions about the extent to which religious discourse and argument should 
be included in political decision making. (cf. Boettcher 2005, 497) It is 
interesting to see how some authors explicitly changed their mind about 
the subject over the years. Michael Perry for instance defended an exclu-
sionist position in Love and Power (1991) and a more moderate exclusion-
ist position in Religion in Politics (1997), but in Under God? (2003) he 
defends a form of inclusionism. Also Jürgen Habermas changed from a 
resolutely secular perspective (1962) to a post-secular perspective with a 
broad-minded acknowledgement of religion’s special niche in the spec-
trum of public political debate (2006). Even Richard Rorty, one of the 
most famous exclusionist liberals, gives a restatement of his ‘hasty and 
insufficiently thoughtful’ ideas that he wrote in his article with the well-
known title ‘Religion as Conversation-stopper’. In that article Rorty (1999, 
169) wrote approvingly of ‘privatizing religion – keeping it out of [...] the 
public square’, making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussion 
of public policy. But in his ‘reconsideration’ he doubts if good citizen-
ship requires us to have non-religious bases for our political view and he 
acknowledges that it is false that religion is ‘essentially’ a conversation-
stopper. Rorty’s view can now be summarized as: ‘What should be dis-
couraged is mere appeal to authority. [...] Citizens of democracy should 
try to put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible’ (Rorty 
2003, 147-8; see also Stout 2004).
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 John Rawls also modified his position considerably. Unlike some of his 
critics suggest (cf. Quinn 1997; 2001), exclusionism was never defended in 
print by Rawls, but he acknowledges that at first he inclined to the more 
restrictive exclusive view (Rawls 1993, 247 n. 36). In the first edition of 
Political Liberalism, Rawls defends the idea of public reason based on rea-
sons that can be agreed to by all reasonable people, irrespective of which 
comprehensive (religious or secular) doctrine they affirm. The ideal of 
citizenship imposes a moral ‘duty of civility’ to be able to explain to one 
another how their political choices and actions can be supported by the 
political values of public reason (Rawls 1993, 217). But Rawls makes a dif-
ference between the well-ordered society wherein the public reason must 
follow the exclusive view, and the nearly well-ordered societies and not 
well-ordered societies wherein the ideal of public reason allows the inclu-
sive view. So in certain (unjust) situations it may be justified for citizens 
to appeal to comprehensive (religious) reasons ‘provided they do this in 
ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason itself ’ (Rawls 1993, 247ff ). 
Later Rawls revises his position. In the introduction of the paperback edi-
tion of Political Liberalism (1996) and in his article, ‘The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited’ (2001), he more clearly stresses that the ideal of pub-
lic reason should be applied only in the discourse of judges, government 
officials, and politicians when discussing constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice. The idea of public reason does not apply to the 
background culture (Habermas’s public sphere, 1962) like civil society and 
media. (Rawls 2001, 134; 1996, I-Ii) Moreover, Rawls (2001, 152ff; 1996, Iii) 
introduces the ‘wide view of public political culture’. Now comprehensive 
doctrines ‘may be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that 
in due course public reasons [...] are presented sufficient to support what-
ever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support’. Rawls refers 
to this as the proviso. So religious discourse is only allowed as supplemen-
tary in public reason. The wide view of public reason is still a type of ‘weak 
inclusionism’ because it does suggest that on some occasions restraints on 
the appeal to religious and other comprehensive doctrines are warranted. 
(Boettcher 2005, 500) In fact the wide view of public reason cannot allow 
public justifications that rely solely on religious justification and cannot 
be translated in public political reasons.
 The latter is defended by the so-called strong inclusionists like Chris-
topher Eberle, Jeffrey Stout, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Paul Weithman, John 
Neuhaus, and Veit Bader. They argue that citizens are morally permit-
ted to offer exclusively religious arguments in public debate. One of the 
most powerful statements of strong inclusionism is presented in Eberle’s 
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Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics. He criticizes the authors who 
defend what he calls ‘justificatory liberalism’ (from Rawls and Gutmann 
to Ackerman and Audi) for their failure to present an adequate account 
of why religious believers should avoid relying solely on their religious 
convictions in their political choices and activities.
 Also the defenders of deliberative democracy tend to be more inclu-
sive than their colleagues who defend the standard liberal democracy. 
Since the early 1990s the so-called ‘deliberative turn’ has preoccupied the 
debates concerning democratic theory. Authors such as Jürgen Haber-
mas, Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, and Joshua Cohen had emphasized 
that democracy is much more than the aggregation of preferences into 
collective decisions through devices such as voting and representation. 
‘Under deliberative democracy, the essence of democratic legitimacy 
should be sought instead in the ability of all individuals subject to a col-
lective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision. 
These individuals should accept the decision only if it could be justified 
to them in convincing terms’ (Dryzek 2000, v). Moreover, deliberative 
democratic theory works with another view on the ‘moral self ’ that par-
ticipates in public deliberations than other liberals. Rawls, for instance, 
does not view democratic citizens as ‘socially situated or otherwise root-
ed, that is, as being in this or that social class, or as having this or that 
comprehensive doctrine’ (cf. Rawls 2001, 171). In deliberative democratic 
theory citizens are not the Kantian, free-floating, abstract, generalized, 
equal, and reasonable subjects but concrete and unique individuals ‘with 
a certain life history, disposition and endowment’, and therefore ‘there 
can be no coherent reversibility of perspectives and positions unless the 
identity of the other as distinct from the self, not merely in the sense of 
bodily otherness but as a concrete other, is retained’ (Benhabib 1992, 
10; 158ff ). It is not surprising that deliberative democratic theorists re-
ject the path of conversational restraint and argue for a more open, un-
restricted deliberation. Shared political values (part of the overlapping 
consensus of comprehensive doctrines) are important, but the input in 
public and political deliberation cannot be restricted to those values. 
Contradicting Ackerman, Benhabib writes that citizens must feel free 
to introduce ‘any and all moral arguments into the conversation field’. A 
deliberative model of democracy is therefore much more interested in 
‘background cultural conditions’ and the contribution to public reason 
of comprehensive doctrines, because ‘politics and political reasoning are 
always seen to emerge out of a cultural and social context’ (cf. Benhabib 
1992, 95; 1996, 74-77).
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 In sum, in the debate about the ‘neutrality of public reason’ there are 
many liberal perspectives and (sometimes changing) positions and the 
discussion is still going on. In our overview of the liberal landscape, we 
made a distinction between exclusionists and (strong and weak) inclu-
sionists. Unfortunately, there is no standard terminology in the literature 
and it is not always clear for each author to which category he or she be-
longs. Some call Audi an exclusionist, while others (even Audi himself, cf. 
Audi 2000, 69-78) would like to be a weak inclusionist. Especially about 
the (changed) position of Rawls there was, and is, a lot of discussion (cf. 
Weithman 1994; 1997; 2002, ch. 7; Thiemann 1996; Habermas 1995).
 However, we think that the distinction can be seen as follows: weak 
inclusionism not only acknowledges that religious arguments, motivation 
and justification are relevant for the person who defends a certain posi-
tion (this personal relevance will not be denied by many exclusionists), 
the weak inclusionists are also convinced that (in some circumstances) 
religious arguments and reasons are relevant to the public and political 
deliberation itself. While weak inclusionists (in some circumstances) see 
the instrumental value of world views and comprehensive (religious) doc-
trines, strong inclusionists argue that citizens should not be discouraged 
from basing their political decisions and arguments solely on religious 
grounds because it is impossible and in essence undesirable that public 
reason makes no place for the contribution of comprehensive doctrines.
 Arguments For and Against Strong Inclusionism
In the literature many arguments are given to reject (strong) inclusionism. 
Most of the arguments are focused on the exclusion of religious argu-
ments: they would be conservative, unreasonable and uncritical, religious 
arguments would undermine the political stability of diversified societies, 
religious arguments would function as a conversation-stopper and would 
undermine the possibility of consensus. Religious arguments would be 
unintelligible for people who do not share that religion and as such the 
use of religious arguments would be a lack of respect for other partici-
pants in the public dialogue. Moreover nobody wishes that fundamental-
ism dominated public decision making. An extensive and detailed critical 
review of all these arguments is beyond the scope of this chapter, we only 
make some general remarks.
 Religious arguments are not always uncritical and unreasonable. The 
religious life of people is much more than obedience to divine authori-
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ties. Let it suffice to mention the important Thomistic tradition that gives 
place to reason (lumen naturalis rationis) and individual conscience in 
Christian moral philosophy. This tradition wherein morality is accessible, 
at least in principle, to human reason, is until today an important part 
of the official Catholic doctrine. (cf. Riordan 2004, 191; Perry 2003, 67; 
Vatican I’s Dei Filius (1870)) Here it is important to make a distinction be-
tween a political position that is inspired by religious commitments, be-
liefs, and ideas, and religious arguments for that position. People can take 
a position against abortion, torture, or capitalism because of their reli-
gious beliefs, but at the same time they can try to give us rational (secular 
or political) arguments to defend that position. (Gascoigne 2001, 188-211; 
Rawls 2001, 152ff.) Most people do not have problems with the idea that 
religious beliefs have an influence upon political positions as long as the 
justification can be given in neutral terms, independent of the religious 
beliefs itself. As such we must be aware that some religious positions are 
disavowed not because they are religious but because they are (sometimes 
indeed in a reactionary way) conservative. But there are many religious 
positions that are ‘very human’ and not conservative. (cf. Weithman 2002, 
5, ch.2) We can think about the role of religious arguments in the Civil 
Rights Movement (Martin Luther King) and abolitionism, but also about 
the religious position toward irregular migrants, capitalism and ecolo-
gy. With these ‘politically correct positions’, the religious contribution is 
much less controversial. (cf. Rawls 1993, 249-50) Sometimes church lead-
ers are even praised when they take a stand that pleases political leaders, 
but in many other issues they are (hypocritically) rebuked. (cf. De Dijn 
2003, 293)
 What to do now with religious arguments? First it must be clear that 
not all religious arguments are conversation-stoppers, and not all reli-
gious arguments are used in a fundamentalist way. In many cases, the 
religious voice can be seen as a contribution to the ongoing conversation 
about moral, political issues. Moreover, nobody will disagree that there 
are also some secular arguments that can be used in an authoritative way. 
The secular use of Marx, Darwin, or the idea of absolute property rights 
can also put a brake on conversation. So why should we say that religion 
has to shape up without also saying that Marxism, Darwinism, and liber-
tarianism has to shape up and ought to be privatized? ‘Why isn’t sauce for 
the goose, sauce for the gander?’ (cf. Wolterstorff 2003, 136-7; Rorty 2003) 
Although religious contributions to the public discussion were, and are, 
sometimes dogmatic, there is no reason to believe that religious contribu-
tions are never deliberative. As Michael Perry (2003, 42) mentioned: ‘at 
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its best, religious discourse in public culture is not less dialogic – not less 
open-minded, not less deliberative – than is, at its best, secular discourse 
in public culture. (Nor, at its worst, is religious discourse more monologic 
– more closed-minded and dogmatic – than is, at its worst, secular dis-
course.)’
 It can be true that it is easier to reach consensus when all people argue 
in neutral, political terms, independent of any comprehensive world view, 
but this is not a sufficient argument to keep different religious arguments 
out of political debate. First, reasonable deliberation cannot guarantee 
consensus, and our democratic political system is important because it 
gives us the best option so far to cope in a peaceful and civil way with 
these unavoidable moral and political disagreements (cf. Gutman and 
Thompson 1996, 26). Pluralism and (political and moral) disagreement 
are the very essence of our democracy’s right to exist. With Wolterstorff 
we can ask: ‘What’s so bad about reaching an impasse in political discus-
sions?’ We can try to seek deliberative consensus, but democracy allows 
more than that. We can try to make some political deals or take a vote. As 
long as those who lose the democratic game think it’s better to lose than 
to destroy the system, democracy survives. (cf. Wolterstorff 2003, 135-7)
 Moreover, within one religious doctrine, there is often a degree of mor-
al disagreement and some Christians may be more in agreement with a 
non-believer on a certain moral issue than they are with another believer 
(Kole 2002, 254). Religious plurality is, therefore, not the only cause of 
contemporary moral plurality, and the other way round, the use of dif-
ferent religious arguments does not necessarily prevent moral consensus 
with an atheist. People can argue from within their different comprehen-
sive views and draw on the different religious, philosophical, and moral 
grounds those provide, but still an ‘overlapping consensus’ is possible. 
Maybe the justification for human rights or a conception of justice is in-
commensurable, but not the political position about human rights and 
justice itself (cf. Wong 1989; Taylor 1999; Rawls 2001, 147-8; Bader 1999, 
617; Gascoigne 2001, 199).
 Some authors suggest the idea that religious pluralism in the public 
debate could undermine the political stability. They then refer to the cru-
sades, the Thirty Years War, the Bosnian or Palestinian conflict and terror-
ism. It is true that in some (historical) circumstances the intrusion of reli-
gion into the political sphere can be very inflammatory and can continue 
deep and problematic divisiveness, but this provides us – in contemporary 
Western Europe and the US – with no reason to exclude religion from the 
public and political debate (Eberle 2002, 158ff ). Nowadays western people 
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who use a religious argument are not necessarily dangerous people who 
want to eliminate the other. And of course secular (antidemocratic, illib-
eral) opinions and discussions can also undermine political stability and 
generate problematic division (cf. Chaplin 2000, 628, 641; Wolterstorff 
1997b, 80; Perry 1997, 45; 2003, 40, 48-51). So the point is that democracy 
cannot allow antidemocratic commitments that lead to political chaos, 
war and destruction – therefore, laws against racism and hate speech can 
be justified – but this is not a sufficient argument to privatize religion in 
all circumstances.
 One of the most important arguments in the debate about the place of 
religious arguments in the public sphere is the idea that people have to ar-
gue with each other in reasonable and neutral terms out of respect for oth-
ers as free and dignified individuals. Respect for other people with other 
world views requires the use of arguments that everybody can share, un-
derstand and endorse (cf. Larmore 1987). With Gutmann and Thompson, 
Rawls defends ‘the principle of reciprocity’: it is reasonable to think that 
other citizens with other comprehensive ideas about the good life might 
also reasonably accept the reasons we offer for our political actions and 
choices (Rawls 2001, 136-7; Gutmann & Thompson 1996, chs. 1-2). How-
ever, the standard approach that respect needs a kind of ‘neutral dialogue’ 
is not unproblematic. Of course the norm of equal respect is essential for 
liberalism and indeed to treat an individual as a person is to offer him an 
explanation for our political and moral opinions, but it is not clear that 
this explanation has to be neutral. Galston (1991, 108-9) remarks that a 
respectful explanation does not necessarily appeal to beliefs already held 
by one’s interlocutors. He suggests to show respect for others by offering 
them, by way of explanation, what we take to be our best reasons for act-
ing and thinking as we do. Also Eberle and Weithman argue at length that 
an attitude of respect for one’s fellow citizens as equal and free individuals 
does not require ‘the exercise of restraint’. The use of religious convictions 
in political decision making does not necessarily exclude mutual respect 
in a democratic liberal framework (cf. Eberle 2002, 71, ch. 4&5; Weithman 
1997; 2002).
 Moreover, it seems not at all true that people with different world views 
cannot understand each other when they argue in terms specific for their 
world view. Socialists and libertarians use a radically opposite conception 
of freedom, but they can reasonably discuss with each other the themes 
wherein freedom is involved. The same is true for religious perspectives. 
It is not true that there is nothing to be done for secular atheists with what 
Christians or Jewish persons argue from their specific religious perspec-
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tive. (cf. Habermas 2006; Chambers 2007) So why would Christians not 
offer a Christian perspective and atheists their secular perspective of, 
for instance, human life and ecology? As such, allowing people to use 
religious reasons is not a form of disrespect; it is rather a way in which 
one can show respect for another person in his or her particularity. ‘Real 
respect for others takes seriously the distinctive point of view each oth-
er occupies. It is respect for individuality, for difference’ (Stout 2004, 
73; see also Wolterstorff 2003, 135; 1997b, 110ff ). Also Rawls (2001, 154) 
wrote that ‘it is wise, then, for all sides to introduce their comprehensive 
doctrines, whether religious or secular, so as to open a way for them to 
explain to one another how their views do indeed support those basic 
political values.’
 So far, we have just given some negative arguments for strong inclu-
sionism by showing how the arguments for exclusion fail. There are also 
some positive arguments for strong inclusionism in deliberative democ-
racy. Some political issues cannot be discussed in a neutral way. Obvious 
examples are abortion, euthanasia, and the bioethical discussions about 
(human) cloning (cf. Roetz 2006). It is not difficult to show that the dis-
cussion for and against abortion rights cannot be neutral with respect 
to the underlying moral and religious controversy, and therefore must 
engage rather than avoid substantive moral and religious doctrines at 
stake. (Sandel 1996, 21; Hauerwas 1981, 196, 212) The political discourse 
on birth and death, fertilization, embryos and parenthood, but also on 
poverty, distributive and global justice and ecology is not (and cannot be) 
value-free. Political and democratic deliberation would be redundant if 
a neutral scientific discussion resolved all the tensions and antagonisms. 
As such, in some (important) issues it is undoubtedly an asset when the 
voices of different religions and world views are heard in public and po-
litical debate.
 The most powerful argument has to do with the concept of the self that 
is used. Once we agree that citizens who participate in political delibera-
tion are not the abstract, reasonable subjects as traditional liberalism pro-
poses, it becomes clearer why we cannot keep religious arguments out of 
public reason. Religions and world views are constitutive elements for the 
moral identity and it is impossible to make abstraction of these elements 
when people enter the public space. With Sandel (1996, 18) we can ask if 
it is possible that ‘however encumbered we may be in private, however 
claimed by moral or religious conventions, we should bracket our encum-
brances in public and regard ourselves, qua public selves, as independent 
of any particular loyalties or conceptions of the good’. For believers who 
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take their faith to be among the very most significant features of their be-
ing, how can we expect that they act and argue ‘pretending’ that they are 
not a Christian without violating their integrity? (cf. Weithman 1994, 8) 
Benjamin Berger (2002, 47) clarifies: ‘From the perspective of the adher-
ent, religion cannot be left in the home or on the steps of Parliament. The 
religious conscience ascribes to life a divine dimension that infuses all 
aspects of being. The authority of the divine extends to all decisions, ac-
tions, times, and places in the life of the devout.’ Religion is not a ‘hobby’ 
– a private interest with no public policy implications. In other words, 
from the perspective of Christians it may be an ‘existential necessity’ to 
express religious moral beliefs in a public or political discussion (cf. Kole 
2002, 251-3; Carter 1993, 54; Habermas 2006, 9; Wolterstorff 1997b, 105).
 In fact the same is true for secular arguments, because it is a misunder-
standing to think about secular reasons as neutral reasons. I agree with 
Rawls (2001, 143, 148) that secular reason is also ‘reasoning in terms of 
comprehensive nonreligious doctrines’. Secular values, concepts and rea-
soning belong to a particular moral doctrine and are not independent of 
a particular comprehensive world view. As such, secular philosophical 
doctrines do not provide neutral public reasons. Quite often people seem 
to confuse secular and neutral reasons and believe that asking Christians 
to argue in neutral terms is asking them to argue in secular terms. This is 
not fair as it is possible that much of the Christian view will be lost in the 
translation, because much of the Christian view (e.g. about abortion) is 
not translatable in secular terms (cf. Hauerwas 1981, 212; Sandel 1996, 20-
21; Greenawalt 1995, 83-84, 119-120). Moreover, the confusion between 
secular and neutral reasons conceals that in fact atheist humanists argue 
with their comprehensive terms and values while religious people may 
not do so. Again: ‘Why isn’t sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander?’ 
The view often expressed ‘that while religious reasons should not be in-
voked to justify legislation, sound secular arguments may be’ (cf. Rawls’s 
(2001, 148) formulation) is inconsistent and not tenable. Secularism is 
not the overarching neutral framework of public reason itself, but only 
one voice in political life, and it cannot be allowed to be the only one 
(Parekh 1997, 21).
 The whole discussion goes back to the philosophical discussion about 
autonomous morality. The exclusive view presupposes that an autono-
mous freestanding morality – a morality that can be thought and justified 
independently of God, but also independently of any world view – is pos-
sible. Audi (2000, 139-41) is quite explicit on that matter: ‘Liberal democ-
racy, however, is committed, at least in its best-developed forms, to the 
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conceptual and epistemic autonomy of ethics. [...] It is not too much to ask 
of conscientious religious citizens [...] that they abide by the principles 
of secular rationale and secular motivation.’ The idea of an independent 
morality is not only endorsed by atheists, also many theologians (Audi is 
also a Christian) have advocated an autonomous conception of morality 
(cf. Auer 1971; Fuchs 1973).
 However, this autonomous conception of morality is highly problem-
atic because our moral considerations are not fully independent of our 
world view. Once the limits of platitudinous morality are passed, moral 
systems and moral theories, both secular and religious, will reflect what 
Iris Murdoch called ‘a vision of life’ (Murdoch 1956; Mitchell 1980, 97-105, 
146; Brody 1981). What we believe ‘is’ (ontology and metaphysics) has con-
sequences for what we believe to be ‘good and bad’ (ethics). This is true 
for religious believers and non-believers. Moral beliefs are not ‘metaphys-
ically neutral’; they are intertwined in a wide reflective equilibrium with 
particular (scientific, metaphysical and/or religious) background theories 
about human nature and the nature of the world (cf. Gascoigne 2001, 190; 
Daniels 1979, 258-9; Nielsen 1988, 21-2). So, we agree with Mitchell (1980, 
97-8) that it cannot be made ‘a reasonable ground of complaint against a 
religious ethic that it involves metaphysical assumptions, for this is true of 
any system of ethics. It is a mistake to identify secular morality with “mo-
rality” tout court.’ The consequence for public reason is clear: the appeal 
to religious-moral reasons cannot be forbidden for their metaphysical 
presuppositions, because the permitted secular reasons also have (some-
times more implicitly) such presuppositions. When moral questions are 
discussed in the public forum, it is impossible for people not to argue 
from within their own comprehensive views and not to draw on the re-
ligious, philosophical, and moral grounds that those views provide. We 
have to acknowledge that religiously grounded moral beliefs inevitably 
play a role in political deliberation on fundamental matters, so ‘it is im-
portant that such beliefs, no less than secular moral beliefs, be presented 
in public political argument so that they can be tested there’ (Perry 2003, 
39). There are too many issues that cannot be resolved or discussed solely 
on the basis of commonly accepted principles and scientific knowledge, 
because the disagreement goes back to a deep conflict of values. It seems, 
then, that the choice for exclusionism leaves a long list of important po-
litical questions unaddressed (cf. Greenawalt 1988, ch. 6-9; Galston 1991, 
113; Stout 2004, 88-91).
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 Deliberative Democratic Restraints on Public Reason
In the light of the deliberative democratic perspective and our rejection of 
autonomous freestanding morality, strong inclusionism is the best theory 
when thinking about religious arguments in political decision making. 
However, strong inclusionism is not an ‘anything goes’ view. Insofar as 
strong inclusionism goes together with an ideal of democratic delibera-
tion, it must also accept certain requirements and conditions associated 
with a deliberative approach to political decision making (cf. Boettcher 
2005, 512; Habermas 2006). Citizens must incorporate deliberative-de-
mocratic attitudes and practices. One of them is the ‘duty of civility’: (reli-
gious) citizens ought to explain their reasons and present public justifica-
tions for supporting political choices and positions. Citizens can be asked 
to do this, as much as possible, with political or public (instead of moral 
or religious) reasons that can be agreed on by all reasonable persons, ir-
respective of which comprehensive doctrine they affirm (cf. Rawls’s (1993) 
idea of the overlapping consensus). However, citizens are not discouraged 
from basing their political decisions or arguments on a religious rationale 
alone, and in some political discussions it seems impossible to maintain 
‘a wall of separation’ between religiously grounded moral discourse and 
the discourse that takes place in public political argument (Perry 2003, 43; 
Eberle 2002, 10; Bader 1999).
 The democratic attitude means, at the least, that citizens will not sup-
port any policy on the basis of a dehumanizing rationale (such as racism 
or Nazism) that denies the freedom and equal dignity of their compatri-
ots. ‘The important thing, given the priority of democracy, should not 
be whether arguments are religious or secular but whether arguments, 
attitudes, and practices are compatible with the principles, rights, cul-
ture, virtues, and good practices of social, democratic constitutionalism’ 
(Bader 1999, 602; see also Thiemann 1996, 89ff., 173; Wolterstorff 1997a, 
1997b, 1997c). Religious or other comprehensive positions that would like 
to force everybody to live according to that particular doctrine (e.g. the 
position that all women have to dress in a certain covered way) are prob-
lematic, and most of the time not welcome on the democratic forum be-
cause they are moving toward reducing the (religious) freedom of other 
citizens (cf. Audi 2000, 87).
 In short, we can say that the deliberative democratic perspective re-
quires respect for the other, involvement in search of the better argument, 
an engagement in dialogue with the other and the acceptance of democratic 
decisions (especially when you consider the decision to be immoral). One 
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defi ning feature of deliberative democracy is that participants are ready for 
a rational transformation of their beliefs and preferences as a result of the 
refl ection induced by political deliberation (Elster 1998, 1; Dryzek 2000, 31; 
Habermas 1992). An attitude of fallibility and mutual criticism is thus the 
basic requirement for every public and political engagement, also when it is 
based on strong religious commitments. Th e attitude of fallibility and mu-
tual criticism is one of the most discussed conditions in the context of the 
use of religious arguments, because citizens who use their religion in the 
public dialogue are often characterized as people who ‘regard themselves 
as bound to obey a set of overriding and totalizing obligations imposed 
upon them by their Creator’ (cf. Eberle 2002, 183). Very often the critics 
of inclusionism think that all religious citizens are fundamentalists who 
are not open for the ideas of others and not willing to change their minds. 
However, this is not always what happens in reality. Religious people who 
participate as believers can also consider the arguments and criticism of 
other citizens with another mindset, and allow that other participants in 
the democratic deliberation make an evaluation of their reasons. Religious-
ly committed citizens ought to be willing to learn from others and even 
change their commitments if given suffi  cient reason to do so (Eberle 2002, 
102-8; Perry 2003, 39-44; 1988, 183; Waldron 1993, 817, 841-2).
 This deliberative attitude also means that people should not uncriti-
cally rely on religiously grounded moral beliefs and must remain open to 
the criticism of other believers. For example, there is also widespread dis-
agreement among Christians about many politically or morally contested 
subjects, like same-sex unions, the use of condoms, or abortion. Such 
disagreement should be an occasion for Christians to subject traditional 
beliefs to careful, critical scrutiny. This is especially true for the use of the 
Bible. The position that a citizen can use the Bible uncritically in a literal 
way, without any extra-Biblical information and in abstraction of human 
experience is ‘obviously and straightforwardly indefensible’ (Perry 2003, 
55-97; Eberle 2002, 274).
 Conclusion
From a deliberative democratic perspective, strong inclusionism is the 
best theory for thinking about the place of religious (and secular) com-
prehensive doctrines in public reason. Liberalism does not necessarily ex-
clude the use of religiously grounded moral beliefs in public debate. With 
Michael Perry (2003, 44) we can conclude that it is not ‘that religious 
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convictions are brought to bear in public political argument that should 
worry us, but how they are sometimes brought to bear (e.g. dogmatically). 
But we should be no less worried about how fundamental secular convic-
tions are sometimes brought to bear in public political debate.’ It must 
be clear that strong inclusionism is not the same as the laissez-faire op-
tion. There are still the deliberative-democratic requirements, but these 
requirements are equally valid for religious as well as for secular partici-
pants in the political dialogue.
All of them have to learn how to resolve the fundamentalist dilemma 
– namely, that in democratic deliberation and decision making, their 
‘truths’ are no more than opinions among others. Instead of trying to 
limit the content of public reason by keeping all contested comprehen-
sive doctrines and truth-claims out, one has to develop the duties of 
civility, such as the duty to explain positions in publicly understand-
able language, the willingness to listen to others, fair-mindedness, and 
readiness to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in one’s 
own view. (Bader 1999, 614; see also Wolterstorff  1997c, 145-7)
Political decisions should be neutral in their formulation of a proposition, 
but this does not exclude that there is some room for pluralism in the de-
bate that precedes those decisions. From a democratic point of view there 
is no objection to religious political inputs, on the condition that citizens 
adopt a democratic attitude with regard to their own (comprehensive) 
views. Nobody can be excluded in virtue of the fact that he or she uses 
comprehensive doctrines to argue for his political choice. Only people 
who refuse dialogue and have no respect for other positions are a priori 
excluded from democratic decision making and put themselves outside 
the political community.
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13 The Knowledge Defi cit and Beyond:
 Sources of Controversy in Public Debates
 Olga Crapels1
According to many biotechnological scientists, controversies over agri-
cultural biotechnology (or any kind of biotechnology for that matter) are 
characterised by a knowledge gap between the lay public and the expert 
scientists (e.g. Yankelovich 1991; Irwin & Wynne 1996; Hornig Priest 2001). 
It is often claimed that the difference between adversaries and advocates 
is overlapping the distinction between public and experts. Hence, in bio-
technology science communication research, the public/expert gap has 
often been said to be an important, if not the most important cause for 
biotechnology controversies. According to these scientists, what ought to 
be done to solve this controversy is to minimize this gap. They claim that 
the public’s lack of information or a lack of understanding is the dominant 
reason for this gap. The gap can be minimized by educating the public 
into becoming semi-experts.
 The central question of this essay is whether it really makes sense to lo-
cate this lack of information or knowledge as the central source of the bio-
technology controversy. Can it not be the case that the difference between 
the public’s and the scientists’ perspective on biotechnology is caused by 
wholly different kind of problem? This article evaluates the claim that the 
public’s lack of information or understanding is the main cause for the 
biotechnology controversy. Although it appears defensible to claim that 
there really is a lack of information and understanding among the public, 
I want to suggest that there are alternative and more plausible sources of 
controversy. Perhaps we should direct our attention away from the field of 
the public understanding of science by focusing on the scientists’ under-
standing of the public.
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 Knowledge Defi cit
Most scientific risk communication is still grounded in a knowledge deficit 
approach. This means that risk communicators think that many people 
don’t have enough information about science and risks or that they don’t 
understand this information. This is also referred to as the problem of sci-
ence illiteracy. Risk communicators assume that this is the main reason 
why most people are reluctant to accept, for example, agricultural bio-
technology. To them, this knowledge deficit is what characterizes the gap 
between experts and the lay public.
 Although being a lay person does not automatically imply that you are 
not able to answer simple questions about science or biotechnology in 
particular, much empirical scientific research concludes that many people 
are in fact not able to do so. Important examples of such research are 
the EuroBarometer surveys (e.g. Gaskell et al. 2003), which always re-
ceive a fair amount of media and policy attention. Since the 1990s, these 
surveys have also been carried out to study how Europeans think about 
biotechnology. One of the striking and often-mentioned findings of the 
1996 survey is that 25 to 35 per cent (and these numbers only increased in 
the 2005 survey) of the Europeans answer ‘true’ to statements such as the 
following:
–  Ordinary tomatoes don’t have genes, but genetically modifi ed ones do.
–  By eating a modifi ed fruit, a person’s genes could also become modifi ed.
–  Genetically modified animals are always bigger than ordinary ones.
None of these statements are correct. This seems to indicate a lack of 
information on biotechnology or a lack of accurately understanding this 
information among the public. As a result, these survey results are of-
ten taken as an important quantitative source for biotechnological risk-
perception research. The aim of such research is to study why the public 
usually has such a different perception of biotechnological risk than ex-
perts do, and particularly, why they are so negative about biotechnology. 
A crucial point is that this research is often implicitly carried out in order 
to reduce this negativism to a minimum, to avoid controversy and to in-
crease the level of acceptance of biotechnology.
 Controversies are often characterized by uncertainties: cognitive uncer-
tainties (due to a lack of information of lack of knowledge), socio-economic 
uncertainties, and moral uncertainties (due to a lack of commonly shared 
normative evaluatory guidelines) (cf. Hansen 2005, 10). Following survey 
results like those from the EuroBarometer, researchers studying risk per-
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ception (scientists or science-oriented scholars) argue that cognitive un-
certainties must be the main reason behind people’s negative attitude.
 The EuroBarometer survey questioned Europeans about biotechnolog-
ical controversies. It found out that most Europeans, in contrast to what 
the media state, are not very negative or technophobic about biotechnol-
ogy. But they aren’t very optimistic either. More specific findings show 
that most people are rather supportive of medical applications of bio-
technology, while at the same time being much less supportive regarding 
agricultural use of biotechnology. This seems to correlate with people’s 
uncertainty, measured in the same surveys, concerning the level of risk 
and benefits people think are linked to the application.
 Because people are uncertain about the level of risk in the case of ag-
ricultural biotechnology, and because there is a controversy about GMOs 
(genetically modified organisms), the link is quickly made: it could be said 
that the public’s uncertainty, according to some scientists only caused by 
blatant ignorance or stupidity, is the primary cause for this controversy. 
Science communicators see this risk perception research analysis as an 
important basis for their vision on science communication: science com-
munication must aim at informing people about science and help them to 
understand this information better. The implicit assumption here is that 
knowledgeable, better informed people are more inclined to evaluate sci-
ence positively. A positive evaluation of science means less opposition, a 
broader consensus, and thus less controversy. This is desirable in order 
to boost the public acceptance of science and to make further scientific 
development and progress easier.
 However, while the results of EuroBarometer surveys show that there 
seems to be some relation between being negative or uncertain about bio-
technology and knowing little about it, the EuroBarometer researchers do 
not conclude that a lack of knowledge tells the whole story. People can 
also object and feel uncertain about the introduction or development of a 
technology for other reasons, like moral or socio-economic ones. Factors 
such as trust, moral values, and religious beliefs play a very important role 
here. Th us, it is not only cognitive uncertainty that causes people’s negative 
attitude. Informing people about the technical facts, so that they will not 
consider false statements to be true anymore, does, therefore, not auto-
matically imply that they are more willing to accept the technology. Why 
then do risk perception researchers and science communicators still hold 
on to the belief that cognitive uncertainties are the ultimate cause of peo-
ple’s negative attitude and the source of the biotechnology controversy?
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 Science and Myths
Since the 1990s, many philosophers, sociologists, and others (e.g. Slovic 
2000; Irwin & Wynne 1996) have looked closer into the issue of science 
communication, risk perception and public controversy. They also stud-
ied the knowledge deficit approach. Their conclusion has been that the 
public is not irrational, ignorant, or stupid. What is described by scien-
tists as a lack of knowledge or information is in fact most of the time 
something completely different and, therefore, cannot be the main reason 
for a controversy or for the public to be negative about biotechnology. 
Marris et al. (2001) studied these findings and used the results of these 
studies to strengthen their own conclusion that scientists actually believe 
in ‘myths’.
 Marris and her co-authors have analysed literature and interviewed lay 
people about their ideas of biotechnology, as well as interviewing ‘stake-
holders’:2 ‘those within governmental, regulatory, scientific (research and 
expertise) institutions, and commercial organizations (mostly biotech-
nology firms, less so food producers and food distributors)’ (ibid. 2001, 
75), and conclude that there are at least ten myths that these ‘scientists’ 
often believe in. For example:
Myth :  Th e primordial cause of the problem is that lay people are ig-
norant about scientifi c facts.
Myth :  People are either ‘for’ or ‘against’ GMOs.
Myth :  Consumers accept medical GMOs but refuse GMOs used in 
food and agriculture.
Myth :  Consumers want labelling in order to exercise their freedom 
of choice.
Myth :  Th e public thinks – wrongly – that GMOs are unnatural.
Myth :  Th e public demands ‘zero risk’ – and this is not reasonable.
Why are they called ‘myths’? Humans have always created myths, in or-
der to control, to give coherence and a sense of meaning to our experi-
ences. Myths can inspire and guide us in our daily lives by helping us to 
deal with problems, fears or challenges. Like many other stories, myths 
make it possible for us to keep on living in a world that most of the times, 
seems uncontrollable and mysterious to us. But while myths can help us, 
they can also blind us by letting us believe in things that have no basis 
in reality. Marris et al. call scientist’s perceptions ‘myths’ to stress the 
fact that these statements are not supported by empirical evidence, and 
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in order to ‘convey the fact that among certain circles of actors they are 
assumed to be obvious and do not need to be supported by empirical evi-
dence. Thus they circulate, largely unchallenged, accompanied by a se-
ries of repeated anecdotes, which are accepted as confirmation of these 
views’ (ibid. 2001, 75; italics added). One of these ‘anecdotes’ is that, 
historically speaking, the public has never been enthusiastic about new 
technologies (for example cars, planes, or vaccines) being introduced 
into their daily life, but once they found out the benefits of these tech-
nologies they were keen to accept them. In scientific circles, the main 
idea behind this ‘anecdote’ is that things will happen in the same way in 
the case of GMOs: lay people have groundless and even irrational opin-
ions, but over time these will evaporate. Even so, what this ‘anecdote’ and 
other ‘anecdotes’ fail to recognize is that the technologies in question 
were modified, through regulatory and technological evolutions, before 
becoming accepted (e.g. extensive regulations concerning the driving and 
manufacture of motor vehicles). Moreover, they fail to acknowledge that 
many of the original risk concerns raised by the lay public have indeed 
been realized (e.g. pedestrian deaths from car driving, plane accidents, 
the Chernobyl accident, negative health impacts linked to vaccinations, 
and so on), and that some more or less unanticipated negative impacts 
have also occurred (e.g. harmful environmental impacts of motor ve-
hicles) (ibid. 2001, 77).
 The acceptance of new technologies thus may have followed the in-
creasing familiarity with these technologies, but not without the modifi-
cations made that took into account some very real concerns people had. 
In the end, then, what these ‘anecdotes’ accomplish is a widening of a gap 
between what scientists consider to be real objective risks and rational 
opinions and what the public thinks.
 This difference between what scientists claim as objective risks and 
what lay people perceive as risks (and what is later often acknowledged 
as real risk), and why this difference exists, has been extensively studied. 
One approach, of which Brian Wynne is a prominent proponent, con-
cerns the quality of knowledge on which risk management and politics 
is built on, with an important theme being the apparent ‘scientification 
of knowledge’. On the one hand, according to Wynne, policy makers and 
risk researchers put too much faith in scientific knowledge, even to the 
extent that it denies or excludes uncertainties inherent in all knowledge 
production and excludes other forms of knowledge. On the other hand, 
they are predisposed to misunderstand the concerns of the public which 
underlie a number of technological controversies. Wynne (1996) illus-
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trates this by the case of the Cumbrian sheep farmers in the wake of the 
Chernobyl disaster. These farmers experienced radioactive fallout from 
this accident, which contaminated their flocks and upland pastures. The 
government restricted them from selling their sheep freely, although this 
was their primary form of income. Furthermore, scientists visited the 
farmers to inform them about the influence of radioactivity and to test 
whether it decreased to an acceptable level. These tests were a reason 
to extend the period in which sheep could not be sold. The relation be-
tween the scientists and the farmers did not develop very well, because 
the scientists had no ear for what the farmers said about, for instance, 
where their flocks grazed, so that the scientists could study that part of 
the land instead of a part that was never grazed upon. Thus, ‘the farmers 
experienced the scientists as denying, and thus threatening, their social 
identity by ignoring the farmers’ specialist knowledge and farming prac-
tices, including their adaptive decision making idiom’ (ibid. 1996, 39). 
According to Wynne’s analysis, the scientists failed to be credible in the 
eyes of the sheep farmers. From numerous interviews with the farmers 
concerned, he derives that there are several criteria that lay people have 
to judge to assess whether an authority is credible (cf. 1996, 38). For ex-
ample: does the scientific knowledge work, are predictions accurate? Do 
scientists pay attention to other available knowledge; for example, when 
doing tests do they follow farmer’s knowledge on sheep grazing instead 
of testing on a pasture where they never graze? Are scientists open to 
criticism? What are the institutional and social affiliations of scientists; 
are they trustworthy or is there a conspiracy with the government? In 
analysing the controversy between the sheep-farmers and the scientists, 
it becomes clear that it is not primarily a lack of technical information 
or a lack of knowledge that underpins the farmers’ negativity about the 
scientists and scientific knowledge. This could pinpoint an alternative 
vision on what the most important source of biotechnological controver-
sies is. Wynne’s analysis suggests among other things that it is ‘trust’ and 
‘credibility’ that are the key dimensions of the public’s understanding and 
perception of risks. Perhaps the public’s experience of not being taken 
seriously and their lack of trust and credibility in scientists and scientific 
institutions are better predictors for scientific controversy than a knowl-
edge deficit.
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 Professional Responsibility
Although the knowledge deficit approach is still ‘endemic’ (cf. Hansen et 
al. 2003, 111) in some scientific circles, trust and credibility are nowadays 
also acknowledged by risk perception researchers as important factors in 
technological controversy. Even so, it remains unclear what they under-
stand by ‘trust’, ‘apart from the absence of controversy’ (Hansen 2005, 72). 
In Marris et al. (2001, 87 ff.) the interviewed scientists were asked why 
they think the public does not trust them. Their answers suggested that it 
is actually the public itself that was to be distrusted, and there are several 
reasons for this, for example:
–  the public’s lack of adequate information;
–  the public’s failure to acknowledge their past errors in risk perception 
and to learn from past mistakes;
–  the public’s lack of sanctions for those responsible for mismanagement 
or fraud;
–  the public’s denial of inherent uncertainties, especially long-term or 
chronic impacts;
–  the public’s reliance on limited types of expertise.
In reading these reasons it becomes clear that ‘scientists’ mainly have no 
trust in the public or its abilities. In the few cases in which they think 
themselves involved they claim that better communication (to increase 
public understanding) could prevent a lack of trust (for a typical example 
of this type of reasoning see Marchant 2001). It may not come as a sur-
prise, therefore, that Marris et al. firmly conclude that the knowledge-
deficit approach still exists.
 However, not all scientists blame the public, at least not directly. 
Some scientists acknowledge that it is not only information that is mis-
understood or distrusted, but also institutions or people (e.g. the third 
bullet above). Sometimes they look in the mirror: among scientists it is 
pretty often thought that ‘scientific excellence’ is the manner in which 
a ‘crisis of trust’ and credibility can be dissolved. An excellent scientist 
is a credible scientist. Although not admissible as empirical evidence, 
this became really clear to me in a recent discussion with a friend who 
holds a Ph.D. in theoretical physics: he could not believe that the public 
could distrust an excellent scientist – what more can such a person do 
to be trustworthy than being very good at his job? Psychological and so-
cial scientific research studies suggest alternatives. In their 2003 article, 
Hansen et al. review some of these studies. One of the conclusions they 
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derive from these studies is that the public makes a distinction between 
expertise or excellence, and trustworthiness. Although excellence might 
be something that can be objectively established, this is not the case 
with trustworthiness. People can perceive a scientist to be an excellent 
researcher, but at the same time not consider her to be a trustworthy 
person.
 Annoying as that may be for hard working scientists, expertise is in the 
eyes of the public worth nothing without trustworthiness. And without 
trustworthiness there is no trust in science. Universities are acknowledg-
ing this by making it clear that researchers (scientists and scholars alike) 
and teachers at universities have a professional responsibility to do their 
work in such ways that it can be qualified as trustworthy. In its Code of 
Conduct for Scientific Practice (2004) the Association of Universities in 
the Netherlands (in Dutch: VSNU) provides a set of norms for teachers 
and researchers at universities that go beyond mere expertise; for example 
scrupulousness (being thorough and honest), reliability (being trustwor-
thy), verifiability (that something can be checked and that results can be 
replicated), impartiality (not being led by personal or other interests), and 
independence (operating in academic liberty). These kinds of observa-
tions and codes can also be found in the business world. It is thus pos-
sible to draw a parallel between discussions on trust in science and trust 
in business organizations. In the business world the question of how to 
attain trust from the public is also a prominent topic. Public trust is nec-
essary for the survival of companies. Without it, it would be impossible 
to develop and sell products. The public gives business its ‘license to op-
erate’. Businesses recognize that trust is not something one-dimensional; 
if it’s not based solely on expertise, there must be other reasons that give 
the public reason to trust you. Koehn (1994, 11) confirms this: ‘We do not 
base our decision to trust professionals upon cleverness or skilfulness. 
Since a given skill may be perfectly compatible with harmful service, our 
judgments of professionalism ultimately look beyond skill to some trust-
engendering feature of professional practice.’ Apparently then, there seem 
to be other forms of trust necessary than just professionals’ expertise. 
However, the question remains as to what this ‘trust-engendering feature’ 
that Koehn refers to actually is.
 In some literature (e.g. Nooteboom 2002; Hansen 2005) several forms 
of trust are distinguished, for example: trust in persons; trust in social 
roles or competences (doctors, judges, policemen); trust in procedures 
(that is not directly vested in actors; e.g. in the fairness and indepen-
dence of courts); trust in materials (e.g. trust that machines will not fail). 
THE KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT AND BEYOND
What all these different forms of trust illustrate is that to overcome the 
public’s distrust it is not enough for science communication researchers 
to provide information or to stress the credible source of their informa-
tion, no matter how sound the scientific evidence or the scientist behind 
that source is. Scientists and scientific institutions are ever more almost 
‘pushed’ in addressing the public’s concerns and in showing that they take 
their professional responsibilities serious. Business organizations have al-
ready learned this lesson the hard way, something illustrated by the case 
of the dumping of the Brent Spar, a ‘classic example of risk communica-
tion gone wrong’ (cf Löfstedt & Renn 1997).
 In May 1995, Shell and Exxon, two major oil companies, wanted to 
dispose of the oil storage buoy named Brent Spar. Th is decision received 
massive media attention. After this, everything went downhill for Shell. 
Although Shell communicated to the public that, environmentally speak-
ing, dumping of the oil storage in deep water wasn’t that bad, the public, 
especially in Germany, supported Greenpeace by boycotting Shell. Shell 
Germany received over 11,000 letters from lay people protesting against 
the dumping. Many of them complained that Shell was greedy: they had 
the money to dispose of the oil storage in a more responsible way, so why 
didn’t they use it? Were they even thinking of the harm they could infl ict 
on future generations (many people added photographs of their children)? 
Others stressed that, according to them, deep sea dumping was morally 
wrong, because it could hurt nature. Besides the boycott, Shell gas stations 
were threatened with bomb explosions. Shell was standing in the dark and 
had no idea how to counter the public’s responses (cf Löfstedt and Renn 
1997).
 In the Dutch television documentary about the Brent Spar case, ‘Een 
geschenk uit de hemel’ (‘A gift from heaven’; VPRO 2000), Shell officials 
acknowledged in retrospective that, at the time, they had a very weak risk 
communication strategy. What went wrong was that they:
adopted a top-down approach rather than a dialogue approach...In so 
doing, they alienated the public immediately, and came across as arro-
gant and unmovable. Once the amplifi cation process was at full speed, 
time was running out to launch such a dialogue approach. Second, Shell 
was not seen as trustworthy, while Greenpeace was (Löfstedt & Renn 
1997, 134).
Shell learned from these events. In 1998, they published the report ‘Prof-
its & Principles – does there have to be a choice?’ which marked their 
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‘renewed’ commitment to recognize the concerns of the public, and the 
need to listen, engage and respond, to the public. In the introduction to 
the 1999 brochure ‘Listening and Responding’, chairman Moody-Stuart 
states:
We know that we will be judged by our actions, rather than by fi ne 
words...Of course, we don’t expect you to see things just from our point 
of view. We know all real dialogue must be a two-way conversation, and 
so we’ve ended each advertisement with a request to our stakeholders to 
talk to us and let us know what they think (Shell 1999, 1-2).
What business organizations like Shell have learned from the public is 
that they really need a license to operate. The traditional business adagio 
has moved from ‘trust us’ via ‘tell me’ (information) to ‘show me’ (trans-
parency) and ‘involve me’ (dialogue). Trustworthiness can be improved 
by being more socially responsive, by engaging in a real dialogue with the 
public, and by actively showing that you do something with the public’s 
knowledge and concerns. This means that in order to enhance public 
trust in science, time (and money) need to be invested to study what 
 really concerns people and what can be done to take these concerns seri-
ously.
 Taking Matters Seriously
‘Was will das Weib?’ is said to be one of the questions that haunted Sig-
mund Freud until the day he died. Maybe biotech scientists should expe-
rience that same haunted feeling considering the question ‘Was will das 
Publikum?’. Of course, they could still choose not to think about possible 
answers to this question. Nelkin (1989) suggests that in the past, ‘con-
cerns about the effect of risk communication have spawned proposals to 
restrict public access of information’ (1989, 110). ‘From the perspective of 
industry, public discussion of potential risks could lead to the intrusion of 
burdensome regulations, fuel compensation claims, or require the instal-
lation of costly equipment to reduce risks’ (ibid.). However, not informing 
people about what’s happening in biotechnology is not a very realistic 
option. Clearly, there are costs and inconveniences for scientists and in-
dustries linked to the disclosure of information. But these costs and in-
conveniences must be weighed against what Nelkin calls the ‘imperatives 
of open communication’ (1989, 111 ff.):
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–  to engage knowledgeably as informed citizens in political choices, citi-
zens must have access to information about the risks as well as the 
benefits of technology;
–  informed consent must take precedence over efficiency;
–  open communication may force public officials to be accountable to 
their constituents;
–  open communication may help bring critical problems to the policy 
agenda.
So, as specified by Nelkin, ‘there are sound political, ethical and pragmatic 
reasons for improving (...) access to risk information’ (cf. Nelkin 1989, 111). 
However, what does Nelkins’ plea for the imperative of open communica-
tion means concretely? According to many social studies (Hansen 2005; 
Irwin & Wynne 1996), the main thing the public wants is to be included 
in a dialogue with science and policy makers. In the case of the Cum-
brian sheep-farmers, the scientists could have taken the farmers’ practi-
cal knowledge seriously when they were applying their scientific knowl-
edge to these people’s flocks and pastures. In the case of the Brent Spar 
it means that Shell should have considered the public’s ethical concerns 
before deciding on dumping the oil storage buoy.
 Business organizations already learned from experience that the public 
wants to be included in a dialogue; slowly but surely words like ethics, 
integrity, values and responsibility became incorporated in management 
jargon. In the academic world, scholars acknowledge that the established 
sources of knowledge cannot always deliver solutions to problems that are 
satisfactory to all stakeholders involved (including the public). People’s 
concerns have to be considered too. The question remains how this can be 
done sincerely, without letting it look like mere window-dressing (saying 
that you pay attention to the public’s concerns or needs but actually doing 
nothing).
 According to Karssing (2000, 19ff ), some organizations might think 
that they don’t have to take the people’s concerns very seriously. However, 
he claims that there are very good reasons why organizations should do 
so; in the end it will only cost them if they think they can solve problems 
with ‘window dressing’. Karssing distinguishes four motives for organiza-
tions to pay attention to people’s concerns:
–  because it limits their risks;
–  because it is profitable;
–  because it is the right thing to do;
–  because they are forced to by law.
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According to Karssing, these four motives do not exclude each other. Of 
course, organizations can have more than one reason to do something, 
just like individuals can have more than one motive to do something. Al-
though it is never really clear what one’s motives are, because they are 
invisible to other people, Karssing states that it would be very cynical to 
conclude that window-dressing is then always a possibility. Besides that, 
when it comes to business ethics: ‘you can fool all of the people some of 
the time, you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you cannot 
fool all of the people all the time’ (Abraham Lincoln, quoted by Karssing 
2000, 22). Organizations or people (be it business organizations, scien-
tists or scientific institutions) that fool people will have even more prob-
lems to be trusted in the future.
 Conclusion
Most scientists experience the public/expert gap as the dominant rea-
son for the biotechnology controversy on GMOs. According to many of 
them, what causes this gap is the lay public’s lack of being technologically 
informed or the lack of having the knowledge to understand such infor-
mation. In this paper I question whether this really is the primary source 
of the controversy. My conclusion is that it is not. I agree with Marris, et 
al., that there are certain ‘myths’ at the basis of this knowledge deficit ap-
proach. Risk science communicators should take more time to study what 
really lies beneath the controversy. This paper has argued that concepts 
like trust and credibility play a major role at the core of this controversy. It 
has argued that a more self-reflexive attitude on the scientists’ side (hav-
ing an eye for their own mistakes, weaknesses and responsibilities), and 
a more open attitude for the concerns of the public involved, could really 
help. Involving the public in a real dialogue might prove a better way to 
quench the heat of the biotechnology controversy. That this is an impor-
tant subject for further study, becomes obvious when following the me-
dia attention for biotechnology. Not only is biotechnology still a very hot 
topic, controversies over biotechnology are only one example of the ever-
recurring question of how we should think and act in situations when sci-
ence and new technologies are involved.
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 Notes
1 I would like to thank Willem B. Drees and Edgar Karssing for their comments 
on a draft of this article. Research for this contribution was supported by the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, nwo.
2 Because ‘stakeholder’ is also a term that is often used in everyday life to in-
clude the public as well, I will from now on say ‘scientist’ (between quotation 
marks) in cases when I also mean those within governmental, regulatory, and 
scientific institutions, and commercial biotechnology organizations.
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 Introduction
A trip to the diet doc, circa 2013. You prick your fi nger, draw a little 
blood and send it, along with a 100 fee, to a consumer genomics lab 
in California. Th ere, it’s passed through a mass spectrometer, where its 
proteins are analyzed. It is cross-referenced with your DNA profi le. A 
few days later, you get an e-mail message with your recommended diet 
for the next four weeks. It doesn’t look too bad: lots of salmon, spinach, 
selenium supplements, bread with olive oil. Unsure of just how lucky 
you ought to feel, you call up a few friends to see what their diets look 
like...(...) Nobody is eating exactly what you are. Your diet is uniquely 
tailored. (Grierson 2003)
This example is probably quite different from what we are used to as we 
do our daily shopping. What we put in our shopping trolley is often only 
to a marginal extent determined by our health status, let alone by our 
genotype. However, as the result of research in the field of nutrigenomics 
this scenario might become less like science fiction than it may appear 
now. Nutrigenomics is a generic term for a field of research that pro-
vides the opportunities to study the interactions between food, lifestyle, 
and genetic factors. This results in many new food and dietary products. 
Personalized dietary advices can be one of these products. The aim is to 
introduce dietary advices that fit the specific genetically induced risk pro-
file of a person or of a sub-group within a population, while traditionally 
the aim is to develop advices that are beneficial for individuals in general 
(cf. Meijboom et al. 2003).
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 This is a useful example to use for an analysis of trust in new technolo-
gies, since it illustrates that nutrigenomics research does not only result in 
new opportunities of health promotion and preventive medicine, but also 
raises questions of trust. A personalized dietary advice that can reduce 
our individual risk of a certain ailment, for instance colon cancer, does 
not merely presuppose self-discipline, but also trust in numerous other 
agents. Our need to trust experts and (regulatory) institutions grows with 
the introduction of new technologies. On top of this issue of the increased 
need of trust, the combination of two sectors, the food and the health sec-
tors, has as a result that existing routines that provide predictability are 
either unavailable or insufficiently clear, which complicates trust (Meij-
boom 2007).
 This leads to the question of how we have to deal with public trust in 
nutrigenomics products. This question is especially relevant since public 
trust in food products has been subjected to a lot of discussion and aca-
demic attention during the last decade (cf. FAO 2003; Poppe & Kjaernes 
2003). Especially the introduction of technologies such as biotechnology 
have raised various questions of trust.
 Th e dominant (regulatory) approach to this problem aims at establishing 
trust by providing information on risks and increasing the predictability of 
the product. Th is is in line with some theories that claim that establishing 
trust is mainly an issue of risk calculation based on information. However, 
with all the eff orts that have been made at the level of risk analysis and 
communication, we are still faced with a debate on the lack of public trust. 
Th is calls for an explanation and raises the question of how we have to deal 
with public trust when we are confronted with novel food products.
 In this chapter I argue that the problems of trust can better be ad-
dressed as problems of trustworthiness. From this shift of focus, I analyse 
the tension between the improved risk analysis and information services 
and the problematic status of trust. First, I argue that trust is based on 
other considerations than risk calculation. Trusting and making risk cal-
culations are two different, albeit sometimes complementary, mechanisms 
that help us deal with situations of uncertainty. Therefore, better risk as-
sessment and more risk information do not necessarily lead to more trust. 
Second, information that enhances predictability is often proposed as a 
way to establishing public trust. However, enhancing predictability with 
respect to new food products is not an easy task. Moreover, showing that 
an institution is predictable does not necessarily entail that it is trustwor-
thy. I also argue that a focus on trustworthiness illustrates the importance 
of taking the emotional aspect of trust seriously and claim that this calls 
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for the introduction of two normative conditions for trustworthiness. The 
emotional aspect of trust explains why the same information and the same 
acts of the trustee are evaluated differently, depending on whether one 
trusts the other actor or not. The normative conditions illustrate why the 
vulnerable status of the individual should not be seen as an opportunity 
to take advantage of them, and that it is possible to formulate trustful ex-
pectations when we lack predictable actions.
 Trustworthiness as the Key
Trust enables an individual to perform actions, such as buying and con-
suming food, despite the uncertainty and the lack of personal control he 
is confronted with. For instance, when I lack any kind of knowledge re-
garding the possible health effects of a nutrigenomics product, I am still 
able to buy and consume it. I would not buy it because I am indifferent 
to my own health, but because I trust certain agents in science, the food 
sector, or the government to take care of my health. In trusting, one acts 
‘as if ’ certain possible situations will not occur (Lewis & Weigert 1985). 
This acting ‘as if ’ is not an escape into a make-believe world of certainty 
and control. When we adopt an attitude of trust we do not pretend, but we 
actually have a sincere belief that the other agent is trustworthy, that is, 
competent and adequately motivated to act in the expected way.
 Since it is the attitude of the individual who is trusting that is decisive 
here, problems of trust are often addressed as a dilemma of the individual 
agent. Consequently, the problem is framed in terms of a failure of trust 
from the individual. Therefore, increasing trust is considered the most 
effective method to address the problem.
 However, the definition of a decline in trust as a failure of individual 
agents has an incorrect starting point. To address problems of trust in a 
fruitful way, the question should not be ‘How to increase trust?’, but ‘Why 
would an individual agent trust the other agent?’ and ‘Is this agent trust-
worthy?’ To start with, he who wants to be trusted should be trustworthy. 
This shift has a practical reason, since institutional agents cannot change 
individuals so that they will adopt a trustful attitude. However, they can 
show themselves to be trustworthy. The shift in focus is important since 
defining a hesitance to trust in terms of the individual’s problem only un-
derscores and confirms the individual’s vulnerable position.
 The observed problems of trust can be interpreted as an important 
signal of the problems with respect to the trustworthiness of agents. 
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Therefore, the problems should better be addressed as problems of trust-
worthiness (Meijboom et al. 2006; 2008) as opposed to problem of trust. 
Consequently, the aim is not just to build trust in novel food and dietary 
products, but to show oneself to be a trustworthy actor.
 Public Trust as Diff erent from Considerations of Risk
Most definitions of trust have one element in common: the idea that it en-
ables agents to cope with situations of uncertainty and lack of control. The 
context of trust is always one of uncertainty and related to the inability 
to personally control the situation. This element can easily be recognized 
with respect to products of nutrigenomics. As a consumer you cannot 
but rely on experts in food safety, health claims, and dietary advices. We 
simply lack the knowledge and capacity to personally assess these issues. 
Trust, however, enables us to act in spite of this uncertainty and to make 
choices, even when we cannot fully control the situation.
 As a result of this link between uncertainty and trust it is easy to argue 
that trust is a risky matter (Gambetta 1988) and that it is a venture (Luh-
mann 2000 [1968]). This close link between trust and risk leads some 
authors to the conclusion that trust is a bet about future actions of others 
and consequently ‘copes with one type of risk by trading it for another 
type of risk’ ( Sztompka 1999, 32). In relying on others, we run a risk that 
we can never be sure whether the other party will act in the expected 
way. Consequently, the aspect of risk is considered as a central element 
in the understanding of public trust. In its most stringent form, trust is 
considered as just a subclass of those situations involving risk (Coleman 
1990).
 From this perspective, risk calculation is essential in the process of 
maintaining and building trust. When we consider trust in these terms, 
it is mainly a technical matter of calculation. It requires the assessment 
of the risks and benefits of trusting in the light of the aims and goals one 
pursues. This view of trust as a matter of risk calculation can easily be rec-
ognized in European policy measures that aim to build trust in new tech-
nologies that have an impact on the food sector, like biotechnology. The 
emphasis on risk assessment is particularly in line with the idea of trust 
as based upon risk calculation. It has been suggested that the results from 
improved risk analysis directly contribute to the individual’s willingness 
to trust persons and institutions. Moreover, the risk analysis is assumed to 
be especially relevant for new technologies in food, such as nutrigenom-
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ics, that are surrounded by ongoing scientific and public discussions on 
the benefits, unknown societal consequences and long-term effects of the 
product.
 Notwithstanding the relevance of an adequate food safety policy in-
cluding attention to proper risk assessment, trust and risk are concepts 
on different levels. In empirical research evidence has been found that 
decisions to trust are not always thought of as risky gambles (Eckel & Wil-
son 2004). From another disciplinary background, Lagerspetz (1998) has 
drawn similar conclusions. In his philosophical analysis he underscores 
that trust is something fundamentally different from risk taking. He does 
not deny that trusting is important in cases of uncertainty and that en-
trusting certain objects to someone else may be related to risk. Yet he 
emphasizes that trusting is not the same as deliberately taking a risk. He 
states that ‘considerations about risk taking can only motivate risk taking, 
not trusting’ (56).
 Th is confronts us with a dilemma. On the one hand, when a person trusts 
he is in a vulnerable position. Th us, trust appears to be a risky matter. On 
the other hand, Lagerspetz’s view is also plausible. When a person trusts, 
it appears that he does not perceive the situation as risky or as a gamble, 
although he certainly will run a risk. Th is sounds like a contradiction, but 
it is not. Th e problem here is that the authors have a diff erent focus, which 
illustrates the importance of a distinction between fi rst-person and third-
person perspectives. From a third-person perspective, trust is certainly a 
risky matter: A person who trusts takes a risk. In acting as if only one state 
of aff airs were to be expected, one runs a risk and makes trust close to a 
gamble. Nevertheless, from a fi rst-person perspective the picture is quite 
diff erent. As a person who trusts one is not aware of taking this risk. If he 
were, he would be a risk taker and not a person who trusts. Th e person who 
trusts judges the trustee to be competent and properly motivated with re-
gard to what is entrusted. He considers the trustee to be trustworthy. From 
the perspective of the individual who is trusting risks are not the main 
element of trust, only as an observer one may notice that this person runs 
a risk. An example to illustrate this point: in the case of faith, believers 
can sometimes take considerable risks – from a third-person perspec-
tive – without any sense of uncertainty. This is not the result of different 
views on risk management, but it is a result of the believers’ consideration 
of God as ultimately trustworthy. The individual believer may not be able 
to assess the involved risks in relying on God, but that is not the point. 
Because he trusts he is certain about his acts. Only if he were to lack such 
trust, he will consider his way of acting as risky and uncertain.
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 This shift in focus has direct consequences for the idea of trust as the 
act of risk taking. In contrast to a risk taker, a trusting person is not calcu-
lating but coping with complexity. He is not calculating risks, but dealing 
with the uncertainty he is faced with. Trust is not something that you de-
cide on with a personal computer. Hence I conclude that the act of taking 
risks and trusting are two complementary, yet different mechanisms to 
deal and cooperate with other agents in cases of uncertainty. A risk ap-
proach aims to clarify the uncertain aspects of the situation in which one 
has to rely on another agent. In this context a risk-benefit analysis pro-
vides tools to assess this probability and to evaluate the hazard, it helps to 
translate the problem of known uncertainty into one of risk. Consequent-
ly, I can make my personal assessment and decide whether it is worth to 
take the risk involved in relying on another agent or not. A risk-benefit 
analysis does not provide a direct reason to trust, but it can show that the 
risk, given our preferences, is worth it. Then I can choose to take ‘the risk 
of cooperating with you on some matter even if I do not trust you’ (Hardin 
2002, 11).
 A trust approach to uncertainty, on the other hand, has a different focus 
and starts where a risk focus ends. It focuses on those situations that re-
main uncertain even after all possible uncertain aspects have been turned 
into risk factors. The aim is not to try to make a risk-benefit analysis, but 
to personally assess the competence and motivation of the trusted agent. 
When I trust a company that offers novel foods I do not assess risks, but 
I make an assessment of the company’s competence and motivation with 
respect to this new food product. In this process of assessing the compe-
tence and motivation, risk information may contribute to trust only as far 
as it serves as a signal or proof of the competence and motivation of the 
trustee. Suppose that the risk at stake is very low or the risk information 
is of a high quality, if I do not consider the other agent, on whom I have to 
rely, to be competent or to have any goodwill to me, I will not trust him. 
Maybe I consider it worth the risk and act nonetheless, in that case I am a 
risk taker, not a person who is trusting.
 This explains why risk information or improved risk analysis does not 
directly influence the level of trust. It only has direct influence on a mech-
anism that helps us cope with uncertainty that is different from trust. In 
building trust, risk information only plays a secondary role, as far as it 
provides clarity about the trustworthiness of the other agent.
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 Communication to Enhance Predictability
I have concluded in the previous section that risk information is only of 
secondary relevance to trust. However, we should not jump to the con-
clusion that information in general about the trustee is irrelevant. On 
the contrary, information facilitates trust. To assess the competence and 
motivation of a company that offers novel food products an agent needs 
information. However, as improved risk analysis does not directly build or 
maintain trust, more information also turns out not to have a direct influ-
ence on trust. O’Neill shows that the availability of information is often 
not the real problem. She argues that although ‘It seems no information 
about institutions and professions is too boring or too routine to remain 
unpublished’ (2002, 66), we are still confronted with problems of trust. 
We do not need ‘just’ information, but the offered information has to be 
qualified; it should provide the truster with material that enables her to 
clarify what she can expect of the other party.
 This additional criterion has been recognized in public policy on food. 
Consequently, a lot of attention has been paid to explicate routines and 
patterns in the food sector. Transparency has become a key concept. The 
argument that underlies this focus is that the real problem of trust is a 
lack of predictability and a need for structures that enable a truster to 
anticipate. At first hand, this seems a promising approach. Trust needs a 
certain level of predictability. This is what is meant by ‘anticipatory trust’ 
or ‘predictive trust’ (Sztompka 1999, 27-29; Hollis 1998, 10-11). In this type 
of trust one has the expectation that the other party will act according 
to normal patterns and routines. If patterns and routines are available, 
it is easier to predict how the trustee will react. Making a situation more 
predictable by providing information or by increasing transparency is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition in the aim to build public trust 
in new food technologies. I have two arguments that lead me to make this 
claim.
 First, in the case of new food technologies or products that result from 
these innovations, trust based upon predictable patterns is complicated 
by (a) the lack of predictable patterns and (b) the capacity by which the 
available patterns are applicable. To start with (a): it is by definition that 
food technologies confront us with situations in which it is not easy to 
predict what we can expect. Concerning novel technologies, we often lack 
the predictability and familiarity that can serve as a first basis for trust; 
this is partly because we are confronted with new benefits, unknown car-
ry-over and long-term effects of novel technologies, and partly because 
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we lack a history in which trustees could have proven their reliability. 
There is no clear pattern or history that only has to be explicated or re-
vealed in order to show the person who is trusting that his reliance is 
warranted. It takes time before trust based on routine is achievable. Until 
that moment, the problem of trust remains, because it is unclear what to 
expect of the other party. With respect to (b): issues of trust will arise as 
a result of conflicting patterns, but it is still difficult to predict how the 
trusted person will react and what to expect. Nutrigenomics combines 
different domains, such as food and health and the introduction of prod-
ucts, such as genotype-adjusted dietary advices, merges expectations and 
patterns of food production and consumption with those of preventive 
medicine and health promotion. We have clear patterns and traditions for 
both food and health care that provide a predictability that shows what we 
can expect regarding issues on for instance safety and justice. This helps 
the building of trust with regards to food and pharmaceutical products. 
However, dietary advices based upon nutrigenomics can be categorised in 
both groups. There is not one unambiguous pattern available upon which 
one can formulate trustful expectations. Trust is either based on patterns 
of the food sector, although the advice has a health-related claim, or it is 
based on patterns of the health domain, although it is a dietary product. 
Thus, the introduction of such dietary advices complicates pattern-based 
trust. In this situation more information or increased transparency con-
tributes to the explication of patterns of behaviour and action, but it does 
not address the fundamental problem of which the conflicting patterns 
are the most applicable and serve as a warrant for one’s reliance.
 A second argument focuses on a conceptual problem of enhancing 
predictability to enhance trust. Trust is an attitude that enables agents 
to cope with situations of uncertainty by formulating a positive expecta-
tion towards another agent. Hence, clarity of what one may expect from 
another is essential. However, trust is more than mere expectations. It is 
a specific attitude that entails a positive expectation. Therefore, increas-
ing predictability as such does not lead to trust. Suppose that I am regu-
larly confronted with some criminals. After a while their doings become 
pretty predictable for me. Nevertheless, I would not say that I trust that 
they will burgle the university’s new flat screens, although I expect that 
they will do so, based on my knowledge of their routines. Hence, ‘If there 
were nothing other than expectations at issue, the current literature on 
trust would not exist’ (Hardin 2006, 33). We do not merely rely on pat-
terns. We rely on other agents since we have to consider them as being 
trustworthy or not.
PUBLIC TRUST AND NUTRIGENOMICS
 Similarly to how I concluded the section concerning risks, I also con-
clude that the increase of predictability contributes to building trust only 
to the extent that it serves as a signal or is proof of the competence and 
motivation of the trustee.
 Information As an Answer Rather Than a Matter of Knowledge
When we defi ne problems of trust as problems of trustworthiness it is clear 
that merely increasing predictability is not a suffi  cient condition to build 
trust. Nevertheless, information is essential since we need evidence about 
the competence and motivations of the agent on whom we have to rely. 
Without any evidence on the other agent we can hope or gamble that he 
will act in the favourable way, but we cannot trust him. To trust we need 
information. Th e relation between trust and information, however, is com-
plex. Some information can be conceived by person A as suffi  cient reason 
to entrust something to an institution, while person B considers the same 
evidence as neither suffi  cient nor an adequate reason to trust. Moreover, 
it is even possible to trust when we objectively lack suffi  cient evidence. To 
understand this we have to focus on the epistemology that is used in the 
case of trust and on the role emotions play in perceiving and evaluating 
information. In this section I analyse the relation between trust and evi-
dence. Th e section thereafter deals with the emotional dimension of trust.
 Trust, Knowledge, and Evidence
When we trust we have a sincere belief about the trustworthiness of the 
trustee. This, however, does not imply that we have knowledge. With re-
spect to knowledge we must understand how reasons prove that the prop-
osition is true, yet in a case of trust the focus is on the reasons that prove 
why you think it is true. It can be sufficient for the person who is trusting 
to think that the reason he has proves the belief to be true. For instance, as 
a consumer I trust science and industry to develop products based upon 
nutrigenomics that are beneficial to my health. This attitude is based 
upon what I know about the competence and motivation of agents in sci-
ence and industry from my own experience and external sources, such as 
newspapers, the Internet, or hearsay. For my attitude it is important that 
I personally believe this to be true rather than that it is true, in the sense 
that my belief is justified by public criteria.
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 This illustrates that the epistemology that is needed in the case of trust 
does not and need not meet the standards of traditional epistemology 
that aims to find justified true beliefs. A person who is trusting does not 
primarily search for evidence that is justifiable on public criteria, but 
is after an answer to the question whether the other person on whom 
he has to rely is sufficiently competent and motivated to be trusted. To 
answer this question, he needs evidence. However, a truster wants to 
‘use’ the evidence, ‘not to verify or justify it’ (Hardin 2003, 17). When the 
knowledge that leads to trust can be justified by universal criteria it may 
be an extra motivation for trust, but it is not a necessity. This pragmatic 
focus in the search for evidence demands a specific epistemology. In Har-
din’s terms, it asks for a subjective and pragmatic ‘street-level epistemol-
ogy’ rather than an epistemology that focuses on justification, that seeks 
for knowledge and deals with truth claims (1993; 2003). A person who is 
trusting certainly will check the value of the information he has obtained, 
but this check does not need to meet external or public criteria of justi-
fication. Hardin stresses that the epistemic search is focused on useful-
ness rather than justification. If information provides an answer to the 
question whether the other agent is trustworthy it is relevant, even if it 
cannot be justified as true knowledge by any of the criteria of a standard 
epistemology. Obtaining knowledge with respect to trust is ‘not simply a 
matter of analyzing the given information to get to some factual expecta-
tion on what will happen or has happened. It rather amounts to evaluat-
ing information in a certain way and asking certain questions’ (Lahno 
2001, 178).
 Hearing this argument, it is evident that there are differences between 
the amount of knowledge a person needs and the extent to which they 
accept knowledge as evidence for the trustworthiness of another agent. 
It depends on their assessment of knowledge as a useful answer to the 
question of trustworthiness. There is no objective amount or quality of 
evidence that is both necessary and sufficient for someone to come to 
trust. This explains why the same information does not necessarily result 
in the same level of trust for all people who are trusting.
 The Leap Element of Trust
As a person who is trusting, we not only use a pragmatic epistemology, it 
is even possible to trust when we objectively lack evidence, or to remain 
distrustful even though all evidence shows the trustee to be trustworthy. 
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This point illustrates that evidence is a necessary, but never a sufficient, 
condition for trust. Lewis and Weigert write: ‘No matter how much addi-
tional knowledge of an object we may gain (...), such knowledge alone can 
never cause us to trust. (...) The cognitive element in trust is characterized 
by a cognitive ‘leap’ beyond the expectations that reason and experience 
alone would warrant – they simply serve as the platform from which the 
leap is made’ (1985, 970).
 There is a gap between the interpretation of the accessible informa-
tion on the trustworthiness of the other agent and my trust in this per-
son or institution. Evidence is essential with respect to trust, but there is 
‘something else’ between the recognition of information as relevant for 
the assessment of trustworthiness and the actual trust in a person or in-
stitution. There is more than the evidence at stake. There is an element 
in the process of coming to trust that ‘happens to us’ rather than that 
we decide to adopt a stance of trust. Simmel defined the gap between 
the interpretation of the facts and the expectations that are the result of 
trust as a process of suspension (1950). It is a suspension of one’s hesita-
tion and doubt with regard to another person or institution. He identified 
in this gap between interpretation and expectation a ‘mysterious further 
element, a kind of faith that is required to explain trust and to grasp its 
unique nature’ (Möllering 2001, 404).
 The reference to religious faith seems appropriate since coming to have 
faith in God equally entails a leap moment. Like trust, faith is not the logi-
cal conclusion from all possible situations. On the other hand, faith is not 
completely independent of the available information (cf. Berkhof 1993). 
Historical evidence, scientific research or formal rules of logic certainly 
influence one’s faith in God, but do not fully determine whether or not 
one comes to have faith. This leads Kierkegaard, for instance, to claim that 
the reflection on the facts available can be halted only by a leap of faith. 
Otherwise, the subject ‘is made infinitive in reflection, i.e., he does not 
arrive at a decision’.(1992, 105) This does not imply that one is no longer 
aware of the uncertainty or one’s vulnerability, but that the commitment 
entailed with authentic religious faith is deeper than one’s interest to jus-
tify one’s attitude based upon identifiable reasons only.
 The reference to commitment can also be recognized in the work of 
Giddens, who describes the additional element of trust as ‘a leap to com-
mitment, a quality of ‘faith’, which is irreducible’ (1991, 19). He argues that 
the ‘leap of faith’ is a process of bracketing the lack of knowledge and 
ignorance (18-19; 224). This emphasizes that the need for trust remains 
unchanged: one still is ignorant or confronted with uncertainty; one still 
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lacks control. However, the one who trusts brackets this problem and con-
sequently trusts the other agent, since he has a commitment with respect 
to the trustee or the object of trust. Having a deep commitment, however, 
is not the only way to make a leap. Lewis and Weigert identify two other 
reasons. First, the particular psychological make-up of the individual can 
enable him to make the leap beyond evidence. If there is no balance of the 
basic trust over basic mistrust going beyond evidence becomes extremely 
difficult. Second, one is able to make a leap on the assumption that ‘others 
in the social world join in the leap (...) Each trusts on the assumption that 
others trust’ (1985, 970). This belief with respect to the participation of 
others illustrates that trust presumes trust, or in other words that we have 
to trust in trust (Gambetta 1988).
 Explicating this leap element of trust illustrates that trusting is in-
formed by, but not exclusively based on, evidence. Addressing problems 
of trust from the perspective of information easily ignores that the rela-
tionship between trust and evidence is more dynamic. Evidence is not 
only the input in the complex process of coming to trust. The direction is 
also the other way around: trust influences the way we perceive and evalu-
ate information. The leap aspect of trust illustrates that at a certain point 
one can accept specific evidence and consider the provider as being trust-
ful because of a certain commitment that does not have any further jus-
tification. This illustrates that trust has the ability to colour the value we 
attach to certain beliefs, make them resistant to change or exclude other 
beliefs from deliberation. This indicates that trust includes an emotional 
component.
 Trust and Its Emotional Dimension
Trust cannot only go beyond the evidence, the evaluation of the available 
information also tends to confirm the pre-existing trust or distrust. The 
presence or absence of trust substantially influences the way we interpret 
information about the person who, or institution that, we have to rely 
on. This concerns the emotional dimension of trust. Adopting a stance 
of trust entails a positive belief on the subject or object of trust. These 
beliefs are informed by knowledge, however, we have seen that trust is not 
fully evidence-based. Emotions also play a role.
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 ‘A Lens of Trust’
Following Frijda (986; Frijda et al. 2000) emotions and beliefs are two 
mental states that are to be distinguished, yet mutually influence each 
other. Not only will our beliefs determine our emotions, this influence also 
works in the reverse direction: emotions can create and shape beliefs and 
can make them resistant to change. This influence of emotion on beliefs 
is possible because beliefs are more emotion-sensitive than knowledge 
(Frijda et al. 2000), but also because emotions ‘permeate our experiences’ 
(Solomon 1994, 296) and make us looking at the object ‘through one’s 
own window’ (Nussbaum 2001, 28). Following this perspective, emotions 
are not merely unwanted disturbances of an otherwise completely ratio-
nal calculation. As Nussbaum stresses, emotions are not just ‘unthinking 
forces that have no connection with our thoughts, evaluations, or plan’. 
They are appraisals or value judgments that we ascribe to things and 
people that we regard as important for our own flourishing, yet are be-
yond our full control (2001, 26-27, 43, 90). This implies that our emotions 
modify action-readiness and define the way we perceive the world and our 
conception of the world (Frijda et al. 2000).
 When we refer to emotions in these terms it is a small step to rec-
ognizing the emotional dimension of trust. In the literature on trust 
it has been regularly observed that ‘trust is a way of seeing that guides 
our attention, colours our perceptions, and thus gives rise to certain be-
liefs’ (Miller 2000). The presence of trust makes us interpret another’s 
behaviour and the available information through a ‘lens of trust’ (Jones 
1996, 13), which implies a way of evaluating information in a specific way 
(Lahno 2002). This view of trust explains why the available evidence can 
be sufficient reason for person A to entrust something to an institution, 
while person B does not consider the evidence as an adequate reason to 
trust. Information not only influences one’s stance of trust, but the pres-
ence or absence of trust also colours the perception of the information 
and of beliefs as trustworthy. This influence can be so strong that we can 
hold an attitude of trust or distrust although we lack the evidence and 
even do not have the belief that it is justified. Suppose that the producer 
of a useful novel food product has been recommended by your local 
GP, who is a close friend. You believe that the producer is trustworthy. 
Nonetheless, you do not buy the product since you are unable to stop 
conceiving the company with suspicion because you look through a ‘lens 
of distrust’ at these kind of companies. Consequently, you see them as 
untrustworthy partners (cf. Jones 1996). If trust were to be a belief based 
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upon justified knowledge your attitude would be unjustified, but your 
suspicion is sincere, even though it is hardly possible to articulate the 
reason for it. Ascribing this emotional dimension to trust can explain why 
we can remain hesitant to trust even when others or our own beliefs say 
otherwise, and it clarifies why we can remain trustful even if the evidence 
tells us not to trust.
 Trust and Manipulation
The recognition of the emotional element of trust can lead to the conclu-
sion that people who trusts are easily manipulated, since it is all about the 
individual’s perception rather than about genuine trustworthiness. Thus, 
one can argue that when an institution wants to be trusted it only has to 
pretend that it is competent and motivated by the cares and concerns of 
individuals. Whether they are sincerely trustworthy or only motivated by 
strategic reasons does not really matter as long as the individual perceives 
the institution as trustworthy. This view, however, is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it disregards the reflective element in emotions. Emotions, 
as defined above, are more than mere feelings and not completely inde-
pendent of rational reflection. Thus the inclusion of an affective element 
in trust does not make trust completely disconnected from any form of 
reflection and deliberation. A person who is trusting is still able to reflect 
on his emotions and the emphasis on the affective aspects of trust does 
not exclude the impact of critical reflection by other agents. Therefore, 
the assessment of competence and motivation does matter in the process 
of trust.
 This leads to the second problem. Since trust is based upon someone’s 
assessment of the trustworthiness of an agent it requires that the trusted 
person should be sincere in what he communicates concerning his com-
petence and motivation. Pretending to be trustworthy for strategic rea-
sons is not morally neutral. When the trustee does not respond to what 
is entrusted this can have serious moral implications, since the individual 
may suffer losses, for example, one’s freedom to choose food products is 
limited or one’s health is endangered. This has implications for the incen-
tives of trust-responsiveness since the person who trusts is often not able 
to prevent this situation her/himself.
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 Two Normative Conditions for Trustworthiness
From the observation that harm can be done to individuals when they are 
not in the position to trust others, it would be too easy to conclude that 
there is an obligation for the trustee to respond to trust, however, it indi-
cates two moral conditions for trustworthiness.
 Trustworthiness ought to be motivated by a specific view of the moral 
status of the person who is trusting : the dependent and vulnerable position 
of the individual who is confronted with the products of a new technology 
is not to be taken advantage of, but it is an imperative for the trustee to act 
in a trust-responsive way, since one is faced with an individual with inher-
ent worth. Thus Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: 
‘Always treat the humanity in a person as an end, and never as a means 
merely’ also underlies trust. As for morality in general, trusting has to 
start from the assumption that human beings matter. The basic assump-
tion that other agents should be treated as an end in themselves should 
underlie trusting as well. Trust and trustworthiness have to start from 
the fundamental moral requirement to ‘acknowledge each human being 
aright’ (Cordner 2007, 67). This is not to say that the trustee may not 
profit from trusting, but it implies that trust may not be used in a way that 
disrespects the inherent worth of the individual who will give the trust.
 Th is shows that we have reasons to trust and to respond to trust. With re-
spect to the latter, the vulnerable status of the person who is trusting is cru-
cial. Th is vulnerability provides reason for reacting, since not responding to 
the vulnerable status of the trusting person implies a violation of his or her 
inherent worth. Th is requirement provides a direct reason to act in a trust-
responsive manner and prevents an agent to only pretend trustworthiness.
 Additionally, trustworthiness includes a second moral precondition 
with respect to motivation: the recognition of the trusting person as a 
moral agent. The issues concerning the case of nutrigenomics products are 
not merely technical or scientific themes, they also include moral issues. 
Products at the interface between food and health highlight questions 
concerning moral responsibility and the interpretation of well-known 
principles, such as justice and autonomy. In both the food and the health 
sectors it is relatively clear what we may expect of each other. However, 
at the interface of both sectors this is often less obvious. For instance, can 
we expect a company to live up to all the expectations we normally have 
regarding the medical sphere when they introduce a genetic test kit to 
provide genotype-adjusted dietary advice? To answer this question the 
use of ethical deliberation is inevitable.
 PART 4 – A MATTER OF ARGUMENT OR OF TRUST?
 An Additional Safeguard on an Institutional Level
The two conditions of trustworthiness raise a serious question: ‘What 
incentive would an agent on an institutional level have to live up to the 
demand to take the moral value of the person trusting as primary and to 
reckon her as a moral agent?’ This question also holds on an individual 
level. However, Niebuhr’s idea of ‘moral man and immoral society’ (1934) 
shows why the issue is even more prominent on an institutional level. 
Moral problems that do not occur or are implicit on a personal level be-
come problematic on a societal level.
 This illustrates that the requirement to take the inherent worth of hu-
man beings as primary in trusting relationships needs an extra safeguard 
with respect to institutional trust. To take the inherent value of the per-
son who is trusting as primary we do not only require rational agents 
who pursue their own interests and act strategically, but also reasonable 
agents. One is reasonable when one is ‘ready to propose principles and 
standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, 
given the assurance that others will likewise do so’ (Rawls 1993, 49). As 
long as trust is just a strategy to promote one’s self-interest, institutional 
trust will be highly problematic as it would not start from the recognition 
of the inherent value of the other, but from the aim to achieve one’s goal. 
Therefore, the emphasis on reasonableness and the attached willingness 
to act on terms that others, as equals, might reasonably expect to approve 
is crucial for trust.
 For this reason, we need to introduce a contractual element. This does 
not imply the replacement of trust by contracts, but entails the introduc-
tion of moral contractualism in order to safeguard the inherent worth of 
humans as being primary in a trusting relationship, even in an institu-
tional context. Contractualist theories can provide this extra safeguard 
by insisting that rules of behaviour must be justifiable to each other. The 
moral value of each person entails that one must judge the actions and be-
haviour of trusted agents using the criterion of whether one can reason-
ably agree on the underlying principle, or more specifically, whether the 
trustee acts on principles they could not reasonably reject (Scanlon 1998). 
This implies that in trusting one does not only have a formal, but also a 
substantial reason to judge and even to veto the acts of the trustee. This 
can serve as an assurance that the individual is acknowledged as a moral 
subject that should be respected in his vulnerability even in an institu-
tional context and can help to identify what one may reasonably expect of 
an institutional agent.
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 Public Trust in Products from Nutrigenomics Research
We can now formulate four concluding remarks on public trust in nutri-
genomics products. First, there are good reasons to carry out strict safety 
studies before introducing novel products, such as personalized dietary 
advices, in order to assess the amounts of risk involved. However, to ad-
dress problems of trust these studies and the underlying regulations are 
not sufficient, since trust and risk are on different levels and risk informa-
tion is only relevant as far as it provides information on the trustworthi-
ness of the agent on whom one has to rely. Trust requires an indication 
of the competence and motivation of the trustee, rather than a reduction 
of risk.
 Second, the increase of predictability enables us to rely on others more 
easily, since we can better anticipate on their future actions. However, 
especially in the case of nutrigenomics, the explication of routines and 
patterns on which an individual can anticipate is highly difficult. Since 
nutrigenomics contributes to the interaction of the health and food sec-
tors it is less clear what levels of competence and motivation can be ex-
pected of the agents to be trusted. Thus it is more difficult to asses the 
trustworthiness on the basis of routines and predictable patterns only.
 Third, the explication of patterns and the increase of transparency in 
the sector show that the relation between providing information and es-
tablishing trust is complex. Information is highly relevant to address is-
sues of trust since they provide the person who is trusting with knowledge 
about the competence and motivation of the trustee. However, when an 
institution aims to provide information in order to prove to be trustwor-
thy it has to reckon with the fact that people who tend to trust use a 
subjective and pragmatic kind of epistemology, and that trust entails an 
emotional dimension that profoundly affects the perception and interpre-
tation of the available information.
 Finally, to act trustworthily implies that the trustee recognizes the per-
son trusting as a moral subject with inherent worth and as a moral agent. 
The first condition prevents that the vulnerable status of the individual 
who is confronted with the products of nutrigenomics is seen as an op-
portunity to take advantage of. The second condition enables the trusting 
person to formulate trustful expectations when he lacks predictable ac-
tions. Only if it is clear what we can expect with respect to the competence 
and motivation of, for instance, a company that offers a genetic test to rec-
ommend a dietary product that reduces a consumer’s risk of an ailment, 
is it possible to trust such a company. This is not a discussion about risks 
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or predictability, but about moral responsibilities and the interpretation 
of moral values and norms that show us what we can reasonably expect of 
each other. The recognition of these moral questions is a necessary condi-
tion for being trustworthy and consequently for building public trust in 
new technologies.
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
15 Deep Pluralism: Interfaith Alliances for
 Progressive Politics
 Nancie Erhard
On the morning of 11 September 2001, I was in Manhattan. By noon, I was 
attending an improvised worship service, which included a Jew, a Christian, 
and a Muslim, each reading from his or her own scriptures. We prayed and 
sang together – in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Many of us had friends 
and loved ones who worked in or near the World Trade Center. We prayed for 
their safety, of course. We prayed for the families and friends of the lost. We 
also prayed for peace and justice in the world. And we held onto each other.
 Since that day, questions about pluralism that may once have been the-
oretical, even academic, have come to be widely discussed. Is there a set of 
values to which all citizens in the West, including immigrants, are expect-
ed to adhere? What if those values include freedom of religion, and yet 
the religious views of some contradict other values, such as tolerance? Is 
there a limit to tolerance? What is acceptable freedom of expression? Is it 
acceptable to criticize a minority religion? Does religion even have a role 
in a multicultural civil society? The implications of such questions need to 
be explored, and ways of engaging in conversations across different moral 
frameworks examined, in order for our deliberations on the intersections 
of science and religion with issues such as ecology and genomics to have 
any connection to our social realities.
 In this context, the activities of multi-faith groups engaged in political 
action become an important location of discerning pluralist, as opposed 
to absolutist or relativist, approaches to ethics. I have closely examined 
the present activity in the United States, where it is at the moment in-
tense, and surveyed it globally, where efforts have been building for over 
a decade. I have identified patterns of pluralist ethical discernment that, 
with further development, could be widely applied.
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 Origins and Contours of a Movement
For this study, I was interested in those groups that fit four criteria: multi-
faith, multi-issue, politically active, and who sought membership beyond 
those who were professionally involved with religion, scholarship or poli-
tics. I looked at national and international organizations rather than local 
groups. There are thousands of local interfaith or multi-faith groups in 
North America, Europe, Asia, Pacifica, and Africa. Not only was it not 
possible to survey all of these, but I was looking for groups whose agendas 
included issues of broad relevance. Many local, as well as national and 
international, groups are focused on local issues or on interfaith relations 
per se, rather than specific political issues, as a primary focus. Many oth-
ers have a single issue – often peace – as their driving objective. I was 
intent on those who saw issues such as peace or ecojustice in their wid-
est context of social, economic, political, and ecological relations. I also 
want to acknowledge that there are groups within one faith – including 
ecumenical groups – that focus on multiple issues. (Kairos in Canada is a 
good example of this, where ecumenical Christian groups that dealt with 
distinct issues, such as poverty, health care, and ecology, were brought 
together under one organization after the 2000 Jubilee.) While they 
do important work, I was looking for groups with both diverse ethical 
sources and the widest sets of issues, which would necessitate discovery 
of links or demand prioritizing among issues. Many of the single-faith 
multi-issue groups and the single-issue multi-faith groups are included 
through overlapping connections to the groups on which I have concen-
trated. The other two criteria, political activism and participation beyond 
professional scholars or religious leaders, create a situation where theo-
ry is always in conversation with practical realities, and the discourse is 
widely accessible.
 Globally, I am looking at groups such as the United Religions Initiative 
and the Council for a Parliament of World Religions. The latter, particu-
larly, has worked to develop an explicit statement on a global ethic, an 
effort driven by Hans Küng. In the United States, there are two primary 
multi-faith groups that represent a resurgence of and a new level of co-
ordination among progressive religious activism: Faithful America and 
the Network of Spiritual Progressives. Faithful America, a multi-faith ini-
tiative of the National Council of Churches, first came to my attention 
when they produced a television ad for Al-Jazeera featuring prominent 
members of different faiths apologizing for the abuses at Abu Ghraib and 
insisting that Bush and others did not represent them as people of faith 
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in America. Presently, Faithful America functions chiefly as an Inter-
net activist group, similar to MoveOn and TrueMajority, through which 
subscribers are informed about a variety of issues and are given an easy 
way to contact their political representatives. The Network of Spiritual 
Progressives (NSP), while also making extensive use of the Internet, has 
developed face-to-face activities, organizing chapters around the coun-
try and in Canada, and convening two national meetings to organize and 
launch the movement. Of the groups I have been studying, it is the most 
dynamic and the one most progressive in its positions. Their platform 
calls for action on global warming and global poverty, but goes further to 
demand new legislation governing corporations that would enforce social 
responsibility. Their vision of supporting families includes equal marriage 
for gay and lesbian couples, an extremely volatile subject in the United 
States.
 Perhaps not surprisingly, people open to engagement with those of 
other faiths tend to have more politically progressive ideas, whereas those 
more exclusive about religion remain more religiously and politically con-
servative (Evans 2006). While the public and political religious voices in 
the United States have been overwhelmingly conservative over the last 
three decades, the involvement of religion in progressive causes draws on 
a long history. The language of the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, Jr., 
was unapologetically biblical, and the core of his message about the goals 
and means of the Civil Rights movement – equality, love, redemption, and 
reconciliation through nonviolence – drew as much on Mahatma Gandhi 
and Jesus as it did the Enlightenment philosophies behind the Declaration 
of Independence and the US Constitution. This religious dimension of the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s is neither singular within nor con-
fined to North America. Faith, and arguments from religion, contributed 
to the establishment of modern Western democracy, and were integral in 
the abolition of slavery and apartheid, in promoting temperance, women’s 
suffrage, the anti-Vietnam War movement in the US, and – in Canada – 
establishment of universal public health care.
 This history of religion in the service of progressive politics has been 
overtaken in more recent decades by another face of religion – absolutist 
groups within various faiths, not only Islam, but also Judaism, Christian-
ity, and Hinduism. I refer to these groups as ‘absolutist’ rather than ‘fun-
damentalist’ because ‘fundamentalism’ has associations with a particu-
lar historical development of American Christianity. It is also somewhat 
misleading, since many people who share the same faith but not the same 
positions as those in extremist, absolutist groups would object that they 
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are not reflecting what is actually ‘fundamental’ to the faith. ‘Absolutism’ 
is used here to indicate a religious and ethical position which claims sin-
gular and absolute truth for one’s own beliefs and norms, a more fitting 
descriptor of these groups.
 In the United States there arose the curious mix of televangelism, the 
‘prosperity gospel’, and the political movement that began with the ‘Mor-
al Majority’, aligning a particular form of conservative Christianity with 
American political neo-conservatism. This alliance of the political and 
religious right fused the agendas of free market capitalism and American 
militarism with a conservative view of sexual morality. Those Christians 
who originally forged that alignment were opposed to disarmament, ra-
cial desegregation of schools, court rulings that prohibited public prayer 
in government-operated schools, the equal rights amendment (for wom-
en – the ERA), and the legalization of abortion. They have lobbied, some-
times with temporary success, to have ‘creationism’ included in elemen-
tary school science curricula. Currently, their official opposition to racial 
desegregation has been buried, and the ERA is dead; they continue to op-
pose abortion and support US military power (including the ‘war on ter-
rorism’), but opposition to same-sex marriage and stem cell research have 
come to the fore. Through the efforts of organizations such as the Moral 
Majority and its successors – the Christian Coalition, the Family Research 
Council, Focus on the Family, and the American Family Association – ex-
tremely conservative Christians have been instrumental in the election 
of Presidents Reagan and Bush (both father and son), as well as the 1996-
2006 Republican majorities in the Congress. The political campaigns of 
the religious right, which concentrated at first on leadership at higher 
levels, were later directed to every level, including state legislatures, city 
councils, and school boards.
 They have more recently turned their efforts to the judiciary, and the 
Institute for Religion and Democracy represents yet another thrust – or-
ganizing ‘renewal’ groups within mainline Protestant denominations such 
as the Presbyterian, United Methodist, and Episcopal churches to reverse 
what they see as the ‘liberal’ swing of these churches. One of the most in-
teresting facets of the religious right is that despite their evident political 
successes, the sense of fighting a losing cultural battle against the ‘liberal’ 
society is still pervasive.
 Through the very effective public campaign that conservatives have 
conducted in the United States over the last thirty-odd years, the word 
‘liberal’ itself has become a term of contempt, leading some to adopt the 
word ‘progressive’ as a self-descriptor instead. One of the difficulties is 
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that some people use the two terms with identical meanings, whereas 
others want to maintain a distinction: ‘liberal’ carrying the worldview of 
the Enlightenment – a modern viewpoint that would stress such things 
as reason, tolerance, individual rights and liberties – and ‘progressive’ 
indicating a somewhat more radical position with a distinct critique of 
power and established systems, incorporation of group as well as individ-
ual rights and responsibilities, and more recognition of the postmodern. 
The political term ‘left’ is used, but widely identified as misleading and 
anachronistic. I use ‘progressive’ here primarily, and ‘left’ occasionally, to 
indicate those who maintain that the provision for those who are vulner-
able in a society is foremost the responsibility of the state as the agent of 
the people, who work for ecological responsibility, who see racism and 
sexism in systemic terms, and who advocate for non-military responses to 
conflict and terrorism. Within these broad outlines, there is a wide variety 
of priorities, objectives, strategies and theories. Indeed, it has been the 
very diversity and plurality within the left that accounts for some of the 
inability to counter the conservative tide of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries in the United States.
 The consequences of the rise of religious right in its US and global 
varieties have caused people to recoil in horror from the combination of 
religion and politics. But more recently, they have catalyzed a new im-
petus for cooperation among people of faith on the left domestically and 
internationally. The opposition to the Iraq War brought millions of peo-
ple around the world into the streets in protest together with a sense of 
common purpose. Similarly, the campaign to ‘make poverty history’ has 
involved people of faith on the left in domestic and global politics around 
poverty. In the US, Hurricane Katrina has illustrated the consequences 
of governments whose policies have diverted public money from infra-
structure and social welfare to militarism and private wealth, graphically 
connecting issues of imperialism, racism, poverty, and global climate in-
stability. Further, actions of the US government that include eroding the 
domestic civil liberties on which the country was built, as well as aban-
doning multinational agreements (particularly the weakening the Geneva 
Convention by prolonged imprisonment, torture and degradation in the 
context of hostilities), have driven the progressive religious movement in 
the United States with a particular intensity and passion (Lerner 2005; 
2006; Carter 2005).
 I have called it a ‘movement’. As such, its significance is not (yet) a 
matter of numbers, although Taylor Branch, biographer of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., and chronicler of the Civil Rights movement, told a gathering of 
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members of the Network of Spiritual Progressives in a rundown church 
on Capitol Hill in May 2006, that they were more than enough to be a ma-
jor movement. One aspect of its significance is that it brings complexity 
to the question of religion in politics. The extreme conservative religious 
voices of various faiths have been portraying themselves as battling a sec-
ular, ‘godless’, liberal modernity. When religion is relegated to the private 
sphere, it reinforces that world view. Conversely, when people who share 
their faith publicly use religious arguments for progressive causes, it gives 
the lie to this dichotomized view of the world. It may not convince the 
most adamantly conservative, but it demonstrates a wider set of positions 
than either/or: either an extreme version of a faith or ‘godlessness’.
 The history of religious conflict in Europe up to and including the reli-
gious wars of the Reformation has shaped the attitudes of that continent 
and North America toward the subject of the place of religion in the civil 
society. European countries devised a variety of formal solutions suited 
to their situations at the time. Those arrangements ranged from state-
supported churches geographically determined to an intentionally secu-
lar state such as France. In practical rather than formal terms, recognized 
religious bodies may be supported by the state, but religious practice and 
belief tend to be regarded as a private concern, with an occasional nod to 
common Christian history and cultural influence (Germany may be a pos-
sible exception).
 The United States, which was colonized in part by dissenting religious 
minorities, some intent on theocracy, devised its solution to conflictual 
religious plurality in the form of the first amendment to its constitution. 
This amendment is usually interpreted to prohibit the establishment of 
religion – the support of the state for one religious body. At the same 
time, though, it links free exercise of religion with free speech and as-
sembly, as well as a free press and the right to petition the government 
for grievances. Placing religion in this context implies that religion is con-
nected with political acts of public speech, assembly, and protest. What 
is prohibited is endorsement of one religious entity or point of view with 
the power of the state, not the public practice of religion (as long as it is 
not state-sponsored) or the use of religious ideas and language in public 
debate. This is an important distinction.
 If religious points of view are seen as detrimental to the collective de-
liberation of civil society, something to be avoided in public debate, this 
in itself endorses and privileges a worldview that is anti-religious. In his 
essay in this volume, Patrick Loobuyck has concisely reviewed the history 
of this exclusionist argument and presents a fuller refutation of it from a 
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philosophical basis than I will pursue here. As he points out, the idea that 
‘religion’ can be banned from the public sphere erroneously presumes 
that sphere is or can be value-neutral. Although several philosophers who 
once overtly promoted an exclusivist position have recently moderated 
their stand, the idea of a secular ethos that represents a consensus of min-
imal, distilled, universal values that can enable all of us, ‘religious’ or not, 
to live together, is one of the legacies of modernity.
 The problem with this position is not only its inaccuracy but what it 
prevents in terms of full democratic deliberation. By denying that certain 
operative values in much of the West, such as materialism, and those sup-
ported with particular fervor in American civil religion – individualism 
and market economics – are as much based on ‘faith’ as any values derived 
from our religious traditions, these values are entrenched as ‘natural’ or 
‘common sense’, and the sources for opposing them are limited.
 Without religious voices as religious in public debate, society as a whole 
loses the benefit of the wisdom of thousands of years. The distinct mes-
sages of religious traditions, their power to inspire us to breathe in the 
space of generosity and compassion, to suffer the pains of others, to dance 
with the imagination and the soul, to transcend our narrow interests, to 
struggle against entrenched power and ways of life that are destructive of 
humanity and the planet, and to find hope – these are lost to our common 
thought, and the whole of the society is diminished. Annika den Dikken’s 
essay in this volume is an example of the contribution religious language 
and ideas can make. She demonstrates that the theological concepts of 
love and redemption enhance the approach of an ethic of care in a discus-
sion of human enhancement technologies.
 It would be a mistake to view this emerging movement in the United 
States as a mirror image of the religious right, which is one reason why 
the term ‘religious left,’ while handy, is misleading. The progressive reli-
gious movement certainly opposes many of the positions of the religious 
right, but among what they oppose is the right’s overt and covert perfora-
tion of the separation of church and state as provided in the first amend-
ment, such as the inclusion of religious ideology in science education in 
public schools. In contrast with the religious right, which strategically 
moved to become a directing power within the Republican Party, the 
progressive religious movement is nonpartisan. They work within parties 
to get candidates nominated and elected, but it is not a concerted effort 
to ally with and direct a single party. Another difference is their sincere 
desire to find ways out of the polarization that has engulfed American 
public discourse, while at the same time remaining faithful to their re-
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ligious insights and ethical convictions. This desire, along with the di-
versity within the movement itself, creates the necessity for pluralism in 
ethics.
 Strategies of Ethical Pluralism
Ethical pluralism is related to, but quite distinct from, ethical relativism, 
the usual alternative to ethical absolutism. Ethical absolutism insists that 
the true and the good or right and wrong are wholly independent of differ-
ences in culture, philosophy, or religion (and identical with what the abso-
lutist holds to be true, good, right or wrong, of course), a stand rejected by 
the relativist. The relativist views norms and values in the same category 
as custom and opinion, with no external standard by which those of oth-
ers can be critiqued. Popular relativist expressions are ‘when in Rome’ and 
‘live and let live’.
 The relativist position has much to be said for it. Its humility, recogni-
tion of the limits of human knowledge, and spirit of generosity and toler-
ance contrast with the rigidity and conceit of absolutism. The credibility 
of relativism is bolstered by the evidence of diverse norms and values. But 
does such descriptive relativism require prescriptive, or normative, rela-
tivism? Because it is this way does that mean that it ought to be? Ethical 
pluralism incorporates the strengths and insights of relativism – humility, 
recognition of the limits of knowledge, openness, and to a certain degree, 
tolerance. But it recognizes the limits and internal contradictions inher-
ent in normative relativism: if tolerance is required, does one tolerate in-
tolerance? If I cannot prescribe norms, can I require you not to prescribe 
them to me; isn’t that itself a norm?
 Pluralism is not merely a moderate version of relativism, any more than 
it is a moderate form of absolutism, because it is willing to declare that 
there are real evils to be resisted with all moral force, as well as univer-
sal goods to be promoted (Hinman 2003). The key distinction from both 
relativism and absolutism is its approaches to difference and contention, 
to building agreement and facing disagreement. My purpose is to examine 
the practices of people who are actively involved in pluralist ethical dis-
course for the purpose of achieving the common good. What I have found 
are patterns of pluralism that would serve beyond any particular context.
 The strategies of pluralism that I have identified include three elemen-
tary moves and a cluster of practices I am calling ‘deep pluralism’. The 
first three moves are elementary both because they each represent where 
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people normally begin and because they are a prerequisite to deeper plu-
ralism. They are (1) seeking a common moral vocabulary, (2) identifying 
moral equivalence across traditions, and (3) bracketing acknowledged dif-
ference in the service of a prioritized value or goal.
 Common Moral Vocabulary
Seeking a common moral vocabulary is the most frequent approach, re-
presented by the statement of the 1993 Council of the Parliament of World 
Religions ‘Towards a Global Ethic’. I have seen two aspects within this 
strategy. The first is the attempt to translate particular religious values 
and ideas into ‘universal’ terms, claimed and comprehended by anyone, 
‘religious’ or not: tolerance, justice, compassion, love, liberty. ‘Towards 
a Global Ethic’ claims to have identified a set of core values within reli-
gions, but the core values themselves are discussed in terms any humanist 
would use, without reference to any particular differences in conception. 
This translation into the ‘universal’ – meaning non-religious language – 
is often put to religious voices as an imperative, an expectation of them 
necessitated by the nature of civil society, since the only shared language 
is non-religious. Because of this, people within this movement sometimes 
advocate it as ‘the best we can do’. While I would agree that there are cir-
cumstances that require it, I would not agree that this is the best or only 
option. As Jeffrey Stout has pointed out, the act of translation into non-
religious terms can disguise authentic motivations, which does not foster 
relationships of integrity (2004, 72). It erodes the requirements of public 
trust. It also inhibits any distinctive contribution to the public conversa-
tion. Th e conversation can fl atten, become generic and reductive rather 
than evocative. Religion employs music and the heart in its language. It 
moves the soul. My problem is not with the tactic itself but with it as a 
singular, superior, or coerced approach.
 Th e second branch of this strategy does not aim at translation into a ‘uni-
versal’ secular vocabulary, but rather identifying ‘widely-shared’ terms and 
ideas that are still recognizably religious or spiritual. For example, Mary 
Elizabeth Moore says she now chooses the phrase ‘transcendent possibili-
ties’ instead of ‘grace’ because the latter does not ‘cross well’ into multi-
religious conversation (Network of Spiritual Progressives conference, July 
2005). People choose many words and phrases for the divine (instead of 
‘God’) out of consideration for non-theistic religious sensibilities, as ‘To-
ward a Global Ethic’ uses ‘Ultimate Reality’. I think of the attempts to forge 
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a common language, universal or widely shared, as the religious version of 
the kind of moral Esperanto that requires translation into ‘neutral’ or non-
religious language. Such a move is useful, but limited.
 Moral Equivalence
The attempt to find moral equivalence across traditions is less like Es-
peranto and more akin to simultaneous translation; it is the attempt to 
understand another’s tradition on its own terms and function bilingually 
and even multilingually. At its simplest it is close to trying to find a com-
mon moral language, as in the claim that despite different expressions, the 
kernel of the ‘Golden Rule’ is present in many traditions, with different 
formulations. What makes this different from seeking a common moral 
language is that an original formulation stands and is linked. A clearer 
example of how this differs from the first strategy is the more complex 
performance of Ama Zenya when she links concepts of sacrifice across 
traditions – connecting submission to Allah in Islam with Esther’s life-
risking act for love of her people in Judaism, the self-emptying of Christ 
in his Incarnation, and the figure of the Bodhisattva in Buddhism – and 
contrasts this with the rhetoric of rights (NSP Conference 2005). Here, I 
think people are doing somewhat intuitively what Kupper et al. have done 
with their explicit methodology of analysis of focus group conversations 
about animals and biotechnology. They are retaining the integrity of par-
ticular language and looking for conceptual parallels.
 Bracketing Diff erence
The third move, bracketing difference, also has two aspects. The simpler 
one is the recognition that different motivations for trying to accomplish 
the same end need not hinder action. As Patrick Loobuyck rightly observes 
in this volume, concepts of justice and justifications for human rights can 
be incommensurable, yet the goal of human rights is shared. This works 
easily when the goal is urgent or as compelling as human rights and actu-
ally may create the environment in which other strategies of pluralism, 
including those above, can take root.
 The trickier aspect is when people share some convictions, but not oth-
ers, and they decide that the shared convictions are of such priority that 
they can work together while they differ, even deeply, on other matters. 
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Where I see this strategy evolving is in the participation of some (not all) 
Evangelicals and Roman Catholics in this movement. I refer to those who 
may continue to oppose equal marriage and legal abortion, but have de-
cided that poverty, war, materialism and the destruction of our environ-
ment are more pressing moral issues, more of a threat to families and the 
general society.
 This aspect is tricky not only because it’s more difficult, but because it 
can set up a situation of repressed difference, where those whose lives are 
more directly affected by issues that are deemed of less priority could feel 
ignored and demeaned, stoking resentment and fracturing alliances. An 
example would be the possibility that the willingness of Evangelicals and 
Roman Catholics to work within the movement on war, poverty, and eco-
logical issues engenders a corresponding spirit of compromise so that ad-
vocacy for equal marriage, for instance, is marginalized. This is a potential 
outcome, not inevitable but certainly possible. The hopeful possibility is 
that relationships built by working side by side, discovering shared values, 
will be able to sustain work on the more difficult issues, and the question 
of what serves human dignity in sexuality is pursued in that spirit. But in 
order to do this, I think it takes moving into a deep form of pluralism.
 Deep Pluralism
Deep pluralism is a more complex phenomenon than the elementary strat-
egies outlined above. Its practice presumes at least the goodwill toward 
others that the elementary moves demonstrate and the level of knowledge 
that finding moral equivalence does. But pluralism must go beyond trying 
to find similarities and commonalities. It must deal with difference and 
conflict at times, not simply set them aside. Difference here means not 
only difference in sources, principles, values, practices or ideas. Dealing 
with difference means going to the meta-ethical level, paying attention to 
the contextual relationships, particularly differences in power and privi-
lege, and what is probably the most challenging area, recognizing differ-
ent methods of deliberation.
 Working toward common statements of principle may be useful, but 
care is needed so as not to privilege the philosophical or cultural practices 
of some over others. Ethical deliberation is not limited to discerning, pri-
oritizing, and applying principles, but occurs through various practices 
– narrative, poetry, art, ritual. These media have different standings and 
inflections in different religions and cultures. Deep pluralism would call 
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for attending to one another’s stories, for example, without trying to re-
duce them to an abstract principle, and learning ‘how they mean’ in their 
original context.
 Recognizing power and privilege differences goes beyond even this to 
discern how power relationships shape the meaning of events and prac-
tices. For example, take political cartoons, something that not long ago 
caused passionate reactions, even violence. In common Western practice 
this medium is normally used to ridicule a powerful person or group in 
order to check that power in a democratic context. As such it is a treasured 
form of liberty. But the dynamic is different when a cartoon characterizes 
a minority race or religion as a threat to a majority group in a context of 
fear, as the National Socialists did with cartoons in the 1920s and 1930s, 
and, I would contend, as was happening in the recent Danish case. A radi-
cally different purpose is at work, one that is a danger of democracy. Deep 
pluralism explores such differences in contexts and purposes; it does not 
rest at abstract principles of ‘tolerance’ or press freedom.
 Creating the space for deeply pluralist conversation takes time, per-
sonal interaction, attention to power and privilege, and the courage to 
step outside one’s own way of seeing the world. The organizations I have 
named above, and many others whose agendas or constituencies may be 
more limited, have been moving in this direction. The Network of Spiri-
tual Progressives has observed that despite efforts to reach out to more 
communities of colour, including providing free registration and trans-
portation to the Washington conference and recruiting presenters from 
racial minority groups, their constituency is still predominately white. 
Further study would be needed to investigate whether this is a factor of 
the substance of the Network’s positions or is related more to process and 
context. Several members of the Network who are members of minority 
groups are undertaking an effort within their own communities to in-
crease their representation. The Network also has less youth participation 
than would be expected, given the activity of youth in anti-war and anti-
globalization movements. This may be related to a growing alienation of 
many youth from religion in a country where conservative religious voices 
have dominated the public consciousness.
 Beyond attention to context and power, and a holistic approach to 
communication and deliberation, a deeply pluralist conversation is one in 
which disputes are handled in a radically different way than both absolut-
ism and relativism, which both lead more often than not to impasse. Rela-
tivism recognizes the validity of multiple moral frameworks, but has very 
few resources to deal with conflicts between frameworks beyond agreeing 
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to disagree. Absolutism recognizes only its own moral framework as le-
gitimate and tries to persuade the other to conform to it. A deeply plural-
ist conversation does not try to persuade one who differs out of one’s own 
framework, but enters into a conversation characterized by three things: a 
positive attitude toward conflict itself, willingness to ‘think with’ the oth-
er’s moral language and reference, and openness to change. By a positive 
attitude toward conflict, I mean viewing conflict as an opportunity to see 
things from a different angle and so expand understanding, and to work to 
identify the good beneath positions and claims. ‘Thinking with’ the other 
involves what Jeffrey Stout terms ‘immanent criticism’, a Socratic conver-
sation that takes the other side seriously enough to make an attempt to 
use another’s convictions to give reasons for one’s own conclusion (2004, 
72). This is incomplete as a deeply pluralist conversation, however, unless 
the process operates in more than one direction, in other words, that all 
the partners of a conversation are as willing to be challenged as they are to 
challenge. In Lawrence M. Hinman’s terms, this is the pluralist principle 
of fallibility. We must be willing and prepared to learn from others and ‘to 
have some of our own moral shortcomings revealed to us by them’ (2003, 
58). This is a tall order, of course. Glimpses of the emergence of such con-
versations are rare, and they are tentative in nature.
 One surprising area where I see this emerging is the discussion of abor-
tion in the United States. Those who advocate that abortion should be 
‘legal, safe, and rare’ are shifting from a rigid rhetoric about rights to em-
ploy the language of ‘pro-life’, in its fullest implications: the mother’s life, 
access to health care, and the quality of the lives of children. They are 
conceding that some limits on abortion may be warranted. That this is-
sue, which has starkly divided the conservative and progressive camps in 
the United States in bitter opposition, is an area where pluralist ethical 
discourse is being brought to bear is a hopeful sign that these patterns can 
be employed beyond a circle of fellow travelers.
 In a world where religion can be used as a rationale for violence, or 
deemed irrelevant, it is crucial to attend to its potential to motivate us to-
ward justice and compassion, the bases of ecological wholeness and peace. 
This may sound idealistic and unrealistic. The patterns identified above 
may seem feeble in the face of the hatred and violence erupting around us. 
But consider the alternative: Is it practical to devote ever increasing re-
sources to vigilance and destruction, while thousands die daily of hunger 
and preventable disease, and the life of the planet is being sapped away? 
Hypervigilance regarding security will weary us, and the exercise of force 
is proving counterproductive. These can only be short-term measures, 
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because they will fail in the long term. The strategies of pluralism are 
demanding, yes, and more demanding the deeper we go. Education of 
enough people in multiple world views to be capable of pluralist conversa-
tion is critical, as is the cultivation of the grace of humility and hospitality 
to the stranger that all of our religious traditions – at their best – foster.
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